fc¥ 

'"NIA 
DAVIS 


WOODROW  WILSON 
AS  I  KNOW  HIM 


©  Edmonston — Washington,  D.  C. 

Mr.  Tumulty  with  the  President  at  the  Signing  of  a  Treaty 


WOODROW  WILSON 
AS  I  KNOW  HIM 


BY 

JOSEPH  P/TUMULTY 


FRONTISPIECE 


GARDEN  CITY,  N.  Y.,  AND  TORONTO 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 
1921 


LIBRARY 


COPYRIGHT,  1921,  BY 
DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

ALL  BIGHTS  RESERVED,  INCLUDING  THAT  OF  TRANSLATION 
INTO  FOREIGN  LANGUAGES,  INCLUDING  THE  SCANDINAVIAN 

FEINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AT 
THE  COUNTRY  LIFE  PBESS,  GABDEN  CITY,  N.  Y. 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 
MY  DEAR  MOTHER 

ALICIA    TUMULTY 

WHOSE   SPIRIT   OF 

GENEROSITY,   LOYALTY,   AND   TOLERANCE 

I  TRUST   WILL  BE  FOUND   IN 

THE  LINES  OF  THIS  BOOK 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

In  preparing  this  volume  I  have  made  use  of  portions 
of  the  following  books:  'The  War  The  World  and  Wilson" 
by  George  Creel;  "What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris,"  by  Ray 
Stannard  Baker;  "Woodrow  Wilson  and  His  Work"  by 
William  E.  Dodd;  "The  Panama  Canal  Tolls  Controversy" 
by  Hugh  Gordon  Miller  and  Joseph  C.  Freehoff ;  "Wood- 
row  Wilson  the  Man  and  His  Work"  by  Henry  Jones 
Ford;  "The  Real  Colonel  House"  by  Arthur  D.  How- 
den  Smith;  "The  Foreign  Policy  of  Woodrow  Wilson" 
by  Edgar  E.  Robinson  and  Victor  J.  West.  In  addition, 
I  wish  to  make  acknowledgment  to  the  following  books 
for  incidental  assistance:  "My  Four  Years  in  Germany" 
by  James  W.  Gerard;  " Woodrow  Wilson,  An  Interpreta 
tion"  by  A.  Maurice  Low;  "A  People  Awakened"  by 
Charles  Reade  Bacon;  "Woodrow  Wilson"  by  Hester  E. 
Hosford;  "What  Really  Happened  at  Paris,"  edited  by 
Edward  Mandell  House  and  Charles  Seymour,  and  above 
all,  to  the  public  addresses  of  Woodrow  Wilson.  I  myself 
had  furnished  considerable  data  for  various  books  on 
Woodrow  Wilson  and  have  felt  at  liberty  to  make  liberal 
use  of  some  portions  of  these  sources  as  guide  posts  for 
my  own  narrative. 


PREFACE 

WOODROW  WILSON  prefers  not  to  be  written  about.  His 
enemies  may,  and  of  course  will,  say  what  they  please,  but 
he  would  like  to  have  his  friends  hold  their  peace.  He 
seems  to  think  and  feel  that  if  he  himself  can  keep  silent 
while  his  foes  are  talking,  his  friends  should  be  equally 
stoical.  He  made  this  plain  in  October,  1920,  when  he 
learned  that  I  had  slipped  away  from  my  office  at  the 
White  House  one  night  shortly  before  the  election  and 
made  a  speech  about  him  in  a  little  Maryland  town, 
Bethesda.  He  did  not  read  the  speech,  I  am  sure  he  has 
never  read  it,  but  the  fact  that  I  had  made  any  sort  of 
speech  about  him,  displeased  him.  That  was  one  of  the 
few  times  in  my  long  association  with  him  that  I  found 
him  distinctly  cold.  He  said  nothing,  but  his  silence 
was  vocal. 

I  suspect  this  book  will  share  the  fate  of  the  Bethesda 
speech,  will  not  be  read  by  Mr.  Wilson.  If  this  seems 
strange  to  those  who  do  not  know  him  personally,  I  can 
only  say  that  "Woodrow  Wilson  is  made  that  way. "  He 
cannot  dramatize  himself  and  shrinks  from  attempts  of 
others  to  dramatize  him.  "I  will  not  write  about  my 
self,"  is  his  invariable  retort  to  friends  who  urge  him  to 
publish  his  own  story  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  He 
craves  the  silence  from  others  which  he  imposes  upon  him 
self.  He  is  quite  willing  to  leave  the  assessment  and  in 
terpretation  of  himself  to  time  and  posterity.  Knowing 
all  this  I  have  not  consulted  him  about  this  book.  Yet  I 


IX 


x  PREFACE 

have  felt  that  the  book  should  be  written,  because  I  am 
anxious  that  his  contemporaries  should  know  him  as  I 
have  known  him,  not  only  as  an  individual  but  also  as  the 
advocate  of  a  set  of  great  ideas  and  as  the  leader  of  great 
movements.  If  I  can  picture  him,  even  imperfectly,  as  I 
have  found  him  to  be,  both  in  himself  and  in  his  relation 
ship  to  important  events,  I  must  believe  that  the  portrait 
will  correct  some  curious  misapprehensions  about  him. 
fc-  For  instance,  there  is  a  prevalent  idea,  an  innocently 
ignorant  opinion  in  some  quarters,  an  all  too  sedulously 
cultivated  report  in  other  quarters,  that  he  has  been 
uniformly  headstrong,  impatient  of  advice,  his  mind 
hermetically  closed  to  counsel  from  others.  This  book 
will  expose  the  error  of  that  opinion ;  will  show  how,  in  his 
own  words,  his  mind  was  "open  and  to  let,"  how  he 
welcomed  suggestions  and  criticism.  Indeed  I  fear  that 
unless  the  reader  ponders  carefully  what  I  have  written 
he  may  glean  the  opposite  idea,  that  sometimes  the  Presi 
dent  had  to  be  prodded  to  action,  and  that  I  represent 
myself  as  the  chief  prodder. 

The  superficial  reader  may  find  countenance  lent  to 
this  latter  view  in  the  many  notes  of  information  and  ad 
vice  which  I  addressed  to  the  President  and  in  the  record 
of  his  subsequent  actions  which  were  more  or  less  in  ac 
cord  with  the  counsel  contained  in  some  of  these  notes. 
If  the  reader  deduces  from  this  the  conclusion  that  I 
was  the  instigator  of  some  of  the  President's  important 
policies,  he  will  misinterpret  the  facts  and  the  President's 
character  and  mental  processes;  if  he  concludes  that  I 
am  trying  to  represent  myself  as  the  instigator  he  will 
misunderstand  my  motives  in  publishing  these  notes. 

These  motives  are:  first,  to  tell  the  story  of  my  asso 
ciation  with  Mr.  Wilson,  and  part  of  the  record  is  con- 


PREFACE  xi 

tained  in  these  notes;  secondly,  to  show  what  liberty  he 
allowed  me  to  suggest  and  criticize;  how,  so  far  from  being 
offended,  he  welcomed  counsel.  Having  this  privilege 
I  exercised  it.  I  conceived  it  as  part  of  my  duty  as  his 
secretary  and  friend  to  report  to  him  my  own  interpre 
tations  of  facts  and  public  opinion  as  I  gathered  these 
from  newspapers  and  conversations,  and  sometimes  to 
suggest  modes  of  action.  These  notes  were  memoranda 
for  my  chief's  consideration. 

The  reader  will  see  how  frankly  critical  some  of  these 
notes  are.  The  mere  fact  that  the  President  permitted 
me  to  continue  to  write  to  him  in  a  vein  of  candour  that 
was  frequently  brusque  and  blunt,  is  the  conclusive 
answer  to  the  charge  that  he  resented  criticism. 

Contrary  to  the  misrepresentations,  he  had  from  time 
to  time  many  advisers.  In  most  instances,  I  do  not 
possess  written  reports  of  what  others  said  orally  and 
in  writing,  and  therefore  in  this  record,  which  is  essentially 
concerned  with  my  own  official  and  personal  relations 
with  him,  I  may  seem  to  represent  myself  as  a  pre 
ponderating  influence.  This  is  neither  the  fact  nor  my 
intention.  The  public  acts  of  Mr.  Wilson  were  fre 
quently  mosaics,  made  up  of  his  own  ideas  and  those  of 
others.  My  written  notes  were  merely  stones  offered 
for  the  mosaic.  Sometimes  the  stones  were  rejected, 
sometimes  accepted  and  shaped  by  the  master  builder 
into  the  pattern. 

It  was  a  habit  of  Mr.  Wilson's  to  meditate  before  taking 
action,  to  listen  to  advice  without  comment,  frequently 
without  indicating  whether  or  not  the  idea  broached 
by  others  had  already  occurred  to  him.  We  who  knew 
him  best  knew  that  often  the  idea  had  occurred  to  him 
and  had  been  thought  out  more  lucidly  than  any  adviser 


xii  PREFACE 

could  state  it.  But  he  would  test  his  own  views  by  the 
touchstone  of  other  minds'  reactions  to  the  situations  and 
problems  which  he  was  facing  and  would  get  the  "slant" 
of  other  minds. 

He  was  always  ahead  of  us  all  in  his  thinking.  An 
admirer  once  said:  "You  could  shut  him  up  in  an  her 
metically  sealed  room  and  trust  him  to  reach  the  right 
decision,"  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  did  not  work  that 
way.  He  sought  counsel  and  considered  it  and  acted  on 
it  or  dismissed  it  according  to  his  best  judgment,  for  the 
responsibility  for  the  final  action  was  his,  and  he  was 
boldly  prepared  to  accept  that  responsibility  and  consci 
entiously  careful  not  to  abuse  it  by  acting  rashly.  While 
he  would  on  occasion  make  momentous  decisions  quickly 
and  decisively,  the  habitual  character  of  his  mind  was  de 
liberative.  He  wanted  all  the  facts  and  so  far  as  possible 
the  contingencies.  Younger  men  like  myself  could 
counsel  immediate  and  drastic  action,  but  even  while 
we  were  advising  we  knew  that  he  would,  without  haste 
and  without  waste,  calmly  calculate  his  course.  What, 
coming  from  us,  were  merely  words,  would,  coming 
from  him,  constitute  acts  and  a  nation's  destiny.  He 
regarded  himself  as  the  "trustee  of  the  people,"  who 
should  not  act  until  he  was  sure  he  was  right  and  should 
then  act  with  the  decision  and  finality  of  fate  itself. 

Of  another  misapprehension,  namely,  that  Mr.  Wil 
son  lacks  human  warmth,  I  shall  let  the  book  speak  with 
out  much  prefatory  comment.  I  have  done  my  work 
ill  indeed  if  there  does  not  emerge  from  the  pages  a  human- 
hearted  man,  a  man  whose  passion  it  was  to  serve  man 
kind.  In  his  daily  intercourse  with  individuals  he  showed 
uniform  consideration,  at  times  deep  tenderness,  though 
he  did  not  have  in  his  possession  the  little  bag  of  tricks 


PREFACE  xiii 

which  some  politicians  use  so  effectively:  he  did  not 
clap  men  on  their  backs,  call  them  by  their  first  names, 
and  profess  to  each  individual  he  met  that  of  all  the  men 
in  the  world  this  was  the  man  whom  he  most  yearned  to 
see.  Perhaps  he  was  too  sincere  for  that;  perhaps  by 
nature  too  reserved;  but  I  am  convinced  that  he  who 
reads  this  book  will  feel  that  he  has  met  a  man  whose 
public  career  was  governed  not  merely  by  a  great  brain, 
but  also  by  a  great  heart.  I  did  not  invent  this  charac 
ter.  I  observed  him  for  eleven  years. 


CONTENTS 
PREFACE     ....     . ,    f;,  ., Ki%%     *x 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  THE  POLITICAL  LABORATORY      .     .     .     .     -./       1 

II.  DOING  THE  POLITICAL  CHORES    .     .     .    ;^  /  y        6 

III.  MY  FIRST  MEETING  WITH  THE  POLITICAL  Boss      10 

IV.  COLONEL  HARVEY  ON  THE  SCENE     .     .     .  /j/-    14 
V.    THE  NEW  JERSEY  SALIENT 23 

VI.  SOMETHING  NEW  IN  POLITICAL  CAMPAIGNS.   /./     27 

VII.  THE  CRISIS  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN     .     f,    ...       38 

VIII.  THE  END  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  ......       43 

IX.  A  PARTY  SPLIT       .     .     ,     ...,,,;.     v^     46 

X.  EXIT  THE  OLD  GUARD .     ,., ,,. .. ..; ,..  .      .      .      .       65 

XI.  EXECUTIVE  LEADERSHIP   .,,;.,  ,,•<     .  ;.    •.,  /.       72 

XII.  COLONEL  HARVEY  .      .     .  ;  ,.    >*    ,     .      .      .       82 

XIII.  THE  "COCKED  HAT  "INCIDENT  .     (.\!f.    s<     .,     94 

XIV.  WILSON  AND  THE  OLD  GUARD      .     .  /; .     , ,  : ./     98 
XV.  MR.  BRYAN  ISSUES  A  CHALLENGE    .     .     .     .     105 

XVI.  THE  BALTIMORE  CONVENTION     .     .     .     pif  -,y    117 

XVII.  FACING  A  SOLEMN  RESPONSIBILITY  ....     125 

XVIII.    WILLIAM  F.  McCoMBS V    127 

XIX.    THE  INAUGURATION  OF  1913 139 

XX.  MEXICO       ..-......'....-    144 

XXI.  PANAMA  TOLLS       .     .     .     .     ,     .     .     .     .     162 

XXII.    REFORMING  THE  CURRENCY        169 

XXIII.  RENOMINATED        .     .     .     /    ...     .     .     182 

XXIV.  THE  ADAMSON  LAW    .....     .     .     *     197 

XV 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXV.    GERMAN  PROPAGANDA      .  ~ 202 

XXVI.    WILSON  AND  HUGHES 212 

XXVII.    NEUTRALITY     ..;*;, 225 

XXVIII.    PREPAREDNESS 238 

XXIX.  THE  GREAT  DECLARATION     .     .     .     .     .  248 

XXX.     CARRYING  ON 260 

XXXI.  THE  PEN  Is  MIGHTIER  THAN  THE  SWORD  276 

XXXII.  COLONEL  ROOSEVELT  AND  GENERAL  WOOD  285 

XXXIII.  WILSON  THE  WARRIOR     ...     .     .     .  294 

XXXIV.  GERMANY  CAPITULATES   .     .     .     ...  307 

XXXV.  APPEAL  FOR  A  DEMOCRATIC  CONGRESS  .     .  322 

XXXVI.  THE  GREAT  ADVENTURE  .     .     .     .     .     .  335 

XXXVII.    WILSON— THE  LONE  HAND 354 

XXXVIII.    JAPAN-SHANTUNG 380 

XXXIX.    IRELAND A(.     .  392 

XL.    PROHIBITION 409 

XLI.    THE  TREATY  FIGHT 422 

XLII.    THE  WESTERN  TRIP 434 

XLIII.    RESERVATIONS.      .     . 452 

XLIV.  WILSON — THE  HUMAN  BEING      ....  457 

XLV.  THE  SAN  FRANCISCO  CONVENTION   .     .     .  492 

XLVI.    THE  LAST  DAY 506 

APPENDIX    .      .     .     .     .     .     .     ; 515 

INDEX  ....  549 


WOODROW  WILSON 
AS  I  KNOW  HIM 


Woodrow  Wilson  As  I  Know  Him 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   POLITICAL  LABORATORY 

MY  INTRODUCTION  to  politics  was  in  the  Fifth 
Ward  of  Jersey  City,  New  Jersey,  which  for 
many  years  was  the  "Bloody  Angle"  of  politics 
of  the  city  in  which  I  lived.  Always  Democratic,  it  had 
been  for  many  years  the  heart  and  centre  of  what  New 
Jersey  Democrats  were  pleased  to  call  the  great  Gibral 
tar  of  Democracy.  The  ward  in  which  I  lived  was  made 
up  of  the  plainest  sort  of  people,  a  veritable  melting  pot 
of  all  races,  but  with  a  predominance  of  Irish,  Germans, 
and  Italians,  between  whom  it  was,  like  ancient  Gaul, 
divided  into  three  parts. 

My  dear  father,  Philip  Tumulty,  a  wounded  soldier  of 
the  Civil  War,  after  serving  an  apprenticeship  as  an  iron 
moulder  under  a  delightful,  whole-souled  Englishman, 
opened  a  little  grocery  store  on  Wayne  Street,  Jersey 
City,  where  were  laid  the  foundation  stones  of  his  modest 
fortune  and  where,  by  his  fine  common  sense,  poise,  and 
judgment,  he  soon  established  himself  as  the  leader  of  a 
Democratic  faction  in  that  neighbourhood.  This  modest 
little  place  soon  became  a  political  laboratory  for  me.  In 
the  evening,  around  the  plain,  old-fashioned  counters, 
seated  upon  barrels  and  boxes,  the  interesting  characters 
of  the  neighbourhood  gathered,  representing  as  they  did 


2        WOODROW   WILSON   AS    I   KNOW   HIM 

the  leading  active  political  forces  in  that  quaint  cosmo 
politan  community. 

No  matter  how  far  back  my  memory  turns,  I  cannot 
recall  when  I  did  not  hear  politics  discussed — not  ward 
politics  only,  but  frequently  the  politics  of  the  nation  and 
the  world.  In  that  grocery  store,  from  the  lips  of  the 
plainest  folk  who  came  there,  were  carried  on  serious 
discussions  of  the  tariff,  the  money  question,  our  foreign 
relations,  and  all  phases  of  the  then  famous  Venezuelan 
question,  which  in  those  days  threatened  to  set  two  con 
tinents  on  fire. 

The  make-up  of  the  little  "cabinet"  or  group  which 
surrounded  my  father  was  most  interesting.  There  was 
Mr.  Alexander  Hamill,  the  father  of  Congressman  Hamill 
of  Jersey  City,  a  student  of  Queen's  College  in  Ireland 
and  who  afterward  taught  in  the  National  Schools  of 
Ireland,  a  well-read,  highly  cultured,  broad-minded 
man  of  affairs;  and  dear  Uncle  Jimmie  Kelter,  almost  a 
centenarian,  whose  fine  old  gray  hair  gave  him  the  ap 
pearance  of  a  patriarch.  Uncle  Jimmie  nightly  revelled 
in  the  recital  to  those  who  were  present  as  ready  listeners, 
his  experience  when  he  was  present  at  a  session  of  the 
House  of  Parliament  in  London  and  heard  the  famous 
Irish  statesman,  Daniel  O'Connell,  denounce  England's 
attitude  of  injustice  toward  Catholic  emancipation.  He 
loved  to  regale  the  little  group  that  encircled  him  by  re 
citing  from  memory  the  great  speech  of  Robert  Emmett 
from  the  dock,  and  excerpts  from  the  classic  speeches  of 
the  leading  Irish  orators  like  Curran,  Sheridan,  and  Fox. 

While  these  discussions  in  the  little  store  wended  their 
uneasy  way  along,  a  spark  of  humour  was  often  injected 
into  them  by  the  delightful  banter  of  a  rollicking,  good- 
natured  Irishman,  a  big  two-fisted  fellow,  generous- 


THE    POLITICAL   LABORATORY  3 

hearted  and  lovable,  whom  we  affectionately  called  "Big 
Phil."  I  can  see  him  now,  standing  like  a  great  pyramid 
in  the  midst  of  the  little  group,  every  now  and  then 
throwing  his  head  back  in  good-natured  abandon,  re 
counting  wild  and  fantastic  tales  about  the  fairies  and 
banshees  of  the  Old  Land  from  whence  he  had  come. 
When  his  listeners  would  turn  away,  with  skepticism 
written  all  over  their  countenances,  he  would  turn  to  me, 
whose  youthful  enthusiasm  made  me  an  easy  victim 
upon  which  to  work  his  magic  spell  in  the  stories  which 
he  told  of  the  wonders  of  the  Old  Land  across  the  sea. 

I  loved  these  delightful  little  gatherings  in  whose  de 
liberations  my  dear  father  played  so  notable  a  part. 
Those  kind  folk,  now  off  the  stage,  never  allowed  the 
spirit  of  provincialism  to  guide  their  judgment  or  their 
attitude  toward  great  public  affairs.  I  recall  with  pleas 
ure  their  tolerance,  their  largeness  of  view,  and  fine  mag 
nanimity  which  raised  every  question  they  discussed  to 
a  high  level.  They  were  a  very  simple  folk,  but  inde 
pendent  in  their  political  actions  and  views.  Into  that 
little  group  of  free,  independent  political  thinkers  would 
often  come  a  warning  from  the  Democratic  boss  of  the 
city  that  they  must  follow  with  undivided  allegiance  the 
organization's  dictum  in  political  matters  and  not  seek 
to  lead  opinion  in  the  community  in  which  they  lived. 
Supremely  indifferent  were  these  fine  old  chaps  to  those 
warnings,  and  unmindful  of  political  consequences.  They 
felt  that  they  had  left  behind  them  a  land  of  oppression 
and  they  would  not  submit  to  tyrannous  dictation  in  this 
free  land  of  ours,  no  matter  who  sought  to  exert  it. 

In  this  political  laboratory  I  came  in  contact  with  the 
raw  materials  of  political  life  that,  as  an  older  man,  I 
was  soon  to  see  moulded  into  political  action  in  a  larger 


4       WOODROW    WILSON   AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

way  in  the  years  to  come.  I  found  in  politics  that  the 
great  policies  of  a  nation  are  simply  the  policies  and  pas 
sions  of  the  ward  extended.  In  the  little  discussions  that 
took  place  in  that  store,  I  was,  even  as  a  youth,  looking 
on  from  the  side-lines,  struck  by  the  fine,  wholesome, 
generous  spirit  of  my  own  father.  Never  would  he  per 
mit,  for  instance,  in  the  matter  of  the  discussion  of  Ire 
land — so  dear  to  his  heart — a  shade  of  resentment  or 
bitterness  toward  England  to  influence  his  judgment  in 
the  least,  for  he  believed  that  no  man  could  be  a  just  judge 
in  any  matter  where  his  mind  was  filled  with  passion;  and 
so  in  this  matter,  the  subject  of  such  fierce  controversy, 
as  in  every  other,  he  held  a  judgment  free  and  far  away 
from  his  passionate  antagonisms.  I  found  in  the  simple 
life  of  the  community  where  I  was  brought  up  the  same 
human  things,  in  a  small  way,  that  I  was  subsequently 
to  come  in  contact  with  in  a  larger  way  in  the  whirligig 
of  political  life  in  the  Capitol  of  the  Nation.  I  found  the 
same  relative  bigness  and  the  same  relative  smallness, 
the  same  petty  jealousies  and  rivalries  which  manifest 
themselves  in  the  larger  fields  of  a  great  nation's  life; 
the  same  good  nature,  and  the  same  deep  humanity  ex 
pressing  itself  in  the  same  way,  only  differently  ap 
parelled. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  places  in  the  world  for  the 
study  of  human  character  is  the  country  store  or  the  city 
grocery.  I  was  able  as  a  boy  standing  behind  the  counter 
of  the  little  grocery  store  to  study  people;  and  intimately 
to  become  acquainted  with  them  and  their  daily  lives 
and  the  lives  of  their  women  and  children.  I  never  came 
in  contact  with  their  daily  routine,  their  joys  and  sorrows, 
their  bitter  actualities  and  deep  tragedies,  without  feel 
ing  rise  in  me  a  desire  to  be  of  service.  I  remember  many 


THE    POLITICAL    LABORATORY  5 

years  ago,  seated  behind  the  counter  of  my  father's 
grocery  store,  with  what  passionate  resentment  I  read  the 
vivid  headlines  of  the  metropolitan  newspapers  and  the 
ghastly  accounts  of  the  now  famous  Homestead  Strike  of 
1892.  Of  course,  I  came  to  realize  in  after  years  that 
the  headlines  of  a  newspaper  are  not  always  in  agreement 
with  the  actual  facts;  but  I  do  recall  how  intently  I  pored 
over  every  detail  of  this  tragic  story  of  industrial  war 
and  how,  deep  in  my  heart,  I  resented  the  efforts  of  a 
capitalistic  system  that  would  use  its  power  in  this  un 
just,  inhuman  way.  Little  did  I  realize  as  I  pored  over 
the  story  of  this  tragedy  in  that  far-off  day  that  some 
time,  seated  at  my  desk  at  the  White  House  in  the  office 
of  the  secretary  to  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
I  would  have  the  pleasure  of  meeting  face  to  face  the 
leading  actor  in  this  lurid  drama,  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie 
himself,  and  of  hearing  from  his  own  lips  a  human  and 
intelligent  recital  of  the  events  which  formed  the  interest 
ing  background  of  the  Homestead  Strike. 


CHAPTER  II 

DOING   THE   POLITICAL   CHORES 

FOR  the  young  man  who  wishes  to  rise  in  the  poli 
tics  of  a  great  city  there  is  no  royal  road  to  pref 
erment  but  only  a  plain  path  of  modest  service 
uncomplainingly  rendered.  Of  course,  there  seem  to  be 
exceptions  to  this  rule.  At  times  it  is  possible  for  the 
scion  of  a  great  family  to  rise  to  temporary  distinction 
in  politics  without  a  preliminary  course  in  the  school  of 
local  politics,  for  as  a  Democratic  boss  once  said  to  me: 
"Great  family  names  are  fine  window-dressers,"  but 
in  my  own  experience  I  have  seen  the  disappointing 
end  of  careers  thus  begun  and  have  found  that  some 
times  after  a  great  name  has  been  temporarily  used  to 
meet  certain  political  emergencies,  the  would-be  politi 
cian  is  quickly  thrust  aside  to  make  way  for  the  less- 
pretentious  but  more  capable  man.  There  is  nothing 
permanent  or  lasting  about  a  place  in  politics  gained  in 
this  adventitious  way.  Of  course,  there  sometimes  come 
to  high  office  men  from  military  careers,  or  men,  like  the 
distinguished  subject  of  this  book,  from  fields  apparently 
remote  from  practical  politics,  but  such  successes  are  due 
to  an  appealing  personal  force,  or  to  exceptional  genius 
which  the  young  aspirant  had  better  not  assume  that  he 
possesses.  The  general  rule  holds  good  that  a  political 
apprenticeship  is  as  necessary  and  valuable  as  an  indus 
trial  apprenticeship. 
My  first  official  connection  with  politics  was  as  the 


DOING   THE    POLITICAL    CHORES  7 

financial  secretary  of  the  Fifth  Ward  Democratic  Club  of 
Jersey  City.  My  father  had  told  me  that  if  I  intended  to 
play  an  active  part  in  politics,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
begin  modestly  at  the  bottom  of  the  ladder,  to  do  the 
political  chores,  as  it  were,  which  are  a  necessary  part  of 
ward  organization  work.  I  recall  those  days  with  singu 
lar  pleasure,  for  my  work  gave  me  an  unusual  opportunity 
to  meet  the  privates  in  the  ranks  and  to  make  friendships 
that  were  permanent. 

The  meetings  of  the  Club  were  held  each  week  in  a 
modest  club  house,  with  part  of  the  meeting  given  over 
to  addresses  made  by  what  were  then  considered  the 
leading  men  in  the  Democratic  party.  It  is  queer  how  the 
average  political  worker  favours  the  senator,  or  the  ex- 
judge,  or  the  ex-Congressman,  as  a  speaker  on  these 
occasions.  Ex-Congressman  Gray,  of  Texas  (I  doubt 
whether  there  ever  was  a  congressman  by  that  name), 
would  often  be  the  headliner  and  he  could  be  depended 
upon  to  draw  a  crowded  and  enthusiastic  house.  The 
knowledge  and  experience  I  gained  at  these  inspirational 
meetings  were  mighty  helpful  to  me  in  the  political  life 
I  had  carved  out  for  myself.  I  found  that  when  you  had 
convinced  these  plain,  everyday  fellows  that,  although 
you  were  a  college  man,  you  were  not  necessarily  a  high 
brow,  they  were  willing  to  serve  you  to  the  end.  It  was  a 
valuable  course  in  a  great  university.  It  was  not  very 
long  until  I  was  given  my  first  opportunity,  in  1896,  to 
make  my  first  political  speech  in  behalf  of  Mr.  Bryan, 
then  the  Democratic  candidate  for  President.  I  was  not 
able  at  that  time  to  disentangle  the  intricacies  of  the 
difficult  money  problems,  but  I  endeavoured,  imperfectly 
at  least,  in  the  speeches  I  made,  to  lay  my  finger  on  what 
I  considered  the  great  moral  issue  that  lay  behind  the 


8       WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

silver  question  in  that  memorable  campaign — the  attempt 
by  eastern  financial  interests  to  dominate  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States. 

After  my  apprenticeship,  begun  as  secretary  of  the 
Fifth  Ward  Democratic  Club,  an  incident  happened 
which  caused  a  sudden  rise  in  my  political  stock.  At  a 
county  convention  I  was  given  the  opportunity  of  mak 
ing  the  nominating  speech  for  the  Fifth  Ward's  candidate 
for  street  and  water  commissioner — a  bricklayer  and  a 
fine  fellow — who  was  opposing  the  machine  candidate. 
It  was  a  real  effort  on  my  part  and  caused  me  days  and 
nights  of  worry  and  preparation.  Indeed,  it  seemed  to 
me  to  be  the  great  moment  of  my  life.  I  vividly  recall 
the  incidents  of  what  to  me  was  a  memorable  occasion. 
I  distinctly  remember  that  on  the  night  of  the  Conven 
tion,  with  the  delegates  from  my  ward,  I  faced  an  un 
friendly  and  hostile  audience,  our  candidate  having 
aroused  the  opposition  of  the  boss  and  his  satellites. 
While  I  felt  that  the  attitude  of  the  Convention  was  one  of 
opposition  to  our  candidate,  there  was  no  evidence  of 
unfriendliness  or  hostility  to  myself  as  the  humble  spokes 
man  of  the  Fifth  Ward.  When  I  stood  up  to  speak  I 
realized  that  I  had  to  "play  up"  to  the  spirit  of  generosity 
which  is  always  latent  in  a  crowd  such  as  I  was  addressing. 
I  believe  I  won,  although  my  candidate,  unfortunately, 
lost.  My  Irish  buoyancy  and  good  nature  brought  me 
over  the  line.  I  felt  that  the  audience  in  the  gallery  and 
the  delegates  on  the  floor  were  with  me,  but  unfortunately 
for  my  cause,  the  boss,  who  was  always  the  dominating 
influence  of  the  Convention,  was  against  me,  and  so  we 
lost  in  the  spirited  fight  we  made.  In  this  first  skirmish 
of  my  political  career  I  made  up  my  mind  to  meet  defeat 
with  good  grace  and,  if  possible,  smilingly,  and  no  sore 


DOING    THE    POLITICAL    CHORES  9 

spot  or  resentment  over  our  defeat  ever  showed  itself  in 
my  attitude  toward  the  men  who  saw  fit  to  oppose  us. 
Evidently,  the  boss  and  his  friends  appreciated  this  atti 
tude,  for  it  was  reported  to  me  shortly  after  the  Conven 
tion  that  I  was  to  be  given  recognition  and  by  the  boss's 
orders  would  soon  be  placed  on  the  eligible  list  for  future 
consideration  in  connection  with  a  place  on  the  legislative 
ticket. 

One  lesson  I  learned  was  not  to  be  embittered  by  defeat. 
Since  then  I  have  seen  too  many  cases  of  men  so  dis 
gruntled  at  being  worsted  in  their  first  battles  that  their 
political  careers  ended  when  they  should  have  been  just 
beginning. 


CHAPTER  III 

MY   FIRST   MEETING   WITH    THE   POLITICAL   BOSS 

A~TER  serving  my  apprenticeship  as  a  ward  worker, 
devoted  friends  from  my  home  ward  urged  my 
name  upon  the  Democratic  leader,  Mr.  Robert 
Davis,  for  a  place  upon  the  Democratic  legislative  ticket 
for  Hudson  County.  I  had  grown  to  have  a  deep  regard 
and  affection  for  this  fine  old  fellow.  While  he  was  a  boss 
in  every  sense,  maintaining  close  relations  with  the  Public 
Service  Corporations  of  the  state,  he  had  an  engaging 
human  side.  He  never  pretended  nor  deceived.  With 
his  friends  he  was  open,  frank,  generous,  and  honourable 
in  all  his  dealings,  and  especially  kind  to  and  considerate 
of  the  young  men  who  became  part  of  his  working  force. 
With  his  political  enemies  he  was  fair  and  decent.  Many 
a  time  during  a  legislative  session,  when  I  was  a  member 
of  the  House  of  Assembly,  word  would  come  to  us  of  the 
boss's  desire  that  we  should  support  this  or  that  bill, 
behind  which  certain  corporate  interests  lay.  The  orders, 
however,  were  clean  and  without  a  threat  of  any  kind. 
He  took  no  unfair  advantage  and  made  no  reprisals  when 
we  failed  to  carry  out  his  desires. 

While  a  member  of  the  New  Jersey  Legislature,  the 
name  of  Woodrow  Wilson  began  to  be  first  discussed  in 
the  political  world  of  New  Jersey.  It  came  about  in 
this  way:  By  reason  of  the  normal  Republican  majority 
of  the  state  the  nomination  by  the  Legislature  in  those 
days  of  a  Democratic  candidate  for  the  United  States 

10 


MEETING    THE    POLITICAL    BOSS  11 

senatorship  was  a  mere  compliment,  a  courtesy,  a  very 
meagre  one  indeed,  and  was  generally  paid  to  the  old  war 
horses  of  democracy  like  James  E.  Martine,  of  Plainfield, 
New  Jersey;  but  the  appearance  of  the  doughty  Colonel 
Harvey  on  the  scene,  at  the  1907  session  of  the  New  Jer 
sey  Legislature,  gave  a  new  turn  to  this  custom.  A  re 
quest  was  made  by  Colonel  Harvey  and  diplomatically 
conveyed  by  his  friends  to  the  Democratic  members  of  the 
Legislature,  that  the  honorary  nomination  for  the  United 
States  senatorship  at  this  session  of  the  Legislature  should 
be  given  to  President  Wilson  of  Princeton.  It  may  be 
added  that  I  learned  years  afterward  that  Mr.  Wilson 
was  not  a  party  to  Colonel  Harvey's  plans;  that  once  he 
even  sent  a  friend  as  an  emissary  to  explain  to  the  Colonel 
that  Mr.  Wilson  did  not  believe  that  the  use  of  his  name 
in  connection  with  political  office  was  a  service  to  him  or 
to  Princeton  University. 

The  suggestion  that  Woodrow  Wilson  be  given  the 
nomination  was  hotly  resented  by  young  men  like  myself 
in  the  Legislature.  Frankly,  I  led  the  opposition  to  the 
man  I  was  afterward  to  serve  for  eleven  years  in  the 
capacity  of  private  secretary.  The  basis  of  my  opposi 
tion  to  Mr.  Wilson  for  this  empty  honour  was  the 
rumour  that  had  been  industriously  circulated  in  the 
state  House  and  elsewhere,  that  there  was,  as  Mr.  Dooley 
says,  "a  plan  afoot"  by  the  big  interests  of  New  Jersey 
and  New  York  to  nominate  Woodrow  W7ilson  for  the 
senatorship  and  then  nominate  him  for  governor  of  the 
state  as  a  preliminary  start  for  the  Presidency.  I  re 
member  now,  with  the  deepest  chagrin  and  regret,  having 
bitterly  assailed  Woodrow  Wilson's  candidacy  in  a  Demo 
cratic  caucus  which  I  attended  and  how  I  denounced 
him  for  his  alleged  opposition  to  labour.  In  view  of  my 


12      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

subsequent  intimacy  with  Mr.  Wilson  and  the  knowledge 
gained  of  his  great  heart  and  his  big  vision  in  all  matters 
affecting  labour,  I  cannot  now  point  with  pride  to  the 
speech  I  then  made  attacking  him.  I  am  sure  the  dear 
doctor,  away  off  in  Princeton,  never  even  heard  of  my 
opposition  to  him,  although  in  my  conceit  I  thought  the 
state  reverberated  with  the  report  of  my  unqualified  and 
bitter  opposition  to  him.  In  my  poor  vanity  I  thought 
that  perhaps  what  I  had  said  in  my  speech  of  opposition 
to  him  had  reached  the  cloisters  of  Princeton.  As  a  mat 
ter  of  fact,  he  never  heard  about  me  or  my  speech,  and 
afterward  in  the  years  of  our  association  he  "joshed"  me 
about  my  opposition  to  him  and  would  often  make  me 
very  uncomfortable  by  recounting  to  his  friends  at  the 
White  House  how  even  his  own  secretary  had  opposed 
him  when  his  name  was  first  under  consideration  for 
the  United  States  senatorship  in  New  Jersey. 

To  me  was  given  the  honour  of  nominating  at  a  joint 
session  of  the  Senate  and  House  Assembly  the  candidate 
opposed  to  Woodrow  Wilson  for  the  Senate,  the  Honour 
able  Edwin  E.  Stevens.  I  recall  the  comparison  I  made 
between  the  claims  of  Colonel  Stevens,  the  strict  party 
man,  and  those  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  Princeton  pro 
fessor.  The  speech  nominating  Woodrow  Wilson  at 
the  joint  session  of  the  Legislature  was  the  shortest  on 
record.  It  was  delivered  by  a  big  generous  fellow,  John 
Baader,  one  of  the  Smith-Nugent  men  from  Essex  County. 
When  Essex  County  was  called,  he  slowly  rose  to  his  feet 
and  almost  shamefacedly  addressing  the  Speaker  of  the 
House,  said,  tremulously:  "I  nominate  for  the  United 
States  Senate  Woodrow  Wilson,  of  Princeton,"  and 
then,  amid  silence,  sat  down.  No  applause  greeted  the 
name  of  the  man  he  nominated.  It  seemed  as  if  the  col- 


MEETING    THE    POLITICAL    BOSS  13 

lege  professor  had  no  friends  in  the  Legislature  except  the 
man  who  had  put  his  name  forward  for  the  nomination. 

Colonel  Stevens  won  the  honorary  nomination  and 
Woodrow  Wilson  was  defeated.  Colonel  Harvey,  dis 
gruntled  but  not  discouraged,  packed  up  his  kit  and  left 
on  the  next  train  for  New  York. 


CHAPTER  IV 

COLONEL  HARVEY   ON   THE   SCENE 

A  THOUGH  the  intrepid  Colonel  Harvey  was  de 
feated  in  the  first  skirmish  to  advance  the  cause 
of  Woodrow  Wilson,  he  continued  to  pursue  his 
purpose  to  force  his  personal  choice  upon  the  New  Jersey 
Democracy.     The  approaching  gubernatorial  election  in 
1910  gave  the  Colonel  his  opportunity  and  he  took  full 
advantage  of  it. 

Rumours  began  to  circulate  that  the  machine  run  by 
Davis,  Smith,  and  Ross,  the  great  Democratic  triumvirate 
of  the  state,  was  determined  to  nominate  the  Princeton 
president  at  any  cost.  Young  men  like  Mark  Sullivan, 
John  Treacy,  and  myself,  all  of  Hudson  County,  repre 
senting  the  liberal  wing  of  our  party,  were  bitterly  op 
posed  to  this  effort.  We  suspected  that  the  "Old  Gang" 
was  up  to  its  old  trick  of  foisting  upon  the  Democrats  of  the 
state  a  tool  which  they  could  use  for  their  own  advantage, 
who,  under  the  name  of  the  Democratic  party,  would  do 
the  bidding  of  the  corporate  interests  which  had,  under 
both  the  "regular"  organizations,  Democratic  and  Re 
publican,  found  in  New  Jersey  their  most  nutritious  pas 
tures.  At  a  meeting  held  at  the  Lawyers'  Club  in  New 
York,  younger  Democrats,  like  Judge  Silzer  of  Middlesex 
and  myself,  "plighted  our  political  troth"  and  pledged 
our  undying  opposition  to  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince 
ton  president.  As  a  result  of  our  conferences  we  set  in 
motion  the  progressive  machinery  of  the  state  in  an  in- 

14 


COLONEL    HARVEY    ON    THE    SCENE        15 

tensive  effort  to  force  the  nomination  of  Judge  Silzer  in 
opposition  to  that  of  Woodrow  Wilson. 

As  soon  as  the  Democratic  boss  of  Hudson  County, 
Bob  Davis,  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  Wilson  movement  in 
North  Jersey,  was  apprized  of  the  proposed  action  on  our 
part,  he  set  about  to  head  it  off,  and  as  part  of  his  plan  of 
opposition  he  sent  for  me  in  an  effort  to  wean  me  away 
from  the  Silzer  candidacy.  I  refused  to  yield.  Upon 
being  interrogated  by  me  as  to  his  interest  in  Woodrow 
Wilson,  Boss  Davis  stated  that  if  we  nominated  Woodrow 
Wilson  there  would  be  a  big  campaign  fund  put  up  for 
him  by  Moses  Taylor  Pyne,  a  trustee  of  Princeton  Uni 
versity.  Never  before  was  the  ignorance  of  a  boss  made 
more  manifest.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  that  very  time 
there  was  no  more  implacable  foe  of  Woodrow  Wilson 
in  the  state  of  New  Jersey  than  Moses  Taylor  Pyne, 
who  headed  the  opposition  to  Mr.  Wilson  in  the  Prince 
ton  fight. 

Years  after  this  incident  the  President  and  I  often 
laughed  at  what  must  have  been  the  surprise  and  dis 
comfiture  of  Boss  Davis  when  he  finally  learned  the  facts 
as  to  Moses  Taylor  Pyne's  real  feelings  toward  Woodrow 
Wilson.  Previous  to  the  gubernatorial  campaign  I 
asked  Boss  Davis  if  he  thought  Woodrow  Wilson  would 
make  a  good  governor.  His  reply  was  characteristic 
of  the  point  of  view  of  the  boss  in  dealing  with  these 
matters  of  moment  to  the  people  of  the  state.  "How 
the  hell  do  I  know  whether  he'll  make  a  good  governor?" 
he  replied;  "he  will  make  a  good  candidate,  and  that 
is  the  only  thing  that  interests  me." 

Shortly  after,  those  of  us  who  banded  together  to 
oppose  the  bosses  in  their  efforts  to  force  Doctor  Wilson 
upon  us  began  to  feel  the  pressure  of  the  organization's 


16      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

influence.  Many  of  our  friends  left  us  in  despair  and 
in  fear  of  the  power  of  the  machine.  The  movement 
toward  Woodrow  Wilson  in  the  state  was  soon  in  full 
swing.  The  Davis-Smith-Nugent-Iloss  machine  was  in 
fine  working  order  on  the  day  and  the  night  of  the 
Convention. 

I  was  not  even  a  delegate  to  the  Convention,  but  I  was 
present  and  kept  in  close  touch  by  contact  with  my 
friends  with  every  phase  of  the  convention  fight.  Colo 
nel  Harvey  was  again  on  the  scene  as  the  generalissimo 
of  the  Wilson  forces,  quietly  and  stealthily  moving  about, 
lining  up  his  forces  for  the  memorable  battle  of  the  mor 
row.  There  was  bitter  but  unorganized  opposition  to 
the  favourite  son  of  the  state  machine,  Woodrow  Wilson. 
The  Convention  itself  presented  an  unusual  situation  and 
demonstrated  more  than  anything  I  ever  saw  the  power  of 
the  "Old  Gang"  to  do  the  thing  its  masters  had  in  mind. 
As  I  look  back  upon  the  great  event  of  this  convention, 
the  nomination  of  Woodrow  Wilson  for  the  governorship 
of  New  Jersey,  I  feel  that  destiny  was  inscrutably  en 
gaged  there,  working  in  mysterious  ways  its  wonders  to 
perform,  working  perhaps  through  strange,  incongruous 
instrumentalities  to  bring  the  man  of  destiny  into  action, 
led  by  those  who  were  opposed  to  everything  Woodrow 
Wilson  stood  for,  opposed  by  those  who  were  yearning  for 
and  striving  for  just  the  dawn  of  political  liberalism  that 
his  advent  in  politics  heralded.  The  conflict  of  the  Tren 
ton  Convention  about  to  be  enacted  was  an  illustration  of 
the  poet's  line,  "Where  ignorant  armies  clash  by  night." 
The  successful  side  of  the  Convention  was  fighting  for 
what  they  least  wanted;  the  defeated  against  what  they 
most  wanted.  Here  in  this  convention,  in  truth,  were 
present  in  aggressive  action  the  incongruities  of  politics 


COLONEL    HARVEY    ON    THE    SCENE        17 

and  in  full  display  were  witnessed  the  sardonic  contrasts 
between  the  visible  and  the  invisible  situations  in  poli 
tics.  All  the  Old  Guard  moving  with  Prussian  precision 
to  the  nomination  of  the  man  who  was  to  destroy  for  a 
time  the  machine  rule  in  New  Jersey  and  inaugurate  a 
new  national  era  in  political  liberalism  while  all  the 
liberal  elements  of  the  state,  including  fine  old  Judge 
Westcott  of  Camden  and  young  men  like  myself  were 
sullen,  helpless.  Every  progressive  Democrat  in  the 
Convention  was  opposed  to  the  nomination  of  the  Prince- 
tonian,  and  every  standpatter  and  Old  Guardsman  was 
in  favour  of  Woodrow  Wilson.  On  the  convention  floor, 
dominating  the  whole  affair,  stood  ex-Senator  James 
Smith,  Jr.,  of  New  Jersey,  the  spokesman  of  the  "high 
brow"  candidate  for  governor,  controlling  the  delegates 
from  south  and  west  Jersey.  Handsome,  cool,  dignified, 
he  rose  from  the  floor  of  the  convention  hall,  and  in  rich, 
low  tones,  seconded  the  nomination  of  the  man  "he  had 
never  met,"  the  man  he  would  not  "presume"  to  claim  ac 
quaintance  with,  the  man  whose  life  had  lain  in  other 
fields  than  his.  Very  close  to  him,  "taking  his  orders," 
and  acting  upon  every  suggestion  that  came  to  him,  sat 
Jim  Nugent,  grim,  big-jawed,  the  giant  full-back  of 
Smith's  invincible  team,  the  rising  star  of  machine 
politics  in  New  Jersey.  Down  the  aisle  sat  the  "Little 
Napoleon"  of  Hudson  County,  Bob  Davis,  wearing  a 
sardonic  smile  on  his  usually  placid  face,  with  his  big 
eyes  riveted  upon  those  in  the  Convention  who  were 
fighting  desperately  and  against  great  odds  the  effort  of 
the  state  machine  to  nominate  President  Wilson.  Across 
the  aisle  from  me  sat  "Plank-Shad"  Thompson,  of  Glou 
cester,  big  and  debonair,  a  thoroughly  fine  fellow  socially, 
but  always  ready  to  act  upon  and  carry  out  every  tip  that 


18      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

came  to  him  from  the  master  minds  in  the  Convention — 
Davis  and  Smith. 

These  were  the  leading  actors  in  this  political  drama. 
Behind  the  lines,  in  the  "offing,"  was  the  Insurgent 
Group,  young  men  like  Mark  Sullivan  and  John  Treacy 
of  Hudson,  stout  defenders  of  the  liberal  wing  in  the 
Convention,  feeling  sullen,  beaten,  and  hopelessly  impotent 
against  the  mass  attack  of  the  machine  forces.  What  a 
political  medley  was  present  in  this  convention — plebeian 
and  patrician,  machine  man  and  political  idealist — all 
gathered  together  and  fighting  as  leading  characters  and 
supernumeraries  in  the  political  drama  about  to  be 
enacted. 

Not  three  men  outside  of  the  leading  actors  in  this 
great  political  drama  had  ever  seen  the  Princeton  pro 
fessor,  although  many  had  doubtless  read  his  speeches. 
I  watched  every  move  from  the  side-lines.  The  bosses, 
with  consummate  precision,  moved  to  the  doing  of  the 
job  in  hand,  working  their  spell  of  threats  and  coercion 
upon  a  beaten,  sullen,  spiritless  body  of  delegates.  One 
could  easily  discern  that  there  was  no  heart  in  the  dele 
gates  for  the  job  on  hand.  To  them,  the  active  forces  in 
the  Convention,  the  Princeton  president  was,  indeed,  a 
man  of  mystery.  Who  could  solve  the  riddle  of  this 
political  Sphinx?  Who  was  this  man  Wilson?  WThat 
were  his  purposes?  What  his  ideals?  These  questions 
were  troubling  and  perplexing  the  delegates.  Colonel 
Harvey,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Wilson  forces, 
when  interrogated  by  us,  refused  to  answer.  How  master 
fully  the  Old  Guard  staged  every  act  of  the  drama,  and 
thus  brought  about  the  nomination  of  the  Princeton 
president.  The  Convention  is  at  an  end.  Wilson  has 
been  nominated  by  a  narrow  margin;  the  delegates, 


COLONEL    HARVEY    ON    THE    SCENE        19 

bitter  and  resentful,  are  about  to  withdraw;  the  curtain 
is  about  to  roll  down  on  the  last  scene.  The  chairman, 
Mr.  John  R.  Hardin,  the  distinguished  lawyer  of  Essex, 
is  about  to  announce  the  final  vote,  when  the  clerk  of 
the  Convention,  in  a  tone  of  voice  that  reached  every  part 
of  the  hall,  announces  in  a  most  dramatic  fashion:  "We 
have  just  received  word  that  Mr.  Wilson,  the  candi 
date  for  the  governorship,  and  the  next  President  of  the 
United  States,  has  received  word  of  his  nomination;  has 
left  Princeton,  and  is  now  on  his  way  to  the  Convention." 
Excellent  stage  work.  The  voice  of  the  secretary  making 
this  dramatic  statement  was  the  voice  of  Jacob,  but  the 
deft  hand  behind  this  clever  move  was  that  of  Colonel 
Harvey.  This  announcement  literally  sets  the  Conven 
tion  on  fire.  Bedlam  breaks  loose.  The  only  sullen 
and  indifferent  ones  in  the  hall  are  those  of  us  who  met 
defeat  a  few  hours  before.  For  us,  at  least,  the  mystery 
is  about  to  be  solved.  The  Princeton  professor  has  left 
the  shades  of  the  University  to  enter  the  Elysian  Fields 
of  politics. 

At  the  time  the  secretary's  announcement  was  made 
I  was  in  the  rear  of  the  convention  hall,  trying  to  become 
reconciled  to  our  defeat.  I  then  wended  my  weary  way 
to  the  stage  and  stood  close  to  the  band,  which  was  busy 
entertaining  the  crowd  until  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Wilson. 
I  wanted  to  obtain  what  newspaper  men  call  a  "close-up" 
of  this  man  of  mystery. 

What  were  my  own  feelings  as  I  saw  the  candidate 
quietly  walk  to  the  speakers'  stand?  I  was  now  to  see 
almost  face  to  face  for  the  first  time  the  man  I  had  openly 
and  bitterly  denounced  only  a  few  hours  before.  What 
reaction  of  regret  or  pleasure  did  I  experience  as  I  beheld 
the  vigorous,  clean-cut,  plainly  garbed  man,  who  now 


20      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

stood  before  me,  cool  and  smiling?     My  first  reaction 
of  regret  came  when  he  uttered  these  words: 

I  feel  the  responsibility  of  the  occasion.  Responsibility  is  pro 
portionate  to  opportunity.  It  is  a  great  opportunity  to  serve  the 
State  and  Nation.  I  did  not  seek  this  nomination,  I  have  made  no 
pledge  and  have  given  no  promises.  If  elected,  I  am  left  absolutely 
free  to  serve  you  with  all  singleness  of  purpose.  It  is  a  new  era 
when  these  things  can  be  said,  and  in  connection  with  this  I  feel  that 
the  dominant  idea  of  the  moment  is  the  responsibility  of  deserving. 
I  will  have  to  serve  the  state  very  well  in  order  to  deserve  the  honour 
of  being  at  its  head.  .  .  . 

Did  you  ever  experience  the  elation  of  a  great  hope,  that  you 
desire  to  do  right  because  it  is  right  and  without  thought  of  doing  it 
for  your  own  interest?  At  that  period  your  hopes  are  unselfish. 

This  in  particular  is  a  day  of  unselfish  purpose  for  Democracy. 
The  country  has  been  universally  misled  and  the  people  have  begun 
to  believe  that  there  is  something  radically  wrong.  And  now  we 
should  make  this  era  of  hope  one  of  realization  through  the  Demo 
cratic  party. 

I  had  another  reaction  of  regret  when  he  said: 
"Government  is  not  a  warfare  of  interests.  We  shall 
not  gain  our  ends  by  heat  and  bitterness."  How  simple 
the  man,  how  modest,  how  cultured!  Attempting  none 
of  the  cheap  "plays"  of  the  old  campaign  orator,  he 
impressively  proceeded  with  his  thrilling  speech,  carrying 
his  audience  with  him  under  the  spell  of  his  eloquent 
words.  How  tense  the  moment!  His  words,  spoken 
in  tones  so  soft,  so  fine,  in  voice  so  well  modulated,  so 
heart-stirring.  Only  a  few  sentences  are  uttered  and  our 
souls  are  stirred  to  their  very  depths.  It  was  not  only  what 
he  said,  but  the  simple  heart-stirring  way  in  which  he  said 
it.  The  great  climax  came  when  he  uttered  these  moving 
words:  "The  future  is  not  for  parties  "playing  polities' 
but  for  measures  conceived  in  the  largest  spirit,  pushed  by 


COLONEL    HARVEY    ON    THE    SCENE        21 

parties  whose  leaders  are  statesmen,  not  demagogues,  who 
love  not  their  offices  but  their  duty  and  their  opportunity 
for  service.  We  are  witnessing  a  renaissance  of  public 
spirit,  a  reawakening  of  sober  public  opinion,  a  revival 
of  the  power  of  the  people,  the  beginning  of  an  age  of 
thoughtful  reconstruction  that  makes  our  thoughts  hark 
back  to  the  age  in  which  democracy  was  set  up  in  America. 
With  the  new  age  we  shall  show  a  new  spirit.  We  shall 
serve  justice  and  candour  and  all  things  that  make  for 
the  right.  Is  not  our  own  party  disciplined  and  made 
ready  for  this  great  task?  Shall  we  not  forget  ourselves 
in  making  it  the  instrument  of  righteousness  for  the  state 
and  for  the  nation?" 

After  this  climax  there  was  a  short  pause.  "Go  on, 
go  on,"  eagerly  cried  the  crowd.  The  personal  magne 
tism  of  the  man,  his  winning  smile,  so  frank  and  so  sincere, 
the  light  of  his  gray  eyes,  the  fine  poise  of  his  well-shaped 
head,  the  beautiful  rhythm  of  his  vigorous  sentences,  held 
the  men  in  the  Convention  breathless  under  their  mystic 
spell.  Men  all  about  me  cried  in  a  frenzy:  "Thank  God, 
at  last,  a  leader  has  come!" 

Then,  the  great  ending.  Turning  to  the  flag  that  hung 
over  the  speakers'  stand,  he  said,  in  words  so  impressive 
as  to  bring  almost  a  sob  from  his  hearers: 

When  I  think  of  the  flag  which  our  ships  carry,  the  only  touch 
of  colour  about  them,  the  only  thing  that  moves  as  if  it  had  a  settled 
spirit  in  it — in  their  solid  structure,  it  seems  to  me  I  see  alternate 
strips  of  parchment  upon  which  are  written  the  rights  of  liberty  and 
justice  and  strips  of  blood  spilled  to  vindicate  those  rights  and  then — 
in  the  corner — a  prediction  of  the  blue  serene  into  which  every  nation 
may  swim  which  stands  for  these  great  things. 

The  speech  is  over.  Around  me  there  is  a  swirling  mass 
of  men  whose  hearts  had  been  touched  by  the  great 


22      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

speech  which  is  just  at  an  end.  Men  stood  about  me 
with  tears  streaming  from  their  eyes.  Realizing  that  they 
had  just  stood  in  the  presence  of  greatness,  it  seemed  as  if 
they  had  been  lifted  out  of  the  selfish  miasma  of  politics, 
and,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Crusaders,  were  ready  to  dedicate 
themselves  to  the  cause  of  liberating  their  state  from  the 
bondage  of  special  interests. 

As  I  turned  to  leave  the  convention  hall  there  stood 
at  my  side  old  John  Crandall,  of  Atlantic  City,  like  myself 
a  bitter,  implacable  foe  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  the  Con 
vention.  I  watched  him  intently  to  see  what  effect  the 
speech  had  had  upon  him.  For  a  minute  he  was  silent, 
as  if  in  a  dream,  and  then,  drawing  himself  up  to  his  full 
height,  with  a  cynical  smile  on  his  face,  waving  his  hat 
and  cane  in  the  air,  and  at  the  same  time  shaking  his  head 
in  a  self-accusing  way,  yelled  at  the  top  of  his  voice, 
"I  am  sixty -five  years  old,  and  still  a  damn  fool!" 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   NEW   JERSEY   SALIENT 

NO  CAMPAIGN  in  New  Jersey  caused  so  great  an 
interest  as  the  gubernatorial  campaign  of  1910. 
The  introduction  of  a  Princeton  professor  into  the 
political  melee  in  New  Jersey  had  given  a  novel  touch 
to  what  ordinarily  would  have  been  a  routine  affair.  The 
prologue  to  the  great  drama,  the  various  scenes  of  which 
were  now  to  unfold  before  the  voters  of  the  state,  had  been 
enacted  at  the  Democratic  Convention  at  Trenton  under 
the  masterly  direction  of  the  members  of  the  Democratic 
Old  Guard  of  the  state.  New  Jersey  had  long  been 
noted  throughout  the  country  as  the  "Mother  of  Trusts" 
and  the  nesting  place  of  Privilege.  Through  their  alliance 
and  partnership  with  the  political  bosses  of  both  parties 
the  so-called  corporate  interests  had  been  for  many  years 
successful,  against  the  greatest  pressure  of  public  opinion, 
in  blocking  the  passage  of  progressive  legislation. 

Liberal-minded  men  in  the  state  had  for  many  years 
been  carrying  on  an  agitation  for  the  enactment  into  law 
of  legislation  that  would  make  possible  the  following  great 
needs : 

1.  The  passage  of  a  Direct  Primary  Act. 

2.  The  passage  of  an  Employers'  Liability  Act. 

3.  The  regulation  of  Public  Utilities. 

4.  The  passage  of  a  Corrupt  Practices  Act. 

These  were  matters  within  the  scope  of  state  legislation, 
and  to  these  was  added  an  agitation  for  a  fifth  reform, 

23 


24      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

which,  of  course,  could  be  accomplished  only  through  an 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
the  election  of  United  States  senators  by  vote  of  the 
people. 

In  the  old  days  in  New  Jersey,  now  happily  gone,  the 
days  when  the  granting  of  special  corporation  charters 
was  the  vogue,  a  sort  of  political  suzerainty  was  set  up  by 
Railroad  and  Public  Service  interests.  Every  election 
was,  in  its  last  analysis,  a  solemn  referendum  upon  the 
question  as  to  which  corporate  interest  should  control 
legislation — whether  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  whose 
master  mind  was  the  Republican  leader  of  the  state, 
United  States  Senator  Sewall,  or  the  Public  Service 
interests,  whose  votaries  and  friends  were  Senator  Smith 
of  New  Jersey,  and  Milan  Ross,  Sr.,  of  Middlesex  County. 

While  these  corporate  interests  fought  among  them 
selves  over  the  matter  of  a  United  States  senatorship  or 
the  governorship  of  a  state,  they  were  at  one  in  their 
unrelenting,  bitter,  and  highly  organized  opposition  to  the 
passage  of  what  in  this  day  we  call  by  the  highly  dignified 
name  of  Social  Welfare  Legislation.  The  voices  of  those 
liberal-minded  men  and  women  of  the  state,  who,  year 
after  year,  fought  for  this  legislation,  were  like  voices 
crying  in  the  wilderness.  An  illustration  of  corporate 
opposition  was  the  unrelenting  attitude  of  the  Special 
Interest  group  of  the  state  to  the  passage  of  the  Em 
ployers'  Liability  Act.  Every  decent,  progressive,  hu 
mane  man  in  the  state  felt  that  the  old,  barbaric,  Fellow- 
Servant  doctrine  should  be  changed  and  that  there  should 
be  substituted  for  it  a  more  humane,  wholesome,  modern 
doctrine.  Nearly  every  state  in  the  Union  had  already 
recognized  the  injustice  of  the  old  rule,  but  the  privileged 
interests  in  New  Jersey  could  not  be  moved  in  their  bitter 


THE    NEW    JERSEY    SALIENT  25 

and  implacable  opposition  to  it,  and  for  over  half  a  century 
they  had  succeeded  in  preventing  its  enactment  into  law. 
Progressives  or  New  Idea  Republicans,  high  in  the 
councils  of  that  party,  had  fought  with  their  Democratic 
brethren  to  pass  this  legislation,  but  always  without 
result.  At  last  there  came  a  revolt  in  the  Republican 
party,  brought  about  and  led  by  sturdy  Republicans  like 
Everett  Colby  of  Essex,  and  William  P.  Martin  of  the 
same  county;  George  Record  and  Mark  M.  Fagan  of  my 
own  county,  Hudson.  Out  of  this  split  came  the  establish 
ment  in  the  ranks  of  the  Republican  party  itself  of  a 
faction  which  called  itself  the  New  Idea  branch  of  the 
Republican  party.  The  campaign  for  humane  legislation 
within  the  ranks  of  the  G.O.P.  was  at  last  begun  in  real 
fighting  fashion.  It  was  the  irrepressible  conflict  between 
the  old  and  the  new,  between  those  who  believed  human 
rights  are  superior  to  and  take  precedence  over  property 
rights.  The  conflict  could  not  be  stayed;  its  leaders 
could  not  be  restrained.  These  men,  Colby,  Record, 
Martin,  and  Fagan,  were  the  sowers  of  the  Progressive 
seed  which  Woodrow  Wilson,  by  his  genius  for  leadership 
and  constructive  action  along  humane  lines,  was  soon  to 
harvest.  His  candidacy,  therefore,  admirably  fitted  into 
the  interesting  situation. 

When  the  convention  that  nominated  Woodrow  Wil 
son  had  adjourned,  a  convention  wholly  dominated  by 
reactionary  bosses,  it  seemed  as  if  progress  and  every  fine 
thing  for  which  the  Progressives  had  worked  had  been 
put  finally  to  sleep.  Behind  the  selection  of  the  Prince- 
tonian  and  his  candidacy  lay  the  Old  Guard  who  thought 
the  Professor  could  be  used  as  a  shield  for  their  strategy. 
The  Progressives,  both  Democratic  and  Republican,  had 
witnessed  the  scenes  enacted  at  the  Democratic  Conven- 


26      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

tion  at  Trenton  with  breaking  hearts.  They  were  about 
to  lose  hope.  They  did  not  know  that  the  candidate  had 
at  the  outset  served  notice  on  the  Old  Guard  that  if  he 
were  nominated  he  must  be  a  free  man  to  do  nobody's 
bidding,  to  serve  no  interests  except  those  of  the  people 
of  the  state;  but  the  Old  Guard  had  not  published  this. 

The  Republican  candidate,  nominated  at  the  time 
Woodrow  Wilson  was  selected,  was  a  most  pleasant, 
kindly,  genial  man  from  Passaic,  Mr.  Vivian  M.  Lewis, 
who  had  just  retired  as  banking  commissioner  for  the 
state.  By  clever  plays  to  the  Progressives  he  had,  at 
least  temporarily,  brought  together  the  various  pro 
gressive  elements  of  the  state.  This  movement  appar 
ently  was  aided  by  the  Democratic  candidate's  reluctance 
in  the  early  days  of  the  campaign  to  speak  out  boldly 
against  the  domination  of  the  Democratic  party  by  the 
bosses  or  the  Old  Guard. 


CHAPTER  VI 

SOMETHING   NEW   IN   POLITICAL   CAMPAIGNS 

WOODROW  WILSON  opened  his  gubernatorial 
campaign  with  a  speech  in  Jersey  City,  my 
home  town.  It  was  a  distinct  disappointment 
to  those  who  attended  the  meeting.  His  speech  in 
accepting  the  nomination  had  touched  us  deeply  and  had 
aroused  in  us  great  expectations,  but  after  the  Jersey 
City  speech  we  were  depressed  in  spirit,  for  it  seemed  to 
us  that  he  was  evading  the  real  issues  of  the  campaign. 
I  was  most  anxious  to  meet  the  candidate  and  give  him, 
if  he  invited  it,  my  impressions  of  this  speech.  A  dinner 
given  to  complete  the  ceremonies  attendant  upon  the 
purchase  of  the  Caldwell  residence  of  Grover  Cleveland 
gave  me  the  first  opportunity  to  meet  the  president  of 
Princeton  in  an  intimate  way.  Mr.  Wilson's  first  wife, 
a  most  delightful  woman,  made  the  introduction  possible. 
As  I  fondly  look  back  upon  this  meeting,  I  vividly  recall 
my  impressions  of  the  man  who  had  just  been  nominated 
for  the  governorship  of  the  state  in  a  convention  in  which 
I  had  bitterly  opposed  him. 

The  democratic  bearing  of  the  man,  his  warmth  of 
manner,  charm,  and  kindly  bearing  were  the  first  things 
that  attracted  me  to  him.  There  was  no  coldness  or 
austerity  about  him,  nor  was  he  what  the  politicians 
would  call  "high-browish."  He  impressed  me  as  a  plain, 
unaffected,  affable  gentleman,  who  was  most  anxious  to 
receive  advice  and  suggestion  from  any  quarter.  He 

i  27 


28      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

made  us  doubly  welcome  by  saying  that  he  had  heard 
a  great  deal  of  favourable  comment  about  the  work  of 
Judge  Sullivan  and  myself  in  the  Legislature.  This  made 
us  feel  perfectly  at  home,  and  this  frank  manner  of  dealing 
with  us  opened  the  way  for  the  suggestions  we  desired  to 
make  to  him  as  to  the  attitude  we  younger  Democrats 
thought  he  should  assume  on  what  we  believed  were  the 
vital,  progressive  issues  of  the  campaign. 

When  he  was  informed  that  I  was  present  at  his  first 
meeting  a  few  nights  before  in  Jersey  City,  he  came  over 
to  me  and  in  a  most  friendly  way  said:  "What  did  you 
really  think  of  my  speech?"  For  a  moment  I  was  em 
barrassed,  and  yet  the  frankness  of  the  man  was  com 
pelling  and  so  I  said:  "Doctor,  do  you  really  desire  an 
honest  opinion  of  that  speech?  I  really  want  to 
serve  you  but  I  can  do  so  only  by  speaking  frankly." 
He  replied :  "That  is  what  I  most  desire."  "  Well, "  I  said, 
"your  speech  was  most  disappointing."  I  stopped 
suddenly,  feeling  that  I  had  done  enough  damage  to  the 
Professor's  feelings.  But  he  urged:  "Please  tell  me  what 
your  criticism  is.  What  I  most  need  is  honesty  and 
frankness.  You  cannot  hurt  my  feelings  by  truthfully 
expressing  your  opinion.  Don't  forget  that  I  am  an 
amateur  at  this  game  and  need  advice  and  guidance." 
Encouraged  by  this  suggestion,  I  proceeded  to  tell  him 
what  I  considered  the  principal  defects  of  his  opening 
speech  at  Jersey  City.  I  told  him  that  there  was  a  lack 
of  definiteness  in  it  which  gave  rise  to  the  impression  that 
he  was  trying  to  evade  a  discussion  of  the  moral  issues  of 
the  campaign,  among  them,  of  major  importance,  being 
the  regulation  of  Public  Utilities  and  the  passage  of  an 
Employers'  Liability  Act.  Briefly  sketching  for  him  our 
legislative  situation,  I  gave  him  the  facts  with  reference  to 


THE  WHITE.  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 


C03UISH,  N.  H., 
July  3,  1915 


Ity  dear  Tumulty: 

I  am  heartily  oMi^ed  to  you  for 
your  telegrams.     It  is  characteristic  of  you 
to  keep  my  mind  free  "by  such,  messages.     I  am 
really  having  a  most  refreshing  and  rewarding 
time  and  am  very  thankful  to  get   it.     I  hope 
that  you  are  not  having  depressing  weather  in 
ISashington  and  that  you  are  finding  it  possible 
to  make  satisfactory  arrangements  for  the  f tolly, 
so  that  we  can  have  the  pleasure  of  having  you 
with  us  at  the  white  House  when  I  get  "back, 
-warmest  messages  from  us  all, 
Affectionately  yours, 


Hon.  Joseph  p,  Tumulty, 
"Washington,  D.  c. 


This  letter  reveals  the  warm  personal  relations  between  the  President 
and  his  secretary 


30      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

those  large  measures  of  public  interest;  how,  for  many 
years,  in  face  of  constant  agitation,  the  Old  Guard  had 
prevented  the  enactment  of  these  measures  into  law,  and 
how,  therefore,  his  failure  to  discuss  these  matters  in  his 
first  speech  had  caused  a  grave  feeling  of  unrest  in  the 
progressive  ranks  of  both  parties  in  New  Jersey. 

He  listened  with  keen  attention  and  then  modestly 
remarked:  "I  value  very  highly  this  tip  and  you  may  rest 
assured  I  shall  cover  these  matters  in  my  next  speech.  I 
meant  that  speech  to  be  general." 

In  my  ignorance  of  things  past  I  did  not  know  that  the 
candidate  had  himself  written  the  platform  adopted  by  the 
Trenton  Convention,  and  in  my  ignorance  of  the  future 
I  did  not  then  know  that  one  of  the  boldest  and  most 
remarkable  political  campaigns  in  America  was  to  be 
conducted  on  that  platform,  and  that  after  the  election 
and  inauguration  of  the  nominee  the  chief  business  of  the 
legislation  was  destined  to  be  the  enactment  into  law  of 
each  of  the  planks  of  the  platform,  a  complete  and 
itemized  fulfilment  of  preelection  promises,  unusual  in 
the  history  of  American  politics.  At  the  time  of  my 
first  conversation  with  the  nominee  I  only  knew  that  the 
Convention  had  been  dominated  by  the  reactionary  ele 
ments  in  the  party,  that  under  this  domination  it  had 
stolen  the  thunder  of  the  progressive  elements  of  the 
party  and  of  the  New  Idea  Republicans,  and  that  the 
platform  had  been  practically  ignored  by  the  candidate  in 
his  first  campaign  speech.  In  these  circumstances,  and 
smarting  as  I  was  under  the  recollection  of  recent  defeat, 
it  is  not  strange  that  I  thought  I  detected  the  old  political 
ruse  of  dressing  the  wolf  in  sheep's  clothing,  of  using  hand 
some  pledges  as  a  mask  to  deceive  the  gullible,  and  that 
I  assumed  that  this  scholarly  amateur  in  politics  was  being 


SOMETHING    NEW    IN    CAMPAIGNS         31 

used  for  their  own  purposes  by  masters  and  veterans  in 
the  old  game  of  thimblerig. 

The  candidate  soon  struck  his  gait  and  astonished  me 
and  all  New  Jersey  with  the  vigour,  frankness,  and 
lucidity  of  his  speeches  of  exposition  and  appeal.  No 
campaign  in  years  in  New  Jersey  had  roused  such  univer 
sal  interest.  There  was  no  mistaking  the  character  and 
enthusiasm  of  the  greeting  the  candidate  received  every 
place  he  spoke,  nor  the  response  his  thrilling  speeches 
evoked  all  over  the  state.  Those  who  had  gathered  the 
idea  that  the  head  of  the  great  university  would  appear 
pedantic  and  stand  stiff-necked  upon  an  academic  pedestal 
from  which  he  would  talk  over  the  heads  of  the  common 
people  were  forced,  by  the  fighting,  aggressive  attitude  of 
the  Doctor,  to  revise  their  old  estimates.  The  campaign 
had  only  begun  when  the  leading  newspapers  of  the 
country,  particularly  the  large  dailies  of  New  York,  were 
taking  an  interest  in  the  New  Jersey  fight. 

Those  of  us  who  doubted  Woodrow  Wilson's  sincerity 
and  his  sympathy  for  the  great  progressive  measures  for 
which  we  had  been  fighting  in  the  New  Jersey  Legislature 
were  soon  put  at  ease  by  the  developments  of  his  cam 
paign  and  his  sympathetic  attitude  toward  the  things 
we  had  so  much  at  heart. 

No  candidate  for  governor  in  New  Jersey  had  ever 
made  so  striking  and  moving  an  appeal.  Forgetting  and 
ignoring  the  old  slogans  and  shibboleths,  he  appealed  to 
the  hearts  and  consciences  of  the  people  of  the  state.  His 
homely  illustrations  evoked  expressions  of  delight,  until 
it  seemed  as  if  this  newcomer  in  the  politics  of  our  state 
had  a  better  knowledge  of  the  psychology  of  the  ordinary 
crowd  than  the  old  stagers  who  had  spent  their  lives  in 
politics.  His  illustrations  always  went  home. 


32      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

For  instance,  speaking  of  progress,  Doctor  Wilson  said 
that  much  depended  upon  the  action  of  the  one  who  is 
supposed  to  be  progressive.  "  I  can  recall, "  he  would  say  in 
trying  to  make  his  point,  "the  picture  of  a  poor  devil  of  a 
donkey  on  a  treadmill.  He  keeps  on  tramping,  tramping, 
tramping,  but  he  never  gets  anywhere.  But,"  he 
continued,  "there  is  a  certain  elephant  that's  tramping, 
too,  and  how  much  progress  is  it  making?"  And  then, 
again,  he  would  grow  solemn  when  he  spoke  of  the 
average  man.  Turning  aside  from  the  humorous,  he 
would  strike  a  serious  note  like  this  one: 


You  know  that  communities  are  not  distinguished  by  exceptional 
men.  They  are  distinguished  by  the  average  of  their  citizenship. 
.  .1  .  I  often  think  of  the  poor  man  when  he  goes  to  vote :  a  moral 
unit  in  his  lonely  dignity. 

The  deepest  conviction  and  passion  of  my  heart  is  that  the  com 
mon  people,  by  which  I  mean  all  of  us,  are  to  be  absolutely  trusted. 
The  peculiarity  of  some  representatives,  particularly  those  of  the 
Republican  party,  is  that  when  they  talk  about  the  people,  they  ob 
viously  do  not  include  themselves.  Now  if,  when  you  think  of  the 
people,  you  are  not  thinking  about  yourself,  then  you  do  not  belong 
in  America. 

When  I  look  back  at  the  processes  of  history,  when  I  look  back 
at  the  genesis  of  America,  I  see  this  written  over  every  page,  that  the 
nations  are  renewed  from  the  bottom,  not  from  the  top;  that  the 
genius  which  springs  up  from  the  ranks  of  unknown  men  is  the  genius 
which  renews  the  youth  and  the  energy  of  the  people;  and  in  every 
age  of  the  world,  where  you  stop  the  courses  of  the  blood  from  the 
roots;  you  injure  the  great,  useful  structure  to  the  extent  that  at 
rophy,  death,  and  decay  are  sure  to  ensue.  This  is  the  reason  that  an 
hereditary  monarchy  does  not  work;  that  is  the  reason  that  an  heredi 
tary  aristocracy  does  not  work;  that  is  the  reason  that  everything 
of  that  sort  is  full  of  corruption  and  ready  to  decay. 

So  I  say  that  our  challenge  of  to-day  is  to  include  in  the  partnership 
all  those  great  bodies  of  unnamed  men  who  are  going  to  produce  our 


SOMETHING    NEW    IN    CAMPAIGNS         33 

future  leaders  and  renew  the  future  energies  of  America.  And  as  I 
confess  that,  as  I  confess  my  belief  in  the  common  man,  I  know  what 
I  am  saying.  The  man  who  is  swimming  against  the  stream  knows 
the  strength  of  it.  The  man  who  is  in  the  melee  knows  what  blows 
are  being  struck  and  what  blood  is  being  drawn.  The  man  who  is 
on  the  make  is  a  judge  of  what  is  happening  in  America,  not  the  man 
who  has  made;  not  the  man  who  has  emerged  from  the  flood,  not 
the  man  who  is  standing  on  the  bank,  looking  on,  but  the  man  who  is 
struggling  for  his  life  and  for  the  lives  of  those  who  are  dearer  to 
him  than  himself.  That  is  the  man  whose  judgment  will  tell  you 
what  is  going  on  in  America,  and  that  is  the  man  by  whose  judg 
ment  I  for  one  wish  to  be  guided — so  that  as  the  tasks  multiply 
and  the  days  come  when  all  will  seem  confusion  and  dismay,  we  may 
lift  up  our  eyes  to  the  hills  out  of  these  dark  valleys  where  the  crags  of 
special  privilege  overshadow  and  darken  our  path,  to  where  the  sun 
gleams  through  the  great  passage  in  the  broken  cliffs,  the  sun  of 
God,  the  sun  meant  to  regenerate  men,  the  sun  meant  to  liberate 
them  from  their  passion  and  despair  and  to  lift  us  to  those  uplands 
which  are  the  promised  land  of  every  man  who  desires  liberty  and 
achievement. 

Speaking  for  the  necessity  of  corporate  reform  in  busi 
ness,  he  said: 

I  am  not  objecting  to  the  size  of  these  corporations.  Nothing  is 
big  enough  to  scare  me.  What  I  am  objecting  to  is  that  the  Govern 
ment  should  give  them  exceptional  advantages,  which  enables  them 
to  succeed  and  does  not  put  them  on  the  same  footing  as  other 
people.  I  think  those  great  touring  cars,  for  example,  which  are 
labelled  "Seeing  New  York,"  are  too  big  for  the  streets.  You  have 
almost  to  walk  around  the  block  to  get  away  from  them,  and  size 
has  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  trouble  if  you  are  trying  to  get  out 
of  the  way.  But  I  have  no  objection  on  that  account  to  the  ordinary 
automobile  properly  handled  by  a  man  of  conscience  who  is  also  a 
gentleman.  I  have  no  objection  to  the  size,  power,  and  beauty 
of  an  automobile.  I  am  interested,  however,  in  the  size  and  con 
science  of  the  men  who  handle  them,  and  what  I  object  to  is  that  some 
corporation  men  are  taking  "joy-rides"  in  their  corporations. 


34      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Time  and  time  again  men  were  reminded  of  the  great 
speeches  of  Lincoln  and  thought  they  saw  his  fine  spirit 
breathing  through  sentences  like  these: 

Gentlemen,  we  are  not  working  for  to-day,  we  are  not  working  for 
our  own  interest,  we  are  all  going  to  pass  away.  But  think  of  what 
is  involved.  Here  are  the  tradition,  and  the  fame,  and  the  pros 
perity,  and  the  purity,  and  the  peace  of  a  great  nation  involved. 
For  the  time  being  we  are  that  nation,  but  the  generations  that  are 
behind  us  are  pointing  us  forward  to  the  path  and  say  ing:"  Remember 
the  great  traditions  of  the  American  people,"  and  all  those  unborn 
children  that  will  constitute  the  generations  that  are  ahead  will 
look  back  to  us,  either  at  those  who  serve  them  or  at  those  who  be 
tray  them.  Will  any  man  in  such  circumstances  think  it  worthy 
to  stand  and  not  try  to  do  what  is  possible  in  so  great  a  cause,  to  save 
a  country,  to  purify  a  polity,  to  set  up  vast  reforms  which  will  in 
crease  the  happiness  of  mankind?  God  forbid  that  I  should  either  be 
daunted  or  turned  away  from  a  great  task  like  this. 

Speaking  of  the  candidate  who  opposed  him: 

I  have  been  informed  that  he  has  the  best  of  me  in  looks.  Now, 
it  is  not  always  the  useful  horse  that  is  most  beautiful.  If  I  had  a 
big  load  to  be  drawn  some  distance  I  should  select  one  of  those  big, 
shaggy  kinds  of  horses,  not  much  for  beauty  but  strong  of  pull. 

On  one  occasion,  when  he  had  been  talking  about  his 
and  Mr.  Lewis's  different  conceptions  of  the  "constitu 
tional  governor",  and  telling  his  audience  how  he,  if 
elected,  would  interpret  the  election  as  a  mandate 
from  the  people  to  assist  in  and  direct  legislation  in  the 
interests  of  the  people  of  New  Jersey  at  large,  he  paused 
an  instant  and  then  in  those  incisive  tones  and  with  that 
compression  of  the  lips  which  marked  his  more  bellicose 
words,  he  said  curtly:  "If  you  don't  want  that  kind  of  a 
governor,  don't  elect  me." 


SOMETHING   NEW    IN    CAMPAIGNS         35 

Excerpts  from  the  speeches  cannot  do  justice  to  this 
remarkable  campaign,  which  Woodrow  Wilson  himself, 
after  he  had  been  twice  elected  President  of  the  United 
States,  considered  the  most  satisfying  of  his  political 
campaigns,  because  the  most  systematic  and  basic.     As 
Presidential  candidate  he  had  to  cover  a  wide  territory 
and  touch  only  the  high  spots  in  the  national  issues,  but  in 
his  gubernatorial  campaign  he  spoke  in  every  county  of 
the  state  and  in  some  counties  several  times,  and  his  speeches 
grew  out  of  each  other  and  were  connected  with  each 
other  in  a  way  that  made  them  a  popular  treatise  on  self- 
government.     He  used  no  technical  jargon  and  none  of  the 
stereotyped  bombast  of  the  usual  political  campaign.     He 
had  a  theme  which  he  wanted  to  expound  to  the  people  of 
New  Jersey,  which  theme  was  the  nature  and  character 
of  free  government,  how  it  had  been  lost  in  New  Jersey 
through  the  complicated  involvements  of  invisible  govern 
ment,  manipulated  from  behind  the  scenes  by  adroit 
representatives  of  the  corporate  interest  working  in  con 
junction  with  the   old  political  machines;   how   under 
this  clever  manipulation  legislators  had  ceased  to  represent 
the  electorate  and  were,  as  he  called  them,  only  "errand 
boys"  to  do  the  bidding  of  the  real  rulers  of  New  Jersey, 
many  of  whom  were  not  even  residents  of  the  state,  and 
how  free  government  could  be  restored  to  New  Jersey 
through    responsible    leadership.     He    was    making    an 
application    to    practical    politics    of    the    fundamental 
principles    of    responsible    government    which    he    had 
analyzed  in  his  earlier  writings,  including  the  book  on 
"Congressional    Government."     Beneath    the    concrete 
campaign  issues  in  New  Jersey  he  saw  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Magna  Charta  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  and  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  Constitution  of  the 


36      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

United  States.  His  trained  habit  of  thinking  through 
concrete  facts  to  basic  principles  was  serving  him  well  in 
this  campaign;  his  trained  habit  of  clear  exposition  in 
the  Princeton  lecture  hall  was  serving  him  well.  People 
heard  from  him  political  speaking  of  a  new  kind;  full  of 
weighty  instruction  and  yet  so  simply  phrased  and  so 
aptly  illustrated  that  the  simplest  minded  could 
follow  the  train  of  reasoning;  profound  in  political  philoso 
phy  and  yet  at  every  step  humanized  by  one  who  believed 
government  the  most  human  of  things  because  concerned 
with  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  individuals;  sometimes 
he  spoke  in  parables,  homely  anecdotes  so  applied  that  all 
could  understand;  sometimes  he  was  caustic  when  he 
commented  on  the  excessive  zeal  of  corporations  for 
strict  constitutionalism,  meaning  thereby  only  such  legis 
lation  and  judicial  interpretations  as  would  defend  their 
property  rights — how  they  had  secured  those  rights  being 
a  question  not  discussed  by  these  gentlemen;  sometimes, 
though  not  frequently,  there  would  be  purple  patches  of 
eloquence,  particularly  when  descanting  on  the  long 
struggle  of  the  inarticulate  masses  for  political  represen 
tation.  One  of  the  surprises  of  the  campaign  to  those  who 
had  known  him  as  an  orator  of  classic  eloquence  was  the 
comparative  infrequency  of  rhetorical  periods.  It  was 
as  if  he  were  now  too  deeply  engaged  with  actualities  to 
chisel  and  polish  his  sentences.  Of  the  many  anecdotes 
which  he  told  during  the  campaign  one  of  his  favourites 
was  of  the  Irishman  digging  a  cellar,  who  when  asked 
what  he  was  doing  said:  "I'm  letting  the  darkness  out." 
Woodrow  Wilson  told  the  people  of  New  Jersey  that  he 
was  "letting  the  darkness  out"  of  the  New  Jersey  political 
situation.  "Pitiless  publicity"  was  one  of  his  many 
phrases  coined  in  the  campaign  which  quickly  found 


SOMETHING    NEW    IN    CAMPAIGNS         37 

currency,  not  only  in  New  Jersey  but  throughout  the 
country,  for  presently  the  United  States  at  large  began 
to  realize  that  what  was  going  on  in  New  Jersey  was 
symbolical  of  the  situation  throughout  the  country,  a 
tremendous  struggle  to  restore  popular  government  to  the 
people.  Since  the  founders  of  the  Republic  expounded 
free  institutions  to  the  first  electorates  of  this  country  there 
had  probably  been  no  political  campaign  which  went  so 
directly  to  the  roots  of  free  representative  government 
and  how  to  get  it  as  that  campaign  which  Woodrow  Wilson 
conducted  in  New  Jersey  in  the  autumn  of  1910. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   CRISIS   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

THE  crisis  of  the  campaign  came  when  George  L. 
Record,  Progressive  leader  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Republican  party  in  Hudson  County,  uttered  a 
ringing  challenge  to  the  Democratic  candidate  to  debate 
the  issues  of  the  campaign  with  him.  The  challenge 
contained  an  alternative  proposition  that  the  Democratic 
candidate  either  meet  Mr.  Record  in  joint  debate  in 
various  parts  of  the  state  or  that  he  answer  certain 
questions  with  reference  to  the  control  of  the  Democratic 
party  by  what  Mr.  Record  called  the  "Old  Guard. "  Mr. 
Record's  letter  and  challenge  created  a  profound  sensation 
throughout  the  state  and  brought  hope  and  comfort  to 
the  ranks  of  the  Republican  party. 

Record  emphasized  the  Old  Guard's  control  of  the 
convention  at  which  Wilson  was  nominated,  basing  most 
of  his  questions  upon  this  character  of  political  control, 
and  openly  challenging  Wilson,  the  Democratic  candidate, 
to  say  whether  the  elements  that  were  dominant  at 
Trenton  in  the  Convention  would  be  permitted  by  him, 
in  case  of  his  election,  to  influence  his  action  as  governor. 

For  several  days  after  the  letter  containing  the  challenge 
reached  the  Democratic  candidate,  there  was  a  great  deal 
of  apprehension  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic  party  lest 
the  candidate  should  decide  to  ignore  the  Record  chal 
lenge,  thus  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemies  of 
progressivism  in  the  state,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he 

38 


THE    CRISIS    OF    THE    CAMPAIGN  39 

would  accept  it  and  thus  give  Mr.  Record,  who  was  a  most 
resourceful  public  speaker  and  a  leading  exponent  of 
liberalism  in  the  state,  a  chance  to  outwit  him  in  public 
debate.  The  latter  practically  demanded  of  the  Demo 
cratic  candidate  that  he  repudiate  not  only  the  Old  Guard 
but  the  active  management  of  his  campaign  which  had 
been  taken  over  by  James  R.  Nugent,  one  of  the  leaders 
of  Essex  County,  who  daily  accompanied  the  Democratic 
candidate  on  his  tour  of  the  state. 

For  a  time  it  looked  as  if  Doctor  Wilson  would  ignore 
entirely  the  Record  challenge.  It  was  plainly  evident 
from  all  sides  that  what  appeared  to  be  his  reluctance  to 
take  a  stand  in  the  matter  had  turned  support  away  at  a 
time  when  the  sentiment  of  the  state  was  rapidly  flowing 
his  way. 

I  accompanied  the  candidate  on  an  automobile  tour  of 
the  state  and  in  our  little  talks  I  sought  to  find  out,  in  a 
diplomatic  way,  just  how  his  mind  was  running  on  the 
Record  challenge  and  how  he  intended  to  meet  it.  In  the 
automobile  with  us  on  this  tour  was  James  R.  Nugent, 
then  the  state  chairman  of  the  Democratic  Committee. 
I  ascertained  that  even  he  knew  nothing  about  the 
Prince tonian's  attitude  toward  the  Record  challenge. 
A  significant  remark  which  the  candidate  dropped 
"between  meetings"  gave  me  the  first  intimation  that  the 
Democratic  candidate  was,  to  use  a  baseball  expression, 
"on  to  the  Record  curve"  and  that  he  would  answer  him 
in  so  emphatic  and  overwhelming  a  fashion  that  the  Re 
publican  campaign  would  never  entirely  recover  from 
the  blow. 

One  day  while  we  were  seated  in  the  tonneau  of 
the  automobile  discussing  the  Record  challenge,  Mr. 
Wilson  pointed  his  finger  at  Jim  Nugent  and  said, 


40      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

very  significantly:  "I  intend  to  reply  to  Mr.  Record, 
but  I  am  sure  that  it  will  hurt  the  feelings  of  this  fine 
fellow." 

A  few  days  later,  without  consulting  any  one,  Mr. 
Wilson  replied  to  Record's  challenge.  It  was  a  definite, 
clean-cut,  unequivocal  repudiation  of  the  Old  Guard's 
control  of  the  Democratic  party,  and  a  convincing  answer 
to  every  question  that  had  been  put  to  him.  It  rang 
true.  Old-line  Republicans,  after  reading  this  conclusive 
reply,  shook  their  heads  and  said,  regretfully,  "Damn 
Record;  the  campaign's  over." 

It  was  plainly  evident  that  the  crisis  of  the  campaign 
had  been  safely  passed  and  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  on  his 
way  to  the  governorship. 

In  his  challenge  Mr.  Record  had  addressed  to  Doctor 
Wilson  nineteen  questions.  Mr.  Wilson's  reply  was  in  part 
as  follows: 

You  wish  to  know  what  my  relations  would  be  with  the  Democrats 
whose  power  and  influence  you  fear  should  I  be  elected  governor, 
particularly  in  such  important  matters  as  appointments  and  the  sign 
ing  of  bills,  and  I  am  very  glad  to  tell  you.  If  elected  I  shall  not 
either  in  the  matter  of  appointments  to  office,  or  assent  to  legislation, 
or  in  shaping  any  part  of  the  policy  of  my  administration,  submit 
to  the  dictation  of  any  person,  or  persons,  "special  interests,"  or 
organizations.  I  will  always  welcome  advice  and  suggestions  from 
any  citizens,  whether  boss,  leader,  organization  man,  or  plain  citizen, 
and  I  shall  confidently  seek  the  advice  of  influential  and  disinterested 
men  representative  of  the  communities  and  disconnected  from  political 
organizations  entirely;  but  all  suggestions  and  all  advice  will  be  con 
sidered  on  its  merits  and  no  additional  weight  will  be  given  to  any 
man's  advice  because  of  his  exercising,  or  supposing  that  he  exercises, 
some  sort  of  political  influence  or  control.  I  should  deem  myself  for 
ever  disgraced  should  I,  in  even  the  slightest  degree,  cooperate  in 
any  such  system.  I  regard  myself  as  pledged  to  the  regeneration  of 
the  Democratic  party. 


THE    CRISIS    OF    THE    CAMPAIGN  41 

Mr.  Record  also  inquired:  "Do  you  admit  that  the  boss 
system  exists  as  I  have  described  it?  "  " If  so,  how  do  you 
propose  to  abolish  it?" 

Mr.  Wilson  said: 

Of  course  I  admit  it.  Its  existence  is  notorious.  I  have  made  it 
my  business  for  many  years  to  observe  and  understand  that  system, 
and  I  hate  it  as  thoroughly  as  I  understand  it.  You  are  quite  right 
in  saying  that  the  system  is  bipartisan;  that  it  constitutes  "the  most 
dangerous  condition  in  the  public  life  of  our  state  and  nation  to-day"; 
and  that  it  has  virtually,  for  the  time  being,  "destroyed  representa 
tive  government  and  hi  its  place  set  up  a  government  of  privilege." 
I  would  propose  to  abolish  it  by  the  reforms  suggested  in  the  Demo 
cratic  platform,  by  the  election  to  office  of  men  who  will  refuse  to 
submit  to  it,  and  who  will  lend  all  their  energies  to  break  it  up,  and 
by  pitiless  publicity. 

Still  hoping  to  corner  the  Governor,  Mr.  Record  named 
the  bosses: 

In  referring  to  the  Board  of  Guardians,  do  you  mean  such  Re 
publican  leaders  as  Baird,  Murphy,  Kean,  and  Stokes?  Wherein 
do  the  relations  to  the  special  interests  of  such  leaders  differ  from  the 
relation  to  the  same  interests  of  such  Democratic  leaders  as  Smith, 
Nugent,  and  Davis? 

Mr.  Wilson,  answering  this,  said: 

I  refer  to  the  men  you  name.  They  [meaning  Baird,  Murphy, 
Kean,  Stokes]  differ  from  the  others  in  this,  that  they  are  in  control 
of  the  government  of  the  state  while  the  others  are  not,  and  cannot 
be  if  the  present  Democratic  ticket  is  elected. 

In  reply  to  Mr.  Record's  question:  "Will  you  join 
me  in  denouncing  the  Democratic  "overlords'  as  parties 
to  a  political  boss  system?"  Doctor  Wilson  replied: 
"Certainly  I  will  join  you  in  denouncing  them — or  any 


42      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

one  of  either  party  who  attempts  any  outrages  against 
the  Government  and  public  morality." 

At  this  time  I  was  in  close  touch  with  the  managers  of 
the  Wilson  campaign,  including  Smith,  Nugent,  and  Davis. 
While  they  admired  the  fine  strategy  that  lay  back  of  the 
Democratic  candidate's  reply  to  Mr.  Record,  they  looked 
upon  it  as  a  mere  gesture  upon  the  part  of  Mr.  Wilson  and 
scorned  to  believe  that  his  reply  to  Mr.  Record  constituted 
a  challenge  to  their  leadership.  They  did  not  show  any 
evidences  of  dismay  or  chagrin  at  the  courageous  attitude 
taken  by  Doctor  Wilson.  They  simply  smiled  and  shrugged 
their  shoulders  and  said:  "This  is  a  great  campaign  play." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   END   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN 

THE  final  meeting  of  the  gubernatorial  campaign 
was  held  in  a  large  auditorium  in  Newark,  New 
Jersey,  where  the  last  appeal  was  made  by  the 
Democratic  candidate.  It  was  a  meeting  filled  with 
emotionalism  such  as  I  had  never  seen  in  a  campaign 
before.  The  Democratic  candidate,  Woodrow  Wilson, 
had  covered  every  section  of  the  state  and  it  was  easy  for 
even  the  casual  observer  to  note  the  rising  tide  in  his 
favour.  The  campaign  had,  indeed,  become  a  crusade; 
his  eloquence  and  sledge-hammer  blows  at  the  opposition 
having  cut  our  party  lines  asunder.  I  was  present  at  the 
final  meeting  and  took  my  place  in  the  wings  of  the 
theatre  or  auditorium,  alongside  of  Senator  Smith,  the 
Democratic  chieftain  who  a  few  weeks  before  had,  in  a 
masterful  fashion,  manipulated  the  workings  of  the 
Convention  at  Trenton  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the 
Doctor's  nomination  possible.  Mr.  Wilson's  speech  on 
this  occasion  was  a  profession  of  faith  in  the  people,  in  the 
plain  people,  those  "whose  names  never  emerged  into  the 
headlines  of  newspapers."  When  he  said  in  a  delightful 
sort  of  banter  to  his  audience,  "I  want  you  to  take  a 
sportsman's  chance  on  me,"  there  went  up  a  shout  of 
approval  which  could  be  heard  as  far  as  the  hills  of  old 
Bergen. 
The  peroration  of  his  final  speech,  spoken  in  a  tone  of 

43 


44      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

voice  that  seemed  not  only  to  reach  every  ear  but,  in 
fact,  to  touch  every  heart,  was  as  follows: 

We  have  begun  a  fight  that,  it  may  be,  will  take  many  a  generation 
to  complete,  the  fight  against  privilege;  but  you  know  that  men  are 
not  put  into  this  world  to  go  the  path  of  ease.  They  are  put  into 
this  world  to  go  the  path  of  pain  and  struggle.  No  man  would 
wish  to  sit  idly  by  and  lose  the  opportunity  to  take  part  in  such  a 
struggle.  All  through  the  centuries  there  has  been  this  slow,  painful 
struggle  forward,  forward,  up,  up,  a  little  at  a  time,  along  the  entire 
incline,  the  interminable  way  which  leads  to  the  perfection  of  force, 
to  the  real  seat  of  justice  and  honour. 

There  are  men  who  have  fallen  by  the  way;  blood  without  stint 
has  been  shed;  men  have  sacrificed  everything  in  this  sometimes  blind, 
but  always  instinctive  and  constant  struggle,  and  America  has  under 
taken  to  lead  the  way;  America  has  undertaken  to  be  the  haven  of 
hope,  the  opportunity  for  all  men. 

Don't  look  forward  too  much.  Don't  look  at  the  road  ahead  of 
you  in  dismay.  Look  at  the  road  behind  you.  Don't  you  see  how 
far  up  the  hill  we  have  come?  Don't  you  see  what  those  low  and 
damp  miasmatic  levels  were  from  which  we  have  slowly  led  the  way? 
Don't  you  see  the  rows  of  men  come,  not  upon  the  lower  level,  but  upon 
the  upper,  like  the  rays  of  the  rising  sun?  Don't  you  see  the  light 
starting  and  don't  you  see  the  light  illuminating  all  nations? 

Don't  you  know  that  you  are  coming  more  and  more  into  the  beauty 
of  its  radiance?  Don't  you  know  that  the  past  is  for  ever  behind  us, 
that  we  have  passed  many  kinds  of  evils  no  longer  possible,  that  we 
have  achieved  great  ends  and  have  almost  seen  their  fruition  in  free 
America?  Don't  forget  the  road  that  you  have  trod,  but,  remember 
ing  it  and  looking  back  for  reassurance,  look  forward  with  confidence 
and  charity  to  your  fellow  men  one  at  a  time  as  you  pass  them  along 
the  road,  and  see  those  who  are  willing  to  lead  you,  and  say,  "We 
do  not  believe  you  know  the  whole  road.  We  know  that  you  are  no 
prophet,  we  know  that  you  are  no  seer,  but  we  believe  that  you  know 
the  direction  and  are  leading  us  in  that  direction,  though  it  costs  you 
your  life,  provided  it  does  not  cost  you  your  honour." 

And  then  trust  your  guides,  imperfect  as  they  are,  and  some  day, 
when  we  all  are  dead,  men  will  come  and  point  at  the  distant  upland 


THE    END    OF    THE    CAMPAIGN  45 

with  a  great  shout  of  joy  and  triumph  and  thank  God  that  there  were 
men  who  undertook  to  lead  in  the  struggle.  What  difference  does 
it  make  if  we  ourselves  do  not  reach  the  uplands?  We  have  given 
our  lives  to  the  enterprise.  The  world  is  made  happier  and  human 
kind  better  because  we  have  lived. 

At  the  end  of  this  memorable  and  touching  speech  old 
Senator  James  Smith,  seated  alongside  of  me,  pulled  me 
by  the  coat  and,  in  a  voice  just  above  a  whisper  and  with 
tears  in  his  eyes,  said:  "That  is  a  great  man,  Mr.  Tumulty. 
He  is  destined  for  great  things." 

It  did  not  seem  possible  on  this  memorable  night  that 
within  a  few  days  these  two  Democratic  chieftains  would 
be  challenging  each  other  and  engaging  in  a  desperate 
struggle  to  decide  the  question  of  Democratic  leadership 
in  the  state. 


CHAPTER  IX 

A   PARTY   SPLIT 

ALL  the  prophecies  and  predictions  of  the  political 
seers  and  philosophers  of  New  Jersey,  many  of 
them  of  course  feeling  their  own  partisan  pulse, 
were  annihilated  and  set  adrift  by  the  happenings  in  New 
Jersey  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  November,  1910.  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  college  professor,  man  of  mystery,  political 
recluse,  the  nominee  of  the  most  standpat  Democratic 
convention  of  many  years,  had  been  chosen  the  leader  of 
the  people  of  the  state  by  the  unprecedented  majority  of 
39,000,  and  was  wearing  the  laurels  of  victory.  The  old 
bosses  and  leaders  chuckled  and  smiled;  they  were  soon  to 
have  a  Roman  holiday  under  the  aegis  of  the  Wilson 
Administration. 

There  were  many  surprises  in  the  Wilson  victory.  The 
Democrats  awoke  on  the  day  after  the  election  to  find 
that  they  had  not  only  won  the  governorship  of  the  state, 
but  their  joy  was  unbounded  to  find  that  they  had  cap 
tured  the  Lower  House  of  the  Legislature  that  would  have 
the  election,  under  the  preferential  primary  system  just 
adopted,  of  a  United  States  senator.  Therein  lay  the 
fly  in  the  ointment. 

Never  in  their  wildest  dreams  or  vain  imaginings  did 
the  leaders  of  the  Democratic  party  believe  that  there  was 
the  slightest  chance  even  under  the  most  favourable  circum 
stances  of  carrying  a  majority  of  the  vote  of  the  state  for 
the  Democratic  choice,  James  E.  Martine,  of  Plainfield. 

46 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  47 

The  suggestion  that  it  was  possible  to  elect  a  Democrat 
to  the  United  States  Senate  was  considered  a  form  of 
political  heresy.  The  nomination  for  the  Senate  had  been 
thrown  about  the  state  until  torn  and  tattered  almost 
beyond  repair;  it  was  finally  taken  up  and  salvaged  by 
that  sturdy  old  Democrat  of  Union  County,  Jim  Martine. 
Even  I  had  received  the  offer  of  the  senatorial  toga,  but 
the  one  who  brought  the  nomination  to  me  was  rudely 
cast  out  of  my  office.  The  question  was:  What  would  be 
the  attitude  of  the  new  Democratic  leader,  Woodrow 
Wilson,  toward  the  preferential  choice,  Martine?  Would 
the  vote  at  the  election  be  considered  as  having  the  full 
virtue  and  vigour  of  a  solemn  referendum  or  was  it  to  be 
considered  as  Senator  Smith  would  have  it,  a  sort  of 
practical  joke  perpetrated  upon  the  electors?  Soon  the 
opinion  of  the  people  of  the  state  began  to  express  itself 
in  no  uncertain  way,  demanding  the  carrying  out  of 
the  "solemn  covenant"  of  the  election,  only  to  be  an 
swered  by  the  challenge  of  Senator  Smith  and  his  friends 
to  enter  the  field  against  Martine,  the  choice  at  the 
election. 

This  business  pitchforked  the  Governor-elect  pre 
maturely  into  the  rough-and-tumble  of  "politics  as  she 
is, "  not  always  a  dainty  game.  As  I  review  in  retrospect 
this  famous  chapter  of  state  history,  which,  because  of 
the  subsequent  supreme  distinction  of  one  of  the  parties 
to  the  contest,  became  a  chapter  in  national  history,  I 
realize  the  almost  pathetic  situation  of  Mr.  Wilson.  He 
had  called  himself  an  amateur  in  politics,  and  such  he  was 
in  the  practical  details  and  involutions  of  the  great 
American  game,  though  in  his  campaign  he  had  shown 
himself  a  master  of  political  debate.  In  the  ordinary 
course  of  events  he  would  have  been  allowed  two  months 


48      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

between  his  election  and  inauguration  to  begin  an  orderly 
adjustment  to  the  new  life,  to  make  a  gradual  transition 
from  the  comely  proprieties  of  an  academic  chair  to  the 
catch-as-catch-can  methods  of  the  political  wrestling  mat, 
to  get  acquainted  with  the  men  and  problems  of  the  new 
career.  But  the  Smith-Martine  affair  gave  birth  pre 
maturely  to  an  immediate  occasion  for  a  fight. 

As  president  of  Princeton,  Doctor  Wilson  had  proved 
that  he  was  not  averse  to  a  fight  when  a  fight  was  necessary 
and  when  it  was  distinctly  his  affair,  but  he  may  well  have 
paused  to  consider  whether  the  Smith-Martine  business 
was  his  affair.  One  of  his  favourite  stories  in  later  years 
was  of  the  Irishman  who  entered  a  saloon  and  seeing  two 
men  in  a  tangle  of  fists  and  writhing  legs  and  bloody  heads 
on  the  floor  at  the  rear  of  the  saloon,  turned  to  the  bar 
keeper  and  asked:  "Is  this  a  private  fight,  or  can  anybody 
git  into  it?"  A  more  politic  man  than  Woodrow  Wilson 
and  one  less  sensitive  to  moral  duty,  might  well  have  ar 
gued  that  this  contest  was  the  business  of  the  Legislature, 
not  of  the  Governor.  Many  a  governor-elect  would  have 
avoided  the  issue  on  this  unquestionably  sound  legal 
principle,  and  friends  in  Princeton  were  in  fact  advising 
Mr.  Wilson  to  precisely  this  course,  the  course  of  neu 
trality.  It  would  not  be  strange  if  neutrality,  aloofness, 
had  presented  a  rather  attractive  picture  at  times  to  Mr. 
Wilson's  mind.  Why  should  he  gratuitously  take  a 
partisan  position  between  the  factions  which  would 
inevitably  win  for  him  the  enmity  of  a  strong  element 
within  the  party?  Which  would  also  win  for  him  the 
unpleasant  reputation  of  ingratitude?  For  though  he 
had  at  the  first  overtures  from  Senator  Smith  and  his 
friends  made  it  as  clear  as  language  can  make  anything 
that  he  could  accept  the  nomination  only  with  the 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  49 

explicit  understanding  that  acceptance  should  establish 
no  obligations  of  political  favours  to  anybody,  it  would 
be  impossible  to  make  it  appear  that  opposition  to  Smith's 
darling  desire  to  become  senator  was  not  an  ungracious 
return  to  the  man  who  had  led  the  forces  which  had 
nominated  Wilson  at  Trenton. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  his  distinct  pledge  to  the 
people  during  his  campaign,  that  if  they  elected  him  gover 
nor  he  would  make  himself  the  leader  of  the  party,  would 
broadly  and  not  with  pettifogging  legalism  interpret  his 
constitutional  relationship  to  the  Legislature,  would 
undertake  to  assist  in  legislative  action,  and  not  wait 
supinely  for  the  Legislature  to  do  something,  and  then 
sign  or  veto  the  thing  done.  Moreover,  he  had  insisted 
on  the  principle  of  the  preferential  primary  as  one  means 
by  which  the  people  should  participate  in  their  own 
government  and  convey  an  expression  of  their  will  and 
purpose  to  the  law-making  body.  The  people  had  voted 
for  Martine.  The  fact  that  Senator  Smith  had  scorned 
to  have  his  name  placed  on  the  ballot,  the  fact  that  human 
imagination  could  picture  a  stronger  senator  from  New 
Jersey  than  genial  "Jim"  Martine  did  not  affect  the 
argument.  A  great  majority  had  voted  for  Martine 
and  for  nobody  else.  Was  the  use  of  the  preferential 
primary  for  the  first  time  in  the  selection  of  a  United 
States  senator  to  be  ignored,  and  all  the  arguments  that 
Candidate  Wilson  and  others  had  made  in  behalf  of  the 
system  to  be  taken  "in  a  Pickwickian  sense,"  as  not 
meaning  anything? 

There  was  a  real  dilemma  doubtless  much  more  acutely 
realized  by  the  Governor-elect  than  by  the  hot-heads, 
including  myself,  who  were  clamorous  for  an  immediate 
proclamation  of  support  of  Martine,  on  progressive 


50      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

principles,    and   for   an   ultimatum   of   war-to-the-knife 
against  Smith  and  the  old  crowd. 

It  seemed  as  if  Mr.  Wilson  were  hesitating  and  holding 
off,  reluctant  to  accept  the  gage  of  battle  thrown  down  by 
the  challenge  of  the  Smith  wing.  The  leading  Demo 
cratic  and  Independent  journals  of  the  state  were  most 
insistent  that  immediate  proof  be  given  by  Governor-elect 
Wilson  of  his  leadership  and  control  over  the  party  and 
that  a  test  should  be  made  as  to  which  influence,  re 
actionary  or  progressive,  was  to  control  the  destinies  of  our 
party  in  the  state.  Those  of  us  who  had  followed  the 
candidate  throughout  the  campaign  and  who  had  been 
heartened  by  his  progressive  attitude  were  sorely  dis 
appointed  at  his  failure  immediately  to  act.  It  was 
painfully  evident  to  us  that  behind  the  scenes  at  Princeton 
the  new  governor's  friends,  particularly  Colonel  Harvey, 
were  urging  upon  him  cautious  and  well-considered  action 
and  what  mayhap  might  be  called  "a  policy  of  watchful 
waiting,"  picturing  to  him  the  insurmountable  diffi 
culties  that  would  lie  in  his  path  in  case  he  exercised  his 
leadership  in  the  matter  of  Martine's  selection  to  the 
United  States  Senate.  They  suggested  that  the  vote  for 
Martine  had  no  binding  force;  that  it  was  a  mere  per 
functory  expression  of  preference  in  the  matter  of  the 
United  States  senatorship  which  the  Legislature  was  free 
to  ignore.  The  only  man,  therefore,  who  could  make  the 
vote  effective  was  the  Governor-elect  himself.  What  he 
would  do  in  these  circumstances  was  for  days  after  the 
election  a  matter  of  perplexing  doubt  to  his  many  friends. 
Disappointment  and  chagrin  at  the  candidate's  silence 
brooded  over  the  ranks  of  the  progressives  of  the  state. 
In  my  law  office  in  Jersey  City  I  tried  to  convince  those 
who  came  to  confer  with  me  regarding  the  matter  that 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  51 

they  must  be  patient;  that,  ultimately,  everything  would 
be  all  right  and  that  Doctor  Wilson  would  soon  assert  his 
leadership  over  the  party  and  take  his  proper  place  at  the 
head  of  those  who  worked  to  make  the  preferential  vote 
an  effective  instrumentality.  Frankly,  though  I  did  not 
give  expression  to  my  doubts,  I  was  profoundly  and  deeply 
disappointed  at  the  apparently  hesitant,  uncertain  attitude 
of  the  Governor-elect.  Feeling  certain  that  popular  opin 
ion  would  be  with  him.  in  case  he  decided  to  lead  in  this 
struggle,  I  was  convinced  that  the  delay  in  announcing 
his  attitude  toward  the  Smith-Nugent  "defi"  was  dampen 
ing  the  ardour  and  enthusiasm  of  many  of  his  friends. 

The  progressive  Democrats  of  the  state  waited  with 
patience  the  word  of  command  and  counsel  from  the 
Princeton  professor  to  initiate  the  fight  that  would  settle 
for  all  time  in  the  state  of  New  Jersey  the  question 
whether  the  referendum  on  the  question  of  the  election 
of  United  States  senators  should  be  treated  as  "a  scrap 
of  paper,"  or  whether  it  was  to  be  upheld  and  vindicated 
by  the  action  of  the  Legislature.  No  direct  word  came  to 
me  of  the  Governor-elect's  attitude  on  this  vital  question. 
Rumours  of  his  position  toward  Senator  Smith's  candidacy 
filtered  "through  the  lines"  from  Princeton;  various 
stories  and  intimations  that  seemed  to  indicate  that  the 
Governor-elect  would  allow  Martine's  selection  to  go  by 
default;  that  he  would  not  interfere  in  any  way  to  carry 
out  the  mandate  of  the  election. 

Things  were  in  this  unsatisfactory  condition  when  to  my 
surprise  I  received  a  call  in  my  modest  Jersey  City  law 
offices  from  the  Governor-elect.  Knowing  him  as  I  know 
him,  I  can  see  that  in  his  deliberate  fashion  he  was  taking 
testimony  from  both  sides  and  slowly  arriving  at  his  own 
decision.  Having  heard  from  the  cautious  who  counselled 


52      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

neutrality,  he  was  now  seeking  the  arguments  of  the 
impetuous  who  demanded  action  and  wanted  it  "hot  off 
the  bat. "  But  at  that  time,  not  knowing  him  as  I  now 
know  him,  he  seemed,  in  this  interview,  to  be  vacillating 
between  two  opinions,  for  he  did  what  I  have  often  known 
him  to  do  subsequently:  stated  with  lucidity  the  argu 
ments  of  the  other  side,  and  with  the  air  of  one  quite 
open-minded,  without  opinions  of  his  own,  seemed  to  seek 
my  arguments  in  rebuttal.  I  was  sorely  disappointed  by 
what  then  seemed  to  me  his  negative  attitude,  so  unlike 
the  militant  debater  whom  I  had  come  to  admire  in  the 
campaign  which  had  recently  been  brought  to  a  brilliant 
and  victorious  close.  In  my  youthful  impetuosity  I  felt 
that  we  had  been  deceived  in  our  man,  a  bold  talker  but 
timid  in  action.  I  simply  did  not  then  know  the  man  and 
the  mixed  elements  in  him.  Later,  in  close  association, 
I  was  to  see  this  phase  of  him  not  infrequently,  the  canny 
Scot,  listening  without  comment  and  apparently  with 
mind  to  let  to  conflicting  arguments  while  his  own  mind 
was  slowly  moving  to  its  own  position,  where  it  would 
stand  fixed  and  immovable  as  Gibraltar. 

Almost  as  if  it  were  an  academic  question,  with  which 
he  had  no  personal  concern,  he  propounded  the  alter 
natives:  Should  he  lead  the  fight  against  Senator  Smith, 
or  should  he  stand  aloof  and  permit  the  Legislature  to  act 
without  any  suggestion  from  him?  He  summarized  the 
arguments  of  his  friends  at  Princeton  who  were  advising 
him  to  steer  clear  of  this  fight  and  not  permit  himself  to 
be  drawn  into  it  by  young,  impetuous  people  like  myself. 
He  said  that  certain  overtures  and  suggestions  of  compro 
mises  had  been  made  to  him  by  Senator  Smith's  friends, 
to  the  effect  that  if  he  would  not  play  a  leading  part  in  the 
fight  and  allow  the  Legislature  to  act  without  interference 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  53 

from  him,  Senator  Smith  and  his  friends  in  the  state 
would  agree  not  to  oppose  his  legislative  programme  at  the 
coming  session.  It  was  further  suggested  that  Senator 
Smith  had  the  necessary  votes  to  elect  himself  and  that  it 
would  be  futile  to  attempt  to  elect  Jim  Martine;  and  that 
his  intervention  in  this  family  quarrel  would  result  in  a 
bitter  and  humiliating  defeat  for  him  at  the  very  outset 
of  his  administration.  When  the  Governor-elect  had 
concluded  this  preliminary  statement,  I  was  depressed 
and  disappointed.  I  did  not  think  there  should  be  a 
moment's  hesitation  on  his  part  in  at  once  accepting  the 
challenge  so  defiantly  addressed  to  him  by  the  Democratic 
bosses  of  the  state. 

Frankly,  I  laid  the  whole  case  before  him  in  words  to 
this  effect:  "My  dear  Doctor  Wilson,  there  is  no  way  I  can 
better  serve  you  than  by  frankly  dealing  with  the  question. 
Your  friends  away  off  in  Princeton  probably  do  not  know 
how  for  years  our  party  and  its  destinies  have  been  in  the 
hands  of  these  very  men,  enemies  of  liberalism  in  New 
Jersey,  who  by  your  silence  or  indifference  as  to  the 
United  States  senatorship  are  to  be  given  a  new  lease  on 
life.  The  issue  involved  in  this  fight  is  fundamental  and 
goes  far  beyond  the  senatorship.  The  action  you  take 
will  have  a  far-reaching  effect  upon  our  party's  fortunes 
and  no  one  can  calculate  the  effect  it  will  undoubtedly 
have  on  your  own  political  future.  In  urging  you  not  to 
take  part  in  this  fight  your  friends  are  acting  unwisely. 
You  cannot  afford  not  to  fight  and  not  to  have  an  im 
mediate  test  of  your  leadership  in  this  matter.  The 
question  of  Mr.  Martine's  fitness,  as  your  friends  urge,  is 
not  an  issue  seriously  to  be  considered.  47,454  votes  in 
the  state  have  decided  that  matter  and  you  cannot  re 
verse  their  verdict.  Your  friends  have  placed  too  much 


54      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

emphasis  on  Marline's  alleged  unfitness  and  too  little  on 
the  duty  you  owe  the  party  and  the  state  as  leader." 

I  called  to  his  attention  the  fact  that  men  like  myself 
had  been  heartened  and  encouraged  by  his  speeches  in  the 
campaign;  how  we  felt  that  at  last  we  had  found  in  him  a 
leader,  bold  and  fearless,  and  that  now,  when  the  first  real 
test  of  leadership  came,  it  appeared  that  we  were  to  be 
disappointed  and  that  by  his  silence  and  inaction  he 
would  permit  Senator  Smith  to  win  and  allow  Martine, 
the  popular  choice,  to  be  defeated,  thus  setting  aside  the 
verdict  of  the  election.  He  listened  intently  but  without 
comment  to  all  I  had  to  say.  Proceeding  with  my  argu 
ment,  I  said:  "The  people  of  New  Jersey  accepted  your 
word  and,  to  employ  your  own  phrase,  'took  a  sportsman's 
chance  on  you*  and  they  must  not  be  disappointed.  Your 
failure  to  make  this  fight  will  mean  that  you  have  not  only 
surrendered  your  leadership  as  governor  in  this  matter, 
but  by  the  same  act  you  will  have  abdicated  your  leader 
ship  in  favour  of  the  Old  Guard  all  along  the  line.  They 
have  set  a  trap  for  you,  and  I  know  you  will  not  permit 
yourself  to  be  caught  in  it."  In  conclusion  I  said:  "They 
say  they  will  support  your  reform  programme.  What 
assurance  have  you  that,  having  defeated  you  in  this 
your  first  big  fight,  they  will  not  turn  on  you  and  defeat 
your  whole  legislative  programme  ?  As  governor,  you  have 
the  power  to  lead  us  to  a  great  victory  in  this  vital  matter. 
Exercise  it  now,  and  opinion  throughout  the  state  will 
strongly  and  enthusiastically  support  you.  You  have 
but  to  announce  your  willingness  to  lead  and  the  people 
of  the  state  will  rally  to  your  standard.  The  fight,  in 
any  event,  will  be  made  and  we  wish  you  to  lead  it.  This 
is  really  the  first  step  to  the  Presidency.  That  is  what  is 
really  involved.  Not  only  the  people  of  New  Jersey  but 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  55 

the  people  of  America  are  interested  in  this  fight.  They 
are  clamouring  for  leadership,  and  I  am  sure  you  are  the 
man  to  lead,  and  that  you  will  not  fail." 

When  the  Governor-elect  rose  to  leave  my  office,  he 
turned  to  me  and  asked,  still  in  a  non-committal  manner* 
whether  in  my  opinion  we  could  win  the  fight  in  case  he 
should  decide  to  enter  upon  it.  I  at  once  assured  him 
that  while  the  various  political  machines  of  the  state 
would  oppose  him  at  every  turn,  their  so-called  organi 
zations  were  made  of  cardboard  and  that  they  would 
immediately  disintegrate  and  fall  the  moment  he  assumed 
leadership  and  announced  that  the  fight  was  on. 

In  his  own  time  and  by  his  own  processes  Mr.  Wilson 
arrived  at  his  decision.  It  was  the  first  of  my  many 
experiences  of  his  deliberative  processes  in  making  up  his 
mind  and  of  the  fire  and  granite  in  him  after  he  had  made 
his  decision.  He  informed  me  that  he  would  support 
Martine  and  use  all  his  force,  official  and  personal,  to  have 
the  Legislature  accept  the  preferential  primary  as  the 
people's  mandate. 

With  prudence  and  caution,  with  a  political  sense  that 
challenged  the  admiration  of  every  practical  politician  in 
the  state,  the  Princetonian  began  to  set  the  stage  for  the 
preliminary  test.  There  was  nothing  dramatic  about 
these  preliminaries.  Quickly  assuming  the  offensive,  he 
went  about  the  task  of  mobilizing  his  political  forces  in 
the  most  patient,  practical  way.  No  statement  to  the 
people  of  his  purposes  to  accept  the  challenge  of  the 
Democratic  bosses  was  made  by  him.  Certain  things  in 
the  way  of  accommodation  were  necessary  to  be  done  before 
this  definite  step  was  taken.  It  was  decided  that  until 
the  Governor-elect  had  conferred  with  the  Democratic 
bosses  in  an  effort  to  persuade  them  that  the  course  they 


56      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

had  adopted  was  wrong,  it  would  be  best  not  to  make 
an  immediate  issue  by  the  Governor-elect's  announcement. 
We  thought  that  by  tactfully  handling  Smith  and  Davis 
we  would  be  able  by  this  method  of  conciliation  to  con 
vince  their  friends,  at  least  those  in  the  party  organi 
zation,  that  we  were  not  ruthlessly  bent  upon  leading 
a  revolt,  but  that  we  were  attempting  peacefully  a  settle 
ment  that  would  prevent  a  split  in  our  party  ranks. 

We  were  convinced  that  in  the  great  body  of  organi 
zation  Democrats  there  were  many  fine  men  who  resented 
this  attempt  of  the  bosses  to  force  Jim  Smith  again  on  the 
party  and  that  there  were  many  who  silently  wished  us 
success,  although  they  were  not  free  to  come  to  our  side 
in  open  espousal.  Thus  we  began  patiently  to  build  our 
back-fire  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic  organization  it 
self,  to  unhorse  the  Essex  boss. 

The  first  thing  to  carry  out  the  programme  was  a  visit 
paid  to  the  sick  room  of  the  Democratic  boss  of  the 
Hudson  wing,  Bob  Davis,  who  lay  dangerously  ill  in  his 
modest  home  on  Grove  Street,  Jersey  City.  The  visit 
itself  of  the  Governor-elect  to  the  home  of  the  stricken 
boss  had  a  marked  psychological  effect  in  conciliating  and 
winning  over  to  our  side  the  active  party  workers  in  the 
Davis  machine.  To  many  of  the  privates  in  the  ranks  the 
boss  was  a  veritable  hero  and  they  witnessed  with  pleasure 
the  personal  visit  of  the  new  Governor-elect  to  the  boss 
at  his  home  and  looked  upon  it  as  a  genuine  act  of  obei 
sance  and  deference  to  their  stricken  leader.  They  thought 
this  a  generous  and  a  big  thing  to  do,  and  so  it  naturally 
turned  their  sympathies  to  the  Governor-elect.  It  gave 
further  proof  to  them  that  the  man  elected  Governor  was 
not  "high-browish"  or  inclined  to  fight  unless  he  had 
previously  laid  all  his  cards  on  the  table.  We  also 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  57 

realized  that  to  have  ignored  the  boss  would  have  been 
to  give  strength  and  comfort  to  the  enemy,  and  so  we 
deliberately  set  out  to  cultivate  his  friends  in  a  spirit  of 
honourable  and  frank  dealing.  The  visit  to  the  boss  was 
a  part  of  this  plan.  The  meeting  between  these  two  men 
— one,  the  Governor-elect  and  until  recently  the  presi 
dent  of  Princeton;  the  other,  a  Democratic  boss,  old  and 
battle-scarred — in  the  little  sick  room  of  the  humble 
home,  was  a  most  interesting  affair  and  at  times  a  most 
touching  and  pathetic  one.  Both  men  were  frank  in 
dealing  with  each  other.  There  was  no  formality  or  cold 
ness  in  the  meeting.  The  Governor-elect  quickly  placed 
the  whole  situation  before  the  boss,  showing  how  the 
Democratic  party  had  for  many  years  advocated  the  very 
system — the  election  of  United  States  senators  by  the 
people — that  the  Democratic  bosses  of  the  state  were 
now  attacking  and  repudiating.  Briefly,  he  sketched 
the  disastrous  effects  upon  our  party  and  its  prestige  in 
the  state  and  the  nation  if  a  Democratic  legislature  should 
be  the  first,  after  advocating  it,  to  cast  it  aside  in  order  to 
satisfy  the  selfish  ambition  and  vanity  of  one  of  the  Old 
Guard.  In  a  sincere  manly  fashion,  so  characteristic 
of  him,  Boss  Davis  then  proceeded  to  state  his  case. 
Briefly,  it  was  this:  He  had  given  his  solemn  promise 
and  had  entered  into  a  gentleman's  agreement  with  Smith 
to  deliver  to  him  the  twelve  legislative  votes  from  Hudson. 
He  would  not  violate  his  agreement.  Laughingly,  he 
said  to  the  Governor-elect:  "If  the  Pope  of  Rome,  of 
whose  Church  I  am  a  member,  should  come  to  this  room 
to  urge  me  to  change  my  attitude,  I  would  refuse  to  do  so. 
I  have  given  my  promise  and  you  .would  not  have  me 
break  it,  would  you,  Doctor?"  With  real  feeling  and  a 
show  of  appreciation  of  the  boss's  frankness  and  loyalty 


58      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

to  his  friends,  the  Governor-elect  quickly  replied: 
"Of  course,  I  would  not  have  you  break  your  promise, 
but  you  must  not  feel  aggrieved  if  I  shall  find  it  necessary 
to  fight  you  and  Smith  in  the  open  for  the  Hudson  votes." 
"Go  on,  Doctor,"  said  the  sick  man,  "I  am  a  game  sport 
and  I  am  sure  that  with  you  there  will  be  no  hitting  below 
the  belt."  And  thus  the  first  conference  between  the 
Governor-elect  and  the  political  boss  ended. 

Mr.  Wilson's  next  visit  was  to  Senator  Smith  himself  at 
the  Senator's  home  in  Newark,  a  meeting  entirely  friendly 
in  character  and  frank  in  expressions  of  the  unalterable 
determination  of  the  two  men,  of  Senator  Smith  not  to 
withdraw  from  the  race,  of  Doctor  Wilson  to  oppose  his 
candidacy  and  place  the  issue  before  the  people  of  the 
state.  Senator  Smith  with  engaging  candour  gave  Mr. 
Wilson  his  strong  personal  reasons  for  wishing  to  return 
to  the  United  States  Senate:  he  said  that  he  had  left  the 
Senate  under  a  cloud  due  to  the  investigations  of  the 
Sugar  Trust  and  that  for  the  sake  of  his  children  he 
wanted  to  reinstate  himself  in  the  Senate.  Mr.  Wilson 
expressed  his  sympathy  for  this  motive,  more  appealing 
than  mere  personal  ambition,  but  declared  that  he  could 
not  permit  his  sympathy  as  an  individual  to  interfere 
with  his  duty  as  he  conceived  it,  as  an  official  pledged  by 
all  his  public  utterances  to  support  progressive  principles, 
among  which  was  the  preferential  primary  system,  and 
committed  to  a  course  of  active  leadership  in  matters 
which  concerned  the  state  at  large,  in  which  category  the 
selection  of  a  United  States  senator  certainly  fell.  He 
made  a  personal  appeal  to  the  Senator  for  the  sake  of  the 
party  to  forego  his  desire  and  by  a  noble  act  of  renuncia 
tion  to  win  the  regard  of  all  the  citizens  of  the  state,  say 
ing:  "Why,  Senator,  you  have  it  in  your  power  to  become 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  59 

instantly  the  biggest  man  in  the  state. "  But  the  Senator 
was  firm.  And  so,  though  the  visit  was  conducted  with 
the  dignity  and  courtesy  characteristic  of  both  men,  it 
ended  with  their  frank  acknowledgment  to  each  other 
that  from  now  on  there  existed  between  them  a  state  of 
war. 

Returning  to  Princeton  from  Newark,  the  formal 
announcement  of  the  Governor's  entrance  into  the  fight 
was  made  and  the  contest  for  the  senatorship  and  the 
leadership  of  the  Democratic  party  was  on.  The  an 
nouncement  was  as  follows: 

WOODROW  WILSON'S  CHALLENGE  TO  THE  BOSSES 

Friday  Evening,  Dec.  9,  1910. 

The  question  who  should  be  chosen  by  the  incoming  legislature  of 
the  state  to  occupy  the  seat  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
which  will  presently  be  made  vacant  by  the  expiration  of  the  term 
of  Mr.  Kean  is  of  such  vital  importance  to  the  people  of  the 
state,  both  as  a  question  of  political  good  faith  and  as  a  question  of 
genuine  representation  in  the  Senate,  that  I  feel  constrained  to  ex 
press  my  own  opinion  with  regard  to  it  in  terms  which  cannot  be 
misunderstood.  I  had  hoped  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  for  me 
to  speak;  but  it  is. 

I  realize  the  delicacy  of  taking  any  part  hi  the  discussion  of  the 
matter.  As  Governor  of  New  Jersey  I  shall  have  no  part  in  the  choice 
of  a  Senator.  Legally  speaking,  it  is  not  my  duty  even  to  give 
advice  with  regard  to  the  choice.  But  there  are  other  duties  besides 
legal  duties.  The  recent  campaign  has  put  me  in  an  unusual  position. 
I  offered,  if  elected,  to  be  the  political  spokesman  and  adviser  of 
the  people.  I  even  asked  those  who  did  not  care  to  make  their 
choice  of  governor  upon  that  understanding  not  to  vote  for  me. 
I  believe  that  the  choice  was  made  upon  that  undertaking;  and  I 
cannot  escape  the  responsibility  involved.  I  have  no  desire  to  escape 
it.  It  is  my  duty  to  say,  with  a  full  sense  of  the  peculiar  responsi 
bility  of  my  position,  what  I  deem  it  to  be  the  obligation  of  the  Legis 
lature  to  do  in  this  gravely  important  matter. 


60      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

I  know  that  the  people  of  New  Jersey  do  not  desire  Mr.  James 
Smith,  Jr.,  to  be  sent  again  to  the  Senate.  If  he  should  be,  he  will 
not  go  as  their  representative.  The  only  means  I  have  of  knowing 
whom  they  do  desire  to  represent  them  is  the  vote  at  the  recent 
primaries,  where  48,000  Democratic  voters,  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  who  voted  at  the  primaries,  declared  their  preference  for 
Mr.  Martine,  of  Union  County.  For  me  that  vote  is  conclusive. 
I  think  it  should  be  for  every  member  of  the  Legislature. 

Absolute  good  faith  in  dealing  with  the  people,  an  unhesitating 
fidelity  to  every  principle  avowed,  is  the  highest  law  of  political 
morality  under  a  constitutional  government.  The  Democratic 
party  has  been  given  a  majority  in  the  Legislature;  the  Democratic 
voters  of  the  state  have  expressed  their  preference  under  a  law  advo 
cated  and  supported  by  the  opinion  of  their  party,  declared  alike  in 
platforms  and  in  enacted  law.  It  is  clearly  the  duty  of  every  Demo 
cratic  legislator  who  would  keep  faith  with  the  law  of  the  state 
with  the  avowed  principles  of  his  party  to  vote  for  Mr.  Martine. 
It  is  my  duty  to  advocate  his  election — to  urge  it  by  every  honourable 
means  at  my  command. 

Immediately  the  work  of  organizing  our  forces  for  the 
fight  was  set  in  motion.  I  had  been  designated  by  the 
Governor-elect  to  handle  the  fight  in  Hudson  County,  the 
Davis  stronghold.  Meetings  were  arranged  for  at  what 
were  considered  the  strategic  points  in  the  fight:  Jersey 
City  and  Newark.  The  announcement  of  the  Governor- 
elect's  acceptance  of  the  challenge  had  given  a  thrill  to 
the  whole  state  and  immediately  the  reaction  against 
the  Old  Guard's  attempt  to  discredit  the  primary 
choice  was  evident.  The  bitterness  in  the  ranks  of  the 
contesting  factions  began  to  express  itself  in  charges  and 
counter-charges  that  were  made.  Speeches  for  and 
against  the  candidates  were  addressed  to  the  ears  of  the 
unwary  voter.  The  state  was  soon  up  in  arms.  There 
was  no  doubt  of  the  attitude  of  the  people.  This  was 
made  plain  in  so  many  ways  that  our  task  was  to  impress 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  61 

this  opinion  upon  the  members  of  the  Legislature,  whose 
vote,  in  the  last  analysis,  would  be  the  determining  factor 
in  this  contest.  While  we  were  laying  down  a  barrage 
in  the  way  of  organization  work  and  making  preparations 
for  our  meetings  throughout  the  state,  the  Governor- 
elect  was  conferring  nightly  with  members  of  the  Legis 
lature  at  the  University  Club  in  New  York.  From  day  to 
day  could  be  observed  the  rising  tide  in  favour  of  our 
cause,  and  slowly  its  effect  upon  the  members  of  the 
Legislature  was  made  manifest.  The  first  meeting  in  the 
senatorial  contest  was  held  in  Jersey  City.  As  chairman 
of  the  committee,  I  had  arranged  the  details  for  this 
first  speech  of  the  Governor-elect.  I  had  adopted  a 
plan  in  making  the  arrangements  that  I  felt  would  remove 
from  the  minds  of  the  organization  workers,  to  whom  we 
desired  to  appeal,  the  idea  that  this  was  a  revolt  or 
secessionist  movement  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic 
party.  The  committee  in  charge  of  the  meeting  had 
selected  the  finest,  cleanest  men  in  our  party's  ranks  to 
preside  over  and  take  part  in  the  meeting. 

There  was  never  such  an  outpouring  of  people.  Men 
and  women  from  outside  the  state,  and,  particularly,  men 
and  women  from  New  York  and  Connecticut,  had  come 
all  the  way  to  New  Jersey  to  witness  this  first  skirmish  in 
the  political  upheaval  that  was  soon  to  take  place.  The 
metropolitan  dailies  had  sent  their  best  men  to  write  up 
the  story  and  to  give  a  "size-up"  of  the  new  Governor- 
elect  in  fighting  action.  They  were  not  disappointed. 
He  was  in  rare  form.  His  speech  was  filled  with  epigrams 
that  carried  the  fight  home  to  those  upon  whom  we 
were  trying  to  make  an  impression.  When  he  warned 
his  friends  not  to  be  afraid  of  the  machine  which  the 
bosses  controlled  he  said,  with  biting  irony:  "We  do 


62      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

not  fear  their  fortresses  [meaning  the  political  machines] 
that  frown  and  look  down  upon  us  from  their  shining 
heights."  Smiling  deprecatingly  and  waving  his  hand, 
he  continued:  "They  are  but  made  of  paste-board  and 
when  you  approach  them  they  fall  at  your  very  touch." 

Ridiculing  and  belittling  the  power  of  the  bosses,  he 
called  them  "warts  upon  the  body  politic."  "It  is  not," 
said  the  new  chief  of  Democracy,  "a  capital  process  to 
cut  off  a  wart.  You  don't  have  to  go  to  the  hospital  and 
take  an  anaesthetic.  The  thing  can  be  done  while  you 
wait,  and  it  is  being  done.  The  clinic  is  open,  and  every 
man  can  witness  the  operation." 

The  meeting  was  a  triumph  and  strikingly  demonstrated 
the  power  of  brain  and  fine  leadership  over  brawn  and 
selfish  politics. 

The  final  appeal  to  the  voters  on  the  United  States 
senatorship  was  made  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country, 
the  stronghold  of  the  Smith-Nugent  faction  at  Newark, 
New  Jersey.  The  same  enthusiastic,  whole-souled  response 
that  characterized  the  Jersey  City  meeting  was  repeated. 
The  same  defiant  challenge  to  the  Old  Guard  was 
uttered  by  the  new  Governor.  Sarcasm,  bitter  irony, 
delightful  humour,  and  good-natured  flings  at  the  Old 
Guard  were  found  in  this  his  final  appeal.  In  a  tone  of 
voice  that  carried  the  deep  emotion  he  felt,  he  said,  as  his 
final  word: 

Do  you  know  what  is  true  of  the  special  interests  at  this  moment? 
They  have  got  all  their  baggage  packed  and  they  are  ready  to  strike 
camp  over  night,  provided  they  think  it  is  profitable  for  them  to  come 
over  to  the  Democratic  party.  They  are  waiting  to  come  over  bag 
and  baggage  and  take  possession  of  the  Democratic  party.  Will  they 
be  welcome?  Do  you  want  them?  I  pray  God  we  may  never  wake 
up  some  fine  morning  and  find  them  encamped  on  our  side. 


A    PARTY    SPLIT  63 

The  response  was  thrilling.  The  two  meetings  just 
held,  one  in  Jersey  City  and  the  other  in  Newark,  con 
vinced  those  of  us  in  charge  of  the  Martine  campaign  that 
we  had  made  the  right  impression  in  the  state  and,  having 
deeply  aroused  the  voters,  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  harvest 
the  crop,  the  seed  of  which  had  been  planted  in  the  soil 
of  public  opinion  by  the  speeches  the  new  Governor  had 
made.  It  was  plain  that  the  machine  crowd  was  stunned 
and  reeling  from  the  frequent  and  telling  blows  that  had 
been  so  vigorously  delivered  by  him.  Suggestions  of 
compromise  came  from  the  enemy's  ranks,  but  no  armis 
tice  would  be  granted,  except  upon  the  basis  of  an  absolute 
and  unconditional  surrender.  Offers  and  suggested  pro 
posals  from  the  Old  Guard  to  the  Governor-elect  were 
thrust  aside  as  valueless  and  not  worthy  his  consideration. 
There  was  nothing  to  do  but  play  for  a  "knock-out." 
Soon  the  full  pressure  of  the  opinion  of  the  state  began  to 
be  felt.  Members  of  the  Legislature  from  the  various 
counties  began  to  feel  its  influence  upon  them.  Our 
ranks  began  to  be  strengthened  by  additions  from  the 
other  side.  The  Governor's  speeches  and  his  nightly 
conferences  were  having  their  full  effect.  The  bosses, 
now  in  panic,  were  each  day  borne  down  by  the  news 
brought  to  them  of  the  innumerable  defections  in  their 
quickly  dwindling  forces.  However,  the  bosses  showed 
a  bold  front  and  declared  that  their  man  had  the  votes. 
But  their  confidence  waned  as  election  day  approached. 
Realizing  the  fact  that  we  were  dealing  with  the  best- 
trained  minds  in  the  Democratic  party,  we  gave  no  news 
to  the  outside  world  of  the  strength  in  number  of  our  own 
ranks,  knowing  full  well  that  if  we  did  so  imprudent  a 
thing,  the  active  men  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  would  pull 
every  wire  of  influence  and  use  every  method  of  threats 


64      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

and  coercion  to  wean  the  votes  away  from  us.  We 
"stood  pat"  and  watched  with  interest  every  move  made 
by  the  other  side.  In  his  final  statement  before  the  joint 
meeting  of  the  Legislature  Smith  boldly  announced  his 
election  to  the  Senate  on  the  strength  of  the  number  of 
legislative  votes  pledged  to  him,  but  those  of  us  who  were 
in  the  midst  of  this  political  melee  knew  that  he  was 
licked  and  that  he  was  only  whistling  to  keep  up  his 
courage. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Governor-elect  had  tendered  to 
me  the  post  of  secretary  to  the  Governor,  and  I  accepted 
this  office  which  brought  me  into  more  intimate  association 
with  him  and  his  plans. 


CHAPTER  X 

EXIT    THE    OLD    GUARD 

THE  conferences  and  meetings  in  preparation  for 
the  great  senatorial  fight  having  been  concluded, 
the  scene  of  activities  was  transferred  to  Trenton, 
where  shortly  after  the  Inauguration  plans  were  laid  for 
the  final  battle. 

Immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Inaugural 
ceremonies,  the  hand-to-hand  contests  for  the  great 
prize  and  incidentally  the  leadership  of  the  Democrats, 
was  on  in  full  swing.  At  the  beginning  of  the  fight  the 
bosses  counted  upon  the  active  support  of  the  influential 
Democratic  leaders  throughout  the  state,  like  Johnston 
Cornish  of  Warren  County,  Barney  Gannon  and  Peter 
Daily  of  Middlesex  County,  old  Doctor  Barber  of  Hunter- 
don  County,  Otto  Wittpenn  of  Hudson  County,  Billy 
French  and  Judge  Westcott  of  Camden,  Dave  Crater  of 
Monmouth,  and  minor  bosses  or  leaders  in  south  and 
middle  Jersey.  But  in  utter  amazement  they  found  that 
we  had  captured  these  fine  pieces  of  heavy  political 
artillery  and  that  through  them  we  had  acquired  and 
taken  over  some  of  the  most  valuable  political  salients  in 
the  state. 

A  little  incident  in  the  campaign  is  worth  reciting. 
In  managing  the  campaign  I  found  that  for  some  un 
accountable  reason  the  so-called  Irish  vote  of  the  state 
was  massed  solidly  behind  ex-Senator  Smith  and  in  bitter 
opposition  to  Governor  Wilson.  We  were  constantly 

65 


66      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

coming  in  contact  with  these  currents  of  opposition,  and 
how  to  overcome  them  and  bring  the  Irish  vote  into  our 
fold  was  the  task  that  devolved  upon  me  as  the  manager 
of  Martine's  campaign.  Seated  in  my  office  one  day  I 
recalled  that  years  before  I  had  read  in  the  Congressional 
Record  an  account  of  a  speech  delivered  in  the  United 
States  Senate  by  James  Smith,  upholding  in  terms  of 
highest  praise  the  famous  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty.  The 
speech  in  all  its  details,  particularly  the  argument  it 
contained  calling  for  closer  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  was  still  fresh  in  my  memory. 
Evidently  Senator  Smith  and  his  Irish  friends  had  forgot 
ten  it,  for  he  was  now  trying  to  mobilize  the  Irish  vote  of 
the  state  in  his  favour.  On  re-reading  this  speech  of  the 
old  Senator,  I  smiled  with  satisfaction,  realizing  the 
campaign  use  that  could  be  made  of  it.  After  considering 
the  matter  carefully,  I  sent  for  a  devoted  friend  of  mine, 
a  fine,  clean-cut  Irishman,  who  stood  high  in  the  ranks 
of  the  Clan-na-Gael  and  other  Irish  societies  in  our 
county.  After  he  had  read  the  speech,  we  discussed 
the  method  of  using  it,  for  we  felt  sure  that  our  Irish 
friends,  when  they  became  acquainted  with  this  speech 
upon  reading  it,  would  not  find  themselves  in  agreement 
with  Smith's  attitude  toward  England  and  the  Treaty. 
My  friend  consented  to  write  letters  to  the  leading  papers, 
particularly  the  Irish  papers  of  the  state,  setting  forth 
Smith's  attitude  toward  the  Treaty.  The  effect  upon  the 
Irish  vote  was  immediate  and  soon  resolutions  began  to 
be  adopted  by  the  various  Irish  societies  throughout  the 
state,  denouncing  Smith  for  having  advocated  the  much- 
despised  "Anglo-Saxon  Alliance." 

While  I  opposed  Senator  Smith  in  this  contest  there 
was  nothing  personally  antagonistic  in  my  attitude.     We 


EXIT    THE    OLD    GUARD  67 

were,  I  hope,  friends  throughout  the  conflict,  and  many 
times  since  then  we  have  discussed  the  events  leading 
up  to  Martine's  election  to  the  United  States  Senate.  It 
was  only  a  few  months  ago,  while  seated  at  a  table  at  the 
Shoreham  Hotel  in  Washington,  that  the  old  Senator, 
genial  and  debonair  as  ever,  was  discussing  the  fights  of 
the  old  days,  and  particularly  the  events  leading  up  to  his 
defeat  for  the  United  States  senatorship.  In  discussing 
the  New  Jersey  campaign,  he  told  me  of  the  use  that  had 
been  made  by  "someone"  in  the  Wilson  ranks  of  his 
Senate  speech  on  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty.  He  said 
that  his  reason  for  making  this  speech  was  his  sincere 
desire  as  an  Irish- American  to  bring  about  more  amicable 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  England,  and  as 
I  listened  to  this  frank  recital  I  felt  that,  although  the 
use  I  had  made  of  his  speech  was  legitimate  in  the  cir 
cumstances,  there  was  nothing  to  be  proud  of  in  having 
exploited  the  Senator's  really  fine  speech  for  political  pur 
poses. 

The  State  House  at  Trenton  on  the  night  previous  to 
the  balloting  for  the  senatorship  was  a  place  of  feverish  ac 
tivity.  The  Essex  ex-Chieftain,  Smith,  kept  "open  house" 
in  the  then  famous  Room  100  of  the  Trenton  House.  The 
Governor-elect,  calm  and  apparently  undisturbed,  but 
anxious  and  ready  for  a  contest,  quietly  moved  about  the 
Executive  offices  attending  to  official  matters. 

We  felt  confident  of  the  result  of  the  vote  if  the  members 
of  the  Legislature  were  left  free,  but  we  were  certain  that 
every  kind  of  pressure  would  be  put  upon  them  to  change 
the  votes  of  the  wobblers  in  our  ranks.  All  night  long  and 
until  four  or  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Governor- 
elect  and  I  remained  in  the  Executive  office,  keeping  in 
close  contact  with  our  friends  both  by  telephone  and 


68      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

personal  conference.  Senator  Smith  never  knew  it,  but 
some  of  the  men  close  to  him  and  participating  in  his  own 
conferences  on  this  fateful  night  hourly  brought  to  us 
information  as  to  what  would  be  the  real  line-up  of  his 
forces  on  the  day  set  for  balloting.  We  found  a  spy  in  our 
own  ranks — a  leading  lawyer  and  politician  from  my  own 
county — who,  while  pretending  to  be  our  friend,  was 
supplying  the  enemy  with  what  he  thought  was  useful 
information.  We,  however,  were  already  aware  of  this 
gentleman's  duplicity  and,  although  he  never  suspected 
it,  whenever  he  left  the  Executive  office  he  was  followed 
by  a  professional  detective,  who  heard  and  reported  to  us 
every  bit  of  information  he  had  supplied  to  our  political 
foes.  * 

On  the  night  before  the  election  the  Smith-Nugent 
leaders  had  gathered  their  forces  and,  headed  by  a  band, 
paraded  through  the  streets  of  Trenton,  passing  in  review 
before  Senator  Smith  who  stood  upon  the  steps  of  the 
Trenton  House  and  greeted  them  in  most  generous 
fashion.  The  purpose  of  this  demonstration  was  obvious 
to  the  Governor-elect  and  his  friends.  It  was  simply  to 
give  to  the  arriving  legislators  an  impression  of  great 
strength  behind  the  Smith-Nugent  forces. 

On  the  morning  of  the  balloting  the  corridors  and  lobby 
of  the  State  House  were  crowded  with  the  henchmen  of 
the  Essex  chieftain.  The  surface  indications  were  that 
Smith  had  the  necessary  number  of  votes,  but  to  those  of 
us  who  were  able  accurately  to  analyze  the  situation  it 
was  apparent  that  the  froth  would  soon  pass  away.  The 
parade  and  the  demonstration  of  the  Nugent  followers  had 
deeply  impressed  some  of  the  men  in  our  ranks,  particu 
larly  the  editor  of  a  Trenton  newspaper,  who  came  to  the 
Executive  offices  and  urged  upon  the  Governor  the 


EXIT    THE    OLD    GUARD  69 

publication  of  a  statement  which  he  had  prepared,  filled 
with  grandiloquent  phrase,  warning  the  people  of  the 
state  that  the  members  of  the  Legislature  were  about  to 
be  coerced  and  threatened  by  the  strong-arm  methods  of 
the  Smith-Nugent  organization. 

Frankly,  the  suggestion  which  this  Trenton  editor  made 
to  the  new  Governor  impressed  him.  The  Governor  made 
certain  changes  in  the  statement  and  then  sent  for  me  to 
read  it,  asking  my  advice  upon  it.  The  first  test  of  my 
official  connection  with  the  Governor  was  at  hand.  Upon 
reading  the  editor's  article  I  saw  at  once  that  its  issuance 
would  be  most  unwise,  and  I  frankly  said  so.  My 
practical  and  political  objection  to  it,  however,  was  that 
if  published  it  would  give  to  the  people  of  the  state  the 
impression  that  our  forces  were  in  a  panic  and  that  we 
were  in  grave  fear  of  the  result.  I  further  argued  that  it 
was  an  attempt  at  executive  coercion  of  the  Legislature 
that  would  meet  with  bitter  resentment.  I  felt  that  we 
had  already  won  the  fight;  that  the  Legislature,  which 
was  the  jury  in  the  case,  was  inclined  to  favour  us  if 
we  did  not  seek  to  influence  its  members  by  such  foolish 
action  as  the  Trenton  editor  advised.  The  statement 
was  not  published. 

I  found  in  this  little  argument  with  the  new  Governor 
that  he  was  open-minded  and  anxious  for  advice  and  I 
thereafter  felt  free  to  discuss  matters  with  him  in  the 
frankest  way. 

The  first  ballot  showed  Martine  leading  heavily.  In 
the  following  ballots  he  gained  strength  at  every  count. 
The  Legislature  adjourned  the  first  day  without  reaching 
a  decision.  As  we  surveyed  the  field  after  the  first  day's 
balloting  it  was  clear  to  us  that  if  we  hoped  to  win  the 
fight  we  would  have  to  have  Hudson  County's  legislative 


70      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

vote.  The  Democratic  boss,  Bob  Davis,  who  controlled 
this  vote,  lay  ill,  and  had  entrusted  his  affairs  to  the  hands 
of  a  fine,  clean-cut,  wholesome  Irish-American,  James 
Hennessy,  then  chairman  of  the  Hudson  County  Demo 
cratic  Committee.  He  was  one  of  the  squarest  men  I 
ever  met  in  politics  and  had  been  an  intimate  associate  of 
my  father  in  the  old  days  in  Jersey  City.  On  the  day  of 
the  final  balloting  we  were  sorely  pressed.  When  it 
seemed  as  if  we  had  reached  the  limit  of  our  strength,  it 
occurred  to  me  that  a  final  appeal  to  Hennessy  by  the 
Governor  might  have  some  effect.  We  decided  to  send 
for  Hennessy  to  come  to  the  Executive  offices.  It  was 
clear  from  his  attitude  when  he  arrived  that,  while  his 
sympathies  lay  with  us,  he  was  bound  in  honour  to  carry 
out  the  instructions  of  his  chief  and  deliver  the  Hudson 
County  vote  to  Smith.  The  Governor,  getting  very 
close  to  him  and  discussing  the  campaign  in  the  most 
intimate  way,  told  him  that  if  Martine  was  rejected,  the 
political  effect  on  our  party's  fortunes  would  be  disastrous; 
that  we  were  sure  we  had  the  votes  and  that  the  next 
ballot  would  give  proof  of  this,  and  that  it  was  only  a 
question,  to  use  a  campaign  phrase,  of  "getting  on  the 
band  wagon"  and  making  Martine 's  nomination  unani 
mous.  When  the  Governor  concluded  his  talk,  I  turned 
to  Hennessy  in  the  most  familiar  way,  and  spoke  of  the 
Governor's  desire  to  elect  Martine  and  of  the  unselfish 
purpose  he  had  in  mind  and  how  he,  Hennessy,  was  block 
ing  the  way.  I  said  to  him:  "You  have  it  in  your  power 
to  do  a  big  thing.  You  may  never  have  the  chance 
again."  He  finally  stood  up  and  said  to  me:  "What  do 
you  want  me  to  do?"  I  told  him  that  we  wanted  him 
to  go  to  the  Hudson  delegates  and  send  word  to  Davis 
that  the  "jig"  was  up  and  that  they  must  throw  their 


EXIT    THE    OLD    GUARD  71 

support  to  Martine.  Shortly  after  this  meeting  the 
Hudson  delegation  met  in  caucus  and  agreed  to  support 
Martine. 

When  Smith  and  Nugent  heard  of  this  message  they 
practically  surrendered.  The  balloting  which  began  at 
ten  o'clock  was  a  mere  formal  affair  for  it  was  plainly 
evident  from  the  changes  in  the  early  balloting  that 
Martine's  election  was  assured.  Martine's  election  was 
a  fact;  and  Woodrow  Wilson  was  the  victor  in  the  first 
battle  for  the  Presidency. 

I  have  stated  that  I  am  not  proud  of  the  way  I  used 
Senator  Smith's  speech  on  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty. 
We  were  fighting  veterans  in  the  political  game,  men  who 
knew  all  the  tricks  and  who  did  not  scruple  to  play  any 
of  them.  In  the  rough  school  of  practical  politics  I  had 
been  taught  that  "y°u  must  fight  the  devil  with  fire" 
and  that  it  is  as  legitimate  in  politics  as  in  war  to  deceive 
the  enemy  about  your  resources.  But  we  conducted 
politics  on  higher  levels  during  the  eight  years  in  the  White 
House,  when  my  chief,  no  longer  an  amateur,  taught  me, 
by  precept  and  example,  that  effective  fighting  can  be 
conducted  without  resort  to  the  tricks  and  duplicities  of 
those  who  place  political  advantage  above  principle. 
Woodrow  Wilson  made  new  rules  for  the  game,  and  they 
were  the  rules  which  men  of  honour  adopt  when  conduct 
ing  their  private  business  on  principles  of  good  faith  and 
truth-telling. 


CHAPTER  XI 

EXECUTIVE   LEADERSHIP 

THE  election  of  Marline  having  been  settled  and  the 
preferential  vote  having  been  validated  through 
the  courageous  handling  of  a  delicate  situation,  the 
new  Governor  was  firmly  in  the  saddle.     His  leadership 
had  been  tested   and   only   the   fragments   of   the  Old 
Guard  machine  were  left.     The  road  was  thus  cleared 
of  all  obstacles  in  his  own  party  that  might  be  put  in  the 
way  of  his  programme  of  constructive  legislation. 

Having  delivered  his  first  message,  which  contained  a  full 
and  detailed  discussion  of  his  whole  programme,  he  ap 
plied  himself  with  great  energy  and  industry  to  the  task 
of  preparing  bills  for  introduction  in  the  Senate  and 
House.  Not  content  with  the  mere  delivery  of  his 
message,  he  put  himself  entirely  at  the  disposal  of  the 
members  of  the  Legislature  and  industriously  applied 
himself  to  the  task  of  preparation  until  the  following 
measures:  Regulation  of  Public  Utilities,  Corrupt  Practices 
Act,  Direct  Primaries  Act,  and  the  Employers'  Liability 
Act,  were  in  shape  to  be  introduced. 

While  his  leadership  was  vindicated  as  a  result  of 
the  Smith-Martine  fight,  the  contest  had  undoubtedly  left 
many  bitter  scars  and  enmities  which  soon  manifested 
themselves  in  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  the  Smith  men  in 
the  Legislature  toward  the  new  Governor  and  particu 
larly  toward  his  programme  of  constructive  legislation. 
For  awhile  after  the  election  of  Martine  they  seemed 

72 


EXECUTIVE    LEADERSHIP  73 

subdued  and  cheerfully  resigned  to  defeat;  but  when  the 
new  Governor  launched  his  legislative  programme  they 
began  eagerly  to  attack  it  in  many  subtle  ways.  While 
there  were  some  members  of  this  group  who  honestly 
opposed  the  Governor's  programme  because  of  their  con 
servative  tendencies,  the  majority  of  the  opposition  were 
bent  upon  "putting  it  to  sleep,"  because,  forsooth,  it 
bore  the  Wilson  label.  The  new  Governor  quickly 
grasped  the  full  significance  of  the  situation  and  openly 
challenged  the  opposition.  To  accomplish  his  purpose, 
he  did  an  unprecedented  thing.  He  invited  the  Demo 
cratic  members  of  the  Legislature  to  meet  him  in  the 
Supreme  Court  Room  of  the  State  House  and  there,  face 
to  face,  he  laid  before  them  various  items  of  his  pro 
gramme  and  challenged  the  opposition  to  lay  their  cards 
on  the  table.  In  the  course  of  this  conference  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Smith-Nugent  faction  expressed  his  dis 
satisfaction  with  the  whole  programme,  challenging  the 
new  Governor's  right  to  be  present  at  the  conference;  even 
intimating  that  his  presence  was  an  unconstitutional  act 
which  might  subject  him  to  impeachment.  The  new 
Governor,  undisturbed  by  this  criticism,  turned  to  the 
gentleman  who  had  challenged  his  right  to  be  present  at 
the  conference,  and  said: 

You  can  turn  aside  from  the  measure  if  you  choose;  you  can  de 
cline  to  follow  me;  you  can  deprive  me  of  office  and  turn  away  from 
me,  but  you  cannot  deprive  me  of  power  so  long  as  I  steadfastly 
stand  for  what  I  believe  to  be  the  interests  and  legitimate  demands  of 
the  people  themselves.  I  beg  you  to  remember,  in  this  which  prom 
ises  to  be  an  historic  conference,  you  are  settling  the  question  of  the 
power  or  impotence,  the  distinction  or  the  ignominy  of  the  party  to 
which  the  people  with  singular  generosity  have  offered  the  conduct 
of  their  affairs. 


74      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Some  of  the  members  of  the  Legislature  came  to  my 
office  after  this  conference  and  told  me  of  the  great  speech 
the  Governor  had  just  delivered  and  how  defiantly  he  had 
met  the  attack  of  his  enemies.  This  caucus  gave  an 
emphatic  endorsement  of  his  legislative  programme  and 
in  a  few  weeks  the  House  of  Assembly  had  acted 
upon  it,  and  the  various  bills  that  constituted  his 
entire  programme  were  on  their  way  to  the  Republican 
Senate.  How  to  induce  favourable  action  at  the  hands 
of  the  Republican  Senate  was  a  problem.  There  were 
very  few  members  of  the  Senate  whose  ideals  and  purposes 
were  in  agreement  with  those  of  the  Governor. 

When  the  bills  reached  the  Senate,  the  Governor  began 
daily  conferences  with  the  Republican  members  of  that 
body,  discussing  with  them  the  items  of  his  programme 
and  urging  speedy  action  upon  them.  As  a  part  of  the 
programme  of  inducing  the  Republicans  to  support  him,  a 
friend  of  mine  who  was  on  the  inside  of  the  Republican 
situation  reported  to  me  that  it  was  the  opinion  in  the 
Republican  ranks  that  the  new  Governor  was  too  much 
a  professor  and  doctrinaire;  that  he  was  lacking  in  good- 
fellowship  and  companionship;  that  while  the  members 
of  the  Legislature  who  had  conferred  with  him  had  found 
him  open  and  frank,  they  thought  there  was  a  coldness 
and  an  austerity  about  him  which  held  the  Governor 
aloof  and  prevented  that  intimate  contact  that  was 
so  necessary  in  working  out  the  programme  we  had  out 
lined. 

We  finally  decided  that  the  fault  lay  in  the  lack  of 
social  intimacy  between  the  new  Governor  and  the 
members  of  the  Legislature.  In  my  social  and  official 
contact  with  Mr.  Wilson  I  always  found  him  most 
genial  and  agreeable.  When  we  were  at  luncheon  or 


EXECUTIVE    LEADERSHIP  75 

dinner  at  the  old  Sterling  Hotel  in  Trenton  he  would 
never  burden  our  little  talks  by  any  weighty  discussion 
of  important  matters  that  were  pending  before  him.  He 
entirely  forgot  all  business  and  gave  himself  over  to  the 
telling  of  delightful  stories.  How  to  make  the  real  good- 
fellowship  of  the  man  an  asset  in  dealing  with  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Senate  was  a  problem.  I  very  frankly  told 
him  one  day  at  luncheon  that  many  members  of  both 
legislative  bodies  felt  that  he  was  too  stiff  and  academic 
and  that  they  were  anxious  to  find  out  for  themselves  if 
there  was  a  more  human  side  to  him.  In  order  to  give 
him  an  opportunity  to  overcome  this  false  impression 
we  arranged  a  delightful  dinner  at  the  Trenton  Country 
Club,  to  which  we  invited  both  Democratic  and  Republi 
can  members  of  the  Senate.  The  evening  was  a  delightful 
one.  In  the  corner  of  the  little  room  where  the  dinner 
was  served  sat  three  darky  musicians  who  regaled  the 
little  group  with  fine  old  southern  melodies.  It  was  real 
fun  to  watch  the  new  Governor's  conduct  in  this  environ 
ment.  He  was  like  a  boy  out  of  school.  He  was  no 
longer  the  college  professor  or  the  cold  man  of  affairs. 
He  delighted  the  members  of  the  Senate  who  sat  about 
him  with  amusing  stories,  witty  remarks,  and  delightful 
bits  of  sarcasm.  At  the  close  of  the  dinner,  Senator 
Frelinghuysen  walked  over  and  challenged  him  to  a 
Virginia  Reel.  He  accepted  this  invitation  and  the 
crowd  of  men  were  soon  delighted  to  see  the  Somerset 
senator  lead  the  new  Governor  out  on  the  floor  and  his 
long  legs  were  soon  moving  in  rhythm  with  the  music. 
After  all,  men  are  just  boys,  and  this  bringing  together 
of  these  practical  men  on  so  happy  and  free  an  occasion 
did  much  to  convince  the  members  of  the  Senate  that  the 
new  Governor  after  all  was  like  themselves,  a  plain, 


TELEGRAM. 


3  RII  JIL  75  Govt. 

Windsor.  Vermont,  July  5,1915 

Hen.  Jos.  "P.  .Tumulty, 
The  White  House, 

WasnV.Etor.,D.C. 

is  do.vm  and  out  in  hi  a  newspaper— «*wsJt-s£ci  desperately  in 
need  of  employment*  pays  .thew  is  a  vacancy  as  foreign  trade  adviser  in  the 
State  Department  and  also  ore  in  the  District  Play  Grounds  department.  Would 
be  very  much  obliged  if  you  would  se»  if  something  can  be  done  for  him  in 
either  place.  His  address  221  A.  Street,  Southeast. 

Woodrow  Wilson. 


Dear  Tumulty, 

I  want  to  issue  this  statement 
to  help  Mr*  Hoover  and  his  Commis- 
•lorn  ia  the  splendid  work  they  are 
doing,  and  head  off  mischief-makers 
(or,  rather,  one  particular  mischief- 
maker  who  is  a  little  oat  of  his 
mind)  on  this  side  the  water* 

Will  you  not  please  read  it  to 
Lansing  over  the  'phone  and,  if  he 
has  no  objection  to  offsr,  give  it 
out? 


A  glimpse  at  the  President's  human  side 


76 


EXECUTIVE    LEADERSHIP  77 

simple  man,  modestly  trying  to  serve  the  interests  of  a 
great  state. 

This  affair  broke  the  ice,  and  after  that  there  was  a  close 
intimacy  between  the  Governor  and  the  members  of  the 
Legislature,  both  Democrats  and  Republicans,  and  this 
cooperation  soon  brought  about  the  enactment  of  the 
whole  Wilson  programme.  Never  before  had  so  compre 
hensive  a  programme  been  so  expeditiously  acted  upon  by  a 
legislative  body.  The  Legislature  had  convened  in  January 
and  by  the  middle  of  April  every  campaign  pledge  that  the 
Governor  had  made  had  been  kept,  although  the  Senate 
with  which  he  had  to  deal  was  largely  Republican. 

As  the  legislative  session  progressed  it  appeared  that 
certain  Democratic  senators  were  reluctant  to  follow  his 
leadership.  Indeed  it  was  also  apparent  that  the  Re 
publicans  were  alike  unwilling  to  act  favourably  upon  his 
legislative  suggestions.  In  this  situation  he  summoned 
the  Democratic  senators  and  reminded  them  of  the  party 
pledges  in  the  platform  and  served  notice  that  if  they  did 
not  vote  for  these  measures  they  would  have  to  explain 
to  their  constituents.  He  then  summoned  the  Republi 
can  senators  and  said  to  them,  in  effect,  this:  "The 
legislation  proposed  was  promised  in  the  Democratic  plat 
form.  That  is  not  your  platform.  Therefore,  you  are  not 
pledged  to  this  action.  But  if  you  obstruct  the  action  I 
shall  have  to  trouble  you  to  go  with  me  to  your  districts 
and  discuss  these  matters  with  your  constituents  and  tell 
them  why  you  consider  this  bad  legislation  and  why  you 
resisted  it." 

The  newspapers  of  the  country  soon  began  to  discuss 
the  achievements  of  the  Wilson  administration  in  New 
Jersey  and  immediately  the  name  of  the  Governor  began 
to  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  Presidency. 


78     WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

One  of  the  matters  of  national  importance  with  which 
he  was  called  upon  to  deal  during  this  legislative  session 
was  the  passage  of  railroad  grade-crossing  legislation.  In 
response  to  the  agitation  that  had  long  existed  in  New 
Jersey  for  the  elimination  of  grade  crossings,  the  Demo 
crats  had  inserted  a  radical  plank  in  their  platform  in 
reference  to  it,  and,  acting  upon  this,  the  Legislature  had 
passed  a  grade-crossing  bill,  to  which  the  railroads  of  the 
state  strenuously  objected.  It  was  a  matter  of  the 
greatest  public  interest  and  importance  that  for  many 
years  had  been  the  subject  of  bitter  controversies  through 
out  the  state.  While  the  bill  was  before  the  Governor 
for  consideration,  the  railroad  attorneys  had  prepared 
long,  comprehensive  briefs  attacking  the  bill  as  unjust  to 
the  railroads  and  as  containing  many  features  which  in 
their  essence  were  confiscatory.  When  the  bill  came 
before  the  Governor  for  final  action  no  one  considered 
for  a  moment  the  possibility  of  a  veto,  first,  because  of  the 
traditional  attitude  of  the  Democratic  party  of  New 
Jersey  in  the  matter  of  grade  crossings;  and,  secondly, 
because  of  the  effect  a  veto  would  have  upon  the  pro 
gressive  thought  of  the  country.  I  recall  very  well  my 
discussion  with  him  in  regard  to  this  most  important  bill. 
Realizing  that  he  was  at  this  time  looming  up  as  a  na 
tional  figure,  and  knowing  that  the  Progressives  of  the 
country  were  awaiting  with  keen  interest  his  action  on  the 
bill,  I  feared  the  effect  upon  his  political  fortunes  that  a 
veto  of  the  bill  would  undoubtedly  have. 

The  Baltimore  Convention  was  only  a  few  months  away 
and  it  was  clear  to  me  that  no  matter  how  safe  and  sane 
were  the  grounds  upon  which  he  would  veto  this  legislation, 
his  enemies  in  the  Democratic  party  would  charge  him 
with  being  influenced  by  the  New  Jersey  railroad  interests 


EXECUTIVE    LEADERSHIP  79 

who  were  engaged  in  a  most  vigorous  campaign  against 
the  passage  of  this  legislation.  In  fact,  when  we  came  to 
discuss  the  matter,  I  frankly  called  this  phase  of  it  to  his 
attention.  I  tried  to  make  him  see  the  effects  such  a 
veto  would  have  upon  his  political  fortunes,  but  he  soon 
made  it  clear  to  me  that  he  was  unmindful  of  all  such 
consequences.  After  thoroughly  considering  the  matter, 
he  finally  decided  to  veto  the  bill.  In  discussing  the 
matter  with  me,  he  said:  "I  realize  the  unjust  and  un 
fortunate  inference  that  will  be  drawn  by  my  political 
enemies  from  a  veto  of  this  bill,  but  the  bill,  as  drawn,  is 
unjust  and  unfair  to  the  railroads  and  I  ought  not  to  be 
afraid  to  say  so  publicly.  I  cannot  consider  the  effect  of  a 
veto  upon  my  own  political  fortunes.  If  I  should  sign  this 
bill  it  would  mean  practically  a  confiscation  of  railroad 
property  and  I  would  not  be  worthy  of  the  trust  of  a 
single  man  in  the  state  or  in  the  country  were  I  afraid  to 
do  my  duty  and  to  protect  private  property  by  my  act." 
His  attitude  toward  the  bill  was  clearly  set  forth  in  the 
veto,  part  of  which  is  as  follows: 

I  know  the  seriousness  and  great  consequence  of  the  question 
affected  by  this  important  measure.  There  is  a  demand,  well 
grounded  and  imperative,  throughout  the  state  that  some  practicable 
legislation  should  be  adopted  whereby  the  grade  crossings  of  railways 
which  everywhere  threaten  life  and  interfere  with  the  convenience 
of  both  city  and  rural  communities  should  as  rapidly  as  possible  be 
abolished.  But  there  is  certainly  not  a  demand  in  New  Jersey  for 
legislation  which  is  unjust  and  impracticable. 


The  non-enactment  of  this  bill  into  law  will,  of  course,  be  a  serious 
disappointment  to  the  people  of  the  state,  but  it  will  only  concen 
trate  their  attention  upon  the  just  and  equitable  way  of  accomplishing 


80      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  end  in  view.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  people  of  the  state  are 
in  such  haste  as  to  be  willing  to  work  a  gross  injustice,  either  to  the 
railroads  or  to  private  owners  of  property,  or  to  the  several  communi 
ties  affected. 

Of  course  his  political  enemies  made  free  use  of  this  veto 
in  an  effort  to  injure  him  throughout  the  country  in  every 
state  campaign  where  his  fortunes  as  candidate  were 
involved.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  his  veto  of  this  bill  did 
shock  the  people  of  the  state,  but  when  they  seriously 
considered  the  matter  in  all  its  aspects,  they  felt  that  their 
governor  had,  at  least,  done  an  honourable  and  a  cour 
ageous  thing  in  refusing  to  approve  it. 

Discussion  of  him  as  a  strong  Presidential  possibility 
was  steadily  growing.  I  had  felt  a  delicacy  about  talking 
of  this  with  him,  but  in  a  walk  that  we  were  accustomed  to 
take  along  the  banks  of  the  Delaware  and  Raritan  Canal 
between  office  hours,  I,  one  day,  made  bold  to  open  the 
subject  in  this  way:  "It  is  evident  from  the  newspapers, 
Governor,  that  you  are  being  considered  for  the  Presi 
dency."  I  could  plainly  see  from  the  way  he  met  the 
suggestion  that  he  did  not  resent  my  boldness  in  opening 
the  discussion.  I  told  him  that  we  were  receiving  letters 
at  the  Executive  offices  from  various  parts  of  the  country 
in  praise  of  the  programme  he  had  just  put  through  the 
Legislature.  As  we  discussed  the  possibilities  of  the 
Presidential  situation,  he  turned  to  me  in  the  most 
solemn  way,  and  putting  his  hand  to  his  mouth,  as  if  to 
whisper  something,  said:  "I  do  not  know,  Tumulty,  that 
I  would  care  to  be  President  during  the  next  four  years." 
And  then  looking  around  as  if  he  were  afraid  uninvited 
ears  might  be  listening,  he  continued:  "For  the  next 
President  will  have  a  war  on  his  hands,  and  I  am  not  sure 
that  I  would  make  a  good  war  President."  This  reply 


EXECUTIVE    LEADERSHIP 


81 


greatly  excited  my  curiosity  and  interest  and  I  said: 
"With  what  nation  do  you  think  we  will  have  a  war?" 
Very  cautiously  he  said:  "I  do  not  care  to  name  the 
nation,"  and  our  little  talk  ended.  This  statement  was 
made  to  me  in  April,  1910.  Was  it  a  prophecy  of  the  war 
that  was  to  burst  upon  the  world  in  August,  1914? 


CHAPTER  XII 

COLONEL  HARVEY 

UPON  the  completion  of  the  legislative  work  of 
the  first  session  of  the  New  Jersey  Legislature  the 
name  of  Woodrow  Wilson  quickly  forged  to  the 
front  as  a  strong  Presidential  possibility.  Intimate 
friends,  including  Walter  Hines  Page,  afterward  United 
States  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain;  Cleveland  H.  Dodge 
and  Robert  Bridges,  the  two  latter  old  friends  and  class 
mates  of  the  Governor  in  the  famous  class  of  '79  at 
Princeton,  set  about  by  conferences  to  launch  the  Presi 
dential  boom  of  their  friend,  and  selected  for  the  task 
of  the  actual  management  of  the  campaign  the  young 
Princetonian,  William  F.  McCombs,  then  an  active  and 
rising  young  lawyer  of  New  York.  These  gentlemen,  and 
other  devoted  friends  and  advisers  of  the  Governor, 
made  up  the  first  Wilson  contingent,  and  at  once  initiated 
a  plan  of  publicity  and  organization  throughout  the 
country.  They  arranged  to  have  the  New  Jersey  Gover 
nor  visit  strategic  points  in  the  country  to  make  ad 
dresses  on  a  variety  of  public  questions.  Whether 
Colonel  Harvey  was  behind  the  scenes  as  the  adviser  of 
this  little  group  I  have  never  ascertained,  but  Harper's 
Weekly,  then  edited  by  the  Colonel,  was  his  leading 
supporter  in  the  magazine  world,  carrying  the  name  of 
the  Princetonian  at  its  mast-head  as  a  candidate  for  the 
Presidency.  There  were  frequent  conferences  between 
the  Colonel  and  the  Governor  at  the  Executive  offices, 


COLONEL    HARVEY  83 

and  as  a  result  of  these  conferences  the  Wilson  boom  soon 
became  a  thing  to  be  reckoned  with  by  the  Old  Guard  in 
control  of  party  affairs  in  the  nation. 

Wilson  stock  from  the  moment  of  the  adjournment  of 
the  Legislature  began  to  rise,  and  his  candidacy  spread 
with  great  rapidity,  until  in  nearly  every  state  in  the 
Union  "Wilson  Clubs"  were  being  established.  The 
New  Jersey  primaries,  where  again  he  met  and  defeated 
the  Smith  forces;  the  Ohio  primaries,  where  he  split  the 
delegates  with  the  favourite  son,  Governor  Harmon,  a 
distinguished  Democrat;  and  the  Wisconsin  primaries, 
at  which  he  swept  the  state,  gave  a  tremendous  impetus 
to  the  already  growing  movement  for  the  "Reform" 
Governor  of  New  Jersey. 

Everything  was  serenely  moving  in  the  Wilson  camp, 
when  like  a  thunderclap  out  of  a  clear  sky  broke  the 
story  of  the  disagreement  between  Colonel  Harvey, 
Marse  Henry  Watterson,  and  the  Governor  of  New 
Jersey.  I  recall  my  conversation  with  Governor  Wilson 
on  the  day  following  the  Harvey-Watterson  conference 
at  a  New  York  club.  As  private  secretary  to  the  Gover 
nor,  I  always  made  it  a  rule  to  keep  in  close  touch  with 
every  conference  then  being  held  regarding  the  political 
situation,  and  in  this  way  I  first  learned  about  the  Harvey- 
Watterson  meeting  which  for  a  few  weeks  threatened 
to  destroy  all  the  lines  of  support  that  had  been  built  up 
throughout  the  past  months  of  diligent  work  and  organi 
zation. 

The  Governor  and  I  were  seated  in  a  trolley  car  on  our 
way  from  the  State  Capitol  to  the  railroad  station  in 
Trenton  when  he  informed  me,  in  the  most  casual  way 
and  without  seeming  to  understand  the  possible  damage 
he  had  done  his  own  cause,  of  what  followed  the  conference 


84      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  previous  day.  It  was  like  this:  the  conference  had 
ended  and  they  were  leaving  the  room  when  Colonel 
Harvey  put  his  hand  on  Woodrow  Wilson's  shoulder  and 
said:  "Governor,  I  want  to  ask  you  a  frank  question,  and 
I  want  you  to  give  me  a  frank  answer.  In  your  opinion 
is  the  support  of  Harper's  Weekly  helping  or  hurting  you?  " 
In  telling  me  of  it  Woodrow  Wilson  said:  "I  was  most 
embarrassed,  and  replied:  'Colonel,  I  wish  you  had  not 
asked  me  that  question.'  "Well,  what  is  the  answer?' 
Colonel  Harvey  insisted  pleasantly.  'Why,  Colonel,  some 
of  my  friends  tell  me  it  is  not  helping  me  in  the  West.' 
Colonel  Harvey  said:  'I  was  afraid  you  might  feel  that  way 
about  it,  and  we  shall  have  to  soft-pedal  a  bit'."  Mr. 
Wilson  was  so  serenely  unconscious  that  any  offence  had 
been  taken  that  when  informed  by  me  a  little  later  that 
his  name  had  disappeared  from  the  head  of  the  editorial 
column  of  Harper's  Weekly  he  did  not  connect  this  with 
the  interview.  "  Was  Colonel  Harvey  offended?  "  I  asked. 
"He  didn't  seem  to  be,"  was  the  Governor's  answer. 

I  immediately  scented  the  danger  of  the  situation  and 
the  possibilities  of  disaster  to  his  political  fortunes  that 
lay  in  his  reply,  and  I  told  him  very  frankly  that  I  was 
afraid  he  had  deeply  wounded  Colonel  Harvey  and  that 
it  might  result  in  a  serious  break  in  their  relations.  The 
Governor  seemed  grieved  at  this  and  said  that  he  hoped 
such  was  not  the  case;  that  even  after  he  had  expressed 
himself  so  freely,  Colonel  Harvey  had  been  most  kind  and 
agreeable  to  him  and  that  they  had  continued  to  discuss 
in  the  most  friendly  way  the  plans  for  the  campaign  and 
that  the  little  conference  had  ended  without  apparent 
evidence  that  anything  untoward  had  happened  that 
might  lead  to  a  break  in  their  relations.  We  then  dis 
cussed  at  length  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  and  as 


COLONEL    HARVEY  85 

a  result  of  our  talk  the  Governor  wrote  Colonel  Harvey 
and  endeavoured  to  make  clear  what  he  had  in  mind  when 
he  answered  the  question  put  to  him  by  the  Colonel  at  the 
club  conference  a  few  days  before,  not,  indeed,  by  way  of 
apology,  but  simply  by  way  of  explanation.  This  letter 
to  the  Colonel  and  a  subsequent  one  went  a  long  way 
toward  softening  the  unfortunate  impression  that  had 
been  created  by  the  publication  of  the  Harvey-Watterson 
correspondence.  The  letters  are  as  follows: 

(Personal) 

(University   Club 
Fifth  Avenue  and  Fifty-Fourth  Street 
December  21,   1911. 
MY  DEAR  COLONEL: 

Every  day  I  am  confirmed  in  the  judgment  that  my  mind  is  a 
one-track  road  and  can  run  only  one  train  of  thought  at  a  time! 
A  long  time  after  that  interview  with  you  and  Marse  Henry  at  the 
Manhattan  Club  it  came  over  me  that  when  (at  the  close  of  the  inter 
view)  you  asked  me  that  question  about  the  Weekly  I  answered  it 
simply  as  a  matter  of  fact  and  of  business,  and  said  never  a  word  of 
my  sincere  gratitude  to  you  for  all  your  generous  support,  or  of  my 
hope  that  it  might  be  continued.  Forgive  me,  and  forget  my  man 
ners! 

Faithfully,  yours, 

tWooDROW  WILSON. 
::'»I:»T 
To  which  letter  Colonel  Harvey  sent  the  following 

reply: 

(Personal) 

Franklin  Square 
New  York,  January  4,  1912. 
MY  DEAR  WILSON: 

Replying  to  your  note  from  the  University  Club,  I  think  it  should 
go  without  saying  that  no  purely  personal  issue  could  arise  between 
you  and  me.  Whatever  anybody  else  may  surmise,  you  surely 
must  know  that  in  trying  to  arouse  and  further  your  political  as- 


86      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

pirations  during  the  past  few  years  I  have  been  actuated  solely  by 
the  belief  that  I  was  rendering  a  distinct  public  service. 

The  real  point  at  the  time  of  our  interview  was,  as  you  aptly  put  it, 
one  simply  "of  fact  and  of  business,"  and  when  you  stated  the  fact 
to  be  that  my  support  was  hurting  your  candidacy,  and  that  you  were 
experiencing  difficulty  in  finding  a  way  to  counteract  its  harmful 
effect,  the  only  thing  possible  for  me  to  do,  in  simple  fairness  to  you, 
no  less  than  in  consideration  of  my  own  self-respect,  was  to  relieve 
you  of  your  embarrassment  so  far  as  it  lay  within  my  power  to  do  so, 
by  ceasing  to  advocate  your  nomination.  That,  I  think,  was  fully  un 
derstood  between  us  at  the  time,  and,  acting  accordingly,  I  took  down 
your  name  from  the  head  of  the  Weekly's  editorial  page  some  days 
before  your  letter  was  written.  That  seems  to  be  all  there  is  to  it. 

Whatever  little  hurt  I  may  have  felt  as  a  consequence  of  the  un 
expected  peremptoriness  of  your  attitude  toward  me  is,  of  course, 
wholly  eliminated  by  your  gracious  words. 

Very  truly  yours, 

GEORGE  HARVEY. 

To  Colonel  Harvey's  letter  Governor  Wilson  replied  as 
follows: 

(Personal) 

Hotel  Astor 

New  York,  January  11,  1912. 
MY  DEAR  COL.  HARVEY: 

Generous  and  cordial  as  was  your  letter  written  in  reply  to  my 
note  from  the  University  Club,  it  has  left  me  uneasy,  because,  in 
its  perfect  frankness,  it  shows  that  I  did  hurt  you  by  what  I  so  tact 
lessly  said  at  the  Knickerbocker  Club.  I  am  very  much  ashamed  of 
myself,  for  there  is  nothing  I  am  more  ashamed  of  than  hurting  a 
true  friend,  however  unintentional  the  hurt  may  have  been.  I 
wanted  very  much  to  see  you  in  Washington,  but  was  absolutely 
captured  by  callers  every  minute  I  was  in  my  rooms,  and  when  I 
was  not  there  was  fulfilling  public  engagements.  I  saw  you  at  the 
dinner  but  could  not  get  at  you,  and  after  the  dinner  was  surrounded 
and  prevented  from  getting  at  you.  I  am  in  town  to-day,  to  speak 
this  evening,  and  came  in  early  in  the  hope  of  catching  you  at  your 
office. 


COLONEL    HARVEY  87 

For  I  owe  it  to  you  and  to  my  own  thought  and  feeling  to  tell  you 
how  grateful  I  am  for  all  your  generous  praise  and  support  of  me 
(no  one  has  described  me  more  nearly  as  I  would  like  myself  to  be 
than  you  have);  how  I  have  admired  you  for  the  independence  and 
unhesitating  courage  and  individuality  of  your  course;  and  how  far 
I  was  from  desiring  that  you  should  cease  your  support  of  me  in  the 
Weekly.  You  will  think  me  very  stupid — but  I  did  not  think  of 
that  as  the  result  of  my  blunt  answer  to  your  question.  I  thought 
only  of  the  means  of  convincing  people  of  the  real  independence  of 
the  Weekly's  position.  You  will  remember  that  that  was  what  we 
discussed.  And  now  that  I  have  unintentionally  put  you  in  a  false 
and  embarrassing  position  you  heap  coals  of  fire  on  my  head  by 
continuing  to  give  out  interviews  favourable  to  my  candidacy!  All 
that  I  can  say  is  that  you  have  proved  yourself  very  big,  and  that  I 
wish  I  might  have  an  early  opportunity  to  tell  you  face  to  face  how 
I  really  feel  about  it  all.  With  warm  regard, 

Cordially  and  faithfully,  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

For  a  while  it  seemed  as  if  the  old  relations  between  the 
Colonel  and  the  New  Jersey  Governor  would  be  resumed, 
but  some  unfriendly  influence,  bent  upon  the  Governor's 
undoing,  thrust  itself  into  the  affair,  and  soon  the  story  of 
the  Manhattan  Club  incident  broke  about  the  Prince- 
tonian's  head  with  a  fury  and  bitterness  that  deeply  dis 
tressed  many  of  Mr.  Wilson's  friends  throughout  the 
country.  The  immediate  effect  upon  his  candidacy  was 
almost  disastrous.  Charges  of  ingratitude  to  the  "original 
Wilson  man"  flew  thick  and  fast.  Mr.  Wilson's  enemies 
throughout  the  country  took  up  the  charge  of  ingratitude 
and  soon  the  stock' of  the  New  Jersey  man  began  to  fall, 
until  his  immediate  friends  almost  lost  heart.  The  bad 
effect  of  the  publication  of  the  Harvey- Watterson  corre 
spondence  and  the  bitter  attacks  upon  the  sincerity  of  the 
New  Jersey  Governor  were  soon  perceptible  in  the  falling 
away  of  contributions  so  necessary  to  keep  alive  the 


88      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

campaign  then  being  carried  on  throughout  the  country. 
The  "band-wagon"  crowd  began  to  leave  us  and  jump 
aboard  the  Clark,  Underwood,  and  Harmon  booms. 

Suddenly,  as  if  over  night,  a  reaction  in  favour  of  Gov 
ernor  Wilson  began  to  set  in.  The  continued  pounding 
and  attacks  of  the  reactionary  press  soon  convinced  the 
progressives  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic  party  that 
Wilson  was  being  unjustly  condemned,  because  he  had 
courageously  spoken  what  many  believed  to  be  the  truth. 
At  this  critical  stage  of  affairs  a  thing  happened  which 
routed  his  enemies.  One  of  the  leading  publicity  men  of 
the  Wilson  forces  in  Washington,  realizing  the  damage 
that  was  being  done  his  chief,  inspired  a  story,  through 
his  Washington  newspaper  friends,  that  WTilson  was  being 
gibbeted  because  he  refused  to  accept  the  support  of 
Wall  Street  interests  which  Harvey  and  Watterson  had 
offered  him,  and  that  his  refusal  to  accept  their  offer 
was  the  real  cause  of  the  break.  This  new  angle  of  the 
Harvey-Watterson  episode  worked  a  complete  reversal 
of  opinion. 

The  clever  work  of  this  publicity  man  in  turning  the 
light  on  what  he  conceived  to  be  the  real  purpose  of  the 
Harvey-Watterson  conference  probably  did  injustice  to 
these  two  gentlemen,  but  at  all  events  it  gave  weight  to 
the  impression  in  the  minds  of  many  people  throughout 
the  country  that  the  real  reason  for  the  break  was  Mr. 
Wilson's  refusal  to  bow  the  knee  to  certain  eastern 
financial  interests  that  were  understood  to  be  behind 
Harper's  Weekly. 

The  tide  quickly  turned  against  Colonel  Harvey  and 
Marse  Henry  Watterson.  Marse  Henry,  alone  in  his 
suite  at  the  New  Willard  Hotel  at  Washington,  and  the 
Colonel,  away  off  in  his  tower  at  Deal,  New  Jersey,  were 


COLONEL    HARVEY  89 

busily  engaged  in  explaining  to  the  public  and  attempting, 
in  heroic  fashion,  to  extricate  themselves  from  the  un 
fortunate  implications  created  by  the  story  of  the  Wilson 
publicity  man.  What  appeared  at  first  blush  to  be  a 
thing  that  would  destroy  the  candidacy  of  the  New  Jersey 
Governor  had  been,  by  clever  newspaper  manipulation, 
turned  to  his  advantage  and  aid. 

When  the  bitterness  and  rancour  caused  by  this  un 
fortunate  incident  had  happily  passed  away  Colonel 
Watterson  and  I  met  at  a  delightful  dinner  at  Harvey's 
Restaurant  in  Washington  and  discussed  the  "old  fight." 
The  young  fellow  who  had  inspired  the  story  which  so 
grievously  distressed  Marse  Henry  and  Colonel  Harvey 
was  present  at  this  dinner.  Marse  Henry  was  in  fine 
spirits,  and  without  showing  the  slightest  trace  of  the  old 
bitterness,  rehearsed  the  details  of  this  now-famous 
incident  in  a  witty,  sportsmanlike,  and  good-natured  way, 
and  at  its  conclusion  he  turned  to  my  newspaper  friend 
and  laughingly  said:  "You  damn  rascal,  you  are  the 
scoundrel  who  sent  out  the  story  that  Harvey  and  I  were 
trying  to  force  Wall  Street  money  on  Wilson.  However, 
old  man,  it  did  the  trick.  If  it  had  not  been  for  the  clever 
use  you  made  of  this  incident,  Wilson  never  would  have 
been  President." 

In  a  beautiful  letter  addressed  to  the  President  by 
Marse  Henry  on  September  24,  1914,  conveying  his  ex 
pressions  of  regret  at  the  death  of  the  President's  first 
wife,  appears  the  following  statement  with  reference  to  the 
famous  Harvey- Watterson  controversy: 

I  hope  that  hereafter  you  and  I  will  better  understand  one  another; 
in  any  event  that  the  single  disagreeable  episode  will  vanish  and 
never  be  thought  of  more.  In  Paris  last  winter  I  went  over  the  whole 
matter  with  Mr.  McCombs  and  we  quite  settled  and  blotted  out  our 


90      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

end  of  it.  I  very  much  regret  the  use  of  any  rude  word — too  much 
the  characteristic  of  our  rough-and-tumble  political  combats — and 
can  truly  say  that  I  have  not  only  earnestly  wished  the  success  of 
your  administration  but  have  sought  to  find  points  of  agreement, 
not  of  disagreement. 

I  am  writing  as  an  old  man — old  enough  to  be  your  father — who 
has  the  claim  upon  your  consideration  that  all  his  life  he  has  pursued 
the  ends  you  yourself  have  aimed  at,  if  at  times  too  zealously  and 
exactingly,  yet  without  self-seeking  or  rancor. 

Your  friend, 
HENKY  WATTERSON. 

The  President's  acknowledgment  of  this  letter  is  as 
follows : 

September  28,  1914. 
MY  DEAR  COLONEL  WATTERSON: 

Your  kind  letter  has  gratified  me  very  deeply.  You  may  be  sure 
that  any  feeling  I  may  have  had  has  long  since  disappeared  and  that 
I  feel  only  gratified  that  you  should  again  and  again  have  come  to 
my  support  in  the  columns  of  the  Courier- Journal.  The  whole 
thing  was  a  great  misunderstanding. 

Sincerely  yours, 
WOODROW  WILSON. 

While  the  Harvey- Watterson  episode  ended  as  above 
related,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Woodrow  Wilson  deeply 
regretted  the  whole  matter,  and,  so  far  as  he  was  con 
cerned,  there  was  no  feeling  on  his  part  of  unfriendliness 
or  bitterness  toward  Colonel  Harvey.  Indeed,  he  felt 
that  Colonel  Harvey  had  unselfishly  devoted  himself  to 
his  cause  in  the  early  and  trying  days  of  his  candidacy, 
and  that  Harvey's  support  of  him  was  untouched  by 
selfish  interests  of  any  kind.  In  every  way  he  tried  to 
soften  the  unfortunate  impression  that  had  been  made  on 
the  country  by  what  many  thought  was  an  abrupt,  un- 


COLONEL    HARVEY  91 

gracious  way  of  treating  a  friend.  An  incident  in  con 
nection  with  this  matter  is  worth  relating: 

One  day  at  the  conclusion  of  the  regular  Tuesday 
cabinet  meeting  the  President  and  I  lingered  at  the  table, 
as  was  our  custom,  and  gossiped  about  the  affairs  of  the 
Administration  and  the  country.  These  discussions  were 
intimate  and  frank  in  every  way. 

A  note  in  the  social  column  of  one  of  the  leading  papers 
of  Washington  carried  the  story  that  Colonel  Harvey's 
daughter,  Miss  Dorothy  Harvey,  was  in  town  and  was  a 
guest  at  the  home  of  Mrs.  Champ  Clark.  I  took  occasion 
to  mention  this  to  the  President,  suggesting  that  it  would 
be  a  gracious  thing  on  his  part  and  on  the  part  of  Mrs. 
Wilson  to  invite  Miss  Harvey  to  the  Sayre- Wilson 
wedding  which  was  scheduled  to  take  place  a  few  days 
later,  hoping  that  in  this  way  an  opening  might  be  made 
for  the  resumption  of  the  old  relationship  between  the 
Colonel  and  Mr.  Wilson.  The  President  appeared  greatly 
interested  in  the  suggestion,  saying  that  he  would  take  it 
up  with  Mrs.  Wilson  at  once,  assuring  me  that  it  could 
be  arranged.  When  I  saw  how  readily  he  acted  upon  this 
suggestion,  I  felt  that  this  was  an  opening  for  a  full, 
frank  discussion  of  his  relations  with  Colonel  Harvey. 
I  approached  the  subject  in  this  way:  "For  a  long 
time  I  have  wanted  to  discuss  Colonel  Harvey  with 
you.  There  is  no  doubt,  Governor,  that  this  unfortunate 
episode  did  not  sit  well  on  the  stomachs  of  the  American 
people.  Whether  you  believe  it  or  not,  the  country 
resented  your  attitude  toward  your  old  friend,  and  out  of 
this  incident  an  impression  has  grown  which  is  becoming 
stronger  with  each  day,  that  you  pay  little  regard  to 
friendship  and  the  obligations  that  grow  out  of  it.  I  have 
been  hoping  that  in  some  way  the  old  relationship  could 


92      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

be  resumed  and  that  you  would  feel  free  at  some  time  in  a 
public  way  to  attest  your  real  feeling  for  Colonel  Harvey, 
at  least  by  way  of  reciprocation  for  the  genuine  way  he 
stood  by  you  in  the  old  days  in  New  Jersey."  The  President 
looked  at  me  in  the  most  serious  way,  apparently  weighing 
every  word  I  had  uttered,  and  said:  "You  are  right, 
Tumulty;  unfortunate  impressions  have  been  created. 
What  can  I  do  for  Colonel  Harvey  to  attest  in  some  public 
way  my  appreciation  of  what  he  did  for  me  in  the  old 
days?"  I  asked  why,  inasmuch  as  McCombs  had  de 
clined  the  French  Ambassadorship,  this  post  might  not  be 
offered  to  Colonel  Harvey,  adding  that  I  believed  he 
coveted  and  would  appreciate  such  an  appointment. 
The  President  said  that  this  was  an  admirable  suggestion 
and  authorized  me  to  get  in  touch  with  Colonel  Harvey  at 
once  and  make  him  the  offer  of  the  French  post. 

While  my  relations  with  Colonel  Harvey  were  at  no 
time  strained,  and,  in  fact,  up  to  this  day  our  friendship 
has  been  uninterrupted,  I  thought  it  would  be  more  tact 
ful  if  I  should  approach  him  through  the  junior  senator 
from  New  York,  James  O' Gorman.     Immediately  upon 
leaving  the  President  I  went  to  the  Army  and  Navy  Club, 
where  Senator  O'Gorman  was  living,  and  told  him  of  my 
conversation  with  the  President  in  reference  to  Colonel 
Harvey.     He  was  enthusiastic  and  immediately  got  in 
touch  with  Colonel  Harvey  at  his  home  at  Deal,  Nev 
Jersey,  told  him  of  the  President's  offer,  and  asked  for  . 
conference.     Then  a  thing  happened  which  completely 
destroyed  these  plans  for  a  reconciliation.     The  following 
Sunday  an  interview  signed  by  Colonel  Harvey,  bitterh 
assailing  the  President,  appeared  in  the  New  York  Time, 
The  fat  was  in  the  fire.     Senator  O'Gorman  and  I  wen 
silenced.     When  I  approached  the  President  on  Monday 


COLONEL    HARVEY  93 

morning  to  discuss  further  the  matter  with  him,  he  said: 
"I  greatly  regret  this  interview  of  Colonel  Harvey.  How 
can  I  now  with  propriety  offer  him  any  post?  Knowing 
Harvey  as  I  do,  he  would  be  reluctant  to  take  it,  for  the 
country  might  be  of  the  opinion  that  he  had  yielded  in  his 
criticism  of  me  by  the  offer  of  this  appointment,  and  I 
could  not  in  honour  make  the  appointment  now,  for  it 
might  appear  to  the  country  that  by  this  method  I  was 
trying  to  purchase  the  silence  of  the  Colonel.  I  am  very 
sorry,  indeed,  that  the  plan  we  discussed  has  fallen  to  the 
ground." 

And  thus  the  efforts  of  Mr.  Wilson  to  bring  about  a 
reconciliation  with  his  old  friend  ended  in  dismal  failure. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  "COCKED-HAT"  INCIDENT 

WHILE  Governor  Wilson  came  out  of  this  contro 
versy  with  the  two  Colonels,  Harvey  and  Watter- 
son,  with  flying  colours,  he  was  by  no  means 
beyond  the  danger  line.  His  enemies  both  within  and 
without  the  party  hotly  contested  his  leadership,  and  the 
bitterness  of  the  opposition  grew  in  proportion  as  his 
candidacy  gained  daily  advantages.  Everything  possible 
was  done  to  block  his  progress  and  to  make  more  difficult 
his  road  to  the  Presidency.  Everything  he  had  ever  said 
or  written,  especially  his  "History  of  the  American 
People,"  was  carefully  examined  in  the  hope  of  find 
ing  some  way  to  discredit  him.  All  the  guns  of  the 
opposition  were  turned  upon  him,  but  nothing  seemed 
sufficient  to  block  his  progress.  All  the  charges,  inti 
mations,  insinuations,  and  slanders  that  were  industriously 
circulated  by  his  enemies  were  without  effect,  and  the 
trained  political  minds  in  his  own  camp  were  apprehensive 
lest  his  candidacy  had  reached  its  climax  too  long  before 
the  convention.  How  to  maintain  the  present  advantage 
was  the  problem  that  perplexed  them.  They  were  hope 
fully  looking  forward  to  the  benefits  that  would  accrue  to 
their  candidate  in  the  round-up  of  candidates  at  the 
famous  Jackson  Day  dinner,  scheduled  for  early  January, 
1912.  This  dinner  was  an  annual  affair  and  was  eagerly 
looked  forward  to.  It  was  expected  that  the  leading 
lights  of  the  Democratic  party  would  attend  this  dinner, 

94 


THE    "COCKED-HAT"    INCIDENT  95 

including  Colonel  W.  J.  Bryan,  Champ  Clark,  Oscar 
Underwood,  ex-Governor  Folk  of  Missouri,  Roger 
Sullivan  of  Illinois,  and  the  New  Jersey  Governor's 
friends  were  confident  that  because  of  his  ability  as  a 
public  speaker  he  would  make  a  strong  and  favourable 
impression.  They  were  not  disappointed. 

We  were  awaiting  the  Jackson  Day  dinner  with  great 
expectations,  and  congratulating  ourselves  that  we  were 
now  safely  "out  of  the  woods,"  and  that  things  would 
move  smoothly  for  our  candidate,  when  like  a  bolt  from 
the  blue  came  the  publication  of  the  famous  Joline 
"cocked-hat"  letter,  which  caused  another  panic  in  the 
ranks  of  the  too-optimistic  Wilson  forces. 

This  letter  was  written  by  Mr.  Wilson  to  Mr.  Adrian 
Joline,  a  Princeton  alumnus  and  prominent  New  York 
lawyer  at  the  time  of  the  split  in  the  Democratic  party 
over  the  silver  question.  The  letter  is  as  follows: 

Princeton,  New  Jersey, 

April    29,    1907. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  JOLINE: 

Thank  you  very  much  for  sending  me  your  address  at  Parsons, 
Kan.,  before  the  board  of  directors  of  the  Missouri,  Kansas  &  Texas 
Railway  Company.  I  have  read  it  with  relish  and  entire  agreement. 
Would  that  we  could  do  something,  at  once  dignified  and  effective, 
to  knock  Mr.  Bryan  once  for  all  into  a  cocked  hat ! 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

The  publication  of  this  letter  came  at  a  most  inoppor 
tune  time  for  the  Wilson  candidacy,  and  how  to  meet  it 
was  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  that  the  Wilson 
forces  had  to  face.  Our  enemies  were  jubilant.  They 
felt  that  at  last  they  had  broken  our  lines  and  that  we 
would  not  be  able  to  "come  back." 


96      WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

At  this  time  I  was  at  the  State  House  at  Trenton  and  I 
received  a  telegram  from  the  Governor,  requesting  that 
I  come  at  once  to  Washington,  where  he  was  conferring 
with  the  leaders  of  his  forces  in  an  effort  to  find  some  way 
to  neutralize  the  bad  effects  of  the  Joline  cocked-hat 
story  in  advance  of  the  Jackson  Day  banquet,  at  which 
Mr.  Bryan  would  be  present.  On  my  arrival  in  Washing 
ton  I  went  to  the  Willard  Hotel  and  found  the  Governor 
in  a  conference  with  William  F.  McCombs,  Tom  Pence, 
Senator  O' Gorman,  and  Dudley  Field  Malone.  \7e 
discussed  the  situation  fully  and  the  character  of  reply 
the  Governor  should  make  by  way  of  explanation  of  the 
Joline  letter.  Mr.  Josephus  Daniels,  a  friend  and 
associate  of  Mr.  Bryan,  was  sent  to  confer  with  Mr. 
Bryan  in  order  that  Mr.  Wilson  might  have  a  close 
friend  at  hand  who  could  interpret  the  motives  which  lay 
back  of  the  Joline  letter  and  impress  upon  Mr.  Bryan  the 
present  favourable  attitude  of  Mr.  Wilson  toward  him. 
Mr.  McCombs  suggested  that  the  Governor  address 
an  open  letter  to  Mr.  Bryan,  voicing  his  regret  over  the 
publication  of  this  letter  and  assuring  him  of  his  present 
kindly  feelings  toward  him.  I  vigorously  opposed  Mr. 
McCombs'  suggestion,  arguing  that  no  explanation  of  the 
Joline  letter  could  be  made  to  Mr.  Bryan  that  would  wear 
the  appearance  of  sincerity,  or  be  convincing,  and  that 
the  letter  having  been  written  there  was  nothing  to 
do  to  extenuate  it  in  any  way  and  that  the  wise  thing 
was  to  make  a  virtue  of  necessity.  I  suggested  that  on 
the  following  night,  when  the  Governor  was  to  deliver 
his  address  at  the  Jackson  Day  dinner*  he  could,  in  the 
most  generous  and  kindly  way,  pay  a  handsome  tribute 
to  Mr.  Bryan  for  his  unselfish  service  to  the  Demo 
cratic  party  throughout  the  dark  years  he  had  been  its 


THE    "COCKED-HAT'     INCIDENT          97 

leader;  that  I  felt  that  he  would  appreciate  a  tribute 
of  this  kind  and  that  he  would  resent  any  explanation  of 
this  incident  which  would  appear  to  be  truckling  or 
apologetic  in  character.  This  plan  was  finally  agreed 
upon.  In  the  very  beginning  of  his  speech,  in  the  most 
tactful  way,  Governor  Wilson  paid  a  tribute  to  the  Great 
Commoner  by  saying,  as  he  turned  to  Mr.  Bryan:  "When 
others  were  faint-hearted,  Colonel  Bryan  carried  the 
Democratic  standard.  He  kept  the  'fires  burning'  which 
have  heartened  and  encouraged  the  democracy  of  the 
country." 

The  speech  at  the  Jackson  Day  dinner  was  a  triumph 
for  Woodrow  Wilson.  Wliile  it  was  a  tempestuous  voyage 
for  him,  with  many  dangerous  eddies  to  be  avoided,  he 
emerged  from  the  experience  with  his  prestige  enhanced 
and  with  his  candidacy  throughout  the  country  strength 
ened.  The  Bryan-Joline  crisis  was  safely  passed.  In 
the  presence  of  the  newspaper  men  at  the  banquet,  Mr. 
Bryan  put  his  arm  around  Mr.  Wilson's  shoulders  in  an 
affectionate  way,  and  thus  happily  concluded  the  incident 
which  for  a  time  threatened  to  wreck  a  great  enterprise. 

On  his  return  from  Washington  to  Trenton,  Governor 
Wilson  told  me  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  bidden  him  not  to 
worry  about  the  publication  of  the  Joline  letter,  saying: 
"I,  of  course,  knew  that  you  were  not  with  me  in  my 
position  on  the  currency,"  and  Woodrow  Wilson  replied: 
"All  I  can  say,  Mr.  Bryan,  is  that  you  are  a  great,  big 


man.': 


.CHAPTER  XIV 

WILSON  AND   THE   OLD   GUARD 

OLD  line  politicians,  like  Roger  Sullivan  of  Illinois 
and  Tom  Taggart  of  Indiana,  were  turned  to  the 
Princetonian  by  his  notable  speech  at  the  Jackson 
Day  dinner  and  now  gave  sympathetic  ear  to  the  New 
Jersey  Governor's  claims  for  the  nomination.  An  in 
cident  which  happened  at  the  conclusion  of  the  banquet, 
as  the  Governor  was  on  his  way  to  make  his  train  for 
New  Jersey,  illustrates  the  character  of  the  victory  he  had 
won  over  difficulties  which  at  the  time  seemed  insur 
mountable.  The  old  Illinois  leader,  Roger  Sullivan, 
greeted  the  candidate  in  the  most  friendly  way  as  he  left 
the  banquet  hall,  saying  to  him  as  he  grasped  his  hand: 
"That  was  a  great  speech,  Governor,"  and  then,  drawing 
closer  to  him,  added:  "I  cannot  say  to  you  now  just  what 
the  Illinois  delegation  will  do,  but  you  may  rely  upon  it, 
I  will  be  there  when  you  need  me."  This  remark  did  not 
seem  of  importance  at  the  time,  but  when  we  discussed 
the  incident  the  next  day  at  the  Capitol  at  Trenton  we 
both  felt  that,  at  a  critical  moment  of  the  convention 
Roger  Sullivan  could  be  relied  upon  to  support  us  and  to 
throw  the  vote  of  Illinois  our  way.  Sullivan  kept  his 
promise  in  real,  generous  fashion.  When  it  seemed  as  if 
the  Baltimore  Convention  was  at  the  point  of  deadlock, 
and  after  the  Illinois  delegation  had  voted  many  times  for 
Champ  Clark,  Sullivan  threw  the  full  support  of  Illinois 
to  the  New  Jersey  Governor,  and  thus  the  tide  was 


WILSON    AND    THE    OLD    GUARD  99 

quickly  turned  in  favour  of  Mr.  Wilson's  candidacy  for 
the  Presidency.  i 

I  had  often  wondered  what  influence  beyond  this 
Jackson  Day  banquet  speech  had  induced  this  grizzly  old 
political  warrior  to  support  Woodrow  Wilson.  After 
ward  I  learned  the  real  cause  of  it  from  men  who  kept  in 
close  touch  with  the  Illinois  delegation  during  the  trying 
days  of  the  Baltimore  Convention. 

Everyone  who  knew  Roger  Sullivan  knew  the  great 
influence  which  both  his  fine  wife  and  devoted  son  wielded 
over  him.  His  son,  Boetius,  a  Harvard  graduate,  had 
early  become  a  Wilson  devotee  and  supporter,  and  the 
correspondence  between  father,  mother,  and  son,  con 
tained  a  spirited  discussion  of  the  availability  of  the  New 
Jersey  man  for  the  Democratic  nomination.  The  interest 
of  Mrs.  Sullivan  and  her  son  continued  throughout  the 
days  of  the  Convention,  which  they  both  attended,  and  at 
the  most  critical  moment  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
Convention  when  a  point  was  arrived  at  when  the  Illinois 
vote  was  decisive,  the  Illinois  leader  left  a  conference 
where  he  was  being  strongly  urged  by  Mr.  Wilson's 
friends  to  support  the  New  Jersey  Governor,  to  have  a 
final  conference  with  Mrs.  Sullivan  and  their  son  before 
he  would  finally  agree  to  throw  his  support  to  Wilson. 
Everyone  at  Baltimore  knows  the  result  of  this  confer 
ence  and  how  the  inner  councils  of  the  Sullivan  family 
prevailed.  Illinois  swung  to  Wilson  and  he  was  soon 
nominated.  It  was  said,  after  the  New  Jersey  man's 
nomination  and  election,  that  he  showed  base  ingratitude 
to  Roger  Sullivan,  the  man  who  more  than  any  other  sin 
gle  individual  in  the  Convention  had  brought  about  his 
nomination.  Mr.  Sullivan's  devoted  friends  in  Illinois 
were  particularly  bitter  at  the  apparent  coldness  of  Mr. 


100    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Wilson  toward  their  friend  and  idol.  The  President,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  was  never  unmindful  of  his  obligation  to 
Sullivan  for  the  personally  loyal  way  he  had  stood  by  him 
at  Baltimore,  and  in  every  way  while  he  was  President  he 
let  those  associated  with  him  know  that  Sullivan  and  his 
friends,  wherever  it  was  possible,  should  be  preferred  in 
the  matter  of  the  distribution  of  patronage  in  Illinois. 

The  thing,  however,  which  irritated  Sullivan's  friends 
and  made  many  of  them  irreconcilable  foes  of  Woodrow 
Wilson  was  his  apparent  unwillingness  to  say  a  good  word 
for  Sullivan  when  he  announced  his  candidacy  for  the 
United  States  senatorship  of  Illinois.  This  presented  an 
opportunity  for  President  Wilson  to  pay  the  old  debt  and 
"even  up"  things  with  Roger.  Realizing  the  delicacy 
of  the  situation  and  how  deeply  the  progressive  element  in 
the  Democratic  party  throughout  the  country  might  mis 
understand  and  even  resent  his  putting  his  "okeh"  on  the 
candidacy  of  the  Illinois  leader  for  the  senatorship, 
nevertheless,  upon  considering  the  matter,  he  de 
cided  to  do  so  and  prepared  a  generous  and  whole 
hearted  letter  of  endorsement  of  Sullivan.  He  felt 
that  as  a  good  sportsman  he  was  bound  in  honour 
to  do  this  for  the  man  whose  influence  and  support, 
thrown  to  him  at  the  right  moment  of  the  Convention,  had 
brought  about  his  nomination  for  the  Presidency.  But 
there  were  other  and  deeper  reasons  urging  him  on  to 
endorse  his  old  friend.  He  knew  how  eagerly  and 
earnestly  Sullivan  had  fought  for  him  at  Baltimore  and 
how  in  doing  so  he  had  won  the  enmity  of  the  eastern 
wing  of  the  Democratic  party.  The  old  bosses  in  the 
party,  like  Smith  and  Murphy,  had  often  twitted  Sullivan 
on  his  support  of  Wilson  and  threatened  reprisals.  Sulli 
van,  however,  stood  like  adamant  against  these  influences 


WILSON    AND    THE    OLD    GUARD  101 

and  showed  an  allegiance  to  the  New  Jerseyman  which 
earned  the  admiration  and  affection  of  every  Wilsonite  in 
the  country.  The  President  felt  confident  that  should 
Roger  Sullivan  be  elected  to  the  Senate,  he  could  count 
upon  him  to  stand  by  and  loyally  support  him  and  the 
Administration.  At  this  very  time  the  President  was 
beginning  to  realize  in  the  keenest  way  the  necessity  for 
r^al,  loyal  backing  in  the  Senate.  Many  of  the  men  whom 
he  had  personally  supported  for  the  Senate  in  the  various 
senatorial  fights  throughout  the  country,  especially  those 
who  were  known  as  progressive  senators,  like  Hardwick 
and  Smith  of  Georgia,  O'Gorman  of  New  York,  and 
Martine  of  New  Jersey,  had  grown  indifferent  and  were 
reluctant  to  follow  his  leadership  in  anything.  The  so- 
called  Old  Guard  in  the  Senate,  made  up  of  men  like 
Mark  Smith  of  Arizona,  Senators  Martin  and  Swanson 
of  Virginia,  Ollie  James  of  Kentucky,  John  Sharp  Wil 
liams  of  Mississippi,  Joe  Robinson  of  Arkansas,  Billy 
Hughes  of  New  Jersey,  Senator  Culberson  of  Texas, 
Senator  Simmons  of  North  Carolina,  and  Senator 
Smith  of  Maryland,  contrary  to  every  prophecy  and 
prediction  made  by  their  enemies,  stood  with  the  Presi 
dent  through  every  fight  in  the  finest  and  handsomest 
way,  never  deserting  his  leadership  for  a  moment.  Often 
he  would  say  to  me  when  we  were  discussing  the  senatorial 
situation:  "My  head  is  with  the  progressives  in  the 
Democratic  party,  but  my  heart,  because  of  the  way  they 
stood  by  me,  is  with  the  so-called  Old  Guard  in  the 
Senate.  They  stand  without  hitching."  He  knew  that, 
while  Roger  Sullivan  was  a  conservative,  he  could  be  relied 
upon  in  every  emergency  to  back  him  up  even  to  the  point 
of  sacrifice.  What  President  Wilson  wanted  more  than 
anything  else,  as  he  often  said,  was  a  team  that  would 


102    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

work  with  him.  Sullivan  was  just  this  type  of  man,  and 
beyond  everything  else  his  loyalty  had  been  tested  and 
could  be  relied  upon  in  every  emergency. 

In  the  light  of  these  circumstances,  the  President 
decided  finally  to  throw  his  hat  in  the  ring  in  favour  of  the 
boss  of  Illinois  for  the  United  States  senatorship.  The 
letter  advocating  Sullivan's  election  was  dictated  and 
signed  by  the  President,  and  is  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

October  12,  1914. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  RAINEY: 

I  have  read  with  the  greatest  interest  the  account  you  were  kind 
enough  to  send  me  of  the  Illinois  Democratic  State  Convention. 
It  is  full  of  fine  promise  for  the  party;  for  it  shows  all  the  elements 
of  the  party  heartily  drawing  together  for  a  successful  campaign; 
and  with  this  union  success  is  sure  to  come. 

You  call  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  some  Democrats  are  urging 
voters  to  cast  their  ballots  for  the  Progressive  candidate  for  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  rather  than  for  the  nominee  of  the 
Democratic  primaries.  You  ask  me  if  I  approve  of  this.  I  do  not. 
I  have  held  myself  very  strictly  to  the  principle  that  as  a  party  man 
I  am  bound  by  the  free  choice  of  the  people  at  the  polls.  I  have 
always  stood  by  the  result  of  the  primaries;  I  shall  always  do  so;  and 
I  think  it  the  duty  of  every  Democrat  to  do  so  who  cares  for  the 
success  and  sincerity  of  his  party.  Mr.  Sullivan  has  been  selected 
in  a  fair  primary,  and  therefore  he  is  entitled  to  the  support  of  his 
party. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
HON.  HENRY  T.  RAINEY, 
House  of  Representatives. 

This  letter  and  the  contents  of  it  will  be  a  matter  of 
news  to  Sullivan's  friends  throughout  the  country. 
Many,  doubtless,  will  inquire  why  it  was  not  published  at 


:      WILSON    AND    THE    OLD    GUARD  103 

the  time.  The  reason  it  failed  to  reach  the  stage  of 
publication  can  in  no  way  be  attributed  to  Woodrow 
Wilson.  He  never  recalled  it  and  the  original  is  in  my 
files.  This  may  be  surprising  news  to  the  friends  of  the 
dead  leader,  Roger  Sullivan,  but  it  is  only  fair  to  Mr. 
Wilson  to  say  that  he  never  hesitated  in  rushing  to  the 
defence  of  his  old  friend  in  the  most  generous  way.  He 
wrote  this  letter  with  the  full  realization  of  just  how  much 
it  might  personally  injure  him  with  the  progressive 
thought  of  the  country.  The  letter,  after  being  written 
and  signed  by  the  President,  was  held  in  reserve  by  me 
until  Sullivan's  friends  in  Chicago,  those  in  close  touch 
with  his  affairs  there,  felt  free  to  advise  its  publication.  I 
was  directed  by  them  to  release  it,  but  the  order  for  its 
release  was  countermanded  by  one  of  the  advisers  close  to 
Sullivan,  who  telephoned  me  that  it  was  thought  in 
advisable  to  have  the  President  come  into  the  campaign 
in  Sullivan's  behalf,  the  reason  being  that  the  publication 
of  Wilson's  letter  might  arouse  the  passionate  antagonism 
of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  was  about  to  begin  a  tour 
of  Illinois  in  behalf  of  Sullivan's  opponent.  I  was  advised 
later  that  the  individual  with  whom  I  dealt  in  this  matter 
and  upon  whose  direction  the  letter  was  withheld  from 
publication  had  no  authority  to  act  for  Sullivan  in  the 
matter  and  that  Sullivan  and  his  friends  were  deeply 
disappointed  at  Mr.  Wilson's  apparent  unwillingness  to 
take  up  the  cudgel  for  his  old  friend.  Many  times  I 
tried  to  make  clear  to  Sullivan's  friends  just  what  the 
attitude  of  the  President  was,  but  whether  I  succeeded 
I  do  not  know.  The  President,  secluded  in  the  White 
House,  away  from  the  madding  crowd,  never  realized 
the  basis  of  Sullivan's  disappointment,  for  he  felt  that  he 
had  "gone  through"  for  his  friend  and  had  not  forgotten 


104    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

for  a  moment  Sullivan's  advocacy  of  him  at  Baltimore. 
When  the  news  of  Sullivan's  death  was  brought  to  him  at  a 
time  when  he,  also,  was  seriously  ill,  his  lips  quivered, 
great  tears  stood  in  his  eyes,  and  turning  to  Mrs.  Wilson, 
who  stood  beside  his  bed,  he  said:  "Roger  Sullivan  was  a 
wonderful  and  devoted  friend  at  Baltimore,"  and  then, 
turning  to  me,  he  said:  "Tumulty,  I  sincerely  hope  that 
you  will  personally  go  to  Chicago  and  attend  the  funeral 
and  tell  Mrs.  Sullivan  how  deeply  I  grieve  over  the  death 
of  my  old  friend." 


CHAPTER  XV 

MR.    BRYAN   ISSUES   A    CHALLENGE 

THE  contests  for  the  delegates  to  the  National 
Convention  were  on  in  full  swing  throughout  the 
various  states.  In  the  early  contests,  particularly 
in  the  far  western  states,  like  Utah,  South  Dakota,  North 
Dakota,  and  Montana,  the  Wilson  candidacy,  according  to 
primary  returns,  began  to  take  on  the  appearance  of  a  real, 
robust  boom.  As  the  critical  days  of  the  Convention 
approached,  evidences  of  a  recession  of  the  favourable 
tide  to  Wilson  began  to  manifest  themselves,  particularly 
in  the  states  of  Massachusetts  and  Illinois,  both  of  which 
swung  to  Clark,  with  New  York  in  the  offing  quietly 
favouring  Champ  Clark.  It  was  clear  to  the  campaign 
managers  of  Wilson  that  from  a  psychological  standpoint 
the  pivotal  states  were  New  Jersey  and  Ohio;  New 
Jersey,  because  ex-Senator  Smith  had  again  challenged 
the  leadership  of  Wilson  and  had  notified  his  friends 
throughout  the  country  that  New  Jersey  could  be  relied 
upon  to  repudiate  its  governor  in  an  overwhelming 
fashion.  Smith  had  made  deals  and  combinations  with 
all  the  disgruntled  elements  of  the  state,  and  with  powerful 
financial  backing  from  the  so-called  interests  in  New 
Jersey  and  New  York  and  the  mighty  support  of  the 
Hearst  newspapers,  he  was  pressing  the  New  Jersey  man 
closely,  until  at  times  it  seemed  as  if  he  might  succeed  in 
at  least  splitting  the  delegation.  The  friends  of  the  New 

105 


106    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Jersey  man,  therefore,  realizing  the  effect  upon  the 
democracy  of  the  country  of  an  adverse  verdict  in  his 
home  state,  concentrated  all  possible  forces  at  this 
critical  point.  In  the  meantime,  and  before  the  actual 
determination  of  the  issue  in  New  Jersey,  Wisconsin  and 
Pennsylvania  swung  into  the  Wilson  column,  and  the 
Ohio  primaries  resulted  in  a  split  delegation  between 
Wilson  and  Harmon,  in  Harmon's  home  state.  All  eyes 
were,  therefore,  intently  watching  New  Jersey.  A  re 
pudiation  would  be  disastrous,  although  the  old-timers  in 
the  Wilson  camp  tried  to  encourage  us  by  saying  that  even 
though  New  Jersey  might  turn  against  its  governor, 
Grover  Cleveland,  under  similar  circumstances  in  1892, 
despite  the  opposition  of  his  home  state,  had  been  nomi 
nated  and  elected  President.  But,  fortunately  for  us, 
New  Jersey  in  the  handsomest  way  stood  by  her  favourite 
son.  The  news  of  New  Jersey's  endorsement  was  flashed 
through  the  country,  and  there  was  jubilation  in  every 
Wilson  camp.  The  day  following  the  New  Jersey 
primaries  the  New  York  World,  the  great  Democratic 
paper,  carried  a  striking  editorial  under  the  caption  of 
"  WOODROW  WILSON  FOR  PRESIDENT."  The  New  Jersey 
primaries  and  the  Ohio  results  were  great  feathers  in  the 
caps  of  the  Wilson  men,  and  with  enthusiasm  and  ardour 
they  followed  up  this  advantage. 

As  the  days  for  the  opening  of  the  Baltimore  Con 
vention  approached  the  New  Jersey  Governor  and  his 
family  left  Princeton  for  Sea  Girt,  a  delightful  place  along 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  where  the  state  of  New  Jersey  had 
provided  for  its  governor  an  executive  mansion,  a 
charming  cottage,  a  replica  of  General  Washington's 
headquarters  at  Morristown.  With  us  to  these  head 
quarters,  to  keep  vigil  as  it  were  over  the  New  Jersey 


MR.    BRYAN    ISSUES    A    CHALLENGE      107 

Governor,  went  a  galaxy  of  newspaper  men,  representing 
the  leading  papers  of  the  country. 

The  first,  and  indeed  the  most  important,  situation  the 
candidate  was  called  upon  to  handle  at  Sea  Girt  as  a 
preliminary  to  the  Convention  was  his  reply  to  the  now 
famous  Bryan-Parker  telegrams,  which  played  so  impor 
tant  a  part  in  the  deliberations  and  indeed  in  the  character 
of  the  whole  Convention.  It  will  be  recalled  that  Mr. 
Bryan,  who  was  in  attendance  at  the  Republican  Con 
vention  at  Chicago  as  a  special  correspondent,  had  tele 
graphed  an  identic  telegram  to  each  of  the  Democratic 
candidates,  Messrs.  Clark,  Underwood,  Wilson,  and 
Harmon,  as  follows: 

Chicago,  June,  1912. 

In  the  interest  of  harmony,  I  suggest  to  the  sub-committee  of  the 
Democratic  National  Committee  the  advisability  of  recommending 
as  temporary  chairman  some  progressive  acceptable  to  the  leading 
progressive  candidates  for  the  Presidential  nomination.  I  take  it 
for  granted  that  no  committeeman  interested  in  Democratic  success 
would  desire  to  offend  the  members  of  a  convention  overwhelmingly 
progressive  by  naming  a  reactionary  to  sound  the  keynote  of  the 
campaign. 

Eight  members  of  the  sub-committee,  however,  have,  over  the 
protest  of  the  remaining  eight,  agreed  upon  not  only  a  Reactionary 
but  upon  the  one  Democrat  who,  among  those  not  candidates  for 
the  Presidential  nomination,  is,  in  the  eyes  of  the  public,  most  con 
spicuously  identified  with  the  reactionary  element  of  the  party. 
I  shall  be  pleased  to  join  you  and  your  friends  in  opposing  his  se 
lection  by  the  full  committee  or  by  the  Convention.  Kindly  answer 
here. 

W.    J.    BRYAN. 

I  was  on  my  way  from  New  York  to  Sea  Girt  when 
I  read  a  copy  of  this  telegram  in  the  evening  papers.  I 
believe  that  I  grasped  the  full  significance  of  this  move 


108    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

on  the  part  of  Mr.  Bryan.  In  fact,  I  became  so  anxious 
about  it  that  I  left  the  train  before  reaching  my  des 
tination,  in  order  to  say  to  Governor  Wilson  over  the 
'phone  how  important  I  thought  the  message  really  was 
and  how  cautiously  it  should  be  handled.  I  tried  to 
impress  upon  him  the  importance  of  the  answer  he  was 
called  upon  to  make  to  Mr.  Bryan.  He  calmly  informed 
me  that  he  had  not  yet  received  the  telegram  and  that  he 
would,  of  course,  give  me  an  opportunity  to  discuss  the 
matter  with  him  before  making  his  reply. 

It  was  clear  that  Mr.  Bryan,  whose  influence  in  the 
councils  of  the  Democratic  party  at  that  time  was  very 
great,  was  seeking  by  this  method  to  ascertain  from  lead 
ing  Presidential  candidates  like  Wilson,  Underwood, 
Clark,  and  Harmon,  just  how  they  felt  about  the  efforts 
of  the  New  York  delegation,  led  by  the  Tammany  boss, 
Charlie  Murphy,  and  the  conservative  element  of  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  East,  to  control  the  Convention 
and  to  give  it  the  most  conservative  and  standpat  appear 
ance  by  controlling  the  preliminary  organization  and 
nominating  Alton  B.  Parker  as  temporary  chairman. 
For  many  weeks  previous  to  the  Convention  it  had  been 
rumoured  that  that  was  the  programme  and  that  the  real 
purpose  which  lay  behind  it  was  to  unhorse  Bryan  and  to 
end  for  all  time  his  control  and  that  of  the  radicals  of  the 
West  over  the  affairs  of  the  Democratic  party.  It  was  a 
recrudescence  of  the  old  fight  of  1896,  between  the 
conservative  East  and  the  radical  West — Bryan  assuming, 
of  course,  the  leadership  of  the  radicals  of  the  West,  and 
Charlie  Murphy  and  his  group  acting  as  the  spokesmen  of 
the  conservative  East. 

It  was  clear  to  me  that  Bryan  anticipated  just  what 
replies  Underwood,  Clark,  and  Harmon  would  make  to  his 


MR.    BRYAN    ISSUES    A    CHALLENGE      109 

inquiry.  Whether  he  was  certain  of  what  the  New  Jersey 
Governor  would  say  in  answer  to  his  telegram,  I  never 
could  ascertain.  Indeed,  many  of  the  New  Jersey  Gover 
nor's  supporters  were  ungenerous  enough  to  say  that 
behind  the  inquiry  lay  a  selfish  purpose;  that  Mr.  Bryan 
took  this  method  to  reestablish  his  leadership  and  to 
place  himself  at  the  forefront  of  the  liberal,  progressive 
forces  of  the  Convention. 

It  is  clear,  as  one  looks  back  upon  this  incident,  that  a 
misstep  in  the  handling  of  this  inquiry  from  Mr.  Bryan 
might  have  been  fatal  to  the  New  Jersey  man's  candidacy. 

When  I  arrived  at  Sea  Girt  to  discuss  the  matter  with 
Governor  Wilson,  I  was  surprised  to  find  that  he  had  not 
even  read  the  telegram,  although  a  copy  of  it  lay  upon  his 
desk,  and  when  he  did  read  it  and  we  were  discussing  it 
he  did  not  share  my  view  of  its  great  importance.  In 
attempting  to  emphasize  its  importance  I  experienced  one 
of  the  most  difficult  jobs  I  ever  had  in  the  eleven  years  I 
was  associated  with  Woodrow  Wilson.  In  vain  I  tried  to 
impress  upon  him  what  I  believed  to  be  the  purpose  which 
lay  behind  the  whole  business;  that  his  reply  would  de 
termine  the  question  as  to  whether  he  was  going  to  line 
up  with  the  progressive  element  which  was  strong  in  the 
West,  or  whether  he  would  take  sides  with  those  of  the  con 
servative  East,  many  of  whom  were  bitterly  opposed  to 
him.  He  finally  informed  me  that  he  was  in  touch  with 
Mr.  McCombs,  his  campaign  manager  at  Baltimore,  and 
that  he  would  not  reply  to  Mr.  Bryan's  telegram  until 
he  received  some  word  from  the  former  as  to  what  his 
opinion  was  in  regard  to  handling  this  difficult  matter.  I 
left  him,  after  impressing  upon  him  the  necessity  of  early 
action,  lest  our  progressive  friends  both  at  Baltimore  and 
throughout  the  country  who  were  awaiting  word  from  us 


110    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

should  be  disappointed  by  his  apparent  unwillingness  to 
take  his  position  with  the  progressives. 

The  newspaper  correspondents  at  Sea  Girt,  realizing 
the  importance  of  the  candidate's  decision,  industriously 
kept  upon  our  trail  to  find  out  what  reply  would  be  made 
to  Mr.  Bryan.  The  direct  wire  between  Baltimore  and 
Sea  Girt  was  kept  busy  with  inquiries  from  our  friends  as 
to  what  attitude  we  were  taking  in  the  matter.  While  my 
relations  with  McCombs  at  the  time  were  of  the  friend 
liest  sort,  I  feared  that  the  Eastern  environment  in  which 
he  lived,  and  his  attempt  to  bring  Tammany  into  camp 
for  the  New  Jersey  Governor,  would  necessarily  play  a 
large  part  in  influencing  his  judgment,  and  I  was  appre 
hensive  lest  Governor  Wilson  should  be  too  much  in 
clined  to  accept  Mr.  McCombs'  final  judgment  in  the 
matter. 

On  June  21,  1912,  the  following  telegram  came  from 
Mr.  McCombs,  as  the  basis  of  a  proposed  reply  to  Mr. 
Bryan  by  the  New  Jersey  Governor: 

Baltimore,  June  21,  1912. 
HON.  WILLIAM  J.  BRYAN 

Lincoln,  Nebraska. 

I  quite  agree  with  you  that  the  temporary  chairman  of  the  Con 
vention  should  voice  the  sentiments  of  the  democracy  of  the  nation 
which  I  am  convinced  is  distinctly  progressive.  However,  before 
receiving  your  telegram  I  had  given  the  following  statement  for 
publication  in  the  Baltimore  Evening  Sun:  My  friends  in  Baltimore 
are  on  the  people's  side  in  everything  that  affects  the  organization  of 
the  Convention.  They  are  certain  not  to  forget  their  standards  as 
they  have  already  shown.  It  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  remind 
them  of  these  standards  from  New  Jersey  and  I  have  neither  the 
right  nor  the  desire  to  direct  the  organization  of  a  convention  of 
which  I  am  not  even  a  member. 

(signed)     McCoMBS, 


MR.    BRYAN    ISSUES    A    CHALLENGE      111 

I  was  greatly  disappointed,  of  course,  at  the  character 
of  reply  suggested  by  McCombs  and  argued  with  the 
Governor  at  length  on  what  I  considered  would  be  the 
disastrous  effects  of  making  a  reply  such  as  the  one  con 
tained  in  the  above  telegram.  Clearly,  Mr.  McCombs' 
suggested  reply  was  a  rebuke  to  Mr.  Bryan  and  a  bid  for 
the  Eastern  vote  in  the  convention.  Of  course,  Governor 
Wilson  was  most  reluctant  to  disregard  the  advice  of 
McCombs.  He  felt  that  he  (McCombs)  was  "on  the 
job"  at  Baltimore  and  more  intimately  in  touch  with  the 
situation  than  he  himself  could  be  at  Sea  Girt.  After  a 
long  discussion  of  the  matter,  the  proposed  reply  pre 
pared  by  McCombs  was  ignored  and  the  following  tele 
gram  was  prepared  and  sent  by  Woodrow  Wilson: 

W.  J.  BRYAN,  Chicago: 

You  are  quite  right.  Before  hearing  of  your  message  I  clearly 
stated  my  position  in  answer  to  a  question  from  the  Baltimore 
Evening  Sun.  The  Baltimore  Convention  is  to  be  a  convention 
of  Progressives,  of  men  who  are  progressive  in  principle  and  by  con 
viction.  It  must,  if  it  is  not  to  be  put  in  a  wrong  light  before  the 
country,  express  its  convictions  in  its  organization  and  in  its  choice 
of  the  men  who  are  to  speak  for  it.  You  are  to  be  a  member  of  the 
Convention  and  are  entirely  within  your  rights  in  doing  everything 
within  your  power  to  bring  that  result  about.  No  one  will  doubt 
where  my  sympathies  lie  and  you  will,  I  am  sure,  find  my  friends  in 
the  Convention  acting  upon  clear  conviction  and  always  in  the  in 
terest  of  the  people's  cause.  I  am  happy  in  the  confidence  that 
they  need  no  suggestion  from  me. 

(Signed)    WOODROW  WILSON. 

This  reply,  more  than  any  other  single  thing,  changed 
the  whole  attitude  and  temper  of  the  Convention  toward 
Woodrow  Wilson.  The  progressive  forces  in  it  were  seek 
ing  leadership  and  Mr.  Bryan,  by  his  inquiry,  had  pro- 


112    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

vided  an  opportunity,  of  which  Mr.  Wilson  took  full 
advantage. 

An  interesting  incident  occurred  in  connection  with  this 
affair.  Being  unable  to  induce  the  Governor  quickly  to 
reply  to  Mr.  Bryan,  and  realizing  that  our  friends  at 
Baltimore  would  expect  him  to  agree  with  Mr.  Bryan,  and 
thus  take  his  place  with  the  progressive  element  in  the 
Convention,  I  was  firmly  convinced  that  he  would  at  the 
end  be  found  in  agreement  with  Mr.  Bryan.  I,  therefore, 
took  the  liberty  of  saying  to  the  newspaper  men  in  our 
group — those  who  were  favourably  disposed  to  us — that 
when  Mr.  Wilson  did  reply  to  Mr.  Bryan  he  would  be  found 
in  harmony  with  the  Commoner's  ideas.  This  unofficial 
tip  was  immediately  conveyed  to  Baltimore  and  our  friends, 
after  returning  from  the  Convention,  told  me  how  this 
piece  of  inspired  information  had  put  heart  in  our  men, 
and  that  on  a  bulletin  board  before  the  Baltimore  Sun 
offices  there  was  posted  the  announcement  "  WILSON 
AGREES  WITH  BRYAN"  and  before  it  hundreds  of 
Wilson  men  gathered,  cheering  the  message  of  the  New 
Jersey  Governor. 

The  reply  of  the  New  Jersey  Governor  was  prepared 
by  him  while  he  was  seated  on  the  side  of  a  little  bed  in 
one  of  the  rooms  of  the  Sea  Girt  cottage.  He  looked  at 
me  intently,  holding  a  pad  and  pencil  in  his  hands,  and 
then  wrote  these  significant  words  to  Mr.  Bryan:  "You 
are  right. " 

I  have  often  wondered  what  effect  on  the  Convention 
McCombs'  proposed  reply,  which  contained  a  rebuke  to 
Mr.  Bryan,  would  have  had.  From  that  time  on  Mr. 
Bryan  was  the  devoted  friend  of  the  New  Jersey  Gover 
nor.  Mr.  Wilson's  reply  had  convinced  the  Nebraskan 
that  the  Governor  was  not  afraid  to  accept  the  issue  and 


MR.    BRYAN    ISSUES    A    CHALLENGE      113 

that  he  was  in  favour  of  supporting  a  preliminary  organi 
zation  that  was  to  be  progressive  both  in  principle  and  by 
conviction. 

McCombs  was  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the  New 
York  delegation  must  be  won;  that  everything  else  was 
negligible  compared  with  that.  Therefore  he  wished  Mr. 
Wilson  in  his  reply  to  say  something  that  would  be  con 
sidered  by  the  New  York  delegation  as  a  public  rebuke  to 
Mr.  Bryan.  I  afterward  learned  that  McCombs,  ner 
vous,  incapable  of  standing  the  strain  and  excitement  of  the 
Convention,  had  retired  to  a  friend's  house  at  Baltimore 
where,  after  the  Woodrow  Wilson  telegram  to  William 
Jennings  Bryan,  he  was  found  in  a  room,  lying  across  a 
bed,  crying  miserably.  To  the  inquiries  of  his  friends 
as  to  what  was  the  matter  with  him  McCombs  replied, 
weeping,  that  the  Governor  had  spoiled  everything  by 
his  telegram  to  Bryan;  that  had  the  Governor  followed 
his  [McCombs']  advice,  he  could  have  been  nominated. 

The  direct  wire  between  the  Sea  Girt  cottage  and  the 
Wilson  headquarters  at  Baltimore  was  kept  busy  from 
early  morning  until  late  at  night.  The  telephone  ex 
change  in  the  cottage  was  so  arranged  that  a  branch 
telephone  was  kept  in  the  little  room  under  the  stairway, 
which  constituted  a  sort  of  listening  post,  which  per 
mitted  me,  in  accordance  with  the  suggestion  of  the 
Governor  himself,  to  listen  in  on  conversations,  not  by 
way  of  eavesdropping,  but  in  order  that  we  might  intelli 
gently  confer  after  each  conversation  on  the  various 
matters  that  might  have  to  be  decided  upon  with  reference 
to  the  organization  of  the  convention.  Many  of  the 
momentous  questions  having  to  do  with  the  conduct  of  the 
Convention  were  discussed  and  settled  over  this  'phone. 
The  most  frequent  users  of  the  'phone  during  these  days 


114    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

were  Colonel  Bryan  and  Mr.  McCombs,  our  campaign 
manager.  During  the  opening  days  of  the  Convention  I 
made  it  my  business  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  Balti 
more  both  by  conversations  over  the  'phone  with  the 
active  managers  of  the  Wilson  boom  and  by  carefully  read 
ing  each  morning  the  news  items  appearing  in  the  New 
York  Times,  New  York  World,  and  the  Baltimore  Sun, 
this  last-named  paper  being  one  of  the  leading  advocates 
of  the  Wilson  candidacy  in  the  country. 

I  was  personally,  and  in  some  cases  intimately,  ac 
quainted  with  the  special  writers  on  these  great  journals 
and  knew  from  previous  contact  with  them  that  they  were 
on  the  "inside"  of  the  situation  at  Baltimore,  and  in  this 
way  much  information  was  gleaned  which  proved  helpful 
in  keeping  us  in  touch  with  the  many  happenings  at 
the  Convention. 

Having  successfully  passed  through  the  Bryan-Parker 
crisis,  we  decided  upon  a  kind  of  strategy  that  would  win 
to  our  side  the  various  progressive  elements  in  the  Con 
vention.  In  line  with  this  idea,  we  suggested  to  our 
managers  at  Baltimore  the  advisability  of  putting  for 
ward  the  name  of  Ollie  M.  James  of  Kentucky  for  perma 
nent  chairman  of  the  Convention.  While  he  was  a 
staunch  Clark  man  and  a  devoted  follower  of  Mr.  Bryan, 
we  knew  he  could  be  relied  upon  to  give  us  a  fair  deal  as 
the  presiding  officer  of  the  Convention.  There  was 
another  reason,  too.  Away  off  in  Sea  Girt  we  gathered 
the  impression  that  the  sober  second  thought  of  the  Con 
vention  favoured  his  selection  and  that  even  though  we 
might  fail  in  our  attempt  to  nominate  him  for  this  office, 
our  efforts  at  least  in  this  regard  would  give  the  impression 
to  those  who  looked  with  favour  upon  Wilson  as  their 
second  choice.  Another  reason  was  this:  We  were  not 


MR.    BRYAN    ISSUES    A    CHALLENGE      115 

afraid  to  trust  our  cause  to  a  Clark  man,  and  Ollie  James 
for  many  years  had  been  the  idol  of  convention  crowds. 
When,  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Bryan-Parker  episode, 
Mr.  Bryan  telephoned  Sea  Girt  to  discuss  with  the 
Governor  the  matter  of  the  chairmanship,  he  was 
greatly  surprised  and  pleased  to  have  the  Governor  say, 
in  the  most  hearty  way  that,  upon  canvassing  the  whole 
situation,  he  felt  it  would  be  an  admirable  and  just  thing 
to  select  Ollie  James  of  Kentucky.  Mr.  Bryan  said: 
"But,  Governor  Wilson,  Mr.  James  is  in  the  Convention 
as  a  Clark  man."  "It  does  not  matter,"  was  the  Gover 
nor's  reply.  "He  is  our  kind  of  a  fellow,  and  I  am  sure 
my  friends  can  rely  upon  him  to  treat  our  cause  well." 
From  Mr.  Bryan's  subsequent  conversations  over  the 
telephone  it  clearly  appeared  that  he  was  delighted  at  the 
suggestion  of  his  own  intimate  friend,  and  it  was  plain 
that  he  was  being  convinced  from  moves  of  this  kind  by 
the  New  Jersey  Governor  that  Woodrow  Wilson  was 
willing  to  stand  or  fall  with  him  in  attempting  to  organize 
the  Convention  along  progressive  lines. 

Years  after  the  Convention  the  senator  from  Kentucky, 
who  became  my  closest  and  dearest  friend,  and  who 
distinguished  himself  as  a  member  of  the  Senate,  and  who 
was  one  of  the  staunchest  defenders  of  the  President  and 
the  Administration,  told  me  of  the  wisdom  which  he 
thought  lay  behind  the  suggestion  of  himself  for  the 
chairmanship;  that  we,  at  Sea  Girt,  rightly  sensed  the 
situation  and  that  the  suggestion  of  his  name  had  done 
more  than  anything  else  to  convince  the  men  in  the 
Convention  of  the  genuine  character  of  the  New  Jersey 
Governor's  progressiveness.  We  felt  that  strategic 
moves  of  this  kind  appealed  to  the  progressive  thought 
in  the  Convention  and  went  far  to  remove  the  strange 


116    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

impression  many  of  the  delegates  had  that  Wilson  was  a 
rank  conservative.  It  was  plainly  perceptible  that  these 
acts  were  quickly  turning  the  progressives  in  the  Con 
vention  toward  our  candidate. 

In  following  these  suggestions,  we  were,  in  fact,  acting 
independently  of  the  New  Jersey  Governor's  advisers  at 
Baltimore.  It  was  plain  to  be  seen  that  the  battle  at 
Baltimore  would  finally  simmer  down  to  a  contest  between 
the  reactionaries  and  the  progressives,  and  we  decided  at 
Sea  Girt  that  in  every  move  that  was  to  be  made  our  pur 
pose  should  be  to  win  the  progressive  support  in  the 
Convention.  McCombs  was  at  no  time  found  in  harmony 
with  this  action,  his  principal  activities  at  Baltimore  being 
given  over  to  an  attempt  to  win  for  the  New  Jersey  Gover 
nor  the  support  of  the  conservatives  of  the  East,  and, 
particularly,  New  York,  whose  seventy-six  votes  he 
thought  the  great  prize  of  the  Convention. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE   BALTIMORE    CONVENTION 

A  SEA  GIRT  we  kept  in  close  touch  with  our 
friends  at  Baltimore,  so  that  after  each  ballot 
the  New  Jersey  candidate  was  apprised  of  the 
result.  During  the  trying  days  and  nights  of  the  Con 
vention  the  only  eager  and  anxious  ones  in  the  family 
group,  besides  myself,  were  Mrs.  Wilson  and  the  Wilson 
girls.  The  candidate  himself  indeed  seemed  to  take  only 
perfunctory  interest  in  what  was  happening  at  Baltimore. 
He  never  allowed  a  single  ballot  or  the  changes  those 
ballots  reflected  to  ruffle  or  disturb  him.  Never  before 
was  the  equable  disposition  of  the  man  better  manifested 
than  during  these  trying  days.  Only  once  did  he  show 
evidences  of  irritation.  It  was  upon  the  receipt  of  word 
from  Baltimore,  carried  through  the  daily  press,  that  his 
manager  Mr.  McCombs  was  indulging  in  patronage  deals 
to  secure  blocks  of  delegates.  Upon  considering  this 
news  he  immediately  issued  a  public  statement  saying 
that  no  one  was  authorized  to  make  any  offer  of  a  Cabinet 
post  for  him  and  that  those  who  had  done  so  were  acting 
without  authority  from  him.  This  caused  a  flurry  in  the 
ranks  of  our  friends  in  Baltimore  and  the  statement  was 
the  subject  of  heated  discussion  between  the  Governor 
and  Mr.  McCombs  over  the  telephone.  Of  course,  I 
did  not  hear  what  was  said  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire, 
but  I  remember  that  the  Governor  said:  "I  am  sorry, 
McCombs,  but  my  statement  must  stand  as  I  have 

117 


118    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

issued  it.  There  must  be  no  conditions  whatever  at 
tached  to  the  nomination."  And  there  the  conversation 
ended.  While  this  colloquy  took  place  I  was  seated  just 
outside  of  the  telephone  booth.  When  the  Governor 
came  out  he  told  me  of  the  talk  he  had  had  with  McCombs, 
and  that  their  principal  discussion  was  the  attempt  by 
McCombs  and  his  friends  at  Baltimore  to  exact  from  him 
a  promise  that  in  case  of  his  nomination  William  Jen 
nings  Bryan  should  not  be  named  for  the  post  of  Secretary 
of  State;  that  a  great  deal  in  the  way  of  delegates'  votes 
from  the  Eastern  states  depended  upon  his  giving  this 
promise.  The  Governor  then  said  to  me:  "I  will  not 
bargain  for  this  office.  It  would  be  foolish  for  me  at  this 
time  to  decide  upon  a  Cabinet  officer,  and  it  would  be 
outrageous  to  eliminate  anybody  from  consideration  now, 
particularly  Mr.  Bryan,  who  has  rendered  such  fine  service 
to  the  party  in  all  seasons." 

The  candidacy  of  the  New  Jersey  Governor  gained 
with  each  ballot — only  slightly,  however — but  he  was  the 
only  candidate  who  showed  an  increased  vote  at  each 
stage  of  the  Convention  proceedings.  The  critical  period 
was  reached  on  Thursday  night.  In  the  early  after 
noon  we  had  received  intimations  from  Baltimore  that 
on  that  night  the  New  York  delegation  would  throw 
its  support  to  Champ  Clark,  and  our  friends  at  Balti 
more  were  afraid  that  if  this  purpose  was  carried  out  it 
would  result  in  a  stampede  to  Clark.  We  discussed  the 
possibilities  of  the  situation  that  night  after  dinner,  but 
up  to  ten  o'clock,  when  the  Governor  retired  for  the 
night,  New  York  was  still  voting  for  Harmon.  I  left  the 
Sea  Girt  cottage  and  went  out  to  the  newspaper  men's  tent 
to  await  word  from  Baltimore.  The  telegrapher  in 
charge  of  the  Associated  Press  wire  was  a  devoted  friend 


THE    BALTIMORE    CONVENTION          119 

and  admirer  of  the  New  Jersey  candidate.  There  was  no 
one  in  the  tent  but  the  telegrapher  and  myself.  Every 
thing  was  quiet.  Suddenly  the  telegraph  instrument 
began  to  register.  The  operator  looked  up  from  the  in 
strument,  and  I  could  tell  from  his  expression  that  some 
thing  big  was  coming.  He  took  his  pad  and  quickly  began 
to  record  the  message.  In  a  tone  of  voice  that  indicated 
its  seriousness,  he  read  to  me  the  following  message: 
"New  York  casts  its  seventy-six  votes  for  Champ  Clark. 
Great  demonstration  on."  And  then  the  instrument 
stopped  recording.  It  looked  as  if  the  "jig  was  up." 
Frankly,  I  almost  collapsed  at  the  news.  I  had  been  up 
for  many  nights  and  had  had  only  a  few  hours'  sleep.  I 
left  the  tent,  almost  in  despair,  about  eleven  o'clock,  and 
returned  to  the  Sea  Girt  cottage,  preparatory  to  going  to 
my  home  at  Avon,  New  Jersey.  As  I  was  leaving  the 
cottage  the  Governor  appeared  at  one  of  the  upper 
windows,  clad  in  his  pajamas,  and  looking  at  me  in  the 
most  serious  way,  said:  "Tumulty,  is  there  any  news 
from  Baltimore?"  I  replied:  "Nothing  new,  Governor." 
When  we  were  breakfasting  together  the  next  morning, 
he  laughingly  said  to  me:  "You  thought  you  could  fool 
me  last  night  when  I  asked  if  there  was  any  word  from 
Baltimore;  but  I  could  tell  from  the  serious  expression  on 
your  face  that  something  had  gone  wrong."  This  was 
about  the  first  evidence  of  real  interest  he  had  shown  in 
the  Baltimore  proceedings. 

As  will  be  recalled,  the  thing  that  prevented  Champ 
Clark  from  gathering  the  full  benefit  which  would  have 
come  to  him  from  the  casting  of  the  New  York  vote  in  his 
favour  was  a  question  by  "Alfalfa  Bill"  Murray,  a  dele 
gate  from  Oklahoma.  He  said:  "Is  this  convention  going 
to  surrender  its  leadership  to  the  Tammany  Tiger?" 


120    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

This  stemmed  the  tide  toward  Mr.  Clark,  and  changed 
the  whole  face  of  the  Convention. 

It  was  evident  that  on  Friday  night  the  deadlock  stage 
of  the  Convention  had  been  finally  reached.  The  Wilson 
vote  had  risen  to  354,  and  there  remained  without  per 
ceptible  change.  It  began  to  look  as  if  the  candidacy  of 
the  New  Jersey  Governor  had  reached  its  full  strength. 
The  frantic  efforts  of  the  Wilson  men  to  win  additional 
votes  were  unavailing.  Indeed,  Wilson's  case  appeared 
to  be  hopeless.  On  Saturday  morning,  McCombs  tele 
phoned  Sea  Girt  and  asked  for  the  Governor.  The 
Governor  took  up  the  'phone  and  for  a  long  time  listened 
intently  to  what  was  being  said  at  the  other  end.  I 
afterward  learned  that  McCombs  had  conveyed  word  to 
the  Governor  that  his  case  was  hopeless  and  that  it  was 
useless  to  continue  the  fight,  and  asked  for  instructions. 
Whereupon,  the  following  conversation  took  place  in  my 
presence:  "So,  McCombs,  you  feel  it  is  hopeless  to  make 
further  endeavours?"  When  McCombs  asked  the  Gov 
ernor  if  he  would  instruct  his  friends  to  support  Mr. 
Underwood,  Mr.  Wilson  said:  "No,  that  would  not  be 
fair.  I  ought  not  to  try  to  influence  my  friends  in  behalf 
of  another  candidate.  They  have  been  mighty  loyal  and 
kind  to  me.  Please  say  to  them  how  greatly  I  appreciate 
their  generous  support  and  that  they  are  now  free  to 
support  any  candidate  they  choose." 

In  the  room  at  the  time  of  this  conversation  between 
McCombs  and  the  New  Jersey  Governor  sat  Mrs. 
Wilson  and  myself.  When  the  Governor  said  to 
McCombs,  "So  you  think  it  is  hopeless?"  great  tears 
stood  in  the  eyes  of  Mrs.  Wilson,  and  as  the  Governor  put 
down  the  telephone,  she  walked  over  to  him  and  in  the 
most  tender  way  put  her  arms  around  his  neck,  saying: 


THE    BALTIMORE    CONVENTION          121 

"My  dear  Woodrow,  I  am  sorry,  indeed,  that  you  have 
failed."  Looking  at  her,  with  a  smile  that  carried  no 
evidence  of  the  disappointment  or  chagrin  he  felt  at  the 
news  he  had  just  received,  he  said:  "My  dear,  of  course  I 
am  disappointed,  but  we  must  not  complain.  We  must 
be  sportsmen.  After  all,  it  is  God's  will,  and  I  feel  that  a 
great  load  has  been  lifted  from  my  shoulders."  With  a 
smile  he  remarked  that  this  failure  would  make  it  possible 
for  them,  when  his  term  as  Governor  of  New  Jersey  was 
completed,  to  go  for  a  vacation  to  the  English  Lake 
country — a  region  loved  by  them  both,  where  they  had 
previously  spent  happy  summers.  Turning  to  me,  he 
asked  for  a  pencil  and  pad  and  informed  me  that  he  would 
prepare  a  message  of  congratulation  to  Champ  Clark, 
saying  as  he  left  the  room:  "Champ  Clark  will  be  nomi 
nated  and  I  will  give  you  the  message  in  a  few  minutes." 

I  afterward  learned  that  McCombs  was  about  to  re 
lease  the  delegates  when  Roger  Sullivan,  who  had  been 
informed  of  McCombs'  message  to  the  New  Jersey  Gover 
nor,  rushed  over  to  McCombs  and  said  to  him,  "Damn 
you,  don't  you  do  that.  Sit  steady  in  the  boat." 

This  is  the  true  story  of  the  occurrence  so  strangely 
distorted  by  Mr.  McCombs  in  the  book  he  left  for  publi 
cation  after  his  death,  wherein  he  would  make  it  appear 
that  Governor  Wilson  had  got  in  a  panic  and  tried  to 
withdraw  from  the  race;  whereas  the  panic  was  all  in  the 
troubled  breast  of  Mr.  McCombs,  a  physically  frail, 
morally  timid  person,  constitutionally  unfit  for  the  task 
of  conducting  such  a  fight  as  was  being  waged  in  Balti 
more.  More  sturdy  friends  of  Governor  Wilson  at  the 
Convention  were  busy  trying  to  brace  up  the  halting 
manager  and  persuade  him  to  continue  the  fight,  even 
against  the  desperate  odds  that  faced  them.  But  for 


122    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

these  stronger  natures,  among  whom  were  old  Roger 
Sullivan  of  Illinois  and  W.  G.  McAdoo,  the  battle  would 
have  been  lost. 

The  message  of  congratulation  to  Champ  Clark  was 
prepared  and  ready  to  be  put  on  the  wire  for  transmission 
to  him  when  the  Baltimore  Convention  assembled  again 
on  Saturday,  June  29,  1912.  I  had  argued  with  the 
Governor  that  despite  what  McCombs  had  said  to  him 
over  the  'phone  on  the  previous  day  I  felt  that  there  was 
still  a  great  deal  of  latent  strength  in  the  Wilson  forces  in 
the  Convention  which  was  ready  to  jump  into  action  as 
soon  as  it  appeared  that  Champ  Clark's  case  was  hopeless. 
The  first  ballot  on  Saturday  gave  weight  to  my  view,  for 
upon  that  ballot  Wilson  gained  fifteen  or  twenty  votes, 
which  injected  new  hope  into  our  forces  in  the  Convention. 
From  that  time  on  Wilson  steadily  moved  forward,  and 
then  came  Bryan's  resolutions,  opposing  any  candidate 
who  received  the  support  of  the  "privilege-hunting" 
class,  and  attempting  the  expulsion  of  a  certain  Eastern 
group  from  the  Convention.  Pandemonium  reigned  in 
the  Convention  Hall,  but  the  vote  upon  the  resolutions 
themselves  showed  the  temper  of  the  delegates.  This 
made  the  Clark  nomination  hopeless.  Bryan's  role  as  an 
exponent  of  outraged  public  opinion  and  as  a  master  of 
great  conventions  was  superbly  played.  When  he  finally 
threw  his  tremendous  influence  to  Wilson,  the  struggle 
was  over.  Indiana  jumped  to  Wilson,  then  Illinois,  and 
the  fight  was  won.  Wilson  received  the  necessary  two- 
third  vote  and  was  proclaimed  the  candidate. 

The  progressive  element  of  the  Democratic  party  had 
triumphed  after  a  long,  stubborn  fight  by  what  at  first  was 
a  minority  in  the  Convention  for  enlightened  progressiv- 
ism,  with  Woodrow  Wilson  as  the  standard  bearer.  To 


THE    BALTIMORE    CONVENTION 

those  like  myself  far  away  from  the  Convention  there  was 
the  sense  of  a  great  issue  at  stake  at  Baltimore.  One  old 
gentleman  who  visited  Sea  Girt  after  the  Convention  com 
pared  the  stand  of  the  Liberals  in  the  Convention  to  the 
handful  at  Thermopylae;  others  compared  their  heroic 
determination  to  the  struggle  of  Garibaldi  and  his  troops. 
To  the  outside  world  it  was  plain  that  a  great  battle  for 
the  right  was  being  waged  at  Baltimore,  under  the  in 
spiration  of  a  new  leadership.  At  times  it  appeared  that 
the  raw  Wilson  recruits  would  have  to  surrender,  that 
they  could  not  withstand  the  smashing  blows  delivered 
by  the  trained  army  which  the  Conservatives  had  mo 
bilized.  But  they  stood  firm,  for  there  was  in  the  ranks  of 
the  Liberal  group  in  the  Baltimore  Convention  an  un 
conquerable  spirit,  akin  to  that  of  the  Crusaders,  and  a 
leadership  of  ardent  men  who  were  convinced  that  they 
were  fighting,  not  merely  for  a  man  but  for  a  principle 
which  this  man  symbolized.  Among  these  were  men  like 
W.  G.  McAdoo  of  New  York,  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  Joseph 
GuflFey,  and  Vance  McCormick  of  Pennsylvania,  Senator 
"Billy"  Hughes  of  New  Jersey,  and  Angus  McLean  of 
North  Carolina. 

Although  the  Wilson  forces  were  largely  made  up  of 
"new"  men,  some  of  whom  had  never  before  been  actively 
interested  in  politics,  comparatively  young  men  like 
McAdoo,  Palmer,  McCormick,  McLean,  Guffey,  and  old 
men  like  Judge  Westcott  of  New  Jersey,  yet  they  were 
drawn  to  the  light  that  had  dawned  in  New  Jersey  and 
were  eager  and  anxious  to  have  that  light  of  inspired 
leadership  given  to  the  nation.  Judge  Westcott  fired  the 
Convention  with  his  eloquence  and  brought  showers  of 
applause  when  he  quoted  at  length  from  a  speech  Mr. 
Wilson  had  made  when  president  of  Princeton,  and  for 


124    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

which  he  had  been  hissed,  lampooned,  and  derided  by  the 
Princeton  opposition.     Judge  Westcott  said: 

Men  are  known  by  what  they  say  and  do.  Men  are  known  by 
those  who  hate  them  and  those  who  oppose  them.  Many  years  ago 
the  great  executive  of  New  Jersey  said:  "No  man  is  great  who  thinks 
himself  so,  and  no  man  is  good  who  does  not  strive  to  secure  the  hap 
piness  and  comfort  of  others."  This  is  the  secret  of  his  life.  This  is, 
in  the  last  analysis,  the  explanation  of  his  power.  Later,  in  his 
memorable  effort  to  retain  high  scholarship  and  simple  democracy 
in  Princeton  University,  he  declared:  "The  great  voice  of  America 
does  not  come  from  seats  of  learning.  It  comes  in  a  murmur  from 
the  hills  and  woods,  and  the  farms  and  factories  and  the  mills,  rolling 
on  and  gaining  volume  until  it  comes  to  us  from  the  homes  of  common 
men.  Do  these  murmurs  echo  in  the  corridors  of  our  universities? 
I  have  not  heard  them."  A  clarion  call  to  the  spirit  that  now  moves 
America.  Still  later  he  shouted:  "I  will  not  cry  peace  so  long  as  social 
injustice  and  political  wrong  exist  in  the  state  of  New  Jersey." 
Here  is  the  very  soul  of  the  silent  revolution  now  solidifying  senti 
ment  and  purpose  in  our  common  country. 

Men  in  the  Convention,  overwhelmed  with  the  emotion 
of  the  great  hour  and  the  vindication  of  the  bold  liberal, 
Woodrow  Wilson,  bowed  their  heads  and  sobbed  aloud. 
The  "amateurs"  of  that  convention  had  met  the  on 
slaughts  of  the  Old  Guard  and  had  won,  and  thus  was 
brought  about,  through  their  efforts,  their  courage,  and 
their  devotion,  the  dawn  of  a  new  day  in  the  politics  of 
the  nation. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

FACING   A   SOLEMN   RESPONSIBILITY 

SHORTLY  after  the  Democratic  National  Con 
vention  I  gave  a  dinner  at  the  newspaper  men's 
cottage  at  Sea  Girt,  to  which  I  invited  the 
Democratic  candidate  and  the  newspaper  men,  in  order 
that  they  might  be  given  a  chance  to  meet  him  in  the  most 
intimate  way  and  obtain  from  him  what  he  was  pleased  to 
call  the  "inside"  of  his  mind.  Upon  the  conclusion  of  the 
dinner,  the  Democratic  candidate  opened  his  heart  in  a 
little  talk  of  the  most  intimate  and  interesting  character. 
It  contained  not  only  his  views  of  the  Presidency,  but  also 
a  frank  discussion  of  the  great  problems  that  would  con 
front  the  next  administration.  In  referring  to  Mr.  Roose 
velt,  he  said  that  he  had  done  a  great  service  in  rousing 
the  country  from  its  lethargy,  and  in  that  work  he  had 
rendered  admirable  and  lasting  service,  but  beyond  that 
he  had  failed,  for  he  had  not,  during  his  administrations, 
attacked  two  of  the  major  problems:  the  tariff  and  the 
currency,  which  he,  Wilson,  considered  to  be  the  heart  and 
centre  of  the  whole  movement  for  lasting  and  permanent 
reform  in  America.  Discussing  Mr.  Roosevelt,  he  said: 

He  promised  too  often  the  millennium.  No  public  man  has  a 
right  to  go  so  far  afield.  You  have  no  right  to  promise  Heaven  un 
less  you  can  bring  us  to  it,  for,  in  making  promises,  you  create  too 
much  expectation  and  your  failure  brings  with  it  only  disappoint 
ment  and  sometimes  despair.  As  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency 
I  do  not  want  to  promise  Heaven  unless  I  can  bring  you  to  it.  I  can 
only  see  a  little  distance  up  the  road.  I  cannot  tell  you  what  is 

125 


126    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

around  the  corner.  The  successful  leader  ought  not  to  keep  too  far 
in  advance  of  the  mass  he  is  seeking  to  lead,  for  he  will  soon  lose  con 
tact  with  them.  No  unusual  expectation  ought  to  be  created  by 
him.  When  messages  are  brought  to  me  by  my  friends  of  what  is 
expected  of  the  next  President,  I  am  sometimes  terrified  at  the  task 
that  would  await  me  in  case  I  should  be  elected.  For  instance,  my 
daughter,  who  is  engaged  in  social -welfare  work  in  Philadelphia, 
told  me  of  a  visit  she  paid  a  humble  home  in  that  city  where  the  head 
of  a  large  family  told  her  that  her  husband  was  going  to  vote  for  me 
because  it  would  mean  cheaper  bread.  My  God,  gentlemen,  just 
think  of  the  responsibility  an  expectation  of  that  kind  creates!  I 
can't  reduce  the  price  of  bread.  I  can  only  strive  in  the  few  years  I 
shall  have  in  office  to  remove  the  noxious  growths  that  have  been 
planted  in  our  soil  and  try  to  clear  the  way  for  the  new  adjustment 
which  is  necessary.  That  adjustment  cannot  be  brought  about 
suddenly.  We  cannot  arbitrarily  turn  right  about  face  and  pull 
one  policy  up  by  the  roots  and  cast  it  aside,  while  we  plant  another 
in  virgin  soil.  A  great  industrial  system  has  been  built  up  in  this 
country  under  the  fosterage  of  the  Government,  behind  a  wall  of 
unproductive  taxes.  Changes  must  be  brought  about,  first  here, 
then  there,  and  then  there  again.  We  must  move  from  step  to  step 
with  as  much  prudence  as  resolution.  In  other  words,  we  are  called 
upon  to  perform  a  delicate  operation,  and  in  performing  a  delicate 
operation  it  is  necessary  for  the  surgeon  who  uses  the  knife  to  know 
where  the  foundation  of  vitality  is,  so  that  in  cutting  out  the  ex 
crescence  he  shall  not  interfere  with  the  vital  tissues. 

And  while  we  do  so  we  must  create  by  absolute  fairness  and  open- 
mindedness  the  atmosphere  of  mutual  concession.  There  are  no 
old  scores  to  be  paid  off;  there  are  no  resentments  to  be  satisfied; 
there  is  no  revolution  to  be  attempted.  Men  of  every  interest  must 
be  drawn  into  conference  as  to  what  it  behooves  us  to  do,  and  what 
it  is  possible  for  us  to  do.  No  one  should  be  excluded  from  the  con 
ference  except  those  who  will  not  come  in  upon  terms  of  equality 
and  the  common  interest.  We  deal  with  great  and  delicate  matters. 
We  should  deal  with  them  with  pure  and  elevated  purpose,  without 
fear,  without  excitement,  without  undue  haste,  like  men  dealing  with 
the  sacred  fortunes  of  a  great  country,  and  not  like  those  who  play  for 
political  advantage,  or  seek  to  reverse  any  policy  in  their  own  behalf. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

WILLIAM   F.    McCOMBS 

THE  election  being  over,  the  President-elect  pro 
ceeded  with  the  selection  of  his  Cabinet  and  with 
that  end  in  view  immediately  began  those  confer 
ences  with  his  friends  throughout  the  country  in  an  effort 
to  gather  information  upon  which  to  base  a  final  selection. 
All  sorts  of  suggestions  began  to  flow  into  the  Executive 
offices  at  Trenton.  Tentative  slates  were  prepared  for 
consideration,  and  the  records  and  antecedents  of  the 
men  whose  names  appeared  on  them  were  subjected  to  a 
searching  scrutiny.  Every  now  and  then  during  this 
period  the  President-elect  would  discuss  with  me  the 
various  candidates  and  ask  me  to  investigate  this  or  that 
phase  of  the  character  of  certain  men  under  consideration. 
One  day  as  we  were  leaving  the  Executive  offices  at 
Trenton,  the  Governor  said:  "Tumulty,  you  have  read 
Gideon  Wells's  'Diary  of  the  Civil  War',  have  you  not?" 
I  told  him  that  some  months  before  he  had  generously 
presented  me  with  those  three  interesting  volumes  that 
contained  a  most  accurate  and  comprehensive  inside  view 
of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet.  "Who,"  he  said,  "in  Wells's 
discussion  of  the  Lincoln  Cabinet  reminds  you  of  William 
F.  McCombs?"  I  replied  that,  in  some  respects,  William 
A.  Seward,  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  State.  Not,  of 
course,  in  the  bigness  of  Seward 's  mind,  for  I  was  not 
attempting  to  make  any  comparison  between  the  intellects 
of  the  two  men,  but  in  the  effort  of  Seward  to  dominate 


128   WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Lincoln  and  thus  creating  jealousies  in  other  members 
of  the  Cabinet  that  were  the  cause  of  continual  embarrass 
ment  to  Mr.  Lincoln.  Mr.  Wilson  turned  to  me  and 
said:  "You  are  absolutely  right,  and  that  is  one  reason 
why  I  have  not  seriously  considered  the  claims  of  Mr. 
McCombs  for  a  Cabinet  post.  I  am  sure  that  if  I  did  put 
him  in  my  Cabinet,  I  should  find  him  interfering  with  the 
administration  of  the  other  departments  in  the  same  way 
that  Seward  sought  to  interfere,  for  instance,  with  the 
Treasury  Department  under  Salmon  P.  Chase.  McCombs 
is  a  man  of  fine  intellect,  but  he  is  never  satisfied  unless 
he  plays  the  stellar  role,  and  I  am  afraid  he  cannot  work  in 
harness  with  other  men  and  that  I  should  never  get  any 
real  team  work  from  him.  There  is  another  serious 
objection  to  McCombs  for  a  place  in  my  Cabinet.  A  few 
days  ago  he  boldly  informed  me  that  he  desired  to  have 
the  post  of  Attorney  General.  When  I  asked  him  why  he 
preferred  to  be  Attorney  General,  he  informed  me  that, 
being  a  lawyer,  the  Attorney  Generalship  would  help  him 
professionally  after  his  term  of  office  expired.  What  a 
surprising  statement  for  any  man  to  make!  Why, 
Tumulty,  many  of  the  scandals  of  previous  administra 
tions  have  come  about  in  this  way,  Cabinet  officers  using 
their  posts  to  advance  their  own  personal  fortunes.  It 
must  not  be  done  in  our  administration.  It  would  con 
stitute  a  grave  scandal  to  appoint  such  a  man  to  so  high  an 
office." 

It  has  often  been  charged  by  Mr.  McCombs'  friends 
that  Mr.  Wilson  showed  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  his 
services  and  an  utter  disregard  of  the  fine  things  McCombs 
did  in  his  behalf.  Those  of  us  who  were  on  the  inside  and 
witnessed  the  patience  of  Woodrow  Wilson  in  handling  this 
most  difficult  person  know  how  untrue  such  statements 


WILLIAM    F.    McCOMBS  129 

are.  I  personally  know  that  during  the  trying  days 
preceding  the  election  most  of  Mr.  Wilson's  time  was 
given  over  to  straightening  out  McCombs  and  attempting 
to  satisfy  his  mind  that  neither  Mr.  McAdoo,  Colonel 
House,  nor  any  other  friends  of  Mr.  Wilson  were  seeking 
to  unhorse  him  and  to  take  his  place  in  the  candidate's 
affections.  Never  did  any  man  show  greater  patience 
than  did  Woodrow  Wilson  in  his  attitude  toward  Mc 
Combs.  The  illness  of  McCombs  during  the  campaign 
fed  fuel  to  the  fires  of  his  naturally  jealous  disposition. 
He  suspected  everybody;  trusted  no  one,  and  suspected 
that  the  President's  friends  were  engaged  in  a  conspiracy 
to  destroy  him.  Of  course,  it  is  true  that  Mr.  Wilson 
refused  to  give  him  the  post  of  Attorney  General  which 
he  greatly  coveted,  for  reasons  I  have  fully  stated  above; 
but  at  the  very  time  when  McCombs'  friends  were  saying 
that  the  President  had  ignored  him  and  failed  to  offer  him 
any  place  in  his  administration,  the  President  had  already 
tendered  McCombs  his  choice  of  two  of  the  most  im 
portant  diplomatic  posts  at  his  disposal — the  Ambassa 
dorship  to  Germany  and  the  Ambassadorship  to  France. 
An  interesting  incident  in  connection  with  the  offer  of  the 
French  post  to  McCombs  and  his  acceptance  of  it  is 
worth  relating. 

The  President  arrived  in  Washington  on  the  third  of 
March  and  went  to  the  Shoreham  Hotel.  McCombs  had 
already  received  Mr.  Wilson's  offer  of  the  French  Am 
bassadorship,  and  on  the  night  of  the  third  of  March  he 
concluded  he  would  accept  it.  He  sent  a  messenger  to 
the  Shoreham  Hotel  with  his  letter  of  acceptance.  Before 
the  arrival  of  McCombs'  letter  at  the  Shoreham  the 
President  had  retired  for  the  night,  and  the  message  was 
inserted  under  the  door  of  his  room.  However,  it  seems 


130    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

that  shortly  after  sending  the  message  of  acceptance 
McCombs  changed  his  mind  and  sent  a  friend  to  the  Shore- 
ham  to  recover  the  letter,  and  at  twelve  o'clock  at  night  I 
found  him  outside  of  the  President's  room  on  his  knees, 
busily  engaged  in  digging  out  McCombs'  letter  of  ac 
ceptance  from  underneath  the  door. 

From  that  time  on,  with  every  changing  wind,  Mc 
Combs  would  first  accept  and  then  reject  the  offer  of  the 
French  post.  By  his  vacillation  he  prevented  the  ap 
pointment  of  an  Ambassador  to  France  for  four  months. 
He  had  easy  access  to  the  President  and  saw  him  fre 
quently.  As  he  left  the  White  House  after  calling  on  the 
President  one  day,  Mr.  Wilson  showed  sharp  irritation 
and  said  to  me:  "If  McCombs  would  only  discuss  some 
body  else  for  office  save  himself  I  would  be  more  inter 
ested." 

That  the  offer  of  the  French  post  was  made  by  the 
President  and  rejected  by  McCombs  is  evidenced  by  the 
following  letter,  addressed  to  the  President  by  McCombs, 
under  date  of  April  3,  1913: 

WILLIAM  F.  McCoMBS 

COUNSELLOR  AT   LAW 

96  BROADWAY  &  6  WALL  STREET 

NEW    YORK 

April  3,  1913. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

Since  I  saw  you  on  Saturday,  I  have  been  making  continuous 
efforts  to  dispose  of  my  affairs  so  that  I  might  accept  your  very 
flattering  offer.  I  have  been  in  touch  with  Tumulty  from  day  to 
day  to  find  out  whether  my  delay  was  embarrassing  you  in  any  way, 
and  he  told  me  it  was  not.  Of  course,  I  did  not  want  to  inconven 
ience  you. 

As  I  have  told  you  before,  my  difficulty  in  accepting  the  post  has 
lain  in  the  adjustments  of  my  financial  affairs  here  and  in  the  forming 


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132    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

of  a  connection  which  would  continue,  in  some  degree,  my  practice. 
The  clientele  which  any  lawyer  has  is.  very  largely  personal  to  him 
self,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to  arrange  that  the  affairs  of  such 
a  clientele  be  handled  by  others.  This  is  the  difficulty  under  which 
I  have  labored. 

After  intimations  to  my  clients,  I  find  my  absence  would,  in  their 
view,  be  prejudicial  to  their  interests  and  that  they  would  each  seek 
separate  counsel.  This  would  mean  my  return  to  New  York  without 
any  clientele  whatsoever  and  a  new  start.  After  the  statement 
which  you  so  kindly  issued,  it  occurred  to  me  that  I  might  make  an 
arrangement  under  which  my  affairs  could  be  handled.  I  am  con 
vinced  now  that  it  is  impossible,  and  that  I  must  remain  here  to 
maintain  myself.  During  the  past  two  years  I  have  been  com 
pelled  to  neglect  my  business  to  a  very  large  extent,  and  I  feel 
that  it  is  absolutely  essential  for  me  to  recoup.  In  view  of  the 
very  great  honor  of  the  French  post,  I  was  quite  willing  to  sac 
rifice  almost  anything.  I  now  know  that  the  sacrifice  would  be 
complete. 

I  was  sorry  to  see  in  the  New  York  papers  of  yesterday,  under 
Washington  date  line,  that  I  had  accepted  the  embassy.  It  has 
placed  me  in  a  most  embarrassing  position,  and  has  caused  general 
comment  of  vacillation.  I  cannot  imagine  how  the  fact  that  I  was 
re-considering  became  public.  The  press  clippings  I  get  in  the 
matter  are  most  annoying  to  me,  and  must  be  to  you.  I  suppose  the 
only  thing  to  say  in  the  matter  is  that  my  position  is  the  same  as 
it  was  when  my  statement  was  given  out  in  Washington. 

Let  me  again  thank  you  very  deeply  for  the  great  honor  you  have 
conferred  upon  me.  I  sincerely  wish  it  were  within  my  power  to 
accept.  It  is  such  a  thing  as  rarely  comes  in  a  man's  lifetime. 

Believe  me  as  ever, 

Always  yours  to  command, 

WM.  F.  McCoMBS. 
HON.  WOODROW  WILSON, 
The  White  House, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Even  after  McCombs  had  declined  the  French  post,  as 
recited  in  the  above  letter  to  the  President,  he  continued 


J  WILLIAM    F.    McCOMBS  133 

to  vacillate,  and  addressed  the  following  telegrams  and 
cables  to  me  in  regard  to  the  French  Ambassadorship: 

New  York,  April  4,  1913. 
HON.  Jos.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Confidentially,   expect   to   come   tomorrow.     Please   suspend  on 
matter  until  I  see  you. 

W.  F.  M. 

New  York  April  25,  1913. 
Jos.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Confirm  understanding  that  nothing  be  done  for  the  present  and 
nothing  sent  in. 

W.  F.  M 

Sagaponac,  N.  Y.,  May  3,  1913. 

Radio  S.  S.  Olympic. 
Jos.  P.  TUMULTY, 
White  House, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Will  cable  about  time  sending  name  in  when  I  reach  Paris  in 
acceptance  our  understanding. 

W.  F.  M. 

Paris,  Via  French,  May  13,  1913. 
Jos.  P.  TUMULTY, 
White  House, 

Washington. 
Have  been  ill,  improving.     Cable  you  Thursday  in  matter. 

W.  F.  M. 

Paris,  June  1,  1913. 
J.  P.  TUMULTY, 

Washington. 

Some  better.    Operation  doubtful.    Question  delayed  a  few  days. 

W.  F.  M. 


134    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Then  came  the  following  cable  to  the  President  from 
Col.  E.  M.  House: 

Paris,  June  12,  1913. 
THE  PRESIDENT 

Washington. 

Damon  [code  name  for  McCombs]  requests  me  to  say  that  after 
he  sees  present  incumbent  tomorrow  he  will  cable  you.  He  is  much 

improved. 

EMHOUSE. 

Paris,  June  18,  1913. 
Jos.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

Am  sending  conclusive  message  through  usual  channel  so  you  get 
it  tomorrow  morning.  This  confirms  message  today  which  was  in 
complete.  Hope  everything  will  be  o.  k. 

Me. 

Paris,  July  6,  1913. 
J.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

Accept  if  no  previous  arrangement  cable  at  once  care  Monroe 
Banquier  Paris. 

W. 

Paris,  July  7,  1913. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

Better  wait  a  little  or  leave  out  for  another  strictly  confidential. 

W. 

By  this  last  message  McCombs  meant  that  the  Presi 
dent  had  better  wait  a  little  for  him  to  make  up  his  mind, 
or  to  select  another  for  the  French  post,  which  the  Presi 
dent  refused  to  do. 

The  kindest  explanation  of  Mr.  McCombs'  distorted 
and  entirely  untruthful  story  is  that  his  sensitive  mind 
had  brooded  so  long  on  fancied  injuries  that  he  had  come  to 


WILLIAM    F.    McCOMBS  135 

believe  that  what  he  deposed  was  true.  He  was  sensitive 
to  a  pathological  degree,  jealous,  suspicious  of  everybody, 
and  consumed  with  ambition  to  appear  as  the  sole  maker 
of  President  Wilson  politically.  He  is  dead,  and  it  would 
have  been  pleasanter  to  keep  silent  about  him.  I  should 
have  remained  silent  had  he  not  left  his  embittered 
manuscript  in  the  hands  of  friends,  with  directions  to 
publish  it  after  his  death,  when  those  whom  he  attacks  in 
its  various  chapters  would  feel  a  hesitancy  about  challeng 
ing  his  statements  and  attempting  in  any  way  to  asperse 
his  memory.  That  he  was  abnormal  was  known  to  all 
who  came  into  intimate  contact  with  him  during  the 
campaign  and  after.  His  suspicions  and  spites  mani 
fested  themselves  in  ways  so  small  that  he  would  have 
been  laughable  had  he  not  been  pitiable.  The  simple 
fact  is  that  both  the  nomination  and  the  election  of 
Governor  Wilson  were  in  spite  of  Mr.  McCombs,  not 
because  of  him.  Mr.  McCombs  was  ill  during  most  of 
the  campaign,  which  had  to  be  directed  by  the  assistant 
chairman,  Mr.  McAdoo,  with  all  possible  embarrassing 
interference  from  the  chairman's  sick  room. 

The  full  force  of  McCombs'  petty  spite,  malice,  and 
jealousy  was  expended  upon  Mr.  William  G.  McAdoo  of 
New  York,  who  at  the  time  had  established  a  high 
reputation  for  his  courage  and  intrepidity  in  building  the 
famous  Manhattan  and  Hudson  tunnels.  Mr.  McAdoo, 
in  the  early  days  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  candidacy,  took 
his  place  at  the  fore-front  of  the  Wilson  forces.  At  the 
time  of  his  espousal  of  the  Wilson  cause  he  was  the  only 
leader  in  the  New  York  financial  world  ready  and  cou 
rageous  enough  to  take  up  the  cudgels  for  Mr.  Wilson. 
His  influence  thrown  to  the  Wilson  side  strengthened  the 
Wilson  cause  in  every  part  of  the  country.  Every 


136    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

intimation  that  reached  McCombs  during  the  campaign 
that  Mr.  McAdoo,  as  vice-chairman  of  the  National 
Committee,  was  engaged  in  doing  this  or  that  thing  in 
connection  with  his  duties  as  vice-chairman,  was  always 
calculated  to  stir  anew  the  fires  of  envy  and  jealousy 
which  seemed  always  burning  in  the  breast  of  McCombs. 

I  was  in  close  touch  with  Mr.  Wilson  and  all  the  phases 
of  his  campaign  at  the  time,  and  on  several  occasions  was 
asked  to  act  as  mediator  in  the  differences  between  Mr. 
McAdoo  and  Mr.  McCombs,  and  I  am,  therefore,  in  a 
position  calmly  to  analyze  and  assess  the  reasons  for 
McCombs'  implacable  hatred  of  Mr.  McAdoo.  I  found 
that  the  motives  which  actuated  McCombs  were  of  the 
pettiest  and  meanest  sort.  At  their  base  lay  the  realiza 
tion  that  Mr.  McAdoo  had,  by  his  gallant  and  helpful 
support  of  Mr.  Wilson,  won  his  admiration  and  deep  re 
spect,  and  now  everything  must  be  done  by  McCombs  and 
his  friends  to  destroy  Mr.  McAdoo  in  the  estimation  of  the 
Democratic  candidate  for  the  Presidency.  In  the  efforts 
put  forth  by  McCombs  and  his  friends  to  destroy  Mr. 
Wilson's  high  opinion  of  Mr.  McAdoo  every  contemptible 
and  underhanded  method  was  resorted  to.  Mr.  McAdoo 
re-acted  to  these  unfair  attacks  in  the  most  kindly  and  mag 
nanimous  way.  Never  for  a  single  moment  did  he  allow 
the  McCombs  campaign  against  him  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  Woodrow  Wilson's  advancement  to  the  Presidency. 

During  the  whole  time  that  Mr.  McCombs  was  engaged 
in  his  vendetta,  Mr.  McAdoo  was  generous,  gallant,  big, 
and  forgiving,  even  suggesting  to  the  Democratic  candi 
date,  in  my  presence,  that  it  might  be  wiser  for  him 
(McAdoo)  to  withdraw  from  the  campaign,  so  that 
"things  at  headquarters  might  run  easier  and  more 
smoothly."  Mr.  Wilson  would  not  by  any  act  of  his 


WILLIAM    F.    McCOMBS  137 

permit  the  sniping  methods  of  McCombs  to  be  rewarded 
in  the  withdrawal  of  McAdoo  from  his  campaign. 

After  the  election  and  when  it  was  certain  that  McAdoo 
was  being  seriously  considered  for  the  post  of  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  McCombs'  jealousy  began  to  exert  itself 
in  the  most  venomous  way.  He  tried  to  persuade  Mr. 
Wilson  that  the  selection  of  Mr.  McAdoo  for  the  post 
of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  would  be  too  much  a  recog 
nition  of  the  Wall  Street  point  of  view,  and  would  be  con 
sidered  a  repudiation  of  McCombs'  leadership  in  the 
National  Committee. 

The  campaign  of  McCombs  to  prevent  the  nomination 
of  Mr.  McAdoo  for  a  post  in  the  Cabinet  failed  utterly. 
His  poison  brigade  then  gathered  at  the  Shoreham  Hotel 
in  Washington  on  the  day  of  the  Inauguration  and,  at 
tempting  to  reform  their  broken  lines,  now  sought  to 
prevent  his  confirmation  at  the  hands  of  the  Senate. 
Every  agency  of  opposition  that  McCombs  could  invoke 
to  accomplish  this  purpose  was  put  into  action,  but  like 
all  his  efforts  against  Mr.  McAdoo  they  met  with  failure. 
Mr.  McAdoo  was  confirmed  and  took  his  place  as  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  where  his  constructive  genius  in 
matters  of  finance  was  soon  brought  into  play,  and  under 
his  magnificent  leadership  the  foundation  stones  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  system  were  laid,  the  fruitage  of  which 
is  now  being  realized  in  every  business  throughout  the 
country. 

Frequent  conferences  were  held  at  Princeton  with 
reference  to  the  selection  of  the  President's  Cabinet,  and 
in  these  conferences  Colonel  House  and  I  participated. 
At  a  luncheon  at  the  Sterling  Hotel  at  Trenton  Mr. 
Bryan  was  offered  the  post  of  Secretary  of  State. 

On  the  first  of  March  the  post  of  Secretary  of  War  was 


138    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

still  open.  It  had  been  offered  to  Mr.  A.  Mitchell  Palmer 
of  Pennsylvania  and  had  been  declined  by  him  for  an 
unusual  reason.  The  President  requested  Mr.  Palmer  to 
meet  him  at  Colonel  House's  apartment  in  New  York. 
When  the  President  tendered  him  the  position  of  Secretary 
of  War,  Mr.  Palmer  frankly  told  the  President  that  he 
was  a  Quaker  and  that  the  tenets  of  his  religion  prevented 
his  acceptance  of  any  position  having  to  do  with  the 
conduct  of  war.  The  President  tried  to  overcome  these 
scruples,  but  his  efforts  were  unavailing.  The  President 
then  telephoned  me  and  informed  me  of  Palmer's  decli 
nation  and  asked  if  I  had  any  suggestion  regarding  the 
vacancy  in  his  Cabinet.  I  told  him  that  I  was  anxious  to 
see  a  New  Jersey  man  occupy  a  place  at  his  Cabinet  table, 
and  we  discussed  the  various  possibilities  over  the  'phone, 
but  without  reaching  any  definite  conclusion.  I  informed 
the  President  that  I  would  suggest  the  name  of  someone 
within  a  few  hours.  I  then  went  to  the  library  in  my 
home  in  New  Jersey  and  in  looking  over  the  Lawyers' 
Diary  I  ran  across  the  name  of  Lindley  Garrison,  who  at 
the  time  was  vice-chancellor  of  the  state  of  New  Jersey. 
Mr.  Garrison  was  a  resident  of  my  home  town  and 
although  I  had  only  met  him  casually  and  had  tried  a  few 
cases  before  him,  he  had  made  a  deep  impression  upon 
me  as  a  high  type  of  equity  judge. 

I  telephoned  the  President-elect  that  night  and  sug 
gested  the  name  of  Lindley  Garrison,  whose  reputation  as 
a  distinguished  judge  of  the  Chancery  Court  was  known 
to  the  President-elect.  He  was  invited  to  Trenton  the 
next  day  and  without  having  the  slightest  knowledge  of 
the  purpose  of  this  summons,  he  arrived  and  was  offered 
the  post  of  Secretary  of  War  in  Mr.  Wilson's  Cabinet, 
which  he  accepted. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE   INAUGURATION 

A  PRESIDENTIAL  inauguration  is  a  picturesque 
affair  even  when  the  weather  is  stormy,  as  it 
frequently  is  on  the  fourth  of  March  in  Washing 
ton.  It  is  a  brilliant  affair  when  the  sun  shines  bright  and 
the  air  is  balmy,  as  happened  on  March  4,  1913,  when 
Woodrow  Wilson  took  the  oath  of  office  at  noon,  delivered 
his  inaugural  address  a  few  minutes  later,  reviewed  the 
parade  immediately  after  luncheon,  and  before  nightfall 
was  at  his  desk  in  the  White  House  transacting  the  busi 
ness  of  the  Government.  To  the  popular  imagination 
Inauguration  Day  represents  crowds  and  hurrahs,  brass 
bands  and  processions.  The  hotels,  restaurants,  and 
boarding  houses  of  Washington  overflow  with  people  from 
all  parts  of  the  country  who  have  come  to  "see  the  show." 
The  pavements,  windows,  and  housetops  along  Penn 
sylvania  Avenue  from  the  east  front  of  the  Capitol  to  the 
western  gate  of  the  White  House  are  crowded  with  folk 
eager  to  see  the  procession  with  its  military  column  and 
marching  clubs.  From  an  improvised  stand  in  front  of 
the  White  House,  surrounded  by  his  friends,  the  new 
President  reviews  the  parade. 

Every  four  years  the  newspaper  boys  describe  Inaugu 
ration  Day,  but  I  am  not  aware  of  any  novelist  who  has 
put  it  in  a  book.  Why  not?  It  offers  material  of  a  high 
order  for  literary  description.  "  Human  interest "  material 
also  in  abundance,  not  merely  in  the  aspects  of  the  retiring 

139 


140    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

and  incoming  Presidents  with  their  respective  retinues  of 
important  officials,  but  in  the  comedies  and  tragedies  of 
the  lesser  figures  of  the  motley  political  world.  Familiar 
faces  vanish,  new  faces  appear — especially  when  a  change 
of  administration  brings  a  change  of  party  control.  An 
evacuating  column  of  ousted  and  dejected  office-holders, 
prophesying  national  disaster  at  the  hands  of  parvenus, 
meets  an  advancing  column  of  would-be  office-holders 
rejoicing  in  general  over  their  party's  success  and  palpi- 
tantly  eager  for  individual  advantage.  As  in  life,  so  in 
Washington  on  Inauguration  Day,  humour  and  pathos 
mingle.  Inauguration  Day  is  the  beginning  of  a  period 
of  uprooting  and  transplanting. 

So  it  was  when  the  Democrats  came  into  office  on 
March  4,  1913,  after  sixteen  years  of  uninterrupted 
Republican  control  and  for  only  the  third  time  in  the 
fifty -two  years  since  Buchanan  had  walked  out  of  the 
White  House  and  Lincoln  had  walked  in.  Hungry  Demo 
crats  flocked  to  Washington,  dismayed  Republicans 
looked  on  in  silence  or  with  sardonic  comment.  Demo 
cratic  old-timers  who  had  been  waiting,  like  Mr.  Micaw- 
ber,  for  "something  to  turn  up"  through  long  lean  years, 
mingled  in  the  hotel  lobbies  with  youths  flushed  with 
the  excitement  of  a  first  experience. in  the  political  game 
and  discussed  the  "prospects,"  each  confident  that  he  was 
indispensable  to  the  new  administration.  Minor  office 
holders  who  had,  so  they  said,  been  political  neutrals  dur 
ing  the  past  administration,  anxiously  scanned  the  horizon 
for  signs  that  they  would  be  retained.  "Original  Wilson 
men"  from  various  parts  of  the  country  were  introducing 
themselves  or  being  introduced  by  their  friends.  And 
there  were  the  thousands,  with  no  axes  to  grind,  who  had 
come  simply  to  look  on,  or  to  participate  in  a  long- 


THE    INAUGURATION  141 

postponed   Democratic   rejoicing,   or   to   wish   the   new 
President  Godspeed  for  his  and  the  country's  sake. 

It  is  not  my  business  in  a  book  wholly  concerned  with 
the  personal  side  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  political  career  to 
attempt  a  description  of  Inauguration  Day,  with  its 
clamours  and  its  heartaches  and  its  hopes.  To  the  new 
President  the  day  was,  as  he  himself  said,  not  one  of 
"triumph"  but  of  "dedication."  For  him  the  occasion 
had  a  significance  beyond  the  fortunes  of  individuals  and 
parties.  Something  more  had  happened  than  a  replace 
ment  of  Republicans  by  Democrats.  He  believed  that  he 
had  been  elected  as  a  result  of  a  stirring  of  the  American 
conscience  against  thinly  masked  "privilege"  and  a 
reawakening  of  American  aspiration  for  government  which 
should  more  nearly  meet  the  needs  of  the  plain  people  of 
the  country.  He  knew  that  he  would  have  to  disappoint 
many  a  hungry  office-seeker,  whose  chief  claim  to  pref 
erment  lay  in  his  boast  that  he  "had  always  voted  the 
Democratic  ticket."  Among  the  new  President's  first 
duties  would  be  the  selection  of  men  to  fill  offices  and,  of 
course,  in  loyalty  to  his  party,  he  would  give  preference  to 
Democrats,  but  it  did  not  please  him  to  think  of  this  in 
terms  of  "patronage"  and  "spoils."  With  the  concen 
tration  of  a  purposeful  man  he  was  anxious  chiefly  to  find 
the  best  people  for  the  various  offices,  those  capable  of 
doing  a  day's  work  and  those  who  could  sense  the  op 
portunities  for  service  in  whole-hearted  devotion  to  the 
country's  common  cause.  His  inaugural  address  met 
the  expectations  of  thoughtful  hearers.  It  was  on  a  high 
plane  of  statesmanship,  uncoloured  by  partisanship.  It 
was  the  announcement  of  a  programme  in  the  interest  of 
the  country  at  large,  with  the  idea  of  trusteeship  strongly 
stressed.  There  was  nothing  very  radical  in  the  address: 


142    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

nothing  to  terrify  those  who  were  apprehensive  lest 
property  rights  should  be  violated.  The  President  gave 
specific  assurance  that  there  would  be  due  attention  to 
"the  old-fashioned,  never-to-be-neglected,  safeguarding 
of  property,"  but  he  also  immediately  added  "and  of 
individual  right."  Legitimate  property  claims  would  be 
scrupulously  respected,  but  it  was  clear  that  they  who 
conceived  that  the  chief  business  of  government  is  the 
promotion  of  their  private  or  corporate  interests  would  get 
little  aid  and  comfort  from  this  administration.  The 
underlying  meaning  of  the  President's  progressivism 
was  clear:  the  recovery  of  old  things  which  through  long 
neglect  or  misuse  had  been  lost,  a  return  to  the  starting 
point  of  our  Government,  government  in  the  interest  of 
the  many,  not  of  the  few:  "Our  work  is  a  work  of  resto 
ration";  "We  have  been  refreshed  by  a  new  insight  into 
our  life." 

A  deep  humanity  pervaded  the  message.  To  the 
thoughtful  hearer  it  must  have  been  clear  that  the 
President's  mind  was  more  occupied  with  the  masses  than 
with  special  classes.  He  was  not  hostile  to  the  classes. 
He  was  simply  less  interested  in  them.  He  suggested  a 
social  as  well  as  a  political  programme:  "Men  and  women 
and  children"  must  be  "shielded  in  their  lives,  their  very 
vitality,  from  the  consequences  of  great  industrial  and 
social  processes  which  they  cannot  alter,  control,  or  singly 
cope  with. "  "The  first  duty  of  law  is  to  keep  sound  the 
society  it  serves."  Such  was  the  first  utterance  of  the 
President  who  in  a  few  weeks  was  to  appear  as  the  cham 
pion,  not  of  the  special  interests,  native  and  foreign,  in 
Mexico,  but  of  the  fifteen  million  Mexican  people,  groping 
blindly,  through  blood  and  confusion,  after  some  form  of 
self-government,  and  who  in  a  few  years  was  to  appear  as 


THE    INAUGURATION  143 

the  champion  of  small  nations  and  the  masses  throughout 
the  world  in  a  titanic  struggle  against  the  old  principles  of 
autocracy. 

Mingled  with  the  high  and  human  tone  of  it  all  was  a 
clear  and  itemized  forecast  of  proposed  legislation:  a 
revised  tariff,  a  federal  reserve  banking  system,  a  farmers' 
loan  bank.  And  all  who  knew  Woodrow  Wilson's  record 
in  New  Jersey  were  aware  that  the  Executive  would  be  the 
leader  in  the  enactment  of  legislation.  The  executive  and 
legislative  branches  of  the  Government  in  this  adminis 
tration  would,  all  informed  people  knew,  be  in  partnership 
in  the  promotion  of  an  enterprise  as  practical  as  it  was 
inspiring. 

After  Chief  Justice  White  administered  the  oath  of 
office,  the  President  read  the  brief  address,  of  which  the 
following  are  the  concluding  words: 

This  is  not  a  day  of  triumph;  it  is  a  day  of  dedication.  Here  mus 
ter,  not  the  forces  of  party,  but  the  forces  of  humanity.  Men's  hearts 
wait  upon  us ;  men's  lives  hang  in  the  balance ;  men's  hopes  call  upon 
us  to  say  what  we  will  do.  Who  shall  live  up  to  the  great  trust? 
Who  dares  fail  to  try?  I  summon  all  honest  men,  all  patriotic,  all 
forward-looking  men,  to  my  side.  God  helping  me,  I  will  not  fail 
them,  if  they  will  but  counsel  and  sustain  me ! 


CHAPTER  XX 

MEXICO 

MANY  grave  matters  inherited  from  the  Taft 
regime  pressed  upon  the  new  Administration  for 
immediate  solution.  One  of  the  most  serious 
was  the  situation  in  Mexico,  growing  out  of  the  revolution 
against  the  Madero  Government  which  broke  out  in 
Mexico  City  on  February  9,  1913.  The  murder  of  ex- 
President  Madero  and  Vice-President  Suarez,  and  the 
usurpation  of  presidential  authority  by  General  Victoriano 
Huerta,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  general 
industrial  and  social  chaos  of  Mexico,  made  it  necessary 
for  the  new  administration,  only  a  month  in  power, 
quickly  to  act  and  to  declare  its  policy  with  reference  to 
the  question  then  pending  as  to  the  recognition  of  the 
provisional  government,  the  head  of  which  was  Huerta. 
After  becoming  "President"  of  Mexico,  the  usurper  had 
brazenly  addressed  the  following  telegram  to  President 
Taft:  "I  have  overthrown  the  Government  and,  therefore, 
peace  and  order  will  reign,"  and  boldly  asserted  a  claim 
to  recognition  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
This  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  Mexico  when  President 
Wilson  was  inaugurated.  The  duly-elected  President  of 
Mexico,  Francisco  Madero,  had  been  overthrown  by  a 
band  of  conspirators  headed  by  Huerta.  Were  the  fruits 
of  the  hard-won  fight  of  the  Mexican  masses  against  the 
arbitrary  rule  of  the  favoured  few  to  be  wasted?  Presi 
dent  Wilson  answered  this  question  in  his  formal  state- 
Hi 


MEXICO  145 

ment  of  March  12, 1913,  eight  days  after  his  inauguration. 
With  respect  to  Latin- American  affairs,  he  said: 

One  of  the  chief  objects  of  my  administration  will  be  to  cultivate 
the  friendship  and  deserve  the  confidence  of  our  sister  republics 
of  Central  and  South  America,  and  to  promote  in  every  proper  and 
honorable  way  the  interests  which  are  common  to  the  peoples  of  the 
two  continents.  I  earnestly  desire  the  most  cordial  understanding 
and  cooperation  between  the  peoples  and  leaders  of  America,  and, 
therefore,  deem  it  my  duty  to  make  this  brief  statement : 

"Cooperation  is  possible  only  when  supported  at  every  turn  by 
the  orderly  processes  of  just  government  based  upon  law,  not  upon 
arbitrary  or  irregular  force.  We  hold,  as  I  am  sure  all  thoughtful 
leaders  of  republican  governments  everywhere  hold,  that  just  govern 
ment  rests  always  upon  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  there 
can  be  no  freedom  without  order  based  upon  law  and  upon  the  public 
conscience  and  approval.  We  shall  look  to  make  these  principles 
the  basis  of  mutual  intercourse,  respect,  and  helpfulness  between 
our  sister  republics  and  ourselves.  .  .  .  We  can  have  no  sym 
pathy  with  those  who  seek  to  seize  the  power  of  government  to  advance 
their  own  personal  interests  or  ambition.'9 

Two  considerations  animated  the  President  in  the 
formulation  of  his  Mexican  policy  and  compelled  his 
adherence  in  it  throughout  his  administration,  namely: 

The  firm  conviction  that  all  nations,  both  the  weak  and 
the  powerful,  have  the  inviolable  right  to  control  their  internal 
affairs. 

The  belief,  established  from  the  history  of  the  world,  that 
Mexico  will  never  become  a  peaceful  and  law-abiding 
neighbour  of  the  United  States  until  she  has  been  permitted 
to  achieve  a  permanent  and  basic  settlement  of  her  troubles 
without  outside  interference. 

Steadfastly,  Woodrow  Wilson  refused  to  recognize  Huerta 
as  the  Provisional  President  of  Mexico.  He  said :  "Huerta, 


146    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  bitter,  implacable  foe  of  everything  progressive  and 
humane  in  Mexico,  boldly  defending  the  privileges  of  the 
old  scientifico  group  which  he  represented,  openly  defied 
the  authority  of  the  United  States  and  sneered  at  the  much- 
ridiculed  policy  of  'watchful  waiting'  proclaimed  by 
the  new  administration,  and  laughed  to  scorn  the  high 
idealism  which  lay  behind  it."  To  him  the  declaration  of 
the  American  President  that  "we  can  have  no  sympathy 
with  those  who  seek  to  seize  the  power  of  government  to 
advance  their  own  personal  interests  or  ambition"  was  a 
mere  gesture,  too  puerile  to  be  seriously  considered. 

While  Huerta  in  Mexico  was  blatantly  denouncing  this 
benevolent  policy  of  cooperation  and  helpfulness,  aid  and 
comfort  were  rendered  the  usurper  by  the  jingoistic 
criticisms  of  the  President's  enemies  in  the  United  States 
Congress  and  throughout  the  country,  many  of  whom, 
urged  on  by  the  oil  interests,  in  their  mad  delirium,  cried 
out  for  a  blood-and-iron  policy  toward  Mexico.  Resisting 
the  American  interests  in  Mexico  was  a  part  of  the  Presi 
dent's  task.  Those  who  cried  loudest  for  intervention 
were  they  who  had  land,  mineral,  and  industrial  invest 
ments  in  Mexico.  The  "vigorous  American  policy" 
which  they  demanded  was  a  policy  for  personal  enrich 
ment.  It  was  with  this  phase  of  the  matter  in  mind  that 
the  President  said:  "I  have  to  pause  and  remind  myself 
that  I  am  President  of  the  United  States  and  not  of  a  small 
group  of  Americans  with  vested  interests  in  Mexico." 

But  the  new  President,  having  mapped  out  the  course 
he  was  to  follow,  a  course  fraught  with  a  great  deal  of 
danger  to  his  administration,  seeking  to  bring  about  the 
moral  isolation  of  Huerta  himself,  calmly  moved  on, 
apparently  unmindful  of  the  jeers  and  ridicule  of  his 
critics  in  America  and  elsewhere.  "I  am  willing,"  he 


MEXICO  147 

said,  "no  matter  what  my  personal  fortunes  may  be,  to 
play  for  the  verdict  of  mankind.  Personally,  it  will  be  a 
matter  of  indifference  to  me  what  the  verdict  on  the  7th 
of  November  is,  provided  I  feel  any  degree  of  confidence 
that  when  a  later  jury  sits  I  shall  get  their  judgment  in 
my  favour.  Not  my  favour  personally — what  difference 
does  that  make? — but  my  favour  as  an  honest  and  con 
scientious  spokesman  of  a  great  nation. 

What  an  utterly  foolish  thing,  said  his  critics,  it  is  to 
attempt  in  this  day  to  oust  a  Mexican  dictator  by  mere 
rhetoric  and  high-sounding  phrases! 

When  Wilson  said:  "The  situation  must  be  given  a 
little  more  time  to  work  itself  out  in  the  new  circum 
stances;  I  believe  that  only  a  little  while  will  be  necessary. 
.  .  .  We  must  exercise  the  self-restraint  of  a  really 
great  nation  which  realizes  its  own  strength  and  scorns 
to  misuse  it,"  his  enemies  smugly  shrugged  their  shoulders 
and  said,  with  disgust:  "Well,  what's  the  use?  what  can 
you  expect  from  a  dreamer  of  dreams,  a  mere  doctrinaire? 
Doesn't  Wilson,  the  historian,  know  that  force  and  force 
alone  can  bring  that  grizzly  old  warrior  Huerta  to  his 
senses?" 

What  was  the  President  seeking  to  do  in  proclaiming 
his  policy  of  "watchful  waiting"?  He  was  merely 
seeking  to  establish  in  Pan-American  affairs  the  principle 
that  no  president  of  a  South  American  republic  who  came 
to  power  by  usurpation  and  assassination  should  receive, 
while  he  was  president,  the  recognition  of  the  United 
States.  This  doctrine  was  not  only  good  statesmanship, 
but  it  was  likewise  sound  in  morals. 

It  was  disheartening  to  find  bitter  criticism  of  this 
policy  from  the  outside,  and  depressing  to  find  the  en 
emies  of  watchful  waiting  "boring  from  within"  through 


148    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

his  own  Cabinet  officers.  Lindley  Garrison,  his  own 
Secretary  of  War,  had  no  sympathy  for  this  idealistic 
policy.  His  only  antidote  for  what  was  happening  in 
Mexico  was  force  and  intervention  and  he  honourably 
urged  this  view  upon  the  President,  but  without  succeed 
ing  in  bringing  about  the  consummation  so  dear  to  his 
heart. 

And  one  denies,  and  one  forsakes,  and  still 
unquestioning  he  goes,  who  has  his  lonely  thoughts. 

But  the  President  stood  firm  in  his  resolve  that  the 
people  of  Mexico  should  not  be  punished  for  the  male- 
factions  of  their  usurping  president,  and  steadily,  Against 
great  odds,  he  moved  forward  to  vindicate  his  policy, 
unmindful  of  the  jeers  and  criticisms  of  his  enemies. 
The  heart  of  that  policy  he  eloquently  exposed  when  he 
said:  "I  am  more  interested  in  the  fortunes  of  oppressed 
men,  pitiful  women  and  children,  than  in  any  property 
rights  whatever.  The  people  of  Mexico  are  striving 
for  the  rights  that  are  fundamental  to  life  and  happiness 
— fifteen  million  oppressed  men,  overburdened  women, 
and  pitiful  children  in  virtual  bondage  in  their  own  home 
of  fertile  lands  and  inexhaustible  treasure!  Some  of 
the  leaders  of  the  revolution  may  often  have  been  mis 
taken  and  violent  and  selfish,  but  the  revolution  itself 
was  inevitable  and  is  right.  The  unspeakable  Huerta 
betrayed  the  very  comrades  he  served,  traitorously  over 
threw  the  government  of  which  he  was  a  trusted  part, 
impudently  spoke  for  the  very  forces  that  had  driven 
his  people  to  rebellion  with  which  he  had  pretended  to 
sympathize.  The  men  who  overcame  him  and  drove 
him  out  represent  at  least  the  fierce  passion  of  reconstruc- 


7  MEXICO  149 

tion  which  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  liberty;  and  so  long 
as  they  represent,  however  imperfectly,  such  a  struggle 
for  deliverance,  I  am  ready  to  serve  their  ends  when  I 
can.  So  long  as  the  power  of  recognition  rests  with  me 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  refuse  to  extend 
the  hand  of  welcome  to  any  one  who  obtains  power  in 
a  sister  republic  by  treachery  and  violence." 

But  the  President's  policy  of  watchful  waiting  did 
win.  The  days  of  the  Huerta  regime  slowly  wended 
their  uneasy  way.  Huerta  suspended  the  Mexican  Con 
stitution  and,  having  imprisoned  half  of  the  Mexican 
Congress,  proceeded  to  administer  the  Government  as 
an  arbitrary  ruler.  Slowly  but  surely  he  began  to  feel 
the  mighty  pressure  of  the  unfriendly  Government  of 
the  United  States  upon  him.  Still  defiant,  he  sought  to 
unite  behind  him  the  Mexican  people,  hoping  to  provoke 
them  to  military  action  against  the  United  States.  To 
hold  his  power  he  was  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  making 
his  own  country  a  bloody  shamble,  but  President  Wilson 
had  the  measure  of  the  tyrant  Huerta  from  the  beginning, 
and  soon  his  efforts  to  isolate  him  began  to  bear  fruit. 
Even  now  his  bitter  critics  gave  a  listening  ear  to  the  oft- 
repeated  statement  of  the  American  President,  as  if  it 
contained  the  germ  of  a  prophecy: 

The  steady  pressure  of  moral  force  will  before  many  days  break 
the  barriers  of  pride  and  prejudice  down,  and  we  shall  triumph  as 
Mexico's  friends  sooner  than  we  could  triumph  as  her  enemy — and 
how  much  more  handsomely  and  with  how  much  higher  and  finer 
satisfactions  of  conscience  and  of  honour! 

Little  by  little  the  usurper  was  being  isolated.  By 
moral  pressure  every  day  his  power  and  prestige  were 
perceptibly  crumbling.  His  collapse  was  not  far  away 


150    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

when  the  President  declared:  "We  shall  not,  I  believe, 
be  obliged  to  alter  our  policy  of  watchful  waiting." 
The  campaign  of  Woodrow  Wilson  to  force  Huerta 
finally  triumphed.  On  July  15th,  Huerta  resigned  and 
departed  from  Mexico.  Wilson's  humanity  and  broad 
statesmanship  had  won  over  the  system  of  cruel  oppres 
sion  for  which  the  "unspeakable  Huerta"  had  stood. 

During  the  Huerta  controversy  a  thing  happened  which 
aggravated  the  Mexican  affair,  and  which  culminated 
in  the  now-famous  Tampico  incident. 

On  April  9,  1914,  a  paymaster  of  the  United  States 
steamship  Dolphin  landed  at  the  Iturbide  bridge  at 
Tampico  with  a  whaleboat  and  boat's  crew  to  obtain 
supplies  needed  aboard  the  Dolphin.  While  loading  these 
supplies  the  paymaster  and  his  men  were  arrested  by 
an  officer  and  squad  of  the  army  of  General  Huerta. 
Neither  the  paymaster  nor  any  of  the  boat's  crew  were 
armed.  The  boat  flew  the  United  States  flag  both  at  the 
bow  and  stern.  Two  of  the  men  were  in  the  boat  when 
arrested  and  hence  were  taken  from  United  States 
"  soil."  Admiral  Mayo,  commanding  the  American  squad 
ron  then  off  Tampico,  immediately  demanded  the  release 
of  the  sailors.  Release  was  ordered  after  the  paymaster 
and  the  sailors  had  been  detained  about  an  hour. 
Not  only  did  Admiral  Mayo  demand  the  release  of  the 
sailors  but  insisted  on  a  formal  apology  by  the  Huerta  Gov 
ernment  consisting  of  a  twenty-one-gun  salute  to  the  flag. 

During  the  critical  days  following  the  refusal  of  Huerta 
to  accede  to  Admiral  Mayo's  request  the  State  Depart 
ment  was  notified  that  there  would  arrive  at  Vera  Cruz 
the  German  steamship  Ypirango  about  to  deliver  to 
Huerta  15,000,000  rounds  of  ammunition  and  500  rapid- 
fire  guns. 


MEXICO  151 

About  2.30  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  21st  day  of 
April,  1914,  the  telephone  operator  at  the  White  House 
called  me  at  my  home,  and  rousing  me  from  bed,  informed 
me  that  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Bryan,  desired  to 
speak  to  me  at  once  upon  a  very  urgent  and  serious 
matter.  I  went  to  the  telephone  and  was  informed  by 
Mr.  Bryan  that  he  had  just  received  a  wireless  from 
Admiral  Mayo,  informing  him  that  the  German  steam 
ship  Ypirango,  carrying  munitions,  would  arrive  at  Vera 
Cruz  that  morning  about  ten  o'clock  and  that  he  thought 
the  President  ought  to  be  notified  and  that,  in  his  opinion, 
drastic  measures  should  at  once  be  taken  to  prevent  the 
delivery  of  these  munitions  to  the  Customs  House  at 
Vera  Cruz.  While  Mr.  Bryan  and  I  were  talking,  Mr. 
Daniels,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  got  on  the  wire  and 
confirmed  all  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  just  told  me.  Soon 
the  President  was  on  the  'phone,  and  in  a  voice  indicat 
ing  that  he  had  just  been  aroused  from  sleep,  carried  on 
the  following  conversation  with  Messrs.  Bryan,  Daniels, 
and  myself:  Mr.  Bryan  reported  to  him  the  situation 
at  Vera  Cruz  and  informed  him  of  the  receipt  of  Admiral 
Mayo's  dispatch  in  these  words: 

"Mr.  President,  I  am  sorry  to  inform  you  that  I  have 
just  received  a  dispatch  from  Admiral  Mayo  that  a  Ger 
man  ship  will  arrive  at  Vera  Cruz  this  morning  at  ten 
o'clock,  containing  large  supplies  of  munitions  and  arms 
for  the  Mexicans  and  I  want  your  judgment  as  to  how 
we  shall  handle  the  situation." 

Replying  to  Mr.  Bryan,  the  President  said :  "  Of  course, 
Mr.  Bryan,  you  understand  what  drastic  action  in  this  mat 
ter  might  ultimately  mean  in  our  relations  with  Mexico?  " 

Mr.  Bryan  said,  by  way  of  reply: 

"I    thoroughly   appreciate   this,    Mr.    President,    and 


152    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

fully  considered  it  before  telephoning  you."  For  a 
second  there  was  a  slight  pause  and  then  the  President 
asked  Mr.  Daniels  his  opinion  in  regard  to  the  matter. 
Mr.  Daniels  frankly  agreed  with  Mr.  Bryan  that  im 
mediate  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  the  German 
ship  from  landing  its  cargo.  Without  a  moment's  delay 
the  President  said  to  Mr.  Daniels: 

"Daniels,  send  this  message  to  Admiral  Mayo:  'Take 
Vera  Cruz  at  Once9.'9 

As  I  sat  at  the  'phone  on  this  fateful  morning,  away 
from  the  hurly-burly  world  outside,  clad  only  in  my 
pajamas,  and  listened  to  this  discussion,  the  tenseness 
of  the  whole  situation  and  its  grave  possibilities  of  war 
with  all  its  tragedy  gripped  me.  Here  were  three  men 
quietly  gathered  about  a  'phone,  pacifists  at  heart,  men 
who  had  been  criticized  and  lampooned  throughout  the 
whole  country  as  being  too  proud  to  fight,  now  without 
hesitation  of  any  kind  agreeing  on  a  course  of  action 
that  might  result  in  bringing  two  nations  to  war.  They 
were  pacifists  no  longer,  but  plain,  simple  men,  bent  upon 
discharging  the  duty  they  owed  their  country  and  utterly 
disregarding  their  own  personal  feelings  of  antagonism 
to  every  phase  of  war. 

After  Mr.  Bryan  and  Mr.  Daniels  had  left  the  telephone 
the  President  said:  "Tumulty,  are  you  there?  What 
did  you  think  of  my  message?"  I  replied  that  there  was 
nothing  else  to  do  under  the  circumstances.  He  then  said : 
"It  is  too  bad,  isn't  it,  but  we  could  not  allow  that  cargo 
to  land.  The  Mexicans  intend  using  those  guns  upon 
our  own  boys.  It  is  hard  to  take  action  of  this  kind.  I 
have  tried  to  keep  out  of  this  Mexican  mess,  but  we  are 
now  on  the  brink  of  war  and  there  is  no  alternative." 

Discussing  this  vital  matter  that  morning  with  the  Com- 


MEXICO  153 

mander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  I  could  visualize 
the  possible  tragedy  of  the  whole  affair.  I  pictured  the 
flagship  of  Admiral  Mayo  with  its  fine  cargo  of  sturdy 
young  marines,  riding  serenely  at  anchor  off  Vera  Cruz, 
and  those  aboard  the  vessel  utterly  unmindful  of  the 
message  that  was  now  on  its  way  through  the  air,  an 
ominous  message  which  to  some  of  them  would  be  a  por 
tent  of  death.  When  the  President  concluded  his  con 
versation  with  me  his  voice  was  husky.  It  indicated 
to  me  that  he  felt  the  solemnity  of  the  whole  delicate 
business  he  was  now  handling,  while  the  people  of 
America,  whose  spokesman  he  was,  were  at  this  hour 
quietly  sleeping  in  their  beds,  unaware  and  unmindful 
of  the  grave  import  of  this  message  which  was  already 
on  its  way  to  Vera  Cruz. 

When  I  arrived  at  the  White  House  the  next  morning 
I  found  the  newspaper  correspondents  attached  to  the 
Executive  offices  uninformed  of  what  had  happened  in 
the  early  morning,  but  when  I  notified  them  that  the 
President  had  ordered  Admiral  Mayo  at  2.30  o'clock  in 
the  morning  to  take  Vera  Cruz,  they  jumped,  as  one  man, 
to  the  door,  to  flash  this  significant  news  to  the  country 
and  the  world. 

With  Huerta's  abdication  Venustiano  Carranza  took 
hold,  but  the  Mexican  troubles  were  not  at  an  end. 
The  constant  raiding  expeditions  of  Villa  across  the 
American  border  were  a  source  of  great  irritation  and 
threatened  every  few  days  a  conflagration.  While  Villa 
stood  with  Carranza  as  a  companion  in  arms  to  depose 
Huerta,  the  "entente  cordiale"  was  at  an  end  as  soon  as 
Huerta  passed  off  the  stage.  With  these  expeditions 
of  Villa  and  his  motley  crew  across  the  border  our  re 
lations  with  our  neighbour  to  the  south  were  again  seriously 


154    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

threatened.  With  Villa  carrying  on  his  raids  and  Carranza 
always  misunderstanding  the  purpose  and  attitude  of 
our  Government  and  spurning  its  offer  of  helpful  co 
operation,  difficulties  of  various  sorts  arose  with  each 
day,  until  popular  opinion  became  insistent  in  its  demand 
for  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  the  American  President. 
Every  ounce  of  reserve  patience  of  the  President  was  called 
into  action  to  keep  the  situation  steady.  How  to  do  it, 
with  many  incidents  happening  .each  day  to  intensify  and 
aggravate  an  already  acute  situation,  was  the  problem 
that  met  the  President  at  every  turn.  At  this  time  the 
President  was  the  loneliest  figure  in  Washington. 

Grotesque  uncertain  shapes  infest  the  dark 
And  wings  of  bats  are  heard  in  aimless  flight; 

Discordant  voices  cry  and  serpents  hiss, 

No  friendly  star,  no  beacon's  beckoning  ray. 

Even  the  members  of  his  own  party  in  the  Senate  and 
House  were  left  without  an  apology  or  excuse  for  the 
seeming  indifference  of  the  President  to  affairs  in  Mexico. 
Day  after  day  from  outraged  senators  would  come 
vigorous  demands  for  firm  action  on  the  part  of  America, 
insistent  that  something  radical  be  done  to  establish 
conditions  of  peace  along  our  southern  borders.  From 
many  of  them  came  the  unqualified  demand  for  inter 
vention,  so  that  the  Mexican  question  should  be  once  and 
for  all  settled. 

In  the  Cabinet,  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  vigorous 
spokesman  of  the  Cabinet  group,  demanding  radical 
action  in  the  way  of  intervention,  was  insisting  that  we 
intervene  and  put  an  end  to  the  pusillanimous  rule  of 
Carranza  and  "clean  up"  Mexico.  Even  I,  who  had 
stood  with  the  President  during  the  critical  days  of  the 


Otamulty: 

caaft  talk  less  than  half  an  hour  to 
save  his  life,  and  when  he  is  through  he  has  talked 
on  so  many  different  subjects  that  I  never  can  re 
member  what  he  said*  It  is  literally  impossible  for 
me  with  the  present  pressure^  upon  me  to  see  him,  and 
I  hope  you  will  ask  him  if  he  canft  submit  a  memo 

randum. 

The  President. 

C.L.S. 

Eeax  Tumulty: 

I  should  like  to  see  Mr.      but  Just 
now  it  does  sot  seem  possible  because  I  know  he  is 
a  gentleman  who  needs  a  good  deal  of  sea  room*  I 
am  taking  his  suggestions  up  with  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy. 

0?he  President. 


Dealing  with  bores 


155 


156    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Mexican  imbroglio,  for  a  while  grew  faint  hearted  in  my 
devotion  to  the  policy  of  watchful  waiting.  To  me,  the 
attack  of  Villa  on  Columbus,  and  the  killing  of  some  of 
our  soldiers  while  asleep,  was  the  last  straw.  The  con 
tinuance  of  this  impossible  situation  along  the  border  was 
unthinkable.  To  force  the  President's  hand,  if  possible, 
I  expressed  my  feelings  in  the  following  letters  to  him: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

March  15, 1916. 
MY  DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  have  been  thinking  over  what  we  discussed  this  morning  with 
reference  to  the  Mexican  situation. 

I  am  not  acting  on  impulse  and  without  a  full  realization,  I  hope, 
of  everything  that  is  involved.  I  am  convinced  that  we  should 
pursue  to  the  end  the  declared  purpose  announced  by  you  last  Fri 
day  and  endorsed  by  Congress  and  the  people  of  the  United  States 
of  "getting  Villa."  If  the  de  facto  government  is  going  to  resist 
the  entrance  of  our  troops,  a  new  situation  will  be  presented.  I  feel 
that  you  ought  to  advise  Congress  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  of 
what  the  situation  really  is  in  order  to  secure  its  support  and  coopera 
tion  in  whatever  action  is  needed  to  accomplish  the  purpose  you  have 
in  mind.  To  retrace  our  steps  now  would  be  not  only  disastrous  to 
our  party  and  humiliating  to  the  country,  but  would  be  destructive 
of  our  influence  in  international  affairs  and  make  it  forever  impossible 
to  deal  in  any  effective  way  with  Mexican  affairs. 

Your  appeal  to  Congress  ought  to  deal  with  this  matter  in  an 
affirmative  way,  asking  for  the  requisite  power  which  you  may  feel 
assured  will  be  granted  you  in  ungrudging  fashion. 

My  apology  for  writing  you  is  my  distress  of  mind  and  my  deep 
interest  in  everything  that  affects  you  and  your  future  and,  I  hope, 
the  country's  welfare.  I  would  not  be  your  friend  if  I  did  not  tell 
you  frankly  how  I  feel. 

Faithfully, 

TUMULTY. 
THE  PRESIDENT, 
The  White  House. 


MEXICO  157 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 

WASHINGTON 

June  24,  1916. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR  : 

The  Mexican  authorities  admit  that  they  have  taken  American 
soldiers  and  incarcerated  them.  The  people  feel  that  a  demand 
should  be  made  for  their  immediate  release,  and  that  it  should  not 
take  the  form  of  an  elaborate  note.  Only  firmness  and  an  unflinching 
insistence  upon  our  part  will  bring  the  gentlemen  in  Mexico  City  to 
their  senses. 

If  I  were  President  at  this  moment,  or  acting  as  Secretary  of  State, 
my  message  to  Carranza  would  be  the  following: 

"Release   those   American   soldiers   or   take   the   consequences." 

This  would  ring  around  the  world. 

Faithfully, 

TUMULTY. 
THE  PRESIDENT, 
The  White  House. 


After  reading  these  letters,  the  President  sent  for  me 
one  day  to  visit  with  him  in  his  study,  and  to  discuss 
"the  present  situation  in  Mexico."  As  I  sat  down,  he 
turned  to  me  in  the  most  serious  way  and  said: 
"Tumulty,  you  are  Irish,  and,  therefore,  full  of  fight. 
I  know  how  deeply  you  feel  about  this  Columbus  affair. 
Of  course,  it  is  tragical  and  deeply  regrettable  from  every 
standpoint,  but  in  the  last  analysis  I,  and  not  the  Cabinet 
or  you,  must  bear  the  responsibility  for  every  action  that 
is  to  be  taken.  I  have  to  sleep  with  my  conscience  in 
these  matters  and  I  shall  be  held  responsible  for  every 
drop  of  blood  that  may  be  spent  in  the  enterprise  of 
intervention.  I  am  seriously  considering  every  phase  of 
this  difficult  matter,  and  I  can  say  frankly  to  you,  and  you 
may  inform  the  Cabinet  officers  who  discuss  it  with  you, 
that  'there  won't  be  any  war  with  Mexico  if  I  can  prevent  it,' 
no  matter  how  loud  the  gentlemen  on  the  hill  yell  for  it  and 


158    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

demand  it.  It  is  not  a  difficult  thing  for  a  president  to 
declare  war,  especially  against  a  weak  and  defenceless 
nation  like  Mexico.  In  a  republic  like  ours,  the  man 
on  horseback  is  always  an  idol,  and  were  I  considering 
the  matter  from  the  standpoint  of  my  own  political 
fortunes,  and  its  influence  upon  the  result  of  the  next 
election,  I  should  at  once  grasp  this  opportunity  and  in 
vade  Mexico,  for  it  would  mean  the  triumph  of  my 
administration.  But  this  has  never  been  in  my  thoughts 
for  a  single  moment.  The  thing  that  daunts  me  and  holds 
me  back  is  the  aftermath  of  war,  with  all  its  tears  and 
tragedies.  I  came  from  the  South  and  I  know  what  war 
is,  for  I  have  seen  its  wreckage  and  terrible  ruin.  It  is 
easy  for  me  as  President  to  declare  war.  I  do  not  have 
to  fight,  and  neither  do  the  gentlemen  on  the  Hill  who  now 
clamour  for  it.  It  is  some  poor  farmer's  boy,  or  the  son  of 
some  poor  widow  away  off  in  some  modest  community, 
or  perhaps  the  scion  of  a  great  family,  who  will  have  to 
do  the  fighting  and  the  dying.  I  will  not  resort  to  war 
against  Mexico  until  I  have  exhausted  every  means 
to  keep  out  of  this  mess.  I  know  they  will  call  me  a 
coward  and  a  quitter,  but  that  will  not  disturb  me. 
Time,  the  great  solvent,  will,  I  am  sure,  vindicate  this 
policy  of  humanity  and  forbearance.  Men  forget  what  is 
back  of  this  struggle  in  Mexico.  It  is  the  age-long  struggle 
of  a  people  to  come  into  their  own,  and  while  we  look  upon 
the  incidents  in  the  foreground,  let  us  not  forget  the  tragic 
reality  in  the  background  which  towers  above  this  whole 
sad  picture.  The  gentlemen  who  criticize  me  speak  as  if 
America  were  afraid  to  fight  Mexico.  Poor  Mexico, 
with  its  pitiful  men,  women,  and  children,  fighting  to 
gain  a  foothold  in  their  own  land !  They  speak  of  the  valour 
of  America.  What  is  true  valour?  I  would  be  just  as 


MEXICO  159 

much  ashamed  to  be  rash  as  I  would  to  be  a  coward. 
Valour  is  self-respecting.  Valour  is  circumspect.  Valour 
strikes  only  when  it  is  right  to  strike.  Valour  withholds 
itself  from  all  small  implications  and  entanglements 
and  waits  for  the  great  opportunity  when  the  sword 
will  flash  as  if  it  carried  the  light  of  heaven  upon  its 
blade." 

As  the  President  spoke,  his  eyes  flashed  and  his  lips 
quivered  with  the  deep  emotion  he  felt.  It  was  the 
first  time  he  had  unburdened  himself  and  laid  bare  his  real 
feelings  toward  Mexico.  Rising  from  his  chair,  he 
walked  toward  the  window  of  his  study,  the  very  window 
out  of  which  Lincoln  had  looked  upon  the  Potomac  and 
the  hills  of  Virginia  during  the  critical  days  of  the  Civil 
War  when  he  was  receiving  bad  news  about  the  defeat  of 
the  Northern  army.  Continuing  his  talk,  he  said: 
"Tumulty,  some  day  the  people  of  America  will  know  why 
I  hesitated  to  intervene  in  Mexico.  I  cannot  tell  them 
now  for  we  are  at  peace  with  the  great  power  whose 
poisonous  propaganda  is  responsible  for  the  present 
terrible  condition  of  affairs  in  Mexico.  German  propa 
gandists  are  there  now,  fomenting  strife  and  trouble  be 
tween  our  countries.  Germany  is  anxious  to  have  us 
at  war  with  Mexico,  so  that  our  minds  and  our  energies 
will  be  taken  off  the  great  war  across  the  sea.  She 
wishes  an  uninterrupted  opportunity  to  carry  on  her 
submarine  warfare  and  believes  that  war  with  Mexico  will 
keep  our  hands  off  her  and  thus  give  her  liberty  of  action 
to  do  as  she  pleases  on  the  high  seas.  It  begins  to  look  as 
if  war  with  Germany  is  inevitable.  If  it  should  come — 
I  pray  God  it  may  not — I  do  not  wish  America's  energies 
and  forces  divided,  for  we  will  need  every  ounce  of  re 
serve  we  have  to  lick  Germany.  Tumulty,  we  must  try 


160    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

patience  a  little  longer  and  await  the  development  of  the 
whole  plot  in  Mexico." 

Did  not  the  publication  of  the  famous  Zimmerman 
note  show  that  German  intrigue  was  busy  in  Mexico? 

Berlin,  January  19,  1917. 

On  the  first  of  February  we  intend  to  begin  submarine  warfare 
unrestricted.  In  spite  of  this  it  is  our  intention  to  keep  neutral  with 
the  United  States  of  America.  If  this  attempt  is  not  successful,  we 
propose  an  alliance  with  Mexico  on  the  following  basis:  That  we 
shall  make  war  together  and  together  make  peace.  We  shall  give 
general  financial  support  and  it  is  understood  that  Mexico  is  to  re 
conquer  the  lost  territory  in  New  Mexico,  Texas  and  Arizona.  The 
details  are  left  to  you  for  settlement. 

You  are  instructed  to  inform  the  President  of  Mexico  of  the  above 
in  the  greatest  confidence  as  soon  as  it  is  certain  that  there  will  be 
an  outbreak  of  war  with  the  United  States,  and  suggest  that  the 
President  of  Mexico,  on  his  own  initiative,  should  communicate  with 
Japan,  suggesting  adherence  at  once  to  this  plan;  at  the  same  time 
offer  to  mediate  between  Germany  and  Japan. 

Please  call  to  the  attention  of  the  President  of  Mexico  that  the 
employment  of  ruthless  submarine  warfare  now  promises  to  compel 
England  to  make  peace  in  a  few  months. 

ZIMMERMAN. 
To  GERMAN  MINISTER  VON  ECKHARDT, 

Mexico  City. 

In  the  President's  Flag  Day  address,  delivered  at 
Washington  on  June  14,  1917,  appeared  the  following: 

They  [meaning  Germany]  sought  by  violence  to  destroy  our  in 
dustries  and  arrest  our  commerce.  They  tried  to  incite  Mexico  to 
take  up  arms  against  us  and  to  draw  Japan  into  an  hostile  alliance 
with  her;  and  that,  not  by  indirection,  but  by  direct  suggestion 
fr&m  the  Foreign  Office  at  Berlin. 

As  the  storm  of  ridicule  and  criticism  of  his  policy  of 
watchful  waiting  beat  fiercely  upon  him,  I  often  wondered 


MEXICO  161 

if  he  felt  the  petty  meanness  which  underlay  it,  or  was 
disturbed  or  dispirited  by  it.  As  the  unkind  blows  fell 
upon  him,  thick  and  fast  from  every  quarter,  he  gave  no 
evidence  to  those  who  were  close  to  him  of  any  irritation, 
or  of  the  deep  anger  he  must  have  felt  at  what  appeared 
to  be  a  lack  of  sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  country 
toward  the  idealistic  policy  in  the  treatment  of  Mexican 
affairs.  Never  for  a  single  moment  was  he  driven  from 
the  course  he  had  mapped  out  for  himself.  He  had  given 
his  heart  and  soul  to  a  great  humane  task  and  he  moved 
toward  its  consummation  amid  a  hurricane  of  protests 
and  criticisms. 

There  was  a  time,  however,  when  I  thought  he  dis 
played  chagrin  and  disappointment  at  the  obstacles  placed 
in  his  path  in  settling  the  affairs  of  Mexico.  It  was  in  a 
little  speech  delivered  at  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard  on  the 
occasion  of  the  burial  of  the  Marines  who  fell  at  Vera 
Cruz.  The  following  paragraph  contained  a  note  of  sad 
ness  and  even  depression.  Perhaps,  in  the  following  words, 
he  pictured  his  own  loneliness  and  utter  dejection: 

I  never  went  into  battle;  I  never  was  under  fire;  but  I  fancy  there 
are  some  things  just  as  hard  to  do  as  to  go  under  fire.  I  fancy  that 
it  is  just  as  hard  to  do  your  duty  when  men  are  sneering  at  you  as 
when  they  are  shooting  at  you.  When  they  shoot  at  you,  they  can 
only  take  your  natural  life;  when  they  sneer  at  you,  they  can  wound 
your  living  heart,  and  men  who  are  brave  enough,  steadfast  enough, 
steady  in  their  principles  enough,  to  go  about  their  duty  with  re 
gard  to  their  fellow-men,  no  matter  whether  there  are  hisses  or  cheers, 
men  who  can  do  what  Rudyard  Kipling  in  one  of  his  poems  wrote, 
"Meet  with  triumph  and  disaster  and  treat  those  two  imposters 
just  the  same,"  are  men  for  a  nation  to  be  proud  of.  Morally  speak 
ing,  disaster  and  triumph  are  imposters.  The  cheers  of  the  moment 
are  not  what  a  man  ought  to  think  about,  but  the  verdict  of  his 
conscience  and  of  the  consciences  of  mankind. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PANAMA  TOLLS 

IN  AN  introduction  to  "The  Panama  Canal  Tolls 
Controversy,"  edited  by  Hugh  Gordon  Miller  and 
Joseph  C.  Freehoff,  Mr.  Oscar  S.  Straus  wrote: 
"There  is  no  more  honourable  chapter  in  the  highly 
creditable  history  of  the  diplomacy  of  our  country  than 
the  repeal  of  the  Panama  Tolls  Act  under  the  present  ad 
ministration.  Being  a  controversy  affecting  our  inter 
national  relations,  it  is  gratifying  that,  aside  from  the 
leadership  of  the  President,  the  repeal  was  effected  not 
solely  by  the  party  in  power,  but  by  the  help  of  leaders  in 
all  three  parties,  rising  above  the  plane  of  partisan  politics 
to  the  higher  reaches  of  broad  statesmanship,  guided  by  a 
scrupulous  regard  for  our  international  character  in  ac 
cord  with  'a  decent  respect  for  the  opinions  of  mankind,' 
as  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence."  Presi 
dent  Wilson  himself,  after  the  repealing  act  had  been 
passed,  remarked,  "When  everything  else  about  this 
Administration  has  been  forgotten,  its  attitude  on  the 
Panama  Tolls  treaty  will  be  remembered  as  a  long  for 
ward  step  in  the  process  of  making  the  conduct  between 
nations  the  same  as  that  which  obtains  between  honour 
able  individuals  dealing  with  each  other,  scrupulously 
respecting  their  contracts,  no  matter  what  the  cost." 

In  making  his  recommendations  to  Congress  he,  almost 
with  high  disdain,  ignored  legal  technicalities  and  diplo 
matic  quibbles  and  took  high  moral  ground.  Said  he, 

162 


PANAMA    TOLLS  163 

"The  large  thing  to  do  is  the  only  thing  we  can  afford  to 
do,  a  voluntary  withdrawal  from  a  position  everywhere 
quoted  and  misunderstood.  We  ought  to  reverse  our  ac 
tion  without  raising  the  question  whether  we  were  right 
or  wrong,  and  so  once  more  deserve  our  reputation  for 
generosity  and  for  the  redemption  of  our  every  obligation 
without  quibble  or  hesitation." 

An  act  passed  in  1912  had  exempted  American  coast 
wise  shipping  passing  through  the  Canal  from  the  tolls 
assessed  on  other  vessels,  and  the  British  Government  had 
protested  against  this  on  the  ground  that  it  violated  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  which  had  stipulated  that 
the  Canal  should  be  open  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations  "on 
terms  of  entire  equality."  Other  nations  than  England 
had  an  interest  in  this  question,  and  there  was  a  suspicion 
that  some  of  them  were  even  more  keenly  if  not  more 
heavily  interested;  but  England  took  the  initiative,  and 
the  struggle  to  save  the  exemption  was  turned,  in  the 
United  States,  into  a  demonstration  by  the  Irish,  Ger 
mans,  and  other  anti-British  elements.  Innate  hos 
tility  to  England  and  coastwise  shipping  interests 
formed  the  backbone  of  the  opposition  to  any  repeal  of 
this  exemption,  but  the  Taft  Administration  had  held 
that  the  exemption  did  not  conflict  with  the  treaty  (on 
the  ground  that  the  words  "all  nations"  meant  all  na 
tions  except  the  United  States),  and  British  opposition 
to  the  fortification  of  the  Canal,  as  well  as  the  attitude  of 
a  section  of  the  British  press  during  the  Canadian  elec 
tions  of  1911,  had  created  a  distrust  of  British  motives 
which  was  heightened  by  the  conviction  of  many  that 
the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  had  been  a  bad  bargain. 

It  was  understood  early  in  President  Wilson's  Adminis 
tration  that  he  believed  the  exemption  was  in  violation 


164    WOODROW   WILSON   AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

of  the  treaty,  but  not  until  October  did  he  make  formal 
announcement  that  he  intended  to  ask  Congress  to  re 
peal  it.  The  question  did  not  come  into  the  foreground, 
however,  until  March  5,  1914,  when  the  President  ad 
dressed  this  request  to  Congress  in  ominous  language, 
which  to  this  day  remains  unexplained.  "No  communi 
cation  I  addressed  to  Congress,"  he  said,  "has  carried  with 
it  more  grave  and  far-reaching  implications  to  the  interests 
of  the  country."  After  expressing  his  belief  that  the 
law  as  it  stood  violated  the  treaty  and  should  be  repealed 
as  a  point  of  honour,  he  continued:  "I  ask  this  of  you 
in  support  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Administration. 
I  shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with  other  matters  of  even 
greater  delicacy  and  nearer  consequence  if  you  do  not 
grant  it  to  me  in  ungrudging  measure." 

The  first  word  I  received  that  the  President  contem 
plated  addressing  Congress,  asking  for  the  repeal  of 
Panama  Tolls,  came  about  in  this  way:  I  was  notified 
after  dinner  one  evening  that  the  President  wished  to 
confer  with  me  in  his  study.  When  I  arrived  at  the 
White  House  Mrs.  Wilson  met  me  and  informed  me  of 
the  plan  which  the  President  had  in  mind  with  reference 
to  this  matter  and  of  his  decision  to  issue  a  statement 
that  night  which  would  be  carried  in  the  newspapers 
the  following  morning,  and  of  his  determination  to  ad 
dress  Congress,  asking  for  a  repeal  of  the  Panama  Tolls. 
Mrs.  Wilson  showed  considerable  excitement  over  the 
President's  proposed  step  when  she  discussed  the  matter 
with  me  as  I  arrived  at  the  White  House.  She  said  she 
had  argued  with  the  President  and  had  tried  to  persuade 
him  that  if  he  intended  to  do  so  unusual  a  thing  that 
now  was  the  inopportune  moment  for  it  for  the  reason 
that  it  would  create  a  party  crisis  and  probably  a  split, 


PANAMA    TOLLS  165 

the  result  of  which  we  could  not  foresee.  When  I  went 
into  the  President's  study,  he  read  me  the  announcement 
he  had  prepared  for  the  papers.  The  full  significance 
and  the  possible  danger  which  lay  in  the  proposed  move 
that  the  President  was  about  to  make  struck  me  at  once. 
Frankly  I  put  the  whole  political  situation  in  the  country 
before  him  as  it  would  be  affected  by  his  attitude  in  this 
matter,  saying  to  him  that  the  stand  he  was  about  to 
take  would  irritate  large  blocks  of  Irish,  Germans,  and 
other  anti-British  elements  in  the  country,  and  that  we 
might  expect  that  the  leaders  in  our  own  party,  the  heads 
of  the  various  committees,  like  Fitzgerald  of  Appropria 
tions,  Underwood  of  the  Ways  and  Means,  and  Clark, 
the  Speaker  of  the  House,  would  be  found  in  solid  op 
position,  and  that,  at  a  time  when  we  needed  every  bit 
of  strength  to  put  our  party  programme  of  domestic  legis 
lation  into  effect,  it  seemed  to  me  unwise  to  inject  this 
matter,  which  could  only  be  a  disturbing  element,  into 
our  party's  councils.  In  discussing  the  matter  with  me, 
after  I  had  presented  the  objections  to  it,  which  I  did  with 
great  feeling  and  probably  some  irritation,  he  said: 
"I  knew  the  view  you  would  take  of  it,  but,  unfortunately, 
every  argument  you  lay  before  me  in  opposition  to  the 
programme  I  have  outlined  in  this  statement  is  purely  a 
partisan  one  and  one  whose  value  I  cannot  recognize  at 
this  time.  I  must  not  count  the  effect  of  a  move  of  this 
kind  upon  my  own  personal  political  fortunes.  I  am 
the  trustee  of  the  people  and  I  am  bound  to  take  cog 
nizance  of  the  fact  that  by  reason  of  our  attitude  on 
Panama  Tolls  our  treaties  are  discredited  in  every  chan 
cellery  of  Europe,  where  we  are  looked  upon  as  a  na 
tion  that  does  not  live  up  to  its  plighted  word.  We 
may  have  made  a  very  bad  bargain  with  England  on 


166    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Panama  Tolls,  but  it  will  be  all  the  more  credit  to  us  if 
we  stand  by  an  agreement  even  when  it  entails  a  sacrifice 
on  our  part.  The  men  who  were  parties  to  this  treaty, 
like  Joseph  Choate,  all  agree  that  we  have  been  indulg 
ing  in  hair-splitting  and  that  we  have  done  a  great  in 
justice  to  England.  I  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  afraid, 
because  of  the  antagonisms  that  will  be  created,  to  do 
my  duty  and  risk  my  political  future  if  necessary  in 
righting  a  great  wrong.  We  cannot  expect  to  hold  the 
friendship  of  the  world,  especially  of  England,  France, 
and  Japan,  if  we  are  to  treat  agreements  not  as  inviolable 
contracts,  but  as  mere  matters  of  convenience,  whose 
plain  terms  are  to  be  ignored  when  matters  of  expediency 
dictate.  I  know  that  the  Irish,  through  the  Hearst 
newspapers,  will  cry  out  that  I  have  surrendered  to  Eng 
land,  that  I  am  attempting  to  hand  over  to  Europe  a 
quasi -control  over  the  Panama  Canal.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  we  are  in  bad  by  reason  of  our  attitude  on  Panama 
Tolls  with  various  leading  nations  of  Europe,  and  some 
unforeseen  contingency  may  arise  where  it  will  be  found 
that  the  reason  for  their  withdrawal  of  friendship  for 
us  was  our  petty  attitude  in  this  matter.  I  realize,  as 
you  urge,  that  the  leaders  of  our  party  will  be  found 
in  opposition,  but  I  must  forget  this  and  try  to  work  the 
matter  out  so  that  at  least  I  shall  have  cleared  my  skirts 
and  have  done  what  is  possible  for  me  to  do  to  right  a 
great  wrong." 

When  the  President  concluded  his  statement  I  put  be 
fore  him  the  possible  reaction  against  his  administration 
and  him  personally  which  might  be  reflected  in  the  re 
turns  of  the  Congressional  elections  to  be  held  that  year. 
He  replied  by  saying:  "I  have  calculated  every  element 
in  the  situation  and  I  have  concluded  where  the  path  of 


PANAMA    TOLLS  167 

duty  lies.  If  we  begin  to  consider  the  effect  upon  our 
own  political  fortunes  of  every  step  we  take  in  these 
delicate  matters  of  our  foreign  relations,  America  will 
be  set  adrift  and  her  word  questioned  in  every  court  in 
Europe.  It  is  important  that  every  agreement  that 
America  subscribes  her  name  to  shall  be  carried  out  in 
the  spirit  of  those  who  negotiated  it." 

On  March  5,  1914,  the  President  addressed  Congress 
and  asked  for  a  repeal  of  Panama  Tolls  and  immediately 
the  fierce  fires  of  party'  opposition  began  to  burn.  His 
party  leaders  expressed  their  opposition  to  the  repeal 
in  open,  honourable,  and  vigorous  fashion  and  the  fight 
was  on.  Now  that  the  leading  Democrats  in  the  Senate 
and  House  had  left  us,  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  reorganize 
our  forces  at  once.  This  task  devolved  upon  me  and  I 
immediately  got  in  touch  with  younger  men  of  the 
House,  like  Mitchell  Palmer,  Judge  Covington,  and  that 
sturdy  Republican  from  Minnesota,  Pred  Stevens,  and 
over  night  we  had  a  militant  organization  in  the  trenches, 
prepared  to  meet  the  onslaught  of  our  enemies. 

The  President  was  adamant  under  the  bitterest  criti 
cism.  His  attitude  brought  down  on  him  a  shower  of 
personal  abuse  and  vituperation  from  Irish  organs  and 
from  a  group  of  newspapers  which  presently  were  to  appear 
as  the  chief  supporters  of  Germany.  The  arguments 
against  the  repeal  were  unusually  bitter,  and  even  though 
Elihu  Root,  leading  Republican  senator,  in  a  brilliant  and 
effective  speech  took  his  stand  by  the  President  and 
against  the  recent  Republican  Administration,  partisan 
criticism  seized  upon  the  opening.  Nevertheless,  the  tolls 
exemption  was  repealed  in  June  and  the  events  of  July 
and  August,  1914,  and  especially  after  Von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  stood  up  in  the  German  Reichstag  and  character- 


168    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

ized  the  treaty  between  Germany  and  Belgium  as  a  mere 
scrap  of  paper,  gave  a  certain  satisfaction  to  those  who 
stood  by  the  President  for  the  sanctity  of  treaties. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  then  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  commenting  upon  the  action  in  the  House  of 
Commons  said:  "It  has  not  been  done  to  please  us,  or  in 
the  interest  of  good  relations,  but  I  believe  from  a  much 
greater  motive — the  feeling  that  a  government  which  is 
to  use  its  influence  among  nations  to  make  relations  better 
must  never,  when  the  occasion  arises,  flinch  or  quail  from 
interpreting  treaty  rights  in  a  strictly  fair  spirit." 


CHAPTER  XXII 

REFORMING  THE  CURRENCY 

I  HAVE  bitterly  resented  at  times  the  imputation  and 
charge  that  Woodrow  Wilson  is  so  egotistical,  self- 
willed,  and  so  wedded  to  his  own  ideas  that  he  not 
only  does  not  invite  suggestion  from  the  outside  but  that 
he  resents  it  and  refuses  to  be  guided  by  it. 

I  feel  that  my  daily  intimacy  with  him  for  eleven  years 
gives  me  the  right  to  speak  frankly  in  the  matter.  Of 
course,  like  every  great  man,  he  is  firmly  set  in  his  opin 
ions.  He  holds  and  cleaves  to  them  with  a  passionate 
devotion  and  tenacity  but  only  after  the  fullest  con 
sideration  of  all  the  facts  and  information  upon  which 
he  bases  a  final  conviction.  Time  and  again  I  have  seen 
him  gallantly  retreat  under  the  fire  of  a  better  argument 
in  a  matter  that  he  had  been  previously  disposed  to  favour. 

And  what  of  his  attitude  toward  those  who  came  to 
the  Executive  offices  to  argue  with  him  on  some  vital 
matter  in  which  he  had  formed  what  appeared  to  be  an 
unalterable  judgment?  Never  did  he  assume  the  un 
friendly  or  unyielding  attitude  of  the  doctrinaire  or  the 
man  of  a  single  idea.  I  recall  a  case  in  point.  He  was 
discussing  the  revenue  situation  with  Representative 
Claude  Kitchin  of  North  Carolina,  at  a  time  when  it  was 
the  subject  of  bitter  controversy  in  the  ranks  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party.  The  President  and  Mr.  Kitchin  held 
radically  divergent  views  on  this  matter;  the  President 
sought  to  lead  the  party  in  one  direction  and  Mr.  Kitchin 


170    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

openly  pursued  an  opposite  course.  I  was  present  at  this 
conference.  No  warm  friendship  existed  between  these 
two  men;  but  there  was  never  any  evidence  of  hostility  in 
the  President's  attitude  toward  Mr.  Kitchin.  He  listened 
politely  and  with  patience  to  every  argument  that  Mr. 
Kitchin  vigorously  put  forward  to  sustain  his  contention 
in  the  matter,  and  took  without  wincing  the  sledge 
hammer  blows  often  dealt  by  Mr.  Kitchin.  The  Presi 
dent  replied  to  Mr.  Kitchin's  arguments  in  an  open,  frank 
manner  and  invited  him  to  the  fullest  possible  discussion 
of  the  matter. 

I  recall  the  conclusion  of  this  interview,  when  it  seemed 
that,  having  driven  the  President  from  point  to  point, 
Mr.  Kitchin  was  the  victor.  There  was  no  disappoint 
ment  or  chagrin  evident  in  the  President's  manner  as 
he  faced  Mr.  Kitchin  to  accept  his  defeat.  He  met  it 
in  true  sportsmanlike  fashion.  At  the  conclusion  of 
Mr.  Kitchin's  argument  the  President  literally  threw 
up  his  hands  and  said,  quietly,  without  showing  a  trace 
of  disappointment:  "I  surrender,  Mr.  Kitchin.  You 
have  beaten  me.  I  shall  inform  my  friends  on  the  Hill 
that  I  was  mistaken  and  shall  instruct  them,  of  course, 
to  follow  you  in  this  matter." 

I  could  crowd  this  chapter  with  similar  incidents,  but  it 
would  be  a  work  of  supererogation. 

Never  before  was  Mr.  Wilson's  open-minded  desire 
to  apply  in  practice  the  principle  of  common  counsel 
better  illustrated  than  in  his  handling  of  the  important 
work  in  connection  with  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Act,  the  keystone  of  the  great  arch  of  the  Demo 
cratic  Administration.  It  was  the  first  item  in  his  pro 
gramme  to  set  business  free  in  America  and  to  establish  it 
upon  a  firm  and  permanent  basis.  He  aptly  said  to  me, 


REFORMING    THE    CURRENCY  171 

when  he  first  discussed  the  basic  reason  for  the  legislation, 
he  wished  not  only  to  set  business  free  in  America,  but 
he  desired  also  to  take  away  from  certain  financial  in 
terests  in  the  country  the  power  they  had  unjustly  exer 
cised  of  "hazing"  the  Democratic  party  at  every  Presi 
dential  election. 

Shortly  after  the  Presidential  election  in  1912,  while 
he  was  burdened  with  the  responsibilities  of  the  Execu 
tive  office  at  Trenton,  New  Jersey,  he  began,  in  col 
laboration  with  that  fine,  able,  resourceful  Virginian, 
Representative  Carter  Glass,  then  chairman  of  the  Bank 
ing  and  Currency  Committee  of  the  House,  the  prepara 
tion  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Banking  and  Currency  Act. 
For  hours  at  the  Executive  office  in  Trenton  the  Virginia 
Congressman  conferred  with  the  Governor  of  New  Jersey 
over  the  preliminary  drafts  of  this  most  vital  piece  of 
legislation.  For  days  the  work  of  preparation  was  car 
ried  on,  so  that  when  Mr.  Wilson  arrived  in  Washington 
to  take  up  the  duties  of  the  Presidency,  the  Banking 
and  Currency  Bill  was  in  shape  and  ready  for  immediate 
introduction  in  the  Senate  and  House. 

Looking  back  over  the  struggle  that  ensued  from  the 
time  this  measure  was  introduced  into  the  Senate  and 
House,  I  often  wonder  if  the  people  "back  home,"  es 
pecially  the  various  business  interests  of  the  country, 
who  have  been  saved  from  financial  disaster  by  this 
admirable  and  wholesome  piece  of  legislation,  ever  realized 
the  painstaking  labour  and  industry,  night  and  day,  which 
Woodrow  Wilson,  in  addition  to  his  other  multitudinous 
duties,  put  upon  this  task.  Could  they  but  understand 
the  character  of  the  opposition  he  faced  even  in  his  own 
party  ranks,  and  how  in  the  midst  of  one  of  Washington's 
most  trying  summers,  without  vacation  or  recreation  of 


172    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

any  kind,  he  grappled  with  this  problem  in  the  face  of  stub 
born  opposition,  they  would,  perhaps,  be  willing  to  pay 
tribute  to  the  earnestness  and  sincerity  of  this  man  who 
finally  placed  upon  the  statute  books  one  of  the  greatest 
constructive  pieces  of  legislation  of  half  a  century.  Having 
given  his  heart  to  this  important  task,  whose  enactment 
into  law  was  a  boon  to  business  and  established  for  the 
first  time  in  America  a  "Democracy  of  Credit,"  as  he  was 
pleased  to  call  it,  he  relentlessly  pursued  his  object  until 
senators  and  representatives  yielded  to  his  insistent  re 
quest  for  the  enactment  of  this  law,  not  under  the  stress 
of  the  party  whip,  but  through  arguments  which  he  pas 
sionately  presented  to  those  who  sought  his  counsel  in 
this  matter. 

During  this  time  I  gladly  accepted  the  President's 
invitation  to  spend  the  summer  with  him  at  the  White 
House,  where  I  occupied  the  bedroom  that  had  been 
used  as  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet  Room,  and  where  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  signed  his  famous  Emancipation  Procla 
mation.  My  presence,  during  that  summer,  as  a  member 
of  the  President's  family,  gave  me  a  good  opportunity 
to  see  him  in  action  in  his  conferences  in  regard  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act.  Never  was  greater  patience,  for 
bearance,  or  fortitude,  shown  by  a  chief  executive  under 
such  trying  circumstances.  Day  after  day,  when  it 
seemed  as  if  real  progress  was  being  made,  unexpected 
opposition  would  develop  and  make  it  necessary  to  re 
build  bur  shattered  lines,  until  finally  the  bill  was  out  of 
the  House  and  on  its  way  to  the  Senate. 

Its  arrival  in  the  Senate  was  but  the  beginning  of  what 
appeared  an  almost  interminable  struggle.  The  Presi 
dent's  stalwart  adviser  in  the  Treasury,  Mr.  McAdoo, 
was  always  at  hand  to  rally  and  give  encouragement 


REFORMING   THE    CURRENCY  173 

to  our  forces,  many  of  whom  at  times  were  in  despair  over 
the  prospects  of  the  bill.  The  leaders  of  the  opposition 
on  the  committee  were  Senator  Root  on  the  Republican 
side  and  Senators  O'Gorman  and  Reed  on  the  Democratic. 

It  seemed  at  times  as  if  they  had  succeeded  in  blocking 
an  agreement  on  the  Conference  Report.  At  last  word 
was  brought  to  the  President  by  Representative  Glass 
that  the  opposition  of  these  gentlemen  might  succeed 
in  killing  the  bill.  The  President  up  to  this  time,  although 
fighting  against  great  odds,  showed  no  impatience  or 
petulancy,  but  the  message  brought  by  Mr.  Glass  was  the 
last  straw.  Looking  at  Mr.  Glass,  with  a  show  of  fire 
and  in  a  voice  that  indicated  the  impatience  he  felt,  the 
President  said:  "Glass,  have  you  got  the  votes  in  the 
committee  to  override  these  gentlemen  [meaning  O'Gor 
man  and  Reed]?"  Glass  replied  that  he  had.  "Then," 
said  the  President,  "outvote  them,  damn  them,  outvote 
them!" 

Mr.McAdoo  came  to  the  White  House  a  few  days  later 
to  make  a  report  about  the  situation  in  the  Senate,  with 
reference  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  His  report  was 
most  discouraging  as  to  the  final  passage  of  the  bill. 
He  said  that  his  information  from  the  Hill  was  that  the 
leaders  of  the  opposition  in  the  Senate  were  bent  upon 
a  filibuster  and  that  the  probabilities  were  that  the  Senate 
would  finally  adjourn  without  any  action  being  taken 
on  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 

This  conversation  took  place  on  the  White  House 
portico,  which  overlooks  the  beautiful  Potomac  and  the 
hills  of  Virginia.  It  was  one  of  the  hottest  days  in  June, 
a  day  which  left  all  of  us  who  were  about  the  President 
low  in  spirit.  Only  those  who  know  the  depressing  char 
acter  of  Washington's  midsummer  heat  can  understand 


174    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  full  significance  of  this  statement.  The  President 
on  this  occasion  was  seated  in  an  old-fashioned  rocker, 
attired  in  a  comfortable,  cool -looking  Palm  Beach  suit. 
Mr.  McAdoo  reported  the  situation  in  detail  and  said 
that,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  hopeless  to  try  to  do  more  with 
the  bill:  that  an  impasse  had  been  reached  between  the 
Senate  and  the  House.  The  President  quickly  inter 
rupted  Mr.  McAdoo,  saying,  with  a  smile:  "Mac,  when 
the  boys  at  Princeton  came  to  me  and  told  me  they  were 
going  to  lose  a  football  game,  they  always  lost.  We 
must  not  lose  this  game;  too  much  is  involved.  Please 
say  to  the  gentlemen  on  the  Hill  who  urge  a  postponement 
of  this  matter  that  Washington  weather,  especially  in 
these  days,  fully  agrees  with  me  and  that  unless  final 
action  is  taken  on  this  measure  at  this  session  I  will 
immediately  call  Congress  in  extraordinary  session  to 
act  upon  this  matter."  This  challenge,  brought  to  the 
Hill  by  Mr.  McAdoo,  quickly  did  the  job  and  the  bill  was 
soon  on  its  way  to  the  White  House. 

Mr.  Wilson  conducted  the  conferences  in  this  matter 
with  friends  and  foes  alike  with  a  quiet  mastery  and  good 
temper  diametrically  contrary  to  the  reports  sedulously 
circulated  for  political  purposes,  that  he  was  autocratic 
and  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  members  of  the  Senate 
and  House  in  an  effort  to  pass  legislation  in  which  the 
whole  country  was  interested. 

We  have  only  to  recall  the  previous  attempts  made  by 
former  administrations  to  legislate  upon  the  currency 
question,  especially  the  efforts  of  the  Harrison  and 
Cleveland  administrations,  to  understand  and  appreci 
ate  the  difficulties  that  lay  in  the  path  of  Woodrow 
Wilson  in  his  efforts  to  free  the  credit  of  the  country  from 
selfish  control  and  to  push  this  vital  legislation  to  enact- 


REFORMING    THE    CURRENCY  175 

ment.  Previous  attempts  had  always  resulted  in  failure 
and  sometimes  in  disaster  to  the  administrations  in  control 
at  the  time.  The  only  evidences  of  these  frequent  but 
abortive  efforts  to  pass  currency  legislation  were  large  and 
bulky  volumes  containing  the  hearings  of  the  expensive 
Monetary  Commission  that  had  been  set  up  by  Senator 
Aldrich  of  Rhode  Island.  As  an  historian  and  man  of 
affairs,  Woodrow  Wilson  realized  the  difficulties  and 
obstacles  that  lay  in  his  path  in  attempting  to  reform  the 
currency,  but  he  was  not  in  the  least  daunted  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  task  which  confronted  him.  He  moved 
cautiously  forward  and  pressed  for  early  action  at  the 
first  session  of  the  Congress  following  his  inauguration. 
He  realized  that  with  the  passage  of  the  tariff  legislation, 
which  always  acts  as  a  business  depressant,  it  was  neces 
sary  at  the  same  time  to  have  the  stimulus  the  Currency 
Bill  would  afford  when  enacted  into  law.  The  split  of 
'96  in  the  Democratic  ranks  over  the  money  question  was 
an  additional  reason  for  cautious  and  well-considered 
action  if  the  Federal  Reserve  Bill  was  to  become  a  reality. 

The  presence  of  Mr.  Bryan  in  the  Cabinet  and  his  well- 
known  views  on  this  question  were  strong  reasons  for 
watchful  and  careful  prevision.  It  was  obvious  to  Mr. 
Wilson  from  the  outset  that  insurmountable  difficulties 
lay  in  his  path,  but  he  brushed  them  aside  as  if  they  were 
inconsequential. 

In  the  Committee  on  Banking  and  Currency,  in  both 
the  Senate  and  House,  were  many  ardent  and  devoted 
friends  of  Mr.  Bryan,  who  thought  that  his  radical  views 
on  the  money  question  could  be  used  as  a  rallying  point 
for  opposition  to  the  President's  plan  for  currency  reform. 
But  those  who  counted  on  Mr.  Bryan's  antagonism  were 
doomed  to  disappointment  and  failure,  for  while  it  is 


176    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

true  that  Mr.  Bryan  found  serious  objections  to  certain 
parts  of  the  bill,  when  these  were  eliminated  he  moved 
forward  with  the  President  in  the  most  generous  fashion 
and  remained  with  him  until  the  Federal  Reserve  Act 
was  made  part  of  the  law  of  the  land. 

It  was  in  a  conference  with  members  of  the  Banking  and 
Currency  Committee  that  I  first  saw  the  President  in 
action  with  the  gentlemen  of  the  Senate  and  House.  He 
had  invited  the  Democratic  members  of  the  Banking 
and  Currency  Committee  to  confer  with  him  in  the 
Cabinet  Room  in  the  White  House  offices.  From  my 
desk  in  an  ante-room  I  heard  all  the  discussions  of  the 
bill.  There  was  full,  open  discussion  of  the  bill  in  all 
its  phases  at  this  conference  in  which  were  collected  the 
conservatives  of  the  East,  the  radicalists  of  the  West, 
and  those  who  came  to  be  known  as  the  "corn  tassel" 
representatives  of  the  South,  all  holding  widely  diver 
gent  views  and  representing  every  shade  of  opinion,  some 
of  it  sharply  antagonistic  to  the  President's  views.  Some 
of  the  members  were  openly  hostile  to  the  President, 
even  in  a  personal  way,  particularly  one  representative 
from  the  South,  and  some  of  the  questions  addressed 
to  the  President  were  ungracious  to  the  verge  of  open 
insult.  It  was  an  exasperating  experience,  but  Mr. 
Wilson  stood  the  test  with  patience,  betraying  no  resent 
ment  to  impertinent  questions,  replying  to  every  query 
with  Chesterfieldian  grace  and  affability,  parrying  every 
blow  with  courtesy  and  gentleness,  gallantly  ignoring 
the  unfriendly  tone  and  manifest  unfairness  of  some  of  the 
questions,  keeping  himself  strictly  to  the  merits  of  the 
discussion,  subordinating  his  personal  feelings  to  the  im 
portant  public  business  under  consideration,  until  all  his 
interrogators  were  convinced  of  his  sincerity  and  fair- 


REFORMING   THE    CURRENCY  177 

mindedness  and  some  were  ashamed  of  their  own  un 
gracious  bearing. 

It  was  clear  to  me  as  I  watched  this  great  man  in 
action  on  this  trying  occasion  that  in  the  cause  he  was 
defending  he  saw,  with  a  vision  unimpaired  and  a  judg 
ment  unclouded  by  prejudice  or  prepossessions,  far  be 
yond  the  little  room  in  which  he  was  conferring.  He 
saw  the  varied  and  pressing  needs  of  a  great  nation 
labouring  now  under  a  currency  system  that  held  its 
resources  as  if  in  a  strait -jacket.  He  saw  in  the  old 
monetary  system  which  had  prevailed  in  the  country 
for  many  years  a  prolific  breeder  of  panic  and  financial 
distress.  He  saw  the  farmer  of  the  West  and  South  a 
plaything  of  Eastern  financial  interests.  And  thus,  under 
the  leadership  of  Woodrow  Wilson  was  begun  the  first 
skirmish  in  the  great  battle  to  free  the  credit  of  the  coun 
try  from  selfish  control,  a  movement  which  led  to  the 
establishment  of  a  financial  system  that  ended  for  all 
time  the  danger  or  possibility  of  financial  panic. 

There  was  an  interesting  incident  in  connection  with  the 
handling  of  the  currency  legislation  that  brought  about 
what  threatened  to  be  the  first  rift  in  the  President's 
Cabinet.  It  concerned  Mr.  Bryan's  attitude  of  opposition 
to  certain  features  of  the  bill  as  drafted  by  the  Banking 
and  Currency  Committee  of  the  House.  My  connection 
with  this  particular  affair  arose  in  this  way:  In  the  early 
stages  of  the  discussion  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  and 
while  Mr.  Glass's  committee  was  considering  the  matter, 
a  messenger  from  the  White  House  informed  me  that  the 
President  wished  to  confer  with  me  in  his  study.  As  I 
walked  into  the  room,  I  saw  at  once  from  his  general 
attitude  and  expression  that  something  serious  was  afoot 
and  that  he  was  very  much  distressed.  Turning  around 


178    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

in  his  chair  he  said:  "It  begins  to  look  as  if  W.  J.  B.  [he 
thus  referred  to  Mr.  Bryan]  and  I  have  come  to  the  parting 
of  the  ways  on  the  Currency  Bill.  He  is  opposed  to  the 
bank-note  feature  of  the  bill  as  drawn.  We  had  a  long 
discussion  about  the  matter  after  Cabinet  meeting  to-day. 
In  thoroughly  kindly  way  Mr.  Bryan  informed  me  that 
he  was  opposed  to  that  feature  of  the  bill.  Of  course,  you 
know,  W.  J.  B.  and  I  have  never  been  in  agreement  on  the 
money  question.  It  is  only  fair,  however,  to  say  that  in 
our  discussion  Mr.  Bryan  conducted  himself  in  the  most 
generous  way,  and  I  was  deeply  touched  by  his  personal 
attitude  of  friendliness  toward  me.  He  even  went  so  far 
as  to  say  that  in  order  that  I  might  not  be  embarrassed  in 
the  handling  of  the  bill,  he  was  willing  to  resign  and  leave 
the  country  and  make  no  public  criticism  of  the  measure. 
In  the  meantime,  Mr.  Bryan  has  promised  to  say  nothing 
to  any  one  about  the  matter  until  he  has  a  further  dis 
cussion  with  me." 

The  President  then  frankly  discussed  with  me  the  effect 
of  the  possible  resignation  of  Mr.  Bryan.  The  President 
suggested  that  I  drop  in  on  Mr.  Bryan  very  soon  and  if 
possible  casually  invite  a  discussion  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Act,  telling  Mr.  Bryan  of  his  [the  President's]  interests 
in  it,  and  how  much  he  appreciated  Mr.  Bryan's  personal 
attitude  toward  him. 

I  realized  the  seriousness  and  delicacy  of  the  situation 
I  was  asked  to  handle,  and,  being  on  the  friendliest  terms 
with  Mr.  Bryan,  I  telephoned  him  and  invited  myself  to 
his  home — the  old  Logan  Mansion,  a  beautiful  place  in 
the  northwest  part  of  Washington.  I  found  Mr.  Bryan 
alone  when  I  arrived.  We  went  at  once  to  his  library 
and,  in  a  boyish  way,  he  showed  me  a  picture  -which  the 
President  had  autographed  for  him  only  a  few  days  previ- 


REFORMING   THE    CURRENCY  179 

ous.  As  we  stood  before  this  picture  Mr.  Bryan  gave 
expression  to  his  sincere  admiration  and  affection  for  the 
President.  He  related,  with  deep  feeling,  how  much  Mr. 
Bryan  had  enjoyed  his  contact  and  official  companionship 
with  him  and  how  he  had  come  to  have  a  very  deep  affec 
tion  for  him.  As  we  turned  away  from  the  picture,  he 
grew  serious  and  began  the  discussion  of  the  very  thing  the 
President  and  I  had  conferred  on  only  a  few  hours  before. 
He  freely  discussed  his  differences  with  the  President 
over  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  and  asked  me  the  direct 
question:  "Who  from  Wall  Street  has  been  discussing 
this  bill  with  the  President?  I  am  afraid  that  some  of  the 
President's  friends  have  been  emphasizing  too  much  the 
view  of  Wall  Street  in  their  conferences  with  the  President 
on  this  bill."  I  frankly  told  Mr.  Bryan  that  this  imputa 
tion  did  a  great  injustice  to  the  fine  men  with  whom  the 
President  conferred  on  the  matter  of  banking  reform  and 
that  I  was  certain  that  the  President's  only  intimate 
advisers  in  this  matter  were  Mr.  McAdoo,  Senator  Owen 
of  Oklahoma,  and  Mr.  Glass  of  Virginia,  and  that  I 
personally  knew  that  in  their  discussions  the  President 
never  argued  the  point  of  view  of  the  Eastern  financial 
interests.  Mr.  Bryan  was  reassured  by  my  statement 
and  proceeded  to  lay  before  me  his  objections  to  the 
character  of  the  currency  issue  provided  for  in  the  bill. 
He  then  took  from  the  library  shelves  a  volume  con 
taining  all  the  Democratic  National  platforms  and  read 
excerpts  from  them  bearing  upon  the  question  of  currency 
reform.  He  soon  convinced  me  that  there  was  great 
merit  in  his  contention.  Before  leaving  him,  I  told  him 
of  my  interview  with  the  President  and  how  deeply  dis 
tressed  he  [the  President]  was  that  Mr.  Bryan  was  not 
disposed  to  support  him  in  the  matter  of  the  Federal 


180    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Reserve  Act.  It  was  evident  that  Mr.  Bryan  felt  a  keen 
sympathy  for  the  President  and  that  he  was  honestly  try 
ing  to  find  a  way  out  of  his  difficulties  that  would  enable 
him  to  give  the  President  his  whole-hearted  support. 
He  showed  real  emotion  when  I  disclosed  to  him  the 
personal  feelings  of  the  President  toward  him,  and  I  feel 
sure  I  left  him  in  a  more  agreeable  frame  of  mind.  I  told 
him  that  I  would  talk  with  the  President,  Mr.  McAdoo, 
and  Mr.  Glass  and  report  to  him  on  the  following 
day. 

I  returned  to  the  President's  study  and  reported  to  him 
in  detail  the  results  of  my  conference  with  Mr.  Bryan.  I 
called  his  attention  to  Mr.  Bryan's  criticism  of  the  bill 
and  then  ventured  the  opinion  that  Mr.  Bryan,  according 
to  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Democratic  party,  was 
right  in  his  attitude  and  that  I  felt  that  he  [Mr.  Wilson] 
was  wrong.  For  a  moment  the  President  showed  a  little 
impatience  with  this  statement  and  asked  me  to  point  out 
to  him  where  the  party  in  the  National  platforms  had 
ever  taken  the  view  Mr.  Bryan  indicated  in  his  discussion 
with  me.  I  then  showed  him  the  book  Mr.  Bryan  had 
given  me,  containing  the  Democratic  platforms,  and  he 
read  very  carefully  plank  after  plank  on  the  currency. 
He  finally  closed  the  book,  placed  it  on  his  desk,  and 
said:  "I  am  convinced  there  is  a  great  deal  in  what  Mr. 
Bryan  says."  We  then  discussed  ways  of  adjusting  the 
matter.  I  finally  suggested  that  the  President  allow 
me  to  talk  with  Mr.  Glass  and  place  before  him  Mr. 
Bryan's  position  and  that  he  have  Mr.  Glass  confer  with 
Secretary  McAdoo  and  Senator  Owen.  This  was  ar 
ranged.  I  had  no  way  of  ascertaining  just"  what  took 
place  at  this  conference,  but  after  the  Cabinet  meeting 
on  the  following  Tuesday  Mr.  Bryan  walked  around  to 


REFORMING    THE    CURRENCY  181 

where  the  President  was  sitting,  and  said  to  him:  "Mr. 
President,  we  have  settled  our  differences  and  you  may 
rely  upon  me  to  remain  with  you  to  the  end  of  the  fight." 
The  President  thanked  him  cordially,  and  thus  the  first 
break  in  the  Cabinet  line  was  averted. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

RENOMINATED 

AS  THE  days  of  the  1916  Convention  at  St.  Louis  ap- 
A\  proached,  it  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  there 
would  be  no  serious  contender  against  the  Presi 
dent  for  the  nomination  and  that  he  would  win  the  prize 
by  a  practically  unanimous  vote.  While  at  times  the 
friends  of  Mr.  Bryan  and  Mr.  Clark  were  hopeful  that  the 
President  might  withdraw  from  the  contest,  after  the 
Democrats  at  the  Convention  were  assured  that  the  Presi 
dent  was  ready  to  accept  a  renomination,  the  field  was 
made  clear  for  the  setting  of  the  Convention  stage  to 
accomplish  that  end. 

It  was  thought  that  the  St.  Louis  Convention  would  be 
a  trite  affair;  that  there  would  be  no  enthusiasm  in  it. 
This  anticipation  arose  from  the  idea  expressed  by  many 
of  the  devoted  friends  of  the  Democratic  party,  that  the 
cause  of  Democracy  in  1916  was  little  less  than  hope 
less.  Much  of  this  feeling  came  from  the  inordinately 
high  estimate  which  many  placed  upon  Mr.  Justice 
Hughes  both  as  a  candidate  and  as  a  campaigner.  Indeed, 
many  Democrats  who  had  canvassed  the  national  situ 
ation  felt  that  without  a  continuation  of  the  split  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Republican  party  the  road  to  Democratic 
success  was  indeed  a  hard  and  difficult  one  to  travel. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  country 
Mr.  Justice  Hughes  was  the  strongest  man  the  Republi 
cans  could  put  forward.  The  fact  that  he  was  resigning 
from  the  Supreme  Court  bench  and  that  he  had  a  remark- 

182 


RENOMINATED  183 

ably  progressive  record  as  Governor  of  New  York  added 
a  glamour  and  prestige  to  this  nomination.  I,  myself, 
never  lost  confidence,  however,  in  our  ability  to  win.  The 
Congressional  elections  of  1914,  when  the  Democratic 
majority  in  the  House  was  reduced  to  thirty-five,  had 
dispirited  Democratic  friends  throughout  the  country 
and  made  them  feel  that  the  nomination  at  St.  Louis 
would  be  a  purely  formal  matter  and  without  fruitful 
results. 

In  a  letter  addressed  to  Colonel  Harvey  in  1914  I  had 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  reduced  Democratic 
majority  in  the  Congressional  elections  of  1914,  which 
was  being  construed  as  an  apparent  defeat  of  the  party, 
was  not  a  final  judgment  upon  the  work  of  the  President 
and  the  achievements  of  his  administration;  that  it  was 
not  a  reversal  irretrievable  in  character;  that  it  should 
not  depress  the  Democratic  workers  throughout  the 
country,  and  that  the  field  of  conquest  for  the  Democratic 
party  in  1916  was  the  West  and  the  Pacific  coast.  A  calm 
analysis  of  the  election  results  in  1914  convinced  me  that 
if  the  Presidential  election  of  1916  was  to  be  won,  our 
efforts  for  victory  had  to  be  concentrated  upon  a  culti 
vation  of  sentiment  throughout  the  West  in  favour  of  the 
Democratic  cause. 

My  letter  to  Colonel  Harvey  is  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

November  7,  1914. 
DEAR  COLONEL  HARVEY: 

Now  that  the  clouds  have  cleared  away,  let  me  send  you  just  a 
line  or  two  expressing  an  opinion  of  last  Tuesday's  election. 

It  is  my  feeling  that  we  are  making  unmistakable  gains  in  sections 
of  the  country  where  Democratic  hopes  never  ran  high  before  this 
time.  Note  the  results  in  the  states  of  Utah,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 


184    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Wisconsin,  South  Dakota,  North  Dakota,  Washington  and  California. 
It  now  appears  from  the  returns,  regardless  of  what  the  Eastern 
papers  may  say,  that  our  majority  in  the  House  will  be  approxi 
mately  from  thirty-five  to  forty;  that  our  majority  in  the  Senate 
will  be  sixteen. 

We  have  elected  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  Democratic 
party,  so  far  as  I  can  recall,  Democratic  Senators  in  the  great  Re 
publican  States  of  California,  Wisconsin  and  South  Dakota.  The 
gains  we  have  made  in  the  West,  along  the  Pacific  coast,  are  mighty 
interesting  and  show  a  new  field  of  conquest  for  the  Democratic 
party  in  1916.  To  elect  a  congress,  retaining  a  majority  of  the  party 
in  power,  after  a  revision  of  the  tariff,  is  unprecedented.  Once  be 
fore  it  happened,  in  1897,  after  the  passage  of  the  Dingley  Tariff  Act 
when  the  Republican  majority  was  reduced  from  47  to  10.  We  are 
not  in  the  least  bit  disturbed  by  the  situation.  We  have  for  the 
first  time  elected  Democratic  Congressmen  from  the  states  of  Utah, 
Washington,  South  Dakota  and  North  Dakota. 

With  best  wishes,  I  am, 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

J.  P.  TUMULTY, 
Secretary  to  the  President. 
COLONEL  GEORGE  HARVEY, 
Hotel  Chamberlain, 

Old  Point  Comfort,  Virginia. 

While  the  Democratic  Convention  was  in  session  at 
St.  Louis  the  President  remained  in  the  White  House, 
keeping  in  close  touch  by  direct  telephonic  communi 
cation  with  affairs  there. 

What  at  first  appeared  to  be  an  ordinary  and  rather 
spiritless  convention  was  quickly  turned  into  a  most 
enthusiastic  and  fervent  one  by  the  notable  speeches  of 
Governor  Glynn,  of  New  York,  the  temporary  chairman 
of  the  Convention,  and  Senator  Ollie  M.  James,  of 
Kentucky,  the  permanent  chairman. 

The  key-note  speech   delivered   by   Governor   Glynn, 


RENOMINATED  185 

contained  this  ringing  defense  of  the  President's  policy  of 
neutrality:  .-f 

"This  policy  may  not  satisfy  those  who  revel  in  destruction  and 
find  pleasure  in  despair.  It  may  not  satisfy  the  fire-eater  or  the 
swashbuckler  but  it  does  satisfy  those  who  worship  at  the  altar  of 
the  god  of  peace.  It  does  satisfy  the  mothers  of  the  land  at  whose 
hearth  and  fireside  no  jingoistic  war  has  placed  an  empty  chair.  It 
does  satisfy  the  daughters  of  the  land  from  whom  bluster  and  brag 
have  sent  no  loving  brother  to  the  dissolution  of  the  grave.  It  does 
satisfy  the  fathers  of  this  land  and  the  sons  of  this  land  who  will 
fight  for  our  flag,  and  die  for  our  flag  when  Reason  primes  the  rifle, 
when  Honor  draws  the  sword,  when  Justice  breathes  a  blessing  on  the 
standards  they  uphold." 

And  Senator  James  in  a  masterly  oration  paid  this 
splendid  tribute  to  Woodrow  Wilson: 

"Four  years  ago  they  sneeringly  called  Woodrow  Wilson  the  school 
teacher;  then  his  classes  were  assembled  within  the  narrow  walls  of 
Princeton  College.  They  were  the  young  men  of  America.  To-day 
he  is  the  world  teacher,  his  class  is  made  up  of  kings,  kaisers,  czars, 
princes,  and  potentates.  The  confines  of  the  schoolroom  circle  the 
world.  His  subject  is  the  protection  of  American  life  and  American 
rights  under  international  law.  The  saving  of  neutral  life,  the  free 
dom  of  the  seas,  and  without  orphaning  a  single  American  child, 
without  widowing  a  single  American  mother,  without  firing  a  single 
gun,  without  the  shedding  of  a  single  drop  of  blood,  he  has  wrung  from 
the  most  militant  spirit  that  ever  brooded  above  a  battlefield  an 
acknowledgment  of  American  rights  and  an  agreement  to  American 
demands." 

These  eloquent  utterances  prepared  the  way  for  the  great 
slogan  of  the  1916  campaign:  "He  kept  us  out  of  war." 

The  President  himself  never  used  that  slogan,  however. 
From  the  first  declaration  of  hostilities  in  Europe  he 
realized  the  precarious  position  of  the  United  States  and 
the  possibility  that,  whether  we  would  or  not,  we  might  be 


186    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

swept  into  the  conflict.  As  early  as  August,  1914,  he  ex 
pressed  his  anxious  apprehension  that  "something  might 
occur  on  the  high  seas  which  would  make  our  neutrality 
impossible."  He  emphatically  believed  at  that  time  that 
America's  neutrality  would  best  serve  the  interests  of  the 
world;  he  respected  the  American  tradition  of  non 
interference  in  European  quarrels;  with  his  almost  mystic 
ability  to  assess  and  understand  the  opinion  of  the  people 
of  the  country  at  large  he  knew  that  the  American  people 
did  not  want  war;  in  his  comparative  seclusion  he  read  the 
mind  of  America  clearer  than  did  the  "mixers"  of  the 
Pullman  smoking  compartments  who  mistook  the  clamour 
for  intervention  among  certain  classes  along  the  north 
Atlantic  seaboard  for  the  voice  of  America  at  large;  while 
the  German  rape  of  Belgium  stirred  his  passionate  in 
dignation,  he  knew  that  there  was  no  practical  means  by 
which  the  United  States  could  stop  it,  that  we  could  not 
immediately  transport  armies  to  the  theatre  of  war,  and 
that  public  opinion,  especially  in  the  West  and  South,  was 
not  prepared  for  active  intervention;  and  in  addition  to 
all  this  he  was  genuinely,  not  merely  professedly,  a 
passionate  lover  of  peace.  But  with  all  this  he,  realizing 
the  magnitude  of  the  war,  had  already  glimpsed  its  wider 
significance,  which  caused  him  to  say  later  that  "this  is 
the  last  war  of  its  kind,  or  of  any  kind  that  involves  the 
world,  that  the  United  States  can  keep  out  of.  The  busi 
ness  of  neutrality  is  over."  He  saw  that  if  the  war  should 
continue  long,  as  it  promised  to  do,  our  participation 
might  be  inevitable  and  the  American  tradition  of  isolation 
for  ever  destroyed  by  circumstances  beyond  human  con 
trol.  With  patience  mingled  with  firmness,  he  trod  his 
difficult  path,  doing  all  he  could  to  keep  us  from  getting 
involved  without  sacrificing  fundamental  principles  of 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

COHUISH,  !&•  H. , 
August  6, 


Dear  Tumulty: 

Thank  you  for  Bonding  me  the  edi 
torials  from  the  TJbrld  and  from  Life.    You 
don't  need  to  have  me  tell  you  that   I  say 
Anon  to  everything  that  life  says  In  the 
article  "Tumulty  and  Borne."    The  attitude 
of  some  people  about  this  Irritates  me  mow 
than  I  can  say.     It  Is  not  only  preposterous, 
but  outrageous,  and  of  course  you  know  it 
never  makes  the  sligheert  impression  on  me. 

Always 

Affectionately  yours, 


Eon.  Joseph  P.  Tumulty, 

Secretary  to  the  President. 

Showing  the  President's  confidence  in  and  loyalty  toward 
his  secretary 


187 


188    WOODROW   WILSON    AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

human  and  national  rights,  but  he  neither  believed  nor 
pretended  to  believe  that  he  could  give  guaranties  for  the 
future.  Nor  did  any  of  those  who  were  closest  to  him 
make  rash  promises.  For  instance,  the  Cabinet  officers 
who  actively  participated  in  the  campaign  were  careful 
to  say  in  their  speeches  that  he  had  done  all  that  a  presi 
dent  could  honourably  do  to  keep  us  out  of  war  and  that 
he  could  be  depended  upon  to  continue  in  the  future  the 
same  course  so  long  as  it  should  prove  humanly  possible, 
for  "peace"  was  not  merely  a  word  on  his  lips  but  a 
passion  in  his  heart,  but  that  neither  he  nor  any  other 
mortal  could  "look  into  the  seeds  of  time"  and  say  what 
would  be  and  what  would  not  be.  The  event  was  on  the 
knees  of  the  gods.  Those  who  spoke  with  responsibility 
adhered  strictly  to  the  tense  of  the  verb,  the  past  tense: 
"kept."  None  rashly  used,  explicitly  or  by  implication, 
the  future  tense:  "will  keep."  In  strictest  truth  they 
recited  what  had  been,  and,  from  their  knowledge  of  the 
President's  character  and  convictions,  said  that  he  would 
not  be  driven  into  war  by  the  clamour  of  his  critics,  that  he 
would  refrain  from  hostility  so  long  as  it  was  humanly  and 
honourably  possible  to  refrain. 

The  President  had  sent  Secretary  of  War  Baker  to  the 
Convention  to  represent  him  before  the  various  com 
mittees  and  to  collaborate  with  the  Committee  on  Reso 
lutions  in  the  preparation  of  a  suitable  platform. 

Shortly  after  Mr.  Baker's  arrival  in  St.  Louis  the 
question  of  the  attitude  of  the  Convention  and  the  party 
toward  the  "hyphen"  vote  came  up  for  consideration,  and 
there  were  indications  that  certain  members  of  the 
Committee  on  Resolutions  were  inclined  to  ignore  the 
matter  of  the  hyphen  and  to  remain  silent  on  this  grave 
issue. 


RENOMINATED  189 

While  the  Committee  on  Resolutions  was  meeting  at 
St.  Louis,  it  was  reported  to  me  by  Mr.  Henry  C.  Camp 
bell,  one  of  the  editors  of  the  Milwaukee  Journal,  and 
a  devoted  friend,  that  the  Democratic  party,  through  its 
representatives  on  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  was 
engaged  in  "pussyfooting"  on  the  hyphen  issue  and  that 
this  would  result  in  bitter  disappointment  to  the  country. 
At  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  this  telephone  message  from 
St.  Louis  the  President  was  away  from  town  for  a  day  and 
I  called  his  attention  to  it  in  the  following  letter: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

June  13,  1916. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

It  is  clear,  as  the  editorial  appearing  in  this  morning's  New  York 
World  says,  that  the  * 'hyphenate  vote  is  a  definite  factor  that  cannot 
be  discredited";  and  that  from  the  activities  of  the  German- American 
Alliance  every  effort,  as  their  own  supporters  declare,  should  be  made 
to  elect  Justice  Hughes.  That  there  is  abundant  proof  of  this  is 
clear,  so  that  he  who  runs  may  read.  This  is  evident  from  the  atti 
tude  of  the  German-American  press,  and  from  the  statements  of 
professional  German  agitators,  and  from  the  campaign  that  has  been 
carried  on  against  you  from  the  very  beginning. 

I  have  not  read  the  platform  to  be  proposed  by  you.  The  only 
part  that  I  have  any  knowledge  of  is  that  which  you  read  to  me  over 
the  telephone  some  nights  ago;  that  had  to  do  with  the  question  of 
Americanism. 

Frankly,  your  mention  of  Americanism  is  on  all  fours  with  the 
declarations  found  in  the  Bull  Moose  and  regular  Republican  plat 
forms.  The  characteristic  of  all  these  references  to  Americanism  is 
vagueness  and  uncertainty  as  to  what  is  really  meant.  I  believe  that 
the  time  has  come  when  the  Democratic  party  should  set  forth  its 
position  on  this  vital  matter  in  no  uncertain  terms.  Efforts  will  soon 
be  made,  from  stories  now  appearing  in  the  newspapers,  by  pro 
fessional  German-Americans,  to  dominate  our  Convention,  either  in 
an  effort  to  discredit  you  or  to  have  embodied  in  the  platform  some 


190    WOODROW   WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

reference  to  the  embargo  question,  or  a  prohibition  against  the  sale 
of  munitions  of  war.  We  ought  to  meet  these  things  in  a  manly, 
aggressive  and  militant  fashion.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  I  suggest  an 
open  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  setting 
forth  your  position  in  this  matter  so  that  the  Convention  may  know 
before  it  nominates  you  the  things  for  which  you  stand.  Mr.  Baker 
at  the  Convention  will  doubtless  know  when  the  representatives  of 
the  German-American  Alliance  make  their  appearance,  asking  for 
consideration  at  the  hands  of  the  Committee  of  their  resolutions. 
As  soon  as  they  do,  it  appears  to  me  to  be  the  time  for  you  to  strike. 

I  discussed  this  matter  over  the  telephone  yesterday  with  Mr. 
Henry  C.  Campbell,  one  of  our  devoted  friends,  and  editor  of  the 
Milwaukee  Journal.  Mr.  Frank  Polk,  Counsellor  of  the  State  De 
partment,  who  was  at  the  Convention,  tells  me  that  he  was  discussing 
this  matter  with  Mr.  Nieman,  of  the  Milwaukee  Journal,  and  that 
Mr.  Nieman  made  the  statement  that  both  parties  were  "pussy 
footing"  and  that  he  would  not  support  the  Democratic  party  unless 
its  attitude  in  this  matter  was  unequivocal.  When  Mr.  Campbell  dis 
cussed  this  matter  with  me  over  the  telephone,  I  told  him  to  send 
me  a  telegram,  setting  forth  what  he  thought  ought  to  find  lodgment 
in  the  platform,  by  way  of  expressing  our  attitude  in  the  matter. 
This  morning  I  received  the  attached  telegram  from  Senator  Husting, 
expressing  Mr.  Campbell's  and  Mr.  Nieman's  views.  The  part  I 
have  underlined  I  think  should  be  expressed  in  less  emphatic  language. 

The  purpose  of  this  letter,  therefore,  is  to  urge  you  as  strongly  as 
I  can  to  address  at  once  an  open  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Resolutions,  expressing  fully  your  views  in  the  matter. 

TUMULTY. 

As  a  result  of  the  Husting  telegram,  the  President 
wired  Secretary  Baker,  insisting  upon  a  definite  and 
unequivocal  repudiation  of  the  hyphen  vote.  The  Presi 
dent's  "fighting"  telegram  to  Baker  which  contained  the 
substance  of  Husting's  telegram  resulted  in  the  insertion 
in  the  platform  of  the  following  plank: 

Whoever,  actuated  by  the  purpose  to  promote  the  interest  of  a 
foreign  power,  in  disregard  of  our  own  country's  welfare  or  to  injure 


RENOMINATED  191 

this  Government  in  its  foreign  relations  or  cripple  or  destroy  its 
industries  at  home,  and  whoever  by  arousing  prejudices  of  a  racial, 
religious  or  other  nature  creates  discord  and  strife  among  our  people 
so  as  to  obstruct  the  wholesome  processes  of  unification,  is  faithless 
to  the  trust  which  the  privileges  of  citizenship  repose  in  him  and  is 
disloyal  to  his  country.  We,  therefore,  condemn  as  subversive  of 
this  nation's  unity  and  integrity,  and  as  destructive  of  its  welfare, 
the  activities  and  designs  of  every  group  or  organization,  political 
or  otherwise,  that  has  for  its  object  the  advancement  of  the  interest  of 
a  foreign  power,  whether  such  object  is  promoted  by  intimidating 
the  Government,  a  political  party,  or  representatives  of  the  people, 
or  which  is  calculated  and  tends  to  divide  our  people  into  antagonistic 
groups  and  thus  to  destroy  that  complete  agreement  and  solidarity 
of  the  people  and  that  unity  of  sentiment  and  purpose  so  essential  to 
the  perpetuity  of  the  nation  and  its  free  institutions.  We  condemn 
all  alliances  and  combinations  of  individuals  in  this  country  of  what 
ever  nationality  or  descent,  who  agree  and  conspire  together  for  the 
purpose  of  embarrassing  or  weakening  the  Government  or  of  improp 
erly  influencing  or  coercing  our  public  representatives  in  dealing 
or  negotiating  with  any  foreign  power.  We  charge  that  such  con 
spiracies  among  a  limited  number  exist  and  have  been  instigated 
for  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  interests  of  foreign  countries  to 
the  prejudice  and  detriment  of  our  own  country.  We  condemn  any 
political  party  which  in  view  of  the  activity  of  such  conspirators, 
surrenders  its  integrity  or  modifies  its  policy. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  for  a  while  after  the  Convention 
at  Chicago  which  nominated  Mr.  Hughes  there  was  deep 
depression  in  the  ranks  of  our  party  throughout  the 
country,  the  opinion  being  that  the  former  Supreme  Court 
Justice  was  an  invincible  foe.  I  had  engaged  in  sharp 
controversies  with  many  of  my  friends,  expressing  the 
view  that  Mr.  Hughes  would  not  only  be  a  sad  disap 
pointment  to  the  Republican  managers,  but  that  in  his 
campaigning  methods  he  would  fall  far  short  of  the  ex 
pectations  of  his  many  Republican  friends. 

Previous  to  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Hughes  the  Presi- 


192    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

dent  was  his  cordial  admirer  and  often  spoke  to  me  in 
warm  and  generous  terms  of  the  work  of  Mr.  Hughes  as 
Governor  of  New  York,  which  he  admired  because  of  its 
progressive,  liberal  character.  Previous  to  the  Republi 
can  Convention,  he  and  I  had  often  discussed  the  possible 
nominee  of  the  Republican  Convention.  The  President, 
for  some  reason,  could  not  be  persuaded  that  Mr.  Justice 
Hughes  was  a  serious  contender  for  the  nomination  and 
often  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  idea  of  a  nomination 
for  the  Presidency  was  not  even  remotely  in  the  thoughts 
of  the  then  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court.  I  did  not  share 
this  view.  Although  the  newspaper  men  who  conferred 
with  Justice  Hughes  from  day  to  day  at  his  home  in  Wash 
ington  informed  me  of  the  Judge's  feelings  toward  the 
nomination  for  the  Presidency,  I  was  always  strongly  of 
the  opinion  that  the  Justice  was  in  no  way  indifferent  to 
the  nomination  and  that  he  was  not  inclined  to  go  out  of 
his  way  publicly  to  resent  the  efforts  that  his  friends  were 
making  to  land  it  for  him.  When  I  expressed  the  opinion 
to  the  President,  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  Mr.  Justice 
Hughes  was  a  candidate  and  was  doing  nothing  outwardly 
to  express  his  disapproval  of  the  efforts  being  made  by  his 
friends,  the  President  resented  my  statements. 

There  was  a  warm  feeling  of  friendship  on  the  part  of 
all  the  members  of  the  President's  family  toward  Mr. 
Justice  Hughes,  and  at  the  Say  re  wedding,  held  in  the 
White  House,  one  of  Justice  Hughes'  sons  had  played  a 
prominent  part.  Owing  to  the  personal  feelings  of 
friendship  of  the  whole  Wilson  family  for  Mr.  Hughes,  the 
curt  character  of  the  Justice's  letter  of  resignation  to  the 
President  deeply  wounded  the  President  and  the  members 
of  his  family  who  had  been  Mr.  Hughes'  stout  defenders 
and  supporters. 


RENOMINATED  193 

I  recall  that  on  the  day  Mr.  Hughes  was  nominated,  and 
after  the  news  of  his  nomination  was  published  throughout 
the  country,  there  came  to  the  Executive  offices  a  coloured 
messenger,  bearing  the  following  abrupt  note  to  the 
President: 

SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

June  10,  1916. 
To  THE  PRESIDENT: 

I  hereby  resign  the  office  of  Associate  Justice  of  the  Supreme 

Court  of  the  United  States. 

I  am,  Sir, 

Respectfully  yours, 
CHARLES   E.  HUGHES. 

When  I  brought  this  letter  of  resignation  to  the  White 
House  the  President  was  in  conference  with  that  sturdy 
Democrat  from  Kentucky,  Senator  Ollie  M.  James. 
When  the  President  read  the  letter  and  observed  its 
rather  harsh  character  he  was  deeply  wounded  and  dis 
appointed.  When  he  showed  it  to  Senator  James,  the 
Senator  read  it  and  advised  that  by  reason  of  its  character 
the  President  ought  not  to  dignify  it  by  any  acknowledg 
ment.  The  President  turned  quickly  to  the  Kentucky 
statesman  and  said:  "No,  my  dear  Senator,  the  President 
of  the  United  States  must  always  do  the  gentlemanly 
thing." 

The  President  replied  to  Mr.  Hughes  in  the  following 
note: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

June  10,  1916. 
DEAR  MR.  JUSTICE  HUGHES: 

I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter  of  resignation  and  feel  constrained 
to  yield  to  your  desire.  I,  therefore,  accept  your  resignation  as 


194    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  to  take  effect  at 
once. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
HON.  CHARLES  E.  HUGHES, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

On  the  first  of  August,  1916,  I  prepared  the  following 
memorandum  which  explained  my  feelings  regarding  the 
campaign  of  1916  and  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  the 
weakness  of  the  Republican  party  and  the  strength  of 
our  own  candidacy: 

One  of  the  principal  arguments  upon  which  the  Republican  mana 
gers  lay  great  stress  in  favour  of  Hughes'  candidacy  is  his  strength  as 
a  campaigner  as  evidenced  in  his  Youngstown  speech  delivered  years 
ago  in  a  campaign  in  which  Mr.  Bryan  was  the  leader  of  the  Demo 
cratic  hosts.  The  strength  of  that  speech  lies  in  its  cool  analysis  of 
the  attitude  of  a  great  emotional  orator  [Bryan]  on  public  questions 
at  a  time  when  the  Democracy  was  advocating  economic  principles 
of  doubtful  strength  and  virtue.  In  other  words,  the  position  of 
Justice  Hughes  in  that  campaign  was  that  of  attacking  an  economic 
principle  which  had  cut  the  Democratic  party  in  two. 

The  position  of  Hughes  as  a  candidate  in  this  the  [1916]  campaign 
will  be  radically  different  for  he  will  have  to  face  a  candidate  repre 
senting  a  united  party;  one  whose  power  of  analysis  is  as  great  as 
Hughes',  and  to  this  will  be  added  this  feature  of  strength  in  the 
Democratic  candidate — the  power  of  appeal  to  the  emotional  or 
imaginative  side  of  the  American  people.  Added  to  this  will  be  the 
strength  of  conviction  in  urging  his  cause  that  comes  to  a  man  who 
has  passed  through  a  world  crisis  amid  great  dangers  and  who  has 
brought  to  consummation  substantial  (not  visionary)  achievements 
unparalleled  in  the  political  history  of  the  country.  He  will  not 
speak  to  the  country  as  the  representative  of  a  party  divided  in  its 
counsels  or  as  a  dreamer  or  doctrinaire,  but  rather  will  he  stand  before 
the  country  as  the  practical  idealist,  defending,  not  apologizing  for, 
every  achievement  of  his  administration. 


RENOMINATED  195 

In  his  Youngstown  speech,  Justice  Hughes  found  no  difficulty  in 
attacking  the  economic  theories  of  Bryan.  In  this  attack  he  not 
only  had  the  sympathy  of  his  own  party  but  there  came  to  him  the 
support  of  many  Democrats.  In  this  campaign  he  will  have  to 
attack  achievements  and  not  principles  of  doubtful  virtue.  I 
predict  that  the  trip  of  Hughes  to  the  West  will  be  a  disastrous  failure. 

When  Justice  Hughes'  Western  trip  was  announced, 
there  was  consternation  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic 
party,  especially  those  Democrats  with  whom  I  came  in 
contact  in  Washington.  They  declared  that  he  would 
make  a  tremendous  impression  on  the  West  and  that  he 
would  destroy  that  great  salient,  and  make  it  impossible 
for  the  Democrats  to  make  any  gains  there. 

In  a  letter  which  I  addressed  to  Mr.  Raymond  T.  Baker, 
Director  of  the  Mint,  I  expressed  the  opinion  that  Mr. 
Hughes'  Western  trip  would  prove  as  distinct  a  dis 
appointment  to  his  friends  as  had  his  speech  of  accept 
ance.  The  letter  is  as  follows : 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 

WASHINGTON 

August  4,  1916. 
DEAR  RAY: 

You  have  rightly  sensed  the  feelings  of  the  East  as  to  the  Hughes 
speech  of  acceptance,  and  I  was  indeed  glad  to  know  from  your 
telegram,  which  came  as  welcome  news  from  you,  that  the  sentiment 
that  the  speech  was  a  hit-and-miss  affair  was  well  nigh  universal 
throughout  the  West. 

There  is  no  apparent  slump  that  I  can  find  here  in  Democratic 
ranks;  the  same  buoyancy  and  optimisn  which  pervaded  the  whole 
Washington  atmosphere  while  you  were  here  still  predominate. 
My  belief  is  that  Hughes'  trip  to  the  West  will  prove  another  distinct 
disappointment  to  his  friends.  A  candidate  following  the  path  of 
expediency  as  exemplified  by  Hughes  will  find  himself  in  an  unen 
viable  position  in  the  West,  merely  criticizing,  finding  fault,  and  set 
ting  forth  no  policy  of  a  constructive  character. 


196    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

As  I  told  you  and  the  boys  some  weeks  ago,  Mr.  Hughes  is  going  to 
prove  a  distinct  disappointment  as  a  candidate.  He  is  so  eager  for 
the  office  that  he  will  follow  any  path  that  may  lead  to  it,  even  though 
it  may  be  the  rough  path  of  expediency.  We  face  the  foe  unafraid, 
and  will  soon  have  our  big  guns  trained  upon  the  frowning  fortresses 
of  the  enemy.  They  look  formidable  at  this  time,  but  as  we  approach 
them  it  is  my  belief  that  they  will  be  found  to  be  made  of  cardboard 
and  will  fall  at  the  touch  of  the  President's  logic  and  the  record  of 
his  great  achievements. 

Sincerely  yours, 

TUMULTY. 
MR.  RAYMOND  T.  BAKER, 

Oakland,  California. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE  ADAMSON   LAW 

BETWEEN  the  Democratic  Convention  and  the 
time  of  his  departure  for  his  summer  home  at 
Long  Branch,  New  Jersey,  the  President  was 
engaged  in  Washington  in  completing  the  most  important 
items  of  his  legislative  programme,  including  the  Income 
Tax,  Child  Labour  Law,  and  the  Adamson  Eight-Hour 
Law. 

A  disastrous  strike,  involving  the  whole  system  of 
railroad  transportation,  now  seemed  imminent.  At  this 
critical  juncture  the  President  intervened.  On  August 
13th  he  invited  the  disputants,  before  reaching  any  final 
decision,  to  confer  with  him  personally  at  Washington. 
His  intervention  evoked  general  expressions  of  relief  and 
approval. 

At  these  conferences  the  railway  men  stood  firm  for 
an  eight-hour  day.  The  railway  managers  refused  these 
demands.  How  to  meet  this  grave  situation,  which  if 
not  checked  might  have  resulted  in  giving  Germany 
a  victory,  was  one  of  the  pressing  problems  that  con 
fronted  the  President  that  critical  summer.  Not  only 
were  American  business  interests  involved  in  this  matter, 
but  the  Allied  governments  of  western  Europe,  then  in  the 
throes  of  the  great  war,  were  no  less  anxious,  for  a  railroad 
strike  would  have  meant  a  cutting  off  of  the  supplies  to 
the  Allied  forces  that  were  so  much  needed  at  this  import 
ant  juncture. 

197 


198    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

The  President  sent  for  the  Brotherhood  representatives 
and  for  the  managers,  to  confer  with  him  at  the  White 
House,  and  suggested  arbitration  by  way  of  settling 
the  controversy.  The  labour  leaders,  conscious  of  their 
strength,  refused  to  arbitrate.  The  railroad  managers 
were  equally  obdurate.  I  well  remember  the  patience 
of  the  President  at  these  conferences  day  after  day. 
He  would  first  hold  conferences  with  the  Brotherhood 
representatives  and  then  with  the  railroad  managers;  but 
his  efforts  were  unavailing.  It  is  regrettable  that  the 
men  on  both  sides  were  indifferent  to  the  President's 
appeal  and  apparently  unmindful  of  the  consequences  to 
the  country  that  would  inevitably  follow  a  nation-wide 
strike. 

I  remember  what  he  said  to  me  as  he  left  the  Green 
Room  at  the  conclusion  of  his  final  conference  with  the 
heads  of  the  Brotherhoods.  Shaking  his  head  in  a  despair 
ing  way,  he  said:  "I  was  not  able  to  make  the  slightest 
impression  upon  those  men.  They  feel  so  strongly  the 
justice  of  their  cause  that  they  are  blind  to  all  the  conse 
quences  of  their  action  in  declaring  and  prosecuting  a 
strike.  I  was  shocked  to  find  a  peculiar  stiffness  and 
hardness  about  these  men.  When  I  pictured  to  them  the 
distress  of  our  people  in  case  this  strike  became  a  reality, 
they  sat  unmoved  and  apparently  indifferent  to  the 
seriousness  of  the  whole  bad  business.  I  am  at  the  end 
of  my  tether,  and  I  do  not  know  what  further  to  do." 

His  conferences  with  the  managers  were  equally 
unproductive  of  result.  Gathered  about  him  in  a  semi 
circle  in  his  office,  they  were  grim  and  determined  men, 
some  of  them  even  resentful  of  the  President's  attempt  to 
suggest  a  settlement  of  any  kind  to  prevent  the  strike.  I 
shall  never  forget  his  last  appeal  to  them.  I  sat  in  a  little 


THE   ADAMSON   LAW  199 

room  off  the  Cabinet  room  and  could  hear  what  went  on. 
Seated  about  him  were  the  heads  of  all  the  important  rail 
roads  in  the  country.  Looking  straight  at  them,  he  said: 
"I  have  not  summoned  you  to  Washington  as  President 
of  the  United  States  to  confer  with  me  on  this  matter,  for 
I  have  no  power  to  do  so.  I  have  invited  you  merely  as 
a  fellow-citizen  to  discuss  this  great  and  critical  situation. 
Frankly,  I  say  to  you  that  if  I  had  the  power  as  President 
I  would  say  to  you  that  this  strike  is  unthinkable  and  must 
not  be  permitted  to  happen.  What  I  want  you  to  see,  if 
you  will,  is  the  whole  picture  that  presents  itself  to  me  and 
visualize  the  terrible  consequences  to  the  country  and  its 
people  of  a  nation-wide  strike  at  this  time,  both  as 
affecting  our  own  people  and  in  its  effect  upon  the  Allied 
forces  across  the  sea.  For  a  moment  I  wish  you  to  forget 
that  I  am  President,  and  let  us  as  fellow-citizens  consider 
the  consequences  of  such  action.  A  nation-wide  strike  at 
this  time  would  mean  absolute  famine  and  starvation  for 
the  people  of  America.  You  gentlemen  must  understand 
just  what  this  means.  Will  your  interests  be  served  by 
the  passions  and  hatreds  that  will  flow  from  such  an 
unhappy  condition  in  the  country?  If  this  strike  should 
occur,  forces  will  be  released  that  may  threaten  the 
security  of  everything  we  hold  dear.  Think  of  its  effect 
upon  the  people  of  this  country  who  must  have  bread  to 
eat  and  coal  to  keep  them  warm.  They  will  not  quietly 
submit  to  a  strike  that  will  keep  these  things  of  life  away 
from  them.  The  rich  will  not  suffer  in  case  these  great 
arteries  of  trade  and  commerce  are  temporarily  aban 
doned,  for  they  can  provide  themselves  against  the  horror 
of  famine  and  the  distress  of  this  critical  situation.  It  is 
the  poor  unfortunate  men,  and  their  wives  and  children, 
who  will  suffer  and  die.  I  cannot  speak  to  you  without 


200    WOODROW   WILSON   AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

a  show  of  emotion,  for,  my  friends,  beneath  the  surface  in 
America  there  is  a  baneful  seething  which  may  express 
itself  in  radical  action,  the  consequences  of  which  no  man 
can  foresee.  In  asking  your  cooperation  to  settle  this 
dispute  I  am  but  striving,  as  we  stand  in  the  shadow  of  a 
great  war,  to  keep  these  forces  in  check  and  under  con 
trol." 

Getting  closer  to  the  men,  and  lowering  his  voice,  he 
said:  "The  Allies  are  fighting  our  battle,  the  battle  of 
civilization,  across  the  way.  They  cannot  *  carry  on' 
without  supplies  and  means  of  sustenance  which  the  rail 
roads  of  America  bring  to  them.  I  am  probably  asking 
you  to  make  a  sacrifice  at  this  time,  but  is  not  the  sacrifice 
worth  while  because  of  the  things  involved?  Only  last 
night  I  was  thinking  about  this  war  and  its  far-reaching 
effects.  No  man  can  foresee  its  extent  or  its  evil  effects 
upon  the  world  itself.  It  is  a  world  cataclysm,  and  before 
it  ends  it  may  unsettle  everything  fine  and  wholesome  in 
America.  We  of  America,  although  we  are  cut  off  from 
its  terrible  sweep,  cannot  be  unmindful  of  these  conse 
quences,  for  we  stand  in  the  midst  of  it  all.  We  must  keep 
our  own  house  in  order  so  that  we  shall  be  prepared  to  act 
when  action  becomes  necessary.  Who  knows,  gentlemen, 
but  by  to-morrow  a  situation  will  arise  where  it  shall  be 
found  necessary  for  us  to  get  into  the  midst  of  this  bloody 
thing?  You  can  see,  therefore,  that  we  must  go  to  the 
very  limit  to  prevent  a  strike  that  would  bring  about  a 
paralysis  of  these  arteries  of  trade  and  commerce.  If  you 
will  agree  with  me  in  this  matter,  I  will  address  Congress 
and  frankly  ask  for  an  increase  of  rates  and  do  everything 
I  can  to  make  up  for  the  loss  you  may  sustain.  I  know 
that  the  things  I  ask  you  to  do  may  be  disagreeable  and 
inconvenient,  but  I  am  not  asking  you  to  make  a  bloody 


THE   ADAMSON   LAW  201 

sacrifice.      Our  boys  may  be  called  upon  any  minute  to 
make  that  sacrifice  for  us." 

On  August  29,  1916,  the  President  appeared  before  a 
joint  session  of  the  Congress  and  recommended  immediate 
legislation  to  avert  the  impending  strike.  Following 
this,  the  chairman  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com 
mission  of  the  House,  Mr.  Adamson,  of  Georgia,  brought  in 
a  bill,  now  known  as  the  Adamson  Eight-Hour  Law,  which, 
after  several  unsuccessful  attempts  by  members  of  the 
House  and  Senate  to  amend  it,  was  signed  by  the  Presi 
dent  on  September  5th. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

GERMAN   PROPAGANDA 

EARLY  in  January,  1916,  German  sympathizers 
throughout  the  country  began  a  drive  on  both 
Houses  of  Congress  for  the  passage  of  a  resolution 
warning  or  forbidding  Americans  to  travel  on  passenger 
ships  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  belligerent 
nations.  Petitions  of  various  kinds,  demanding  vigorous 
action  in  this  matter,  began  to  pour  in  upon  us  at  the  White 
House  from  various  parts  of  the  country.  While  these 
petitions  were  signed  by  many  devoted,  patriotic  Ameri 
cans,  it  was  clear  to  those  of  us  who  were  on  the  inside  of 
affairs  that  there  lay  back  of  this  movement  a  sinister 
purpose  on  the  part  of  German  sympathizers  in  this 
country  to  give  Germany  full  sway  upon  the  high  seas, 
in  order  that  she  might  be  permitted  to  carry  on  her 
unlawful  and  inhuman  submarine  warfare.  This  move 
ment  became  so  intense  that  leading  Democratic  and 
Republican  senators  and  representatives  soon  became  its 
ardent  advocates,  until  it  looked  as  if  the  resolution  might 
pass  with  only  a  small  minority  found  in  opposition  to  it. 
Those  of  us  who  were  in  the  Executive  offices,  and 
intimately  associated  with  the  President,  kept  in  close 
touch  with  the  situation  on  Capitol  Hill  and  were  advised 
that  the  movement  for  the  resolution  was  in  full  swing  and 
that  it  could  not  be  checked.  A  resolution  was  finally 
introduced  by  Representative  McLemore,  of  Texas,  and 
quickly  received  the  support  of  Senator  Gore  of  Okla- 

202 


GERMAN   PROPAGANDA 

homa,  and  Senator  Stone  of  Missouri,  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  What  the  attitude  of 
the  President  should  be  toward  it  was  the  subject  of  dis 
cussion  between  the  President,  two  of  his  Cabinet  officers, 
and  myself,  after  a  session  of  the  Cabinet  early  in  February, 
1916. 

The  President  was  advised  by  the  Cabinet  officers  with 
whom  he  conferred  regarding  the  matter  that  it  would 
be  a  hopeless  task  on  his  part  to  attempt  to  stem  the  tide 
that  was  now  running  in  favour  of  the  passage  of  the 
McLemore  resolution,  and  that  were  he  to  attempt  to 
prevent  its  passage  it  might  result  in  a  disastrous  defeat 
of  his  leadership,  that  would  seriously  embarrass  him  on 
Capitol  Hill  and  throughout  the  nation. 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  conference  the  President  asked 
me  whether  my  information  about  affairs  on  Capitol  Hill 
and  the  attitude  of  the  members  of  the  House  and  Senate 
toward  the  McLemore  resolution  was  in  accord  with  the 
information  he  had  just  received  from  his  Cabinet  officers. 
I  told  him  that  it  was,  but  that  so  far  as  I  was  concerned 
I  did  not  share  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  officers  and 
did  not  agree  with  the  advice  which  they  had  volunteered, 
to  the  effect  that  it  would  be  useless  for  him  to  throw  down 
the  gage  of  battle  to  those  who  sought  to  pass  the  Mc 
Lemore  resolution.  I  informed  him  that  regardless  of 
what  the  attitude  of  those  on  Capitol  Hill  was  toward  the 
resolution,  he  could  not  afford  to  allow  the  matter  to  pass 
without  a  protest  from  him,  and  that,  indeed,  he  could 
afford  to  be  defeated  in  making  a  fight  to  maintain  Ameri 
can  rights  upon  the  high  seas.  The  discussion  between 
the  President,  the  Cabinet  officers,  and  myself  became 
heated.  They  were  reluctant  to  have  the  President  go 
into  the  fight,  while  I  was  most  anxious  to  have  him  do  so» 


204    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Evidently,  what  I  said  made  an  impression  upon  the 
President  and  he  asked  me,  as  our  conference  was  con 
cluded,  to  let  him  have  as  soon  as  possible  a  memorandum 
containing  my  views  upon  the  subject. 

Shortly  after  the  conference,  Senator  Stone,  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate, 
asked  for  an  appointment  with  the  President,  to  confer 
with  him  on  the  next  morning,  February  25th,  regarding 
the  McLemore  resolution.  I  suggested  to  the  President 
that  inasmuch  as  Senator  Stone  was  to  see  him  in  the 
morning  it  would  be  wise  and  prudent  if,  in  answer  to  his 
letter  asking  for  an  appointment,  the  President  should 
frankly  state  his  views  with  reference  to  the  proposed 
resolution.  The  President  acted  upon  this  suggestion 
and  the  letter  was  immediately  dispatched  to  Senator 
Stone. 

My  letter  to  the  President,  advising  him  of  the  situation, 
was  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 

WASHINGTON 

February  24,  1916. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

What  I  have  heard  since  leaving  you  this  morning  confirms  me 
in  my  belief  that  now  is  the  time  (before  the  night  passes)  to  set 
forth  your  position  to  the  country  on  the  McLemore  resolution  in 
terms  that  no  one  can  misunderstand.  In  the  last  hour  I  have 
talked  with  Speaker  Clark,  Senator  Pittman,  and  Mr.  Sims  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  have  received  impressions  from  them  which  lead  me  to 
conclude:  first,  that  the  consideration  of  this  resolution  cannot  much 
longer  be  postponed,  as  Speaker  Clark  so  informed  me,  although 
Congressman  Doremus  and  Senator  Pittman  say  the  situation  on 
the  hill  is  quieting  down.  I  am  more  than  convinced  that  underlying 
this  resolution  is  a  purpose  to  discredit  your  leadership,  for  the  forces 
that  are  lined  up  for  this  fight  against  you  are  the  anti-preparedness 
crowd,  the  Bryan-Kitchen-Clark  group,  and  some  of  the  anti-British 


GERMAN    PROPAGANDA  205 

Senators  like  Hoke  Smith  and  Gore.  Therefore,  I  cannot  urge  you 
too  strongly  at  once  to  send  an  identic  letter  to  both  Representative 
Flood,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the  House, 
and  Senator  Stone,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
of  the  Senate.  The  letter,  in  my  opinion,  should  embody  the  follow 
ing  ideas: 

First,  explain  in  the  frankest  fashion  just  what  Secretary  Lansing 
attempted  to  obtain  when  he  suggested  to  the  Entente  nations  an 
agreement  on  the  arming  of  merchantmen,  how  this  government 
was  informed  by  Germany  of  her  intention  to  destroy  armed  mer 
chantmen  without  giving  the  passengers  a  moment  of  warning,  and 
how,  in  order  to  stave  off  such  a  contingency,  we  tried  as  the  friend 
and  in  the  interest  of  humanity  to  get  an  agreement  between  both 
sides  that  would  bring  submarine  warfare  within  the  bounds  of  in 
ternational  law. 

Second,  explain  that  a  possible  adjustment  of  this  matter  is  in 
process  of  negotiation  right  now,  and  that,  of  course,  while  we  cannot 
change  international  law  upon  our  own  initiative,  we  are  still  of  the 
hope  that  some  general  agreement  among  the  belligerents  may  event 
ually  be  obtained.  Explain  how  embarrassing  such  a  resolution  as 
the  McLemore  one  will  be  to  negotiations  now  being  threshed  out 
between  the  executive  branches  of  the  Government  charged  with 
the  conduct  of  foreign  relations,  and  foreign  governments. 

Third,  then  say  that  in  the  absence  of  any  general  agreement, 
the  United  States  cannot  yield  one  inch  of  her  rights  without  de 
stroying  the  whole  fabric  of  international  law,  for  in  the  last  analysis 
this  is  what  is  involved.  To  yield  one  right  to-day  means  another 
to-morrow.  We  cannot  know  where  this  process  of  yielding  on  the 
ground  of  convenience  or  expediency  may  lead  us.  These  laws  are 
the  product  of  centuries.  Our  forefathers  fought  to  establish  their 
validity,  and  we  cannot  afford  for  the  sake  of  convenience  when  our 
very  life  is  threatened,  to  adandon  them  on  any  ground  of  conven 
ience  or  expediency. 

Fourth,  to  pass  such  a  resolution  at  this  time  would  seriously  em 
barrass  the  Department  of  State  and  the  Executive  in  the  conduct  of 
these  most  delicate  matters  at  a  time  when  everything  is  being  done 
to  bring  about  a  peaceful  solution  of  these  problems. 

Fifth,  might  you  not  diplomatically  suggest,  in  your  letter  to 


206    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Senator  Stone,  that  to  pass  favorably  upon  a  resolution  of  this  kind 
at  this  time  would  be  showing  lack  of  confidence  in  the  Government, 
and  particularly  in  its  Chief  Executive? 

The  morning  papers  have  outlined  the  details  of  the  opposition 
among  the  Democrats.  The  afternoon  papers  are  repeating  the 
same  thing  with  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  Joe  Cannon,  Jim  Mann, 
and  Lodge  are  going  to  support  you.  I  would  suggest  that  you  in 
sert  the  following  in  your  letter  to  Senator  Stone: 

"I  think  that  not  only  would  such  a  vote  on  this  resolution 
be  construed  as  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  executive  branch  of  the 
Government  in  this  most  delicate  matter  but  if  the  division  con 
tinues  as  I  am  informed  within  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic 
party,  it  will  be  difficult  for  me  to  consider  that  the  majority 
party  speaks  the  will  of  the  nation  in  these  circumstances  and 
as  between  any  faction  in  my  party  and  the  interests  of  the  na 
tion,  I  must  always  choose  the  latter,  irrespective  of  what  the 
effect  will  be  on  me  or  my  personal  fortunes.  What  we  are  con 
tending  for  in  this  matter  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  things 
that  have  made  America  a  sovereign  nation.  She  cannot  yield 
them  without  admitting  and  conceding  her  own  impotency  as  a 
nation  and  the  surrender  of  her  independent  position  among  the 
nations  of  the  world." 

Sincerely, 

TUMULTY. 

The  letter  of  the  President  to  Senator  Stone  was 
published  in  the  morning  papers  of  February  25,  1916, 
and  is  as  follows: 

THE  WTHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

February  25,  1916. 
MY  DEAK  SENATOR: 

I  very  warmly  appreciate  your  kind  and  frank  letter  of  to-day, 
and  feel  that  it  calls  for  an  equally  frank  reply. 

You  are  right  in  assuming  that  I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power 
to  keep  the  United  States  out  of  war.  I  think  the  country  will  feel 
no  uneasiness  about  my  course  in  that  respect.  Through  many 
anxious  months  I  have  striven  for  that  object,  amid  difficulties  more 
manifold  than  can  have  been  apparent  upon  the  surface,  and  so  far 


GERMAN    PROPAGANDA  207 

I  have  succeeded.  I  do  not  doubt  that  I  shall  continue  to  succeed. 
The  course  which  the  central  European  powers  have  announced  their 
intention  of  following  in  the  future  with  regard  to  undersea  warfare 
seems  for  the  moment  to  threaten  insuperable  obstacles,  but  its 
apparent  meaning  is  so  manifestly  inconsistent  with  explicit  assur 
ances  recently  given  us  by  those  powers  with  regard  to  their  treatment 
of  merchant  vessels  on  the  high  seas  that  I  must  believe  that  ex 
planations  will  presently  ensue  which  will  put  a  different  aspect 
upon  it.  We  have  had  no  reason  to  question  their  good  faith  or 
their  fidelity  to  their  promises  in  the  past,  and  I  for  one  feel  confident 
that  we  shall  have  none  in  the  future. 

But  in  any  event  our  duty  is  clear.  No  nation,  no  group  of  nations, 
has  the  right,  while  war  is  in  progress,  to  alter  or  disregard  the  princi 
ples  which  all  nations  have  agreed  upon  in  mitigation  of  the  horrors 
and  sufferings  of  war;  and  if  the  clear  rights  of  American  citizens 
should  very  unhappily  be  abridged  or  denied  by  any  such  action 
we  should,  it  seems  to  me,  have  in  honour  no  choice  as  to  what  our  own 
course  should  be. 

For  my  own  part  I  cannot  consent  to  any  abridgment  of  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  in  any  respect.  The  honour  and  self-respect 
of  the  nation  is  involved.  We  covet  peace,  and  shall  preserve  it  at 
any  cost  but  the  loss  of  honor.  To  forbid  our  people  to  exercise 
their  rights  for  fear  we  might  be  called  upon  to  vindicate  them  would 
be  a  deep  humiliation,  indeed.  It  would  be  an  implicit,  all  but  an 
explicit,  acquiescence  in  the  violation  of  the  rights  of  mankind  every 
where  and  of  whatever  nation  or  allegiance.  It  would  be  a  deliberate 
abdication  of  our  hitherto  proud  position  as  spokesmen,  even  amid 
the  turmoil  of  war,  for  the  law  and  the  right.  It  would  make  every 
thing  this  government  has  attempted  and  everything  that  it  has 
accomplished  during  this  terrible  struggle  of  nations  meaningless 
and  futile. 

It  is  important  to  reflect  that  if  in  this  instance  we  allowed  ex 
pediency  to  take  the  place  of  principle  the  door  would  inevitably 
be  opened  to  still  further  concessions.  Once  accept  a  single  abate 
ment  of  right,  and  many  other  humiliations  would  follow,  and  the 
whole  fine  fabric  of  international  law  might  crumble  under  our  hands 
piece  by  piece.  What  we  are  contending  for  in  this  matter  is  of 
the  very  essence  of  the  things  that  have  made  America  a  sovereign 


208    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

nation.  She  cannot  yield  them  without  conceding  her  own  impotency 
as  a  nation  and  making  virtual  surrender  of  her  independent  position 
among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

I  am  speaking,  my  dear  Senator,  in  deep  solemnity,  without  heat, 
with  a  clear  consciousness  of  the  high  responsibilities  of  my  office  and 
as  your  sincere  and  devoted  friend.  If  we  should  unhappily  differ, 
we  shall  differ  as  friends,  but  where  issues  so  momentous  as  these 
are  involved  we  must,  just  because  we  are  friends,  speak  our  minds 
without  reservation. 

Faithfully  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
SENATOR  WILLIAM  J.  STONE, 

United  States  Senate. 

The  publication  of  the  letter  of  the  President  to  Sena 
tor  Stone  worked  a  complete  reversal  of  opinion  on  the 
Hill. 

Quickly  the  effect  of  the  President's  letter  was  seen, 
and  the  McLemore  resolution  was  overwhelmingly  de 
feated. 

Early  in  August,  1916,  the  President  took  up  his  resi 
dence  at  Shadow  Lawn,  New  Jersey,  and  began  the 
preparation  of  his  speech  of  acceptance.  He  forwarded 
me  a  draft  of  this  speech  which  brought  from  me  the  fol 
lowing  comment  upon  it: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

August  22,  1916. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  think  the  failure  to  bring  out  the  hyphen  question  in  your 
speech  of  acceptance  will  be  vigorously  criticized  even  by  our  loyal 
friends.  Mr.  Hughes  will  soon  be  compelled  to  speak  out  on  this 
question.  Roosevelt's  speeches  in  the  main  will  force  him  to  do  this. 
You  might  open  the  subject  in  that  part  of  your  speech  in  which 
you  discuss  neutrality,  showing  the  embarrassments  under  which  you 
have  laboured  in  trying  to  keep  the  Nation  at  peace.  After  discussing 


GERMAN    PROPAGANDA  209 

these  embarrassments,  consisting  of  plots  against  our  industries, 
etc.,  could  you  not  introduce  a  sentence  like  this?:  "While  I  am  the 
candidate  of  the  Democratic  party,  I  am  above  all  else  an  American 
citizen.  I  neither  seek  the  favour  nor  fear  the  wrath  of  any  alien 
element  in  America  which  puts  loyalty  to  any  foreign  power  first." 
As  to  Huerta:  I  believe  your  reference  to  him  could  be  strength 
ened.  I  think  you  ought  to  bring  out  the  fact  that  the  work  of 
assassination  shall  never  receive  the  endorsement,  so  far  as  you  are 
concerned,  of  this  American  Republic.  I  suggest  the  following: 
"The  United  States  will  refuse,  so  long  as  that  power  remains  with  me, 
to  extend  the  hand  of  welcome  to  one  who  gains  power  in  a  republic 
through  treachery  and  bloodshed."  (This  is  not  only  sound  states 
manship  but  good  morals.)  "No  permanency  in  the  affairs  of  our  sister 
republics  can  be  attained  by  a  title  based  upon  intrigue  and  assas 
sination." 

Respectfully, 

TUMULTY. 


The  President,  always  welcoming  advice,  approved  and 
embodied  some  of  these  suggestions  in  his  speech  of 
acceptance. 

It  has  often  been  said  by  unfair  critics  that  Mr.  Wilson 
was  so  tenacious  of  his  own  opinion  and  views  that  he 
resented  suggestions  from  the  outside  in  any  matter  with 
which  he  was  called  upon  to  deal. 

As  an  intimate  associate  of  his  for  eleven  years,  I  think 
I  was  in  a  position  to  find  out  and  to  know  how  unfair  the 
basis  of  this  criticism  really  was.  In  my  contact  with 
public  men  I  never  met  a  more  open-minded  man;  nor  one 
who  was  more  willing  to  act  upon  any  suggestion  that  had 
merit  in  it.  I  have  seen  him  readily  give  up  his  own 
views  and  often  yield  to  the  influence  of  a  better  argu 
ment.  I  always  felt  free  in  every  public  matter  that  he 
discussed  and  in  every  attitude  which  he  took  on  public 
questions  frankly  to  express  my  own  opinion  and  openly 


•3  I  » 

2  :  ^ 


s  :  4 


M>  S 


1 

r 

r 


^ 


210 


. 

GERMAN    PROPAGANDA  211 

to  disagree  with  him.  In  his  speeches  and  public  state 
ments  he  had  no  pride  of  opinion,  nor  did  he  attempt  to 
hold  his  friends  off  at  arms'  length  when  they  had  sug 
gestions  of  any  kind  to  make. 

In  these  reminiscences  I  am  including  my  letters  to  him, 
embodying  suggestions  of  various  kinds,  many  of  which  he 
acted  upon  and  many  of  which  he  rejected,  in  order  that 
proof  may  be  given  of  the  fact,  that  despite  what  his 
critics  may  say,  he  not  only  did  not  resent  suggestions,  but 
openly  invited  them. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

WILSON   VERSUS   HUGHES 

A  PER  the  delivery  of  the  speech  of  acceptance  on 
September  2nd  quiet  ruled  over  the  Wilson  camp 
at  Shadow  Lawn.  This  lull  in  the  matter  of 
politics  was  intensified  by  the  President's  absence  from 
Shadow  Lawn  because  of  the  death  of  his  only  sister, 
which  called  him  away  and  for  a  while  took  his  mind  and 
his  energies  from  the  discussion  of  politics. 

On  September  llth,  the  state  elections  in  Maine  were 
carried  by  the  Republicans.  The  total  vote  was  the 
largest  ever  cast  in  Maine  in  a  state  election.  The 
Republican  majorities  ranged  from  9,000  to  14,000. 
There  had  been  a  vigorous  contest  in  Maine  by  both 
parties  and  the  Republicans  were  greatly  heartened  by 
the  result  in  the  hope  that  "as  goes  Maine  so  goes  the 
Union." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  result  in  Maine,  which  many 
Democrats  were  of  the  opinion  was  a  forecast  of  the  results 
throughout  the  nation  in  November,  had  a  depressing 
effect.  The  Republicans  accepted  it  as  a  harbinger  of 
victory  and  the  Democrats  as  an  indication  of  defeat.  On 
the  night  of  the  Maine  elections  I  kept  close  to  the 
telephone  at  the  Executive  offices  and  engaged  in  confer 
ences  with  two  or  three  practical  politicians  from  New 
Jersey.  It  was  interesting  to  watch  the  effects  of  the 
returns  from  Maine  upon  these  men.  When  the  returns, 
as  complete  as  we  could  get  them  at  twelve  o'clock  on  the 

212 


WILSON    VERSUS    HUGHES  213 

night  of  September  llth,  came  in,  James  Nugent,  one 
of  the  leading  politicians  of  Essex  County,  New  Jersey, 
who  was  in  the  room,  took  from  my  desk  a  copy  of  the 
"World  Almanac",  and  referring  to  the  returns  of  previous 
elections,  said:  "Of  course,  the  Republicans  will  hail  this 
as  a  great  victory,  but  if  they  will  sit  down  and  analyze 
the  gains  they  have  made,  they  will  find  no  comfort  in 
them,  for  to  me  they  indicate  a  Democratic  victory  in 
November.  If  the  Democrats  make  proportionate  gains 
in  other  states,  you  can  absolutely  count  upon  a  Demo 
cratic  victory  in  1916. 

This  prophecy  was  verified  by  the  results  of  the  election 
of  November  7th. 

It  was  difficult  and  almost  impossible  between  the  date 
of  the  speech  of  acceptance  and  the  first  of  October  to 
revive  interest  in  the  Democratic  campaign  and  to  bring 
about  a  renewal  of  hope  of  success  that  had  almost  been 
destroyed  by  the  psychological  results  of  the  Maine 
election. 

Frequent  demands  were  made  upon  us  at  the  Executive 
offices  at  Asbury  Park  to  get  busy  and  to  do  something. 
"Wilson  was  not  on  the  front  page  and  Hughes  was  busily 
engaged  in  campaigning  throughout  the  West."  But  the 
President  in  his  uncanny  way  knew  better  than  we  the 
psychological  moment  to  strike.  He  went  about  his  work 
at  the  Executive  offices  and  gave  to  us  who  were  closely 
associated  with  him  the  impression  that  nothing  unusual 
was  afoot  and  that  no  Presidential  campaign  was  impend 
ing.  I  made  frequent  suggestions  to  him  that  he  be  up 
and  doing.  He  would  only  smile  and  calmly  say:  "The 
moment  is  not  here.  Let  them  use  up  their  ammunition 
and  then  we  will  turn  our  guns  upon  them." 

The  psychological  moment  came,  and  the  President 


214    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

took  full  advantage  of  it.  One  afternoon  in  September 
the  President  telephoned  me  at  the  Executive  offices  at 
Asbury  Park  to  have  the  newspaper  men  present  for  a 
conference  that  afternoon;  that  he  would  give  out  a  reply 
to  a  telegram  he  had  received.  With  the  newspaper 
group,  I  attended  this  conference.  It  appeared  that  an 
Irish  agitator  named  Jeremiah  O'Leary,  who  had  been 
organizing  and  speaking  against  the  President  and  trying 
to  array  the  Irish  vote  against  him,  wrote  an  offensive 
letter  to  the  President,  calling  attention  to  the  results 
of  the  Maine  elections  and  to  the  New  Jersey  primaries, 
and  to  his  anticipated  defeat  in  November.  The  Presi 
dent  handed  to  the  newspaper  men  the  following  reply  to 
O'Leary: 

I  would  feel  deeply  mortified  to  have  you  or  anybody  like  you 
vote  for  me.  Since  you  have  access  to  many  disloyal  Americans 
and  I  have  not,  I  will  ask  you  to  convey  this  message  to  them. 

This  sharp  and  timely  rebuke  to  the  unpatriotic  spirit 
to  which  O'Leary  gave  expression  won  the  hearty  and 
unanimous  approval  of  the  country  to  the  President. 
Nothing  like  this  bold  defiance  came  from  Hughes  until 
a  few  days  before  the  election. 

The  Democratic  campaign,  within  twenty-four  hours 
after  the  publication  of  the  O'Leary  telegram,  was  on 
again  in  full  swing. 

At  this  same  newspaper  conference  the  President,  who 
had  not  seen  the  newspaper  group  since  his  arrival  at 
Long  Branch,  discussed  the  campaign,  so  that  they  might 
have  what  he  called  the  "inside  of  his  mind."  His  criti 
cism  of  the  campaign  that  Justice  Hughes  was  conduct 
ing  contained  bitter  irony  and  sarcasm.  Evidently,  the 
petty  things  to  which  Mr.  Hughes  had  adverted  in  his 


WILSON    VERSUS   HUGHES  215 

campaign  speeches  by  way  of  criticizing  the  President  and 
his  administration  had  cut  the  President  to  the  quick. 
One  of  the  newspaper  men  asked  him  what  he  thought  of 
Mr.  Hughes'  campaign,  and  he  laughingly  replied:  "If 
you  will  give  that  gentleman  rope  enough  he  will  hang 
himself.  He  has  forgotten  many  things  since  he  closeted 
himself  on  the  bench,  and  he  will  soon  find  himself  out 
of  touch  with  the  spirit  of  the  nation.  His  speeches  are 
nothing  more  or  less  than  blank  cartridges  and  the  coun 
try,  unless  I  mistake  the  people  very  much,  will  place  a 
true  assessment  upon  them." 

The  newspaper  men  left  this  conference  heartened  by 
the  reply  he  had  made  to  O'Leary  and  with  the  firm 
conviction  that  the  Democratic  candidate  was  just 
"playing"  with  Hughes  and  would  pounce  upon  him  at 
the  psychological  moment. 

In  the  delivery  of  the  campaign  speeches  at  Shadow 
Lawn  each  Saturday  afternoon  President  Wilson  took 
full  advantage  of  the  swing  toward  the  Democratic  side 
which  was  manifest  after  the  publication  of  the  famous 
O'Leary  telegram.  While  the  Republican  candidate  was 
busily  engaged  in  invading  the  West  in  his  swing  around 
the  circle,  the  Democratic  candidate  each  week  from  his 
porch  at  Shadow  Lawn  was  delivering  sledge-hammer 
blows  at  the  Republican  breastworks.  As  the  Republican 
candidate  in  an  effort  to  win  the  West  was  heaping  male 
dictions  upon  Dr.  E.  Lester  Jones,  the  head  of  the  Geo 
detic  Survey,  a  Wilson  appointee,  the  President  calmly 
moved  on,  ripping  to  pieces  and  tearing  to  shreds  the 
poor  front  behind  which  the  Republican  managers  were 
seeking  to  win  the  fight. 

Mr.  Hughes  campaigned  like  a  lawyer,  Mr.  Wilson  like 
a  statesman.  Mr.  Hughes  was  hunting  small  game  with 


216    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

bird  shot,  Mr.  Wilson  trained  heavy  artillery  on  the 
enemies'  central  position.  The  essential  difference  be 
tween  the  two  men  and  the  operations  of  their  minds  was 
made  clear  in  the  campaign.  No  one  would  wish  to 
minimize  the  unusual  abilities  of  Mr.  Hughes,  but  they 
are  the  abilities  of  an  adroit  lawyer.  He  makes  "points. " 
He  pleases  those  minds  which  like  cleverness  and  finesse. 
He  deals  with  international  affairs  like  an  astute  lawyer 
drawing  a  brief.  But  has  he  ever  quickened  the  nation's 
pulse  or  stirred  its  heart  by  a  single  utterance?  Did  he 
ever  make  any  one  feel  that  behind  the  formalities  of  law, 
civil  or  international,  he  detected  the  heartbeats  of 
humanity  whom  law  is  supposedly  designed  to  serve? 
Mr.  Wilson  was  not  thinking  of  Mr.  Hughes,  but  perhaps 
he  was  thinking  of  the  type  of  which  Mr.  Hughes  is  an 
eminent  example  when  he  said  in  Paris:  "This  is  not  to  be 
a  lawyers'  peace." 

Every  speech  of  President  Wilson's  was,  to  use  a  base 
ball  phrase,  a  home  run  for  the  Democratic  side.  They 
were  delivered  without  much  preparation  and  were  purely 
extemporaneous  in  character.  The  Republican  oppo 
sition  soon  began  to  wince  under  the  smashing  blows 
delivered  by  the  Democratic  candidate,  and  outward 
proof  was  soon  given  of  the  fear  and  despair  that  were  now 
gathering  in  the  Republican  ranks.  With  a  few  short 
trips  to  the  West,  and  his  final  speech  at  Long  Branch, 
President  Wilson  closed  his  campaign,  with  Democratic 
hopes  on  the  rise. 

The  happenings  of  Election  Day,  1916,  will  long  linger  in 
my  memory.  I  was  in  charge  of  the  Executive  offices 
located  at  Asbury  Park,  while  the  President  remained  at 
Shadow  Lawn,  awaiting  the  news  of  the  first  returns  from 
the  country.  The  first  scattered  returns  that  filtered  in 


WILSON    VERSUS    HUGHES  217 

to  the  Executive  offices  came  from  a  little  fishing  town 
in  Massachusetts  early  in  the  afternoon  of  Election  Day, 
which  showed  a  slight  gain  for  the  President  over  the 
election  returns  of  1912.  Then  followed  early  drifts  from 
Colorado  and  Kansas,  which  showed  great  Wilson  gains. 
Those  of  us  who  were  interested  in  the  President's  cause 
were  made  jubilant  by  these  early  returns.  Every  in 
dication,  though  imperfect,  up  to  seven  o'clock  on  the 
night  of  the  election,  forecasted  the  President's  reelection. 

In  the  early  afternoon  the  President  telephoned  the 
Executive  offices  to  inquire  what  news  we  had  received 
from  the  country  and  he  was  apprised  of  the  results  that 
had  come  in  up  to  that  time.  Then,  quickly,  the  tide 
turned  against  us  in  the  most  unusual  way.  Between 
seven  and  nine  o'clock  the  returns  slowly  came  in  from  the 
East  and  Middle  West  that  undeniably  showed  a  drift 
away  from  us. 

About  nine-thirty  o'clock  in  the  evening  I  was  seated 
in  my  office,  when  a  noise  outside  in  the  hallway  attracted 
my  attention  and  gave  me  the  impression  that  something 
unusual  was  afoot.  The  door  of  my  office  opened  and 
there  entered  a  galaxy  of  newspaper  men  connected  with 
the  White  House  offices,  led  by  a  representative  of  the 
New  York  World,  who  held  in  his  hands  a  bulletin  from 
his  office,  carrying  the  news  of  Hughes'  election.  The 
expression  in  the  men's  faces  told  me  that  a  crisis  was  at 
hand.  The  World  man  delivered  his  fateful  message  of 
defeat  for  our  forces,  without  explanation  of  any  kind. 
To  me  the  blow  was  stunning,  for  the  New  York  World  had 
been  one  of  our  staunchest  supporters  throughout  the 
whole  campaign,  and  yet,  I  had  faith  to  believe  that  the 
news  carried  in  the  bulletin  would  be  upset  by  subsequent 
returns.  Steadying  myself  behind  my  desk,  I  quickly 


218    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

made  up  my  mind  as  to  what  my  reply  should  be  to  the 
World  bulletin  and  to  the  query  of  the  newspaper  men 
whether  we  were  ready  to  "throw  up  the  sponge"  and 
concede  Hughes'  election.  Concealing  the  emotion  I  felt, 
I  dictated  the  following  statement,  which  was  flashed 
through  the  country : 

When  Secretary  Tumulty  was  shown  the  World  bulletin,  con 
ceding  Hughes'  election,  he  authorized  the  following  statement:  "Wil 
son  will  win.  The  West  has  not  yet  been  heard  from.  Sufficient  gains 
will  be  made  in  the  West  and  along  the  Pacific  slope  to  offset  the  losses 
in  the  East." 

Shortly  after  the  flash  from  the  World  bulletin  was 
delivered  to  me,  conceding  Hughes'  election,  the  President 
again  telephoned  me  from  Long  Branch  to  find  out  the 
latest  news  of  the  election.  From  what  he  said  he  had 
already  been  apprised  by  Admiral  Grayson  of  the  bulletin 
of  the  New  York  World.  Every  happening  of  that 
memorable  night  is  still  fresh  in  my  memory  and  I  recall 
distinctly  just  what  the  President  said  and  how  philosophi 
cally  he  received  the  news  of  his  apparent  defeat.  Laugh 
ingly  he  said:  "Well,  Tumulty,  it  begins  to  look  as  if  we 
have  been  badly  licked."  As  he  discussed  the  matter 
with  me  I  could  detect  no  note  of  sadness  in  his  voice. 
In  fact,  I  could  hear  him  chuckle  over  the  'phone.  He 
seemed  to  take  an  impersonal  view  of  the  whole  thing  and 
talked  like  a  man  from  whose  shoulders  a  great  load  had 
been  lifted  and  now  he  was  happy  and  rejoicing  that  he 
was  a  free  man  again.  When  I  informed  him  of  the  drifts 
in  our  favour  from  other  parts  of  the  country  and  said  that 
it  was  too  early  to  concede  anything,  he  said:  "Tumulty, 
you  are  an  optimist.  It  begins  to  look  as  if  the  defeat 
might  be  overwhelming.  The  only  thing  I  am  sorry  for, 
and  that  cuts  me  to  the  quick,  is  that  the  people  ap- 


WILSON    VERSUS    HUGHES  219 

parent ly  misunderstood  us.  But  I  have  no  regrets. 
We  have  tried  to  do  our  duty."  So  far  as  he  was  con 
cerned,  the  issue  of  the  election  was  disposed  of,  out  of  the 
way  and  a  settled  thing.  That  was  the  last  telephone 
message  between  the  President  and  myself  until  twenty- 
four  hours  later,  when  the  tide  turned  again  in  our  favour. 
An  unusual  incident  occurred  about  8 :30  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  shortly  after  my  talk  with  the  President.  I  was 
called  to  the  telephone  and  told  that  someone  in  New 
York  wished  to  speak  to  me  on  a  highly  important 
matter.  I  went  to  the  'phone.  At  the  other  end  in 
New  York  was  an  individual  who  refusing  to  give  his 
name,  described  himself  as  a  friend  of  our  cause.  I 
thought  he  was  one  of  the  varieties  of  crank,  with  whom 
I  had  been  accustomed  to  deal  at  the  White  House  on 
frequent  occasions  during  my  life  there;  but  there  was 
something  about  his  talk  that  convinced  me  that  he 
was  in  close  touch  with  someone  in  authority  at  Repub 
lican  headquarters.  In  his  first  talk  with  me,  and  in 
subsequent  talks  during  the  night  of  the  election  and  on 
the  following  day,  there  was  a  warning  to  us,  in  no  way, 
or  by  the  slightest  sign,  to  give  up  the  fight,  or  to  con 
cede  Hughes'  election.  He  said:  "Early  returns  will 
naturally  run  against  Wilson  in  the  East,  particularly  in 
Illinois  and  Iowa,"  and  intimated  to  me  that  the  plan  at 
Republican  headquarters  would  be  to  exaggerate  these 
reports  and  to  overwhelm  us  with  news  of  Republican 
victories  throughout  the  country.  Continuing  his  talk 
he  said:  "The  Wilson  fight  will  be  won  in  the  West.  I 
shall  keep  you  advised  of  what  is  happening  in  Republican 
headquarters.  I  can  only  tell  you  that  I  will  know  what 
is  happening  and  you  may  rely  upon  the  information  I 
shall  give  you." 


220    WOODROW   WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

All  night  long  the  loyal  newspaper  men  and  I  kept  vigil 
at  the  Executive  offices.  As  I  read  over  the  bulletins  that 
came  to  me,  particularly  those  from  Republican  head 
quarters  in  New  York,  I  was  quick  to  notice  that  although 
the  Republican  managers  were  blatantly  proclaiming  to 
the  country  that  the  fight  was  over,  for  some  reason  or 
other,  the  Republican  candidate,  Mr.  Hughes,  who  was 
at  his  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  Astor,  was  silent. 

Just  about  this  time  there  was  another  message  from 
the  mysterious  stranger  in  New  York.  The  message,  as  I 
recall  it,  was  as  follows:  "They  [meaning  the  Republican 
managers]  are  trying  to  induce  Hughes  to  claim  the 
election,  but  he  is  unwilling  to  make  an  announcement  and 
is  asking  for  further  returns.  You  boys  stant  pat.  Re 
turns  that  are  now  coming  in  are  worrying  them.  Don't 
be  swept  off  your  feet  by  claims  from  Republican  head 
quarters.  I  know  what  is  happening  there." 

Shortly  after  this  telephone  message  came  a  bulletin 
from  Republican  headquarters,  stating  that  the  Re 
publican  managers  were  then  in  conference  with  Mr. 
Hughes  and  that  a  statement  from  Mr.  Hughes  would 
soon  be  forthcoming.  This  unusual  coincidence  con 
vinced  me  that  the  man  who  was  telephoning  me  either 
was  on  the  inside  of  affairs  at  Republican  headquarters, 
or  had  an  uncanny  way  of  knowing  just  what  the  managers 
were  doing. 

Up  to  eleven  o'clock  every  bit  of  news  ran  against  us. 
Finally,  the  Brooklyn  Eagle,  a  supporter  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  then  the  New  York  Times,  our  last  line  of 
defense,  gave  way  and  conceded  Hughes'  election,  but 
the  unterrified  Democrats  at  the  Executive  offices  stood 
out  against  any  admission  of  defeat. 

The  mysterious  stranger  was  again  on  the  wire,  saying 


WILSON    VERSUS    HUGHES 

that  there  was  consternation  in  the  Republican  ranks; 
that  George  Perkins  had  just  conferred  with  National 
Chairman Willcox  and  had  left  VViilcox's  room,  shaking  his 
head  and  saying  to  one  of  the  attaches  of  headquarters, 
that  "things  were  not  looking  well."  A  few  minutes 
later  a  bulletin  came  from  Republican  headquarters 
confirming  the  story  the  mysterious  stranger  had  just 
told  over  the  'phone. 

All  the  while  I  was  keeping  in  touch  with  our  head 
quarters  in  New  York  City,  and  about  10:30  o'clock 
Bob  Woolley,  the  publicity  man  of  the  Democratic 
National  Committee,  'phoned  me  and  advised  me  not 
to  concede  anything  and  assured  me  that  the  returns 
from  the  West,  now  coming  in  greater  drifts,  indicated 
Wilson's  reelection. 

When  I  left  the  telephone  booth,  David  Lawrence, 
the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Evening 
Post,  who  a  few  weeks  before  had  predicted,  in  a  remark 
able  article,  the  election  of  Wilson,  and  who  was  my 
friend  and  co-labourer  during  that  night  (in  conjunction 
with  Mr.  L.  Ames  Brown,  a  noted  newspaper  man  of 
Washington,  connected  with  the  Democratic  National 
Committee)  conferred  with  me,  and  from  a  table  he  had 
prepared  showed  me  how  the  small  states  of  the  West, 
which  the  returns  indicated  were  now  coming  into  the 
Wilson,  column,  would  elect  the  Democratic  candidate, 
and  that  under  no  circumstances  must  we,  by  any  chance, 
in  any  statement,  concede  the  election  of  Hughes. 

All  night  long  telephone  messages,  very  brief,  would 
come  from  the  mysterious  stranger  in  New  York,  and 
quickly  there  would  follow  bulletins  from  Republican 
headquarters  confirming  everything  that  he  said.  These 
messages  came  so  rapidly  that  I  was  soon  convinced  that 


222    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

this  individual,  whoever  he  was,  had  the  real  inside  of 
the  Republican  situation.  So  convinced  was  I  that  I 
followed  up  my  statement  of  the  early  evening  with 
additional  statements,  claiming  the  election  for  Mr. 
Wilson. 

Just  about  the  break  of  day  on  Wednesday  morning, 
as  David  Lawrence,  Ames  Brown,  and  my  son  Joe,  were 
seated  in  my  office,  a  room  which  overlooked  a  wide  ex 
panse  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  we  were  notified  by  Demo 
cratic  headquarters  of  the  first  big  drift  toward  Wilson. 
Ohio,  which  in  the  early  evening  had  been  claimed  by  the 
Republicans,  had  turned  to  Wilson  by  an  approximate 
majority  of  sixty  thousand;  Kansas  followed;  Wtah  was 
leaning  toward  him;  North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota 
inclining  the  same  way.  The  Wilson  tide  began  to  rise 
appreciably  from  that  time  on,  until  state  after  state 
from  the  West  came  into  the  Wilson  column.  At  five 
o'clock  in  the  morning  the  New  York  Times  and  the  New 
York  World  recanted  and  were  now  saying  that  the  elec 
tion  of  Mr.  Hughes  was  doubtful. 

Without  sleep  and  without  food,  those  of  us  at  the 
Executive  offices  kept  close  to  the  telephone  wire.  We 
never  left  the  job  for  a  minute.  The  last  message  from 
the  mysterious  stranger  came  about  one  o'clock,  the  day 
following  the  election,  when  he  'phoned  me  that,  "George 
Perkins  is  now  at  Republican  headquarters  and  is  tele 
phoning  Roosevelt  and  will  soon  leave  to  inform  Roose 
velt  that,  to  use  his  own  words,  'the  jig  is  up,'  and  that 
Wilson  is  elected."  Shortly  after,  from  Republican  head 
quarters  came  a  bulletin  saying:  "George  Perkins  is  on 
his  way  to  confer  with  Mr.  Roosevelt." 

Some  months  after  the  election  the  mysterious  stranger 
came  to  the  White  House  offices,  and  without  identifying 


WILSON    VERSUS   HUGHES 

himself,  informed  me  that  he  was  the  individual  who 
on  the  night  of  the  election  had  kept  me  in  touch  with 
Republican  headquarters,  and  then  astounded  me  by 
telling  me  that  in  some  mysterious  way,  which  he  did 
not  disclose,  he  had  succeeded  in  breaking  in  on  the  Re 
publican  National  Committee  wire  and  had  listened  in 
on  every  conversation  that  had  passed  between  Willcox, 
Hughes,  George  Perkins,  Harvey,  and  Theodore  Roose 
velt  himself  during  the  night  of  the  election  and  the  day 
following. 

Mr.  Wilson  arose  the  morning  after  the  election, 
confident  that  he  had  been  defeated.  He  went  about  his 
tasks  in  the  usual  way.  The  first  news  that  he  received 
that  there  had  been  a  turn  in  the  tide  came  from  his  daugh 
ter,  Margaret,  who  knocked  on  the  door  of  the  bathroom 
while  the  President  was  shaving  and  told  him  of  the 
"Extra"  of  the  New  York  Times,  saying  that  the  election 
was  in  doubt,  with  indications  of  a  Wilson  victory. 
The  President  thought  that  his  daughter  was  playing 
a  practical  joke  on  him  and  told  her  to  "tell  that  to  the 
Marines,"  and  went  on  about  his  shaving. 

When  the  President  and  I  discussed  the  visit  of  his 
daughter,  Margaret,  to  notify  him  of  his  reelection,  he 
informed  me  that  he  was  just  beginning  to  enjoy  the 
reaction  of  defeat  when  he  was  notified  that  the  tide 
had  turned  in  his  favour.  This  will  seem  unusual,  but 
those  of  us  who  were  close  to  the  man  and  who  under 
stood  the  trials  and  tribulations  of  the  Presidency,  knew 
that  he  was  in  fact  for  the  first  time  in  four  years  enjoying 
the  freedom  of  private  life. 

Mr.  Wilson's  imperturbability  on  election  night  was 
like  that  of  sturdy  Grover  Cleveland,  though  tempera 
mentally  the  men  were  unlike.  Mr.  Cleveland  used  to 


224    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

tell  his  friends  how  in  1884  he  had  gone  to  bed  early  not 
knowing  who  was  elected,  and  how  he  learned  the  news 
of  his  election  next  morning  from  his  valet,  after  having 
first  made  inquiries  about  the  state  of  the  weather.  In 
1892  Mr.  Cleveland,  his  wife,  and  two  friends  played  a 
quiet  game  of  cards  while  the  returns  were  coming  in. 
In  reciting  these  reminiscences,  the  old  warrior  used  to 
say  that  he  never  could  understand  the  excitement  of 
candidates  on  election  nights.  "The  fight  is  all  over 
then,"  he  would  say,  "and  it  is  merely  a  matter  of  count 
ing  the  ballots."  Mr.  Wilson  preserved  the  same  calm 
ness,  which  appeared  almost  like  indifference.  In  1912 
he  sat  in  the  sitting  room  of  his  little  cottage  in  Cleve 
land  Lane  in  Princeton  quietly  reading  from  one  of  his 
favourite  authors  and  occasionally  joining  in  the  con 
versation  of  Mrs.  Wilson  and  a  few  neighbours  who  had 
dropped  in.  In  a  rear  room  there  was  a  telegraphic 
ticker,  an  operator,  and  some  newspaper  boys  who  at 
intervals  would  take  an  especially  interesting  bulletin  in 
to  Mr.  Wilson,  who  would  glance  at  it  casually,  make 
some  brief  comment,  and  then  return  to  his  book.  One 
of  the  guests  of  the  evening  who  read  in  a  newspaper  next 
day  a  rather  melodramatic  and  entirely  imaginative  ac 
count  of  the  scene,  said:  "The  only  dramatic  thing  about 
the  evening  was  that  there  was  nothing  dramatic." 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

NEUTRALITY 

WHILE  President  Wilson  was  giving  his  whole 
thought  and  effort  to  the  solution  of  exacting 
domestic  tasks,  the  European  war  broke  upon 
him  and  thus  turned  his  attention  and  study  to  the  age 
long  and  complicated  political  struggle  between  Germany, 
France,  and  England. 

Fully  conscious  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  diffi 
culties  that  lay  in  his  path,  he  was  aware  of  the  eventuali 
ties  the  war  now  beginning  might  lead  to.  As  a  profound 
student  of  history  he  saw  with  a  clear  vision  the  necessity 
of  neutrality  and  of  America  remaining  disentangled  in 
every  way  from  the  embroilments  of  Europe.  To  the 
people  of  the  country  it  at  first  appeared  that  the  war 
was  one  more  in  a  long  series  of  European  quarrels  and 
that  we  must  play  our  part  in  the  great  conflict  as  mere 
spectators  and  strictly  adhere  to  the  American  policy  of 
traditional  aloofness  and  isolation,  which  had  been 
our  immemorial  custom  and  habit.  Although  we  were 
bound  to  maintain  a  policy  of  isolation,  Woodrow  Wilson 
from  the  beginning  foresaw  its  futility,  and  afterward 
gave  expression  to  this  conviction  in  a  campaign  speech 
in  1916,  when  he  said: 

This  is  the  last  war  [meaning  the  World  War]  of  its  kind  or  of 
any  kind  that  involves  the  world  that  the  United  States  can  keep 
out  of.  I  say  that  because  I  believe  that  the  business  of  neutrality 
is  over;  not  because  I  want  it  to  be  over,  but  I  mean  this,  that  war 


226    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

now  has  such  a  scale  that  the  position  of  neutrals  sooner  or  later 
becomes  intolerable. 


He  knew  how  difficult  it  would  be  to  keep  a  people  so 
variously  constituted  strictly  neutral.  No  sooner  was 
his  proclamation  of  neutrality  announced  than  the  differ 
ences  in  points  of  view  in  racial  stocks  began  to  manifest 
themselves  in  language  both  intemperate  and  passionate, 
until  his  advice  to  his  country  "to  be  neutral  in  fact  as 
well  as  in  name"  became  a  dead  and  spiritless  thing. 

I  have  often  been  asked  if  the  policy  of  neutrality  which 
the  President  announced,  and  which  brought  a  fire  of  crit 
icism  upon  him,  represented  his  own  personal  feelings 
toward  the  European  war,  and  whether  if  he  had  been  a 
private  citizen,  he  would  have  derided  it  as  now  his  crit 
ics  were  engaged  in  doing. 

As  an  intimate  associate  of  Woodrow  Wilson  during 
the  whole  of  the  European  war,  and  witnessing  from  day 
to  day  the  play  of  his  feelings,  especially  after  the  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  I  am  certain  that  had  he 
been  free  to  do  so  he  would  have  yielded  to  the  im 
pulse  of  championing  a  cause  that  in  his  heart  of  hearts 
he  felt  involved  the  civilization  of  the  world.  But  it  was 
his  devotion  to  the  idea  of  trusteeship  that  held  him  in 
check,  and  the  consciousness  that  in  carrying  out  that 
trusteeship  he  had  no  right  to  permit  his  own  passionate 
feelings  to  govern  his  public  acts. 

It  would  have  been  a  dramatic  adventure  to  accept 
Germany's  assault  on  Belgium  as  a  challenge  to  the 
humane  interest  of  America,  but  the  acceptance  would 
have  been  only  a  gesture,  for  we  were  unable  to  transport 
armies  to  the  theatre  of  war  in  time  to  check  the  outrage. 
Such  action  would  have  pleased  some  people  in  the  East, 


NEUTRALITY  227 

but  the  President  knew  that  this  quixotic  knight  errantry 
would  not  appeal  to  the  country  at  large,  particularly 
the  West,  still  strongly  grounded  in  the  Washingtonian 
tradition  of  non-interference  in  European  quarrels. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  himself,  who  subsequently  attacked 
so  strongly  the  "pusillanimity"  of  the  Administration's 
course,  said  on  September  23,  1915: 

A  deputation  of  Belgians  has  arrived  in  this  country  to  invoke 
our  assistance  in  the  time  of  their  dreadful  need.  What  action 
our  government  can  or  will  take  I  know  not.  It  has  been  announced 
that  no  action  can  be  taken  that  will  interfere  with  our  entire  neu 
trality.  It  is  certainly  eminently  desirable  that  we  should  remain 
entirely  neutral  and  nothing  but  urgent  need  would  warrant  breaking 
our  neutrality  and  taking  sides  one  way  or  the  other. 

It  was  not  the  policy  of  a  weakling  or  a  timid  man.  It 
was  the  policy  of  a  prudent  leader  and  statesman,  who 
was  feeling  his  way  amid  dangers  and  who  as  an  historian 
himself  knew  the  difficulties  of  an  imprudent  or  incautious 
move. 

I  recall  the  day  he  prepared  his  neutrality  proclamation. 
At  the  end  of  one  of  the  most  strenuous  days  of  his  life 
in  Washington,  he  left  the  Executive  offices  where  he 
was  engaged  in  meeting  and  conferring  with  senators 
and  congressmen,  and  I  found  him  comfortably  seated 
under  an  elm  tree,  serenely  engaged  with  pad  and  pencil 
in  preparing  his  neutrality  proclamation,  which  was  soon 
to  loose  a  fierce  storm  of  opposition  and  ridicule  upon 
him.  He  and  I  had  often  discussed  the  war  and  its  effect 
upon  our  own  country,  and  one  day  in  August,  1914,  just 
after  the  Great  War  had  begun,  he  said  to  me:  "We  are 
going  through  deep  waters  in  the  days  to  come.  The 
passions  now  lying  dormant  will  soon  be  aroused  and  my 


228    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

motives  and  purposes  at  every  turn  will  soon  be  chal 
lenged  until  there  will  be  left  but  few  friends  to  justify 
my  course.  It  does  not  seem  clear  now,  but  as  this  war 
grows  in  intensity  it  will  soon  resolve  itself  into  a  war  be 
tween  autocracy  and  democracy.  Various  racial  groups 
in  America  will  seek  to  lead  us  now  one  way  and  then  an 
other.  We  must  sit  steady  in  the  boat  and  bow  our  heads 
to  meet  the  storm." 

Bound  as  he  was  by  the  responsibilities  of  trusteeship 
to  adhere  to  a  policy  of  neutrality,  personally  he  saw 
that  the  inevitable  results  would  be  only  bitter  disappoint 
ment.  "We  cannot  remain  isolated  in  this  war,"  he  said, 
"for  soon  the  contagion  of  it  will  spread  until  it  reaches 
our  own  shores.  On  the  one  side  Mr.  Bryan  will  cen 
sure  the  Administration  for  being  too  militaristic,  and  on 
the  other  we  will  find  Mr.  Roosevelt  criticizing  us  be 
cause  we  are  too  pacifist  in  our  tendencies." 

Dr.  William  E.  Dodd,  in  his  book  "Woodrow  Wilson 
and  His  Work,"  has  sensed  the  complicated  situation 
in  which  the  President  found  himself:  "The  British  block 
ade,  becoming  more  effective  every  day,  barred  the  way 
of  American  goods  to  Germany  and  even  neutral  countries. 
Hoke  Smith  and  a  score  of  southern  senators  and  repre 
sentatives  urged  him  to  protest  against  the  blockade. 
Representatives  of  the  packers  of  Chicago  and  the  farmers 
of  the  Northwest  urged  him  to  open  the  way  to  hungry 
markets  for  their  goods.  He  made  his  fight  during  the 
autumn  of  1914  and  1915  against  all  the  more  drastic 
phases  of  the  British  blockade,  against  British  inter 
ference  with  our  cargoes  for  neutral  ports. '%•/  Every 
artificial  device  for  increasing  our  trade  with  neutral 
countries  was  suggested  by  those  who  sought  his  aid  and 
counsel  in  the  matter.  Cotton  of  all  the  commodities 


NEUTRALITY  229 

was  the  hardest  hit.  When  Judge  Adamson  of  Georgia 
urged  action  by  the  President  to  help  in  the  matter  of 
cotton,  the  President  tried  to  impress  upon  him  that, 
with  the  World  War  in  progress,  the  law  of  supply 
and  demand  was  deeply  affected  and  that  the  sales  of 
cotton  were  necessarily  restricted  by  reason  of  the  closure 
of  certain  markets  to  our  goods.  Judge  Adamson,  in  urging 
his  views  upon  the  President,  said:  "But  you,  Mr. 
President,  can  suspend  the  law  of  supply  and  demand." 
The  President  responded  by  saying:  "If  I  did,  Judge, 
and  you  ran  your  head  up  against  it,  you  might  get  hurt." 

Every  sympathizer  with  Germany  pursued  the  Presi 
dent  relentlessly  with  insistent  demand  that  England 
should  be  brought  to  book  for  the  unreasonable  character 
of  the  blockade  which  she  was  carrying  on  against  our 
commerce  on  the  high  seas.  The  President  in  every 
diplomatic  way  possible  pressed  America's  claims  against 
England,  but  these  demands  did  not  satisfy  the  German 
sympathizers  throughout  the  country  who  covertly 
sought  to  bring  about  a  real  breach  between  the  two 
countries.  Even  I  felt  that  we  should  go  further  in  our 
demands  upon  England  than  the  President  seemed 
willing  to  go. 

The  pressure  upon  us  at  the  White  House  for  satis 
faction  at  the  hands  of  England  grew  more  intense 
with  each  day.  I  recall  a  conversation  I  had  with  the 
President  shortly  before  the  Congressional  elections 
when  the  President's  political  enemies  were  decrying  his 
kind  treatment  of  England  and  excoriating  him  for  the 
stern  manner  in  which  he  was  holding  Germany  to  strict 
accountability  for  her  actions.  This  conversation  was 
held  while  we  were  on  board  the  President's  train  on  our 
way  to  the  West.  After  dinner  one  evening  I  tactfully 


230    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

broached  the  subject  of  the  British  blockade  and  laid 
before  the  President  the  use  our  enemies  were  making  of 
his  patient  action  toward  England.  My  frank  criticism 
deeply  aroused  him.  Replying  to  me  he  pitilessly  at 
tacked  those  who  were  criticizing  him  for  "  letting  up 
on  Great  Britain."  Looking  across  the  table  at  me  he 
said:  "I  am  aware  of  the  demands  that  are  daily  being 
made  upon  me  by  my  friends  for  more  vigorous  action 
against  England  in  the  matter  of  the  blockade;  I  am 
aware  also  of  the  sinister  political  purpose  that  lies  back 
of  many  of  these  demands.  Many  senators  and  con 
gressmen  who  urge  radical  action  against  England  are 
thinking  only  of  German  votes  in  their  districts  and  are 
not  thinking  of  the  world  crisis  that  would  inevitably 
occur  should  there  be  an  actual  breach  at  this  time  be 
tween  England  and  America  over  the  blockade."  Then 
looking  squarely  at  me,  he  said:  "I  have  gone  to  the  very 
limit  in  pressing  our  claims  upon  England  and  in  urging 
the  British  Foreign  Office  to  modify  the  blockade.  Wal 
ter  Page,  our  Ambassador  to  England,  has  placed  every 
emphasis  upon  our  insistence  that  something  be  done, 
and  something  will  be  done,  but  England,  now  in  the 
throes  of  a  great  war  crisis,  must  at  least  be  given  a 
chance  to  adjust  these  matters.  Only  a  few  days  ago 
Mr.  Page  wrote  me  a  most  interesting  letter,  describ 
ing  the  details  of  a  conference  he  had  had  with  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  to  dis 
cuss  our  protests  against  the  British  blockade.  Mr. 
Page  described  the  room  in  which  the  conference  was 
held,  on  the  wall  of  which  was  hung  as  a  memorial  the 
fifteen-million-dollar  check  with  which  Great  Britain 
paid  the  Alabama  claims  in  the  Civil  War.  Mr.  Page 
pointed  to  this  Alabama  check  and  said:  'If  you  don't 


NEUTRALITY  231 

stop  these  seizures,  Sir  Edward,  some  day  you  will  have 
your  entire  room  papered  with  things  like  that.'  Sir 
Edward  replied:  'That  may  be  so,  but  we  will  pay  every 
cent.  Of  course,  many  of  the  restrictions  we  have  laid 
down  and  which  seriously  interfere  with  your  trade 
are  unreasonable.  But  America  must  remember  that 
we  are  fighting  her  fight,  as  well  as  our  own,  to  save  the 
civilization  of  the  world.  You  dare  not  press  us  too  far !' ' 
Turning  to  me,  the  President  said:  "He  was  right.  Eng 
land  is  fighting  our  fight  and  you  may  well  understand 
that  I  shall  not,  in  the  present  state  of  the  world's  affairs, 
place  obstacles  in  her  way.  Many  of  our  critics  suggest 
war  with  England  in  order  to  force  reparation  in  these 
matters.  War  with  England  would  result  in  a  German 
triumph.  No  matter  what  may  happen  to  me  personally 
in  the  next  election,  I  will  not  take  any  action  to  em 
barrass  England  when  she  is  fighting  for  her  life  and  the 
life  of  the  world.  Let  those  who  clamour  for  radical  ac 
tion  against  England  understand  this!" 

While  the  critics  of  the  President  were  busily  engaged 
in  embarrassing  and  "hazing"  him  at  every  point  and 
insisting  upon  a  "show-down"  with  Great  Britain  over 
the  blockade,  the  world  was  startled  on  May  7,  1915, 
by  the  news  of  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  off  the  coast 
of  Ireland,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  many  American  lives. 
A  few  days  later  came  the  news  that  the  German  people 
were  rejoicing  at  the  fine  stroke  of  the  submarine  com 
mander  in  consummating  this  horrible  tragedy. 

The  President's  critics  who,  a  few  days  before,  were 
assailing  him  for  his  supposed  surrender  to  England,  were 
now  demanding  an  immediate  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany,  but  not  for  a  moment  did  the  President 
waver  before  these  clamorous  demands.  To  such  an 


232    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

extent  did  he  carry  this  attitude  of  calmness  and  stead 
iness  of  purpose  that  on  "the  outside"  the  people  felt 
that  there  was  in  him  a  heartlessness  and  an  indiffer 
ence  to  the  deep  tragedy  of  the  Lusitania.  At  my 
first  meeting  with  him  I  tried  to  call  to  his  attention 
many  of  the  tragic  details  of  the  sinking  of  the  great 
ship  in  an  effort  to  force  his  hands,  so  to  speak,  but  he 
quickly  checked  what  appeared  to  be  my  youthful  impetu 
osity  and  said:  "Tumulty,  it  would  be  much  wiser  for  us 
not  to  dwell  too  much  upon  these  matters."  When  he 
uttered  this  admonition  there  was  no  suggestion  of  coldness 
about  him.  In  fact,  he  seemed  to  be  deeply  moved  as  I 
adverted  to  some  of  the  facts  surrounding  this  regrettable 
and  tragic  affair.  At  times  tears  stood  in  his  eyes,  and 
turning  to  me  he  said:  "If  I  pondered  over  those  tragic 
items  that  daily  appear  in  the  newspapers  about  the 
Lusitania,  I  should  see  red  in  everything,  and  I  am  afraid 
that  when  I  am  called  upon  to  act  with  reference  to  this 
situation  I  could  not  be  just  to  any  one.  I  dare  not  act 
unjustly  and  cannot  indulge  my  own  passionate  feelings." 

Evidently  he  saw  that  his  turning  away  from  the 
topic  in  this  apparently  indifferent  way  did  not  sit  well 
with  me.  Quickly  he  understood  my  dissatisfaction  and 
said:  "I  suppose  you  think  I  am  cold  and  indifferent  and 
little  less  than  human,  but,  my  dear  fellow,  you  are  mis 
taken,  for  I  have  spent  many  sleepless  hours  thinking 
about  this  tragedy.  It  has  hung  over  me  like  a  terrible 
nightmare.  In  God's  name,  how  could  any  nation  calling 
itself  civilized  purpose  so  horrible  a  thing?" 

At  the  time  we  were  discussing  this  grave  matter  we 
were  seated  in  the  President's  study  in  the  White  House. 
I  had  never  seen  him  more  serious  or  careworn.  I  was 
aware  that  he  was  suffering  under  the  criticism  that  had 


NEUTRALITY  233 

been  heaped  upon  him  for  his  apparent  inaction  in  the 
matter  of  the  Lusitania.  Turning  to  me  he  said :  "Let  me 
try  to  make  my  attitude  in  this  matter  plain  to  you,  so  that 
you  at  least  will  try  to  understand  what  lies  in  my 
thoughts.  I  am  bound  to  consider  in  the  most  careful 
and  cautious  way  the  first  step  I  shall  take,  because  once 
having  taken  it  I  cannot  withdraw  from  it.  I  am  bound 
to  consider  beforehand  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  sur 
rounding  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  to  calculate  the 
effect  upon  the  country  of  every  incautious  or  unwise  move. 
I  am  keenly  aware  that  the  feeling  of  the  country  is  now 
at  fever  heat  and  that  it  is  ready  to  move  with  me  in  any 
direction  I  shall  suggest,  but  I  am  bound  to  weigh  care 
fully  the  effect  of  radical  action  now  based  upon  the  pres 
ent  emotionalism  of  the  people.  I  am  not  sure  whether 
the  present  emotionalism  of  the  country  would  last  long 
enough  to  sustain  any  action  I  would  suggest  to  Congress, 
and  thus  in  case  of  failure  we  should  be  left  without 
that  fine  backing  and  support  so  necessary  to  maintain 
a  great  cause.  I  could  go  to  Congress  to-morrow  and 
advocate  war  with  Germany  and  I  feel  certain  that 
Congress  would  support  me,  but  what  would  the  country 
say  when  war  was  declared,  and  finally  came,  and  we  were 
witnessing  all  of  its  horrors  and  bloody  aftermath.  As 
the  people  pored  over  the  casualty  lists,  would  they 
not  say:  'Why  did  Wilson  move  so  fast  in  this  matter? 
Why  didn't  he  try  peaceably  to  settle  this  question  with 
Germany?  Why  could  he  not  have  waited  a  little  longer? 
Why  was  he  so  anxious  to  go  to  war  with  Germany,  yet 
at  the  same  time  why  was  he  so  tender  of  the  feelings 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  matter  of  the  blockade?'  Were  I 
to  advise  radical  action  now,  we  should  have  nothing,  I 
am  afraid,  but  regrets  and  heartbreaks.  The  vastness 


234    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

of  this  country;  its  variegated  elements;  the  conflicting 
cross-currents  of  national  feelings  bid  us  wait  and  with 
hold  ourselves  from  hasty  or  precipitate  action.  When 
we  move  against  Germany  we  must  be  certain  that  the 
whole  country  not  only  moves  with  us  but  is  willing  to 
go  forward  to  the  end  with  enthusiasm.  I  know  that 
we  shall  be  condemned  for  waiting,  but  in  the  last  analysis 
I  am  the  trustee  of  this  nation,  and  the  cost  of  it  all 
must  be  considered  in  the  reckoning  before  we  go  for 
ward." 

Then  leaning  closer  to  me,  he  said:  "It  will  not  do 
for  me  to  act  as  if  I  had  been  hurried  into  precipitate 
action  against  Germany.  I  must  answer  for  the  con 
sequences  of  my  action.  What  is  the  picture  that  lies 
before  me?  All  the  great  nations  of  Europe  at  war, 
engaged  in  a  death  grapple  that  may  involve  civiliza 
tion.  My  earnest  hope  and  fervent  prayer  has  been 
that  America  could  withhold  herself  and  remain  out 
of  this  terrible  mess  and  steer  clear  of  European  em 
broilments,  and  at  the  right  time  offer  herself  as  the 
only  mediating  influence  to  bring  about  peace.  We  are 
the  only  great  nation  now  free  to  do  this.  If  we  should 
go  in,  then  the  whole  civilized  world  will  become  in 
volved.  What  a  pretty  mess  it  would  be !  America,  the 
only  nation  disconnected  from  this  thing  £nd  now  she  is 
surrendering  the  leadership  she  occupies  and  becomes 
involved  as  other  nations  have.  Think  of  the  tragedy! 
I  am  not  afraid  to  go  to  war.  No  man  fit  to  be  Presi 
dent  of  this  nation,  knowing  the  way  its  people  would 
respond  to  any  demand  that  might  be  made  upon  them, 
need  have  fears  or  doubts  as  to  what  stand  it  would 
finally  take.  But  what  I  fear  more  than  anything  else  is 
the  possibility  of  world  bankruptcy  that  will  inevitably 


NEUTRALITY  235 

follow  our  getting  into  this  thing,  Not  only  world 
chaos  and  bankruptcy,  but  all  of  the  distempers,  social, 
moral,  and  industrial,  that  will  flow  from  this  world 
cataclysm.  No  sane  man,  therefore,  who  knows  the 
dangerous  elements  that  are  abroad  in  the  world  would, 
without  feeling  out  every  move,  seek  to  lead  his  people 
without  counting  the  cost  and  dispassionately  deliberat 
ing  upon  every  move." 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Helena,  Montana,  he  frankly 
spoke  of  the  "break  down"  of  neutrality  in  these  words: 

In  the  Providence  of  God,  the  leadership  of  this  nation  was  in 
trusted  to  me  during  those  early  years  of  the  war  when  we  were  not 
in  it.  I  was  aware  through  many  subtle  channels  of  the  movements 
of  opinion  in  this  country,  and  I  know  that  the  thing  that  this  country 
chiefly  desired,  the  thing  that  you  men  out  here  in  the  West  chiefly 
desired  and  the  thing  that  of  course  every  loving  woman  had  at  her 
heart,  was  that  we  should  keep  out  of  the  war,  and  we  tried  to  per 
suade  ourselves  that  the  European  business  was  not  our  business. 
We  tried  to  convince  ourselves  that  no  matter  what  happened  on  the 
other  side  of  the  sea,  no  obligation  of  duty  rested  upon  us,  and  finally 
we  found  the  currents  of  humanity  too  strong  for  us.  We  found  that 
a  great  consciousness  was  welling  up  in  us  that  this  was  not  a  local 
cause,  that  this  was  not  a  struggle  which  was  to  be  confined  to 
Europe,  or  confined  to  Asia,  to  which  it  had  spread,  but  that  it  was 
something  that  involved  the  very  fate  of  civilization;  and  there  was 
one  great  nation  in  the  world  that  could  not  afford  to  stay  out  of  it. 
There  are  gentlemen  opposing  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  who  at 
that  time  taunted  the  Administration  of  the  United  States  that  it  had 
lost  touch  with  its  international  conscience.  They  were  eager  to  go  in, 
and  now  that  they  have  got  in,  and  are  caught  in  the  whole  network 
of  human  conscience,  they  want  to  break  out  and  stay  out.  We  were 
caught  in  this  thing  by  the  action  of  a  nation  utterly  unlike  ourselves. 
What  I  mean  to  say  is  that  the  German  nation,  the  German  people, 
had  no  choice  whatever  as  to  whether  it  was  to  go  into  that  war  or 
not,  did  not  know  that  it  was  going  into  it  until  its  men  were  summoned 
to  the  colours.  I  remember,  not  once,  but  of  ten,  that  while  sitting  at  the 


236    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Cabinet  table  in  Washington  I  asked  my  colleagues  what  their  impres 
sion  was  of  the  opinion  of  the  country  before  we  went  into  the  war,  and 
I  remember  one  day  one  of  my  colleagues  said  to  me:  "Mr.  Presi 
dent,  I  think  the  people  of  the  country  would  take  your  advice  and 
do  what  you  suggested."  "Why,"  I  said,  "that  is  not  what  I  am 
waiting  for;  that  is  not  enough.  If  they  cannot  go  in  with  a  whoop, 
there  is  no  use  of  their  going  in  at  all.  I  do  not  want  them  to  wait 
on  me.  I  am  waiting  on  them.  I  want  to  know  what  the  conscience 
of  this  country  is  speaking.  I  want  to  know  what  purpose  is  aris 
ing  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  this  country  with  regard  to  this 
world  situation."  When  I  thought  I  heard  that  voice,  it  was  then 
that  I  proposed  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  that  we  should 
include  ourselves  in  the  challenge  that  Germany  was  giving  to  mankind. 

On  May  10,  1915,  he  made  a  speech  in  Philadelphia, 
which  contained  the  regrettable  and  much-criticized 
phrase,  "Too  proud  to  fight."  Unfortunately,  the  head 
lines  of  the  papers  carried  only  the  phrase,  "Too  proud 
to  fight,"  and  little  or  no  attention  was  paid  to  the  con 
text  of  the  speech  in  which  the  phrase  was  lodged.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  nothing  unusual  about  the 
character  of  this  speech.  The  phrase,  "Too  proud  to 
fight,"  was  simply  expressive  of  the  President's  policy 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  It  was  not  a  new  thought 
with  him.  Some  weeks  before  he  had  said  the  same 
thing,  only  in  different  words,  in  a  speech  delivered  at  a 
banquet  of  the  Associated  Press  in  New  York:  "My 
interest  in  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States  is  not 
a  petty  desire  to  keep  out  of  trouble.  I  am  inter 
ested  in  neutrality  because  there  is  something  so  much 
greater  to  do  than  fight.  There  is  a  distinction  awaiting 
this  nation  that  no  nation  has  ever  yet  got.  That  is 
the  distinction  of  absolute  self-control  and  mastery." 
The  phrase,  "Too  proud  to  fight,"  was  simply  expressive 
of  the  idea  that  was  close  to  his  heart:  a  reliance  upon 


NEUTRALITY  237 

means  of  settling  our  difficulties  with  Germany  other  than 
a  resort  to  war. 

On  our  way  to  Philadelphia  on  the  day  of  the  delivery 
of  this  speech  I  read  a  copy  of  it  which  the  President 
handed  to  me,  and  when  I  ran  across  the  phrase,  "Too 
proud  to  fight,"  I  scented  the  political  danger  in  it 
and  warned  him,  but  he  declined  to  be  admonished 
because  he  was  confident  in  the  moral  strength  of  his 
position,  namely,  that  self-mastery  is  sometimes  more 
heroic  than  fighting,  or  as  the  Bible  states  it,  "He  that 
ruleth  his  own  spirit  is  greater  than  he  that  taketh  a  city," 
and  trusted  the  people  to  understand  his  full  meaning. 
The  President  himself  was  so  above  the  petty  tricks  by 
which  politicians  wrest  words  from  their  context  and 
force  upon  them  unfavourable  meaning  that  he  sometimes 
incautiously  played  into  the  hands  of  this  type  of  foe. 
Nor  did  he  fully  realize  that  his  gift  for  making  striking 
and  quotable  phrases  added  to  the  danger.  It  was  an 
unfortunate  phrase,  "Too  proud  to  fight,"  but  none  who 
thoughtfully  read  the  context  with  unprejudiced  mind 
could  fail  to  see  the  moral  grandeur  of  the  President's 
position. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

PREPAREDNESS 

THE  feelings  of  the  people  throughout  the  country 
began  to  be  aroused  as  they  witnessed  the  out 
lawry  of  Germany  in  ruthlessly  attacking  and 
wantonly  interfering  with  American  commerce  on  the 
high  seas.  The  agitation  for  preparedness  to  meet  a  criti 
cal  world  situation  was  on  in  full  swing.  Congress  and 
the  President  were  harassed  by  conflicting  demands  from 
every  side  immediately  to  "put  our  house  in  order"  and 
to  set  America  safely  on  the  road  to  national  prepared 
ness.  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  clamorously  demanding 
universal  compulsory  military  service  and  was  ably  aided 
by  General  Wood  and  Admiral  Peary,  who  urged  the  adop 
tion  of  conscription.  Secretary  of  War  Garrison  and  Sena 
tor  Chamberlain,  of  Oregon,  were  converted  to  this  radical 
movement  and  unwittingly  became  part  and  parcel  of  the 
Roosevelt- Wood  preparedness  propaganda.  These  gentle 
men  could  see  only  the  direct  route  to  the  accomplishment 
of  the  purpose  they  had  in  mind  and  were  alike  unmindful 
of  the  difficulties  and  obstacles  that  lay  in  the  President's 
path.  To  them  it  appeared  that  all  it  was  necessary  for 
the  President  to  do  was  boldly  to  announce  his  programme 
of  preparedness  and  serenely  to  await  its  approval  at  the 
hands  of  Congress.  They  were  unmindful  of  the  diffi 
culties  of  the  situation  and  of  the  consummate  tact  that 
would  be  required  on  the  part  of  the  President  to  induce 
Congress  to  turn  away  from  the  old  volunteer  system  and 

238 


PREPAREDNESS  239 

to  put  into  effect  at  once  a  system  that  overnight  would 
transform  America  into  an  armed  camp.  The  President 
was  bound  to  consider  the  stern  actualities  of  the  situ 
ation  and  to  withhold  himself  as  far  as  possible  from  a 
too  vigorous  insistence  on  any  programme  of  preparedness 
that  was  not  traditionally,  fundamentally  American.  It 
was  a  case  of  honest  men  seeing  the  same  thing  in  the 
same  way  but  differing  as  to  the  practicable  means  of  ac 
complishing  it.  The  President  early  realized  that  the  vol 
unteer  system  was  unsuited  to  our  present  needs  and  that 
it  could  not  be  quickly  turned  into  an  active  force  to  an 
swer  emergencies,  but  he  was  certain,  also,  that  the  people 
of  the  country  must  be  convinced  of  this  before  they  would 
agree  to  cut  themselves  away  from  the  volunteer  system 
under  which  previous  American  wars  had  been  fought 
to  a  successful  conclusion.  The  President  felt  that  the 
old  volunteer  system  was  antiquated  and  not  to  be  con 
sidered,  but  the  duty  lay  upon  him  to  convince  the  leaders 
of  the  Senate  and  House  and  the  people  that  this  was 
a  fact.  This  was  no  easy  task  to  accomplish.  Haste  or 
impetuous  action  on  his  part  in  advocating  conscription 
could  only,  in  his  opinion,  delay  matters  and  embarrass 
the  very  purpose  that  lay  in  his  mind. 

While  Roosevelt  and  Garrison  were  criticizing  Con 
gressional  inaction,  the  President's  mind  was  "open  and 
to  let"  on  the  question  of  what  constituted  the  best 
means  of  putting  America  in  a  state  of  actual  and  aggres 
sive  preparedness.  As  President,  he  was  bound  to  take 
cognizance  of  the  deep-seated  antagonism  on  the  part 
of  the  American  people  to  any  system  of  military  pre 
paredness  that  had  a  compulsory  feature  as  its  basic 
element.  It  was  the  President's  opinion  that  the  people 
of  a  country  so  big  and  varied  as  America  had  to  be 


240     WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

convinced  by  alternative  methods  as  to  what,  in  the  last 
analysis,  was  the  best  means  of  preparing  the  country 
against  aggression. 

While  he  was  convinced  that  we  had  to  be  prepared 
and  ready  to  meet  any  emergency,  he  was  not  to  be 
rushed  in  the  matter  and  was  keeping  his  mind  open  to 
find  the  best  and  most  practical  method  of  accomplish 
ing  what  he  thought  the  average  opinion  of  the  country 
demanded  in  the  way  of  preparedness. 

I  had  often  discussed  the  matter  with  the  President 
and,  watching  the  agitation  for  preparedness  from  the 
side-lines,  had  stated  my  views  in  letters  reading  in  part 
as  follows: 


DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

In  my  opinion,  there  is  left  to  the  Republican  party  but  two  avail 
able  issues  for  the  campaign  of  1916, — the  tariff  and  the  question  of 
national  defense.  How  we  are  to  meet  the  enemy  on  these  questions 
is  a  subject  which  we  ought  thoroughly  to  consider  and  discuss  in 
the  coming  months. 

As  to  National  Defense:  In  this  matter  we  must  have  a  sane, 
reasonable  and  workable  programme.  That  programme  must  have 
in  it,  the  ingredients  that  will  call  forth  the  hearty  support  of, 
first,  the  whole  Cabinet  (and  particularly  the  Secretary  of  War); 
second,  the  leaders  of  the  party  in  the  Senate  and  House ;  third, 
the  rank  and  file  of  Democrats  in  both  Houses;  fourth,  the  Army 
and  the  Navy;  and  last  but  not  least,  the  great  body  of  the  American 
people. 

Successfully  to  carry  through  this  programme  will  taxyour  leadership 
in  the  party  to  the  last  degree.  On  the  eve  of  the  campaign  of  1916, 
your  attitude  and  accomplishment  in  this  matter  will  be  accepted 
by  the  country  as  the  final  test  of  your  leadership  and  will  be  of 
incalculable  psychological  importance  to  the  party;  and,  therefore, 
in  the  carrying  out  of  this  programme  we  cannot  afford  to  hesitate  or 
to  blunder,  because  as  election  day  approaches  trivial  mistakes  will 


PREPAREDNESS  241 

be  magnified  and  exaggerated  by  the  opposition,  to  the  hurt  and  in 
jury  of  our  party  and  your  prestige  as  leader. 

TUMULTY. 
THE  PRESIDENT, 

Cornish,  New  Hampshire. 


MY  DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  cannot  impress  upon  you  too  forcibly  the  importance  of  an  appeal 
to  the  country  at  this  time  on  the  question  of  preparedness.  No 
matter  what  the  character  of  the  information  is  that  you  are  re 
ceiving,  I  have  it  from  all  sources  that  there  is  no  enthusiasm  on  the 
"hill"  for  preparedness,  and  that  the  country  itself  is  indifferent  be 
cause  of  its  apparent  inability  to  grasp  the  importance  and  full 
significance  of  this  question.  This  indifference  arises  out  of  two 
things:  first,  the  attitude  of  the  pacifists  whose  feelings  have  been 
nurtured  by  the  preachings  of  Mr.  Bryan;  second,  the  attitude  of 
those  in  the  country  who  believe  in  preparedness  and  who  are  fright 
ened  because  of  the  big  talk  of  Roosevelt  and  others  on  their  plan 
for  military  conscription. 

There  is  no  doubt  how  the  body  of  the  American  people  feel  on  this 
question  of  preparedness.  You  can,  therefore,  with  much  greater 
reason,  address  them  on  this  question  and  with  greater  force  and  earn 
estness.  I  am  afraid  if  you  delay  in  this  matter,  it  will  be  too  late 
to  act,  because  our  enemies  are  already  busy  and  active. 

If  some  unfortunate  thing  should  arise  in  international  affairs  or  in 
Mexico  within  the  next  few  weeks  and  announcement  came  then 
that  you  were  to  make  an  appeal  to  the  country,  it  would  appear  as 
an  anti-climax  and  an  attempt  upon  your  part  to  retrieve  yourself. 
Now  is  the  psychological  moment  to  make  your  plea  for  national 
defense  and  incidentally  to  discuss  Mexico  and  our  foreign  relations. 
In  other  words,  you  must  ask  the  country  to  accept  your  leadership 
or  the  leadership  of  others  who  can't  lead.  Your  voice  is  the  only 
responsible  voice  in  America  that  can  speak  with  certainty,  authority, 
and  calmness  as  to  the  need  for  preparedness.  There  is  no  doubt  of 
the  will  of  a  large  majority  of  our  people,  but  it  lacks  articulate  ex 
pression.  I  am  sure  they  will  not  fail  to  respond. 

TUMULTY. 


WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

Upon  conferring  with  the  President  in  the  matter  of 
preparedness,  I  found  that  he  had  been  slowly  and  pa 
tiently  revolving  the  whole  matter  in  his  own  mind  and 
was  then  considering  the  advisability  of  taking  a  direct 
message  to  the  people  concerning  the  situation  and  was 
only  awaiting  the  psychological  moment  to  strike. 

On  January  27, 1916,  the  President  commenced  his  tour 
of  the  North  and  Middle  West,  assuming  the  leadership 
of  the  movement  for  preparedness  that  had  been  started 
by  his  opponents,  and  called  the  attention  of  the  country 
to  the  critical  world  situation  and  to  the  necessity  that 
America  "put  her  house  in  order."  In  St.  Louis  he  de 
clared  that  America  must  have  comparably  the  greatest 
navy  in  the  world.  It  was  noticeable  in  his  speeches 
that  he  never  employed  the  term  "universal  military 
service"  and  that  he  was  careful  to  explain  that  there  was 
to  be  no  militarism  in  the  country. 

When  the  President  returned  from  his  preparedness 
tour,  he  found  himself  at  the  centre  of  conflicting  views 
as  to  method;  on  the  one  hand,  Representative  Hay  of 
the  Military  Affairs  Committee,  advocated  the  use  of 
the  National  Guard  as  the  new  army;  on  the  other  hand, 
Secretary  Garrison  advocated  an  increase  of  the  Regular 
Army  to  142,000  men  and  a  new  "continental  army" 
of  400,000  men,  with  reserves  of  state  militia.  It  was 
the  recurrent  conflict  between  the  Army  and  Congress, 
between  the  military  department's  desire  for  a  strong 
force  and  Congress'  fear  of  "militarism."  The  Garri 
son  plan  met  with  decided  opposition  in  the  House,  and 
upon  the  President's  refusal  to  lend  support  to  his  Secre 
tary  of  War  in  the  programme  he  had  outlined  in  his  re 
port  of  1915,  Mr.  Garrison  resigned.  Immediately  all 
the  enemies  of  the  President  centred  about  the  retiring 


PREPAREDNESS  243 

Secretary  and  proclaimed  him  a  very  much  abused  official. 
The  letter  which  the  President  addressed  to  Secretary 
Garrison  is  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

January  17,  1916. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

I  am  very  much  obliged  to  you  for  your  letters  of  January  twelfth 
and  January  fourteenth.  They  make  your  views  with  regard  to 
adequate  measures  of  preparation  for  national  defence  sharply  clear. 
I  am  sure  that  I  already  understood  just  what  your  views  were,  but 
I  am  glad  to  have  them  restated  in  this  succinct  and  striking  way. 
You  believe,  as  I  do,  that  the  chief  thing  necessary  is,  that  we  should 
have  a  trained  citizen  reserve  and  that  the  training,  organization, 
and  control  of  that  reserve  should  be  under  immediate  federal 
direction. 

But  apparently  I  have  not  succeeded  in  making  my  own  position 
equally  clear  to  you,  though  I  feel  sure  that  I  have  made  it  perfectly 
clear  to  Mr.  Hay.  It  is  that  I  am  not  irrevocably  or  dogmatically 
committed  to  any  one  plan  of  providing  the  nation  with  such  a  reserve 
and  am  cordially  willing  to  discuss  alternative  proposals. 

Any  other  position  on  my  part  would  indicate  an  attitude  towards 
the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
which  I  should  in  no  circumstances  feel  at  liberty  to  assume.  It 
woud  never  be  proper  or  possible  for  me  to  say  to  any  committee 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  that  so  far  as  my  participation  in 
legislation  was  concerned  they  would  have  to  take  my  plan  or  none. 

I  do  not  share  your  opinion  that  the  members  of  the  House  who 
are  charged  with  the  duty  of  dealing  with  military  affairs  are  ignorant 
of  them  or  of  the  military  necessities  of  the  nation.  On  the  con 
trary,  I  have  found  them  well  informed  and  actuated  with  a  most 
intelligent  appreciation  of  the  grave  responsibilities  imposed  upon 
them.  I  am  sure  that  Mr.  Hay  and  his  colleagues  are  ready  to  act 
with  a  full  sense  of  all  that  is  involved  in  this  great  matter  both  for 
the  country  and  for  the  national  parties  which  they  represent. 

My  own  duty  toward  them  is  perfectly  plain.  I  must  welcome  a 
frank  interchange  of  views  and  a  patient  and  thorough  comparison 


244    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

of  all  the  methods  proposed  for  obtaining  the  objects  we  all  have  in 
view.  So  far  as  my  own  participation  in  final  legislative  action  is 
concerned,  no  one  will  expect  me  to  acquiesce  in  any  proposal  that 
I  regard  as  inadequate  or  illusory.  If,  as  the  outcome  of  a  free  inter 
change  of  views,  my  own  judgment  and  that  of  the  Committee  should 
prove  to  be  irreconcilably  different  and  a  bill  should  be  presented  to 
me  which  I  could  not  accept  as  accomplishing  the  essential  things 
sought,  it  would  manifestly  be  my  duty  to  veto  it  and  go  to  the  coun 
try  on  the  merits.  But  there  is  no  reason  to  anticipate  or  fear  such 
a  result,  unless  we  should  ourselves  take  at  the  outset  the  position 
that  only  the  plans  of  the  Department  are  to  be  considered;  and  that 
position,  it  seems  to  me,  would  be  wholly  unjustifiable.  The  Com 
mittee  and  the  Congress  will  expect  me  to  be  as  frank  with  them  as 
I  hope  they  will  be  with  me,  and  will  of  course  hold  me  justified  in 
fighting  for  my  own  matured  opinion. 

I  have  had  a  delightfully  frank  conference  with  Mr.  Hay.  I  have 
said  to  him  that  I  was  perfectly  willing  to  consider  any  plan  that 
would  give  us  a  national  reserve  under  unmistakable  national  control, 
and  would  support  any  scheme  if  convinced  of  its  adequacy  and  wise 
policy.  More  he  has  not  asked  or  desired. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
HON.  LINDLEY  M.  GARRISON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

It  was  clear  from  the  President's  letter  and  the  attitude 
of  Secretary  Garrison  that  there  was  to  be  no  meet 
ing  of  minds  between  the  President  and  his  Secretary 
of  Waron  the  matter  of  preparedness.  Their  views  could 
not  be  reconciled,  and  when  the  President  refused  to 
support  Garrison's  programme,  hook,  line,  and  sinker,  the 
Secretary  tendered  his  resignation,  which  the  President 
under  the  circumstances  readily  accepted.  Immediately 
the  friends  of  Garrison  declared  that  the  Administra 
tion  had  lost  its  strongest  man  and  that  it  was  now 
on  the  way  to  destruction.  Neither  the  President  nor  his 
many  friends,  however,  were  disturbed  by  these  direful 


PREPAREDNESS  245 

predictions  of  disaster;  and  as  the  people  pondered  the 
President's  letter  of  acceptance  of  Mr.  Garrison's  resig 
nation,  wherein  he  showed  his  own  mind  was  open  to  the 
best  method  of  preparing  the  country  and  that  Mr.  Garri 
son  showed,  petulance  and  impatience  in  handling  the 
matter — the  sober,  second  thought  of  the  country  readily 
and  quickly  came  to  the  President's  support  in  the  belief 
that  the  dogmatic  attitude  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  in 
stead  of  helping,  was  embarrassing  national  preparedness. 

Garrison  had  rendered  distinguished  service  to  the 
Administration  and  had  won  many  friends,  especially 
the  newspaper  group  of  Washington,  by  his  open,  frank 
method  of  dealing  with  public  questions;  but  unfortu 
nately  for  him  he  was  swept  off  his  feet  by  the  unstinted 
praise  that  came  to  him  from  Republican  journals 
throughout  the  country  whenever  it  appeared  that  he  was 
taking  an  attitude — especially  in  the  two  questions  of 
major  importance,  preparedness  and  Mexico — that 
seemed  to  be  at  variance  with  the  Administration's  point 
of  view. 

When  the  President's  letter  to  Garrison  was  read  and 
the  contents  fully  understood  it  showed  Garrison  auto 
cratic  and  unyielding,  and  the  President  open-minded 
and  willing  to  adopt  any  plan  for  preparedness  that 
seemed  to  be  workable.  The  gentle  rebuke  of  Mr. 
Garrison  contained  in  the  President's  statement  that  he 
did  not  share  Mr.  Garrison's  opinion  that  the  members 
of  the  House  charged  with  the  duty  of  dealing  with  mili 
tary  affairs  "are  ignorant  of  them  or  of  the  military 
necessities  of  the  nation,"  completely  won  to  the  President 
the  support  of  the  members  of  that  committee  and  put 
the  President  in  the  position  of  asking  for  and  obtaining 
their  hearty  cooperation  and  support.  Garrison's  resig- 


£46    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

nation,  which  at  first  blush  appeared  to  be  disastrous 
to  the  Administration,  was  soon  turned  to  its  advantage, 
with  the  result  that  a  national  defence  act  was  passed 
during  the  summer.  It  was  a  compromise  measure  but 
it  added  very  greatly  to  the  military  power  of  the  coun 
try.  In  addition,  it  gave  great  powers  to  the  President 
over  the  railroads  in  the  event  of  war  and  authorized  the 
establishment  of  a  council  of  national  defence. 

Of  course,  the  enemies  of  the  President  interpreted  the 
episode  as  another  example  of  his  inability  to  cooperate 
with  "strong  men"  and  continued  in  the  next  breath  to 
repeat  their  accusations  that  he  was  autocratic  in  his 
dealings  with  Congress,  ignoring  their  own  inconsistency. 
It  was  precisely  because  the  President  respected  the 
constitutional  prerogatives  of  the  Congress,  and  Mr. 
Garrison  did  not,  that  the  break  came. 

Every  method  of  propaganda  was  resorted  to  to  force  the 
hand  of  the  President  in  the  matter  of  preparedness  and 
to  induce  him  to  advocate  and  support  a  programme  for 
universal  military  service  put  forth  by  the  National 
Security  League,  whose  backers  and  supporters  through 
out  the  country  were  mainly  Republicans.  Publicity 
on  a  grand  scale,  public  meetings  and  great  parades 
throughout  the  country  were  part  of  this  propaganda. 
While  many  sincere,  patriotic  men  and  women,  with 
out  realizing  the  politics  that  lay  behind  it,  aided  in 
this  movement,  it  was  easy  to  see  that  back  of  it  was  a 
sinister  political  purpose  to  embarrass  and,  if  possible,  to 
force  the  hand  of  the  President.  One  of  the  leaders  of 
this  movement  was  General  Wood,  who  established,  with 
the  permission  of  the  War  Department,  the  famous 
Plattsburg  Camp.  It  will  be  recalled  that  this  was  the 
stage  from  which  Mr.  Roosevelt,  on  an  occasion,  freely 


PREPAREDNESS  247 

gave  expression  to  his  views  of  bitter  antagonism  to  the 
President  for  his  seemingly  slothful  attitude  in  urging 
his  views  on  Congress  with  reference  to  the  preparedness 
programme.  One  of  the  favourite  methods  of  rousing  the 
people,  to  which  the  National  Security  League  resorted, 
was  demonstrations  throughout  the  country  in  the  form 
of  preparedness  parades.  It  was  clear  to  us  at  the  White 
House  that  these  parades  were  part  of  an  organized  move 
ment  to  "agitate"  in  favour  of  a  radical  programme  of  pre 
paredness.  The  President  and  I  had  often  discussed  these 
demonstrations.  One  day  I  asked  him  if  they  were  em 
barrassing  him  in  any  way  and  he  said  that  they  were  not, 
but  that  they  might  affect  opinion  throughout  the  country 
in  such  a  way  as  unreasonably  to  influence  Congress  for 
legislation  so  radical  in  its  character  as  to  be  unnecessary 
and  burdensome  to  the  taxpayers  of  the  country. 

Our  Republican  opponents  on  the  outside  were  claim 
ing  great  political  results  from  these  demonstrations  and 
felt  sure  they  were  a  mighty  force  in  embarrassing  and 
weakening  the  President.  It  was  finally  suggested  to  the 
President  that  he  ought  to  embrace  the  first  opportunity 
presented  to  him  of  leading  in  one  of  the  parades  himself. 
Shortly  after,  the  District  of  Columbia  parade  took  place, 
and  the  President,  upon  my  initiative,  was  invited  to  lead 
it.  The  effect  of  the  President's  personal  participation  in 
this  parade  and  in  the  New  York  parade  held  subse 
quently  was  quickly  evident.  As  soon  as  the  moving 
pictures  throughout  the  country  began  to  feature  the 
President  leading  the  demonstrations,  these  parades  be 
came  less  frequent  and  finally  obsolete.  By  getting  into 
the  "front  line"  the  President  had  cleverly  outwitted  his 
enemies  and  took  command  of  the  forces  in  the  country 
demanding  preparedness. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE  GREAT  DECLARATION 

IN  OCTOBER,  1916,  during  the  Presidential  campaign, 
while  the  President  was  at  Shadow  Lawn,  New  Jersey, 
Ambassador  Gerard,  at  the  President's  invitation, 
paid  a  visit  to  him  and  reported  in  detail  the  general 
situation  in  Germany  as  to  the  submarine  warfare.  He 
said  that  the  restrictions  as  to  submarines  imposed  by 
Germany's  acceptance  of  the  President's  ultimatum  after 
the  Sussex  affair,  were  growing  burdensome  and  intoler 
able  to  the  military  and  naval  masters  of  Germany  and 
that  they  were  bringing  all  kinds  of  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  leaders  of  the  Civil  Government,  notably  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  and  Foreign  Minister  Von  Jagow,  to 
repudiate  the  undertaking.  From  the  critical  situation 
in  Germany,  arising  out  of  the  controversy  over  the 
question  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  which  Am 
bassador  Gerard  laid  before  him,  the  President  was  con 
vinced  that  we  were  now  approaching  a  real  crisis  in  our 
relations  with  Germany  and  that  unless  peace  could 
be  quickly  obtained,  the  European  struggle  would  soon 
enter  upon  a  phase  more  terrible  than  any  in  the  preced 
ing  two  years,  with  consequences  highly  dangerous  to 
the  interests  of  our  country.  The  passionate  wish  and 
deep  desire  of  the  President  from  the  beginning  was  that 
we  could  keep  aloof  and  by  conserving  our  energies  and 
remaining  neutral,  hold  ourselves  in  reserve  as  the  only 
mediating  influence  for  peace;  but  with  each  passing  week 

248 


THE    GREAT    DECLARATION  249 

some  untoward  event  brought  about  by  the  ruthlessness 
of  Germany  made  the  prospect  for  the  interposition  of 
America's  influence  daily  more  unlikely. 

The  following  memorandum  prepared  by  me  on  January 
4,  1916,  of  a  conversation  between  the  President  and 
myself,  shortly  after  the  sinking  of  the  Persia  by  a  sub 
marine,  imperfectly  sets  forth  his  idea  with  reference 
to  war  with  Germany: 

About  ten  minutes  to  ten  o'clock  this  morning  I  had  a  very  in 
teresting  conversation  with  the  President  at  the  White  House,  my 
purpose  being  to  bring  to  him  the  atmosphere  of  Washington  and  the 
country  as  far  as  I  could  ascertain  with  reference  to  the  sinking  of 
the  Persia  by  a  submarine.  The  other  purpose  of  my  visit  was  to 
warn  him  that  Senator  Stone  might  induce  him  to  make  some  ad 
mission  with  reference  to  his  attitude  which  might  embarrass  the 
President  in  the  future. 

The  President  looked  very  well  after  his  trip  and  seemed  to  be  in 
a  fine  mood,  although  it  was  plainly  evident  that  the  Persia  affair 
rested  heavily  upon  him.  My  attitude  toward  this  matter  was  for 
action,  and  action  all  along  the  line.  This  did  not  seem  to  meet  with 
a  very  hearty  response  from  the  President.  He  informed  me  that 
it  would  not  be  the  thing  for  us  to  take  action  against  any  government 
without  our  government  being  in  possession  of  all  the  facts.  I  re 
plied  that  that  was  my  attitude,  but  I  thought  there  should  be  action 
and  vigorous  action  as  soon  as  all  the  facts  were  ascertained.  He 
agreed  with  me  in  this.  When  I  began  to  tell  him  about  the  attitude 
of  the  country  and  the  feeling  in  the  country  that  there  was  a  lack 
of  leadership,  he  stiffened  up  in  his  chair  and  said :  "Tumulty,  you 
may  as  well  understand  my  position  right  now.  If  my  reelection 
as  President  depends  upon  my  getting  into  war,%I  don't  want  to  be 
President.  I  have  been  away,  and  I  have  had  lots  of  time  to  think 
about  this  war  and  the  effect  of  our  country  getting  into  it,  and  I 
have  made  up  my  mind  that  I  am  more  interested  in  the  opinion 
that  the  country  will  have  of  me  ten  years  from  now  than  the  opinion 
it  may  be  willing  to  express  to-day.  Of  course,  I  understand  that  the 
country  wants  action,  and  I  intend  to  stand  by  the  record  I  have  made 


250    WOODHOW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

in  all  these  cases,  and  take  whatever  action  may  be  necessary,  but 
I  will  not  be  rushed  into  war,  no  matter  if  every  last  Congressman 
and  Senator  stands  up  on  his  hind  legs  and  proclaims  me  a  coward." 
He  continued,  speaking  of  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations, — 
"You  must  know  that  when  I  consider  this  matter,  I  can  only  con 
sider  it  as  the  forerunner  of  war.  I  believe  that  the  sober-minded 
people  of  this  country  will  applaud  any  efforts  I  may  make  without 
the  loss  of  our  honour  to  keep  this  country  out  of  war."  He  said  that 
if  we  took  any  precipitate  action  right  now,  it  might  prevent  Austria 
from  coming  across  in  generous  fashion. 

The  President  had  been  elected  on  the  slogan,  "He 
kept  us  out  of  War."  If  it  was  possible  to  continue  at 
peace  on  terms  that  would  protect  and  conserve  our 
national  honour,  he  was  determined  to  do  so. 

I  recall  how  passionately  he  laid  before  Senator  Till- 
man  of  South  Carolina,  a  leading  member  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations,  his  desire  to  keep  the  nation 
out  of  war.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  talk  with  the 
Senator,  he  said:  "But,  Senator,  it  rests  with  Germany 
to  say  whether  we  shall  remain  at  peace."  Turning  to 
the  President,  Senator  Tillman  said:  "You  are  right, 
Mr.  President,  we  must  not  go  around  with  a  chip  on 
our  shoulder.  I  am  for  peace,  but  I  am  not  for  peace  at 
any  damn  price."  This  was  really  expressive  of  the 
President's  attitude.  He  earnestly  desired  peace,  but 
he  was  not  willing  to  remain  at  peace  at  the  price  of  the 
nation's  honour. 

Early  in  May,  1916,  the  President  and  I  had  conferred 
regarding  the  European  situation  and  had  discussed  the 
possibility  of  our  suggesting  to  both  sides  that  they 
consider  the  United  States  as  a  mediating  influence  to 
bring  about  a  settlement.  Early  in  May,  1916,  I  had 
addressed  the  following  letter  to  the  President  with  ref 
erence  to  the  matter: 


THE    GREAT    DECLARATION  251 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

May  16,  1916. 
MY  DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

As  I  have  discussed  with  you  on  frequent  occasions,  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  time  is  now  at  hand  for  you  to  act  in  the  matter  of 
Peace.  The  mere  process  of  peace  negotiations  may  extend  over  a 
period  of  months.  Why  should  we  wait  until  the  moment  of  exhaus 
tion  before  ever  beginning  a  discussion?  Everybody  admits  that  the 
resources  of  the  nations  involved  cannot  last  through  another  year 
without  suffering  of  an  untold  character.  It  is  now  May.  Let  us 
assume  that  everybody  accepts  your  offer.  It  would  be  physically 
impossible  to  get  commissioners  from  various  parts  of  the  world, 
including  Japan,  in  less  than  two  months.  Then  the  discussion  would 
perhaps  last  until  the  fall,  no  matter  what  conclusion  might  be 
reached.  Therefore,  allowing  for  the  time  that  might  be  consumed 
in  persuading  all  the  parties  that  the  time  is  now  ripe,  the  whole 
business  will  require  almost  a  year  in  itself,  during  which  time  the 
hostilities  would  be  continuing  and  certainly  the  chance  of  getting 
a  truce  would  be  better  after  the  discussion  had  been  in  progress 
for  some  time.  Similarly,  as  the  time  for  the  winter  campaign 
approached,  the  inducement  to  agree  on  a  truce  on  any  terms  would 
become  more  powerful  each  day. 

Let  us  look  at  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  postponement.  If  we 
waited  until  the  fall  and  the  negotiations  stretched  out  through  the 
winter,  the  temptation  for  making  new  drives  in  the  spring,  with  the 
preparations  made  throughout  the  winter,  would  incline  the  militar 
istic  element  in  the  various  countries  involved  to  block  peace  negotia 
tions.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  time  to  act  is  now  when  these  drives 
are  spending  their  force. 
3  As  to  the  Procedure: 

It  seems  that  no  belligerent  should  be  put  in  the  position  by  your 
note  of  weakening  or  of  suing  for  peace,  for  we  must  keep  in  mind 
the  pride  and  sensibilities  of  all.  The  initiative  must  be  ours — to 
all  nations,  on  equal  terms.  One  way  to  do  this  would  be  to  send 
a  note,  saying  that  from  the  German  note  and  from  statesmen  rep 
resenting  the  Entente  powers  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
assumes  that  the  belligerent  powers  are  willing  at  least  to  discuss 


WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

suggestions  for  peace,  each  only  reserving  to  itself  liberty  of  action. 
The  United  States  can,  therefore,  announce  that  it  is  willing  to  meet 
at  The  Hague  a  commission  sent  by  the  respective  governments  to 
discuss  means  for  making  peace,  and  for  establishing  a  world  court  or 
international  tribunal  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  the  world  after  the  close 
of  the  war. 

In  the  latter,  namely,  world  peace,  the  United  States  has  a  direct 
interest.  The  United  States  can  in  the  note  assume  that  commis 
sioners  will  meet  with  it  and  hopes  to  be  advised  if  there  is  any  feeling 
to  the  contrary. 

My  idea  is  to  go  ahead  with  the  plan  on  the  theory  that  all  the 
belligerents  are  in  accord  with  the  idea,  so  that  in  answering  our  note 
they  will  not  have  accepted  anything  but  our  proposals  to  discuss, 
first,  the  suggestion  of  peace,  and,  secondly,  the  idea  of  a  world  court. 

The  President  should  say,  in  order  to  elicit  t*he  sympathy  of  the 
world  and  mankind  in  general,  that  the  note  of  the  United  States 
suggesting  a  meeting  between  the  powers  will  be  made  public  within 
a  few  days  and  after  its  receipt  by  the  respective  powers.  This  will 
give  each  government  not  only  its  own  public  opinion  to  reckon  with, 
but  the  public  opinion  of  the  civilized  world.  The  nation  that  objects 
to  a  discussion  of  peace  will  by  no  means  be  in  an  enviable  position. 

I  hope  you  will  read  the  article  I  am  sending  you  by  Mr.  Strunsky, 
"Post  Impressions,"  especially  that  part  I  have  indicated  in  the 
margin.  It  is  from  this  article  that  I  got  the  idea  of  suggesting 
the  alternative  proposition  of  a  world  court.  Your  note  setting 
forth  your  position  in  this  matter  should  be  an  appeal  to  the  heart 
and  to  the  conscience  of  the  world. 

TUMULTY. 

Evidently  the  President  seriously  had  been  considering 
this  very  matter  as  was  shown  by  the  following  reply 
to  my  note: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

Thank  you  for  the  memorandum  about  peace  suggestions.  I  have 
read  it  very  carefully  and  find  my  own  thoughts  travelling  very  much 


THE    GREAT    DECLARATION  253 

the  same  route.     You  may  be  sure  I  am  doing  a  great  deal  of  serious 
thinking  about  it  all. 

Faithfully, 

W.  W. 

The  President,  through  the  State  Department  and 
various  instrumentalities  to  which  he  had  access  for  in 
formation,  was  keeping  in  touch  with  the  German  situa 
tion  and  understood  from  the  beginning  what  the  German 
game  was  with  reference  to  peace,  and  to  the  various 
offers  which  he  was  making.  He  knew  that  the  German 
peace  offers  were  merely  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
civil  government  of  Germany  to  avert  a  resumption  of 
ruthlessness  at  sea;  that  they  were  mere  gestures  on  the 
part  of  the  German  Government  made  to  bolster  up 
the  morale  of  the  German  people  and  that  these  German 
offers  did  not  indicate  the  real  desire  for  peace  on  equit 
able  terms,  as  subsequent  events  showed,  but  that  they 
were  the  terms  of  peace  of  a  nation  which  thought  it 
self  the  victor,  and,  therefore,  in  a  position  ruthlessly 
to  dictate  a  final  settlement. 

Many  of  the  advisers  of  the  President  suggested  that  he 
should  ignore  these  offers.  But  the  President  was  wiser 
than  those  around  him  in  accepting  the  German  bid  at 
its  face  value,  and  he  finally  called  upon  Germany  to 
state  the  practical  terms  upon  which  she  was  willing  to 
consider  a  settlement  for  peace.  There  was  another 
reason  for  the  President's  patience.  Foreseeing  an  inevi 
table  crisis  with  Germany  over  the  frequent  sinking  of  our 
ships,  he  was  fully  conscious  that  he  could  not  draw  the 
whole  country  with  him  in  aggressive  action  if  before  he 
took  the  step  leading  to  war  he  had  not  tried  out  every 
means  of  peace.  While  his  enemies  denounced  his  meek 
ness  and  apparent  subservience  to  German  diplomacy,  and 


254    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

while  some  went  so  far  as  to  characterize  his  conduct  as 
cowardly,  he  serenely  moved  on  and  forced  Germany  to  a 
show-down.  He  not  only  asked  Germany  to  state  her 
terms,  but  he  frankly  asked  the  Allies  to  give  to  the 
world  their  statement  of  what  they  considered  the  basis 
of  peace. 

One  of  the  phrases  in  his  note  to  the  Allies  which  caused 
great  irritation  was  that  "neither  side  had  stated  the 
object  for  which  the  war  had  been  started."  While 
he  was  criticized  for  this  at  the  time,  it  did  just  what  he 
intended  it  to  do.  It  forced  Germany  openly  to  avow 
what  she  believed  to  be  the  basis  of  peace,  and  gave  the 
Allies  their  chance,  as  if  they  were  being  forced  to  do  it 
by  the  American  President,  to  say  what  they  thought 
would  be  a  just  settlement. 

In  the  latter  part  of  January  Germany  announced  to 
the  United  States  that  she  was  going  to  begin,  on  Febru 
ary  first,  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  in  the  zone 
around  the  British  Isles,  and  undertook  to  specify  the 
route  which  a  restricted  number  of  American  ships  might 
take  through  this  zone. 

I  vividly  recall  the  day  the  Associated  Press  bulletin 
reached  the  White  House.  I  took  it  immediately  to 
the  President  who  was  at  his  desk  in  his  private  office. 
As  I  entered,  he  looked  up  from  his  writing,  casual  in 
quiry  in  his  eyes.  Without  comment  I  laid  the  fateful 
slip  of  paper  on  his  desk,  and  silently  watched  him  as 
he  read  and  then  re-read  it.  I  seemed  to  read  his  mind 
in  the  expressions  that  raced  across  his  strong  features: 
first,  blank  amazement;  then  incredulity  that  even  Ger 
many  could  be  guilty  of  such  perfidy;  then  gravity  and 
sternness,  a  sudden  grayness  of  colour,  a  compression  of 
the  lips  and  the  familiar  locking'  of  the  jaw  which  always 


THE    GREAT    DECLARATION  255 

characterized  him  in  moments  of  supreme  resolution. 
Handing  the  paper  back  to  me,  he  said  in  quiet  tones: 
"This  means  war.  The  break  that  we  have  tried  so 
hard  to  prevent  now  seems  inevitable." 

On  February  4th,  he  addressed  Congress,  announcing 
the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany, 
and  stating  his  hope  that  Germany  would  pause  before  it 
was  too  late.  On  February  26th,  the  steamship  .Anconay 
with  Americans  on  board,  was  sunk,  and  on  the  next 
day  the  President  addressed  Congress,  suggesting  the 
proclamation  of  armed  neutrality  as  a  final  effort  to 
apply  pressure  to  the  Government  of  Germany,  to  show 
that  the  United  States  was  in  earnest  and  would  protect 
its  rights  against  lawless  atta  cks  at  sea;  but  these  measures 
failed.  Germany  seemed  bent  upon  a  break  with  us, 
and  on  April  6,  1917,  in  response  to  a  memorable  address 
delivered  by  the  President  on  April  second,  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  declared  solemnly  that  a  state  of 
war  existed  between  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial 
German  Government. 

In  concluding  his  war  message,  the  President  said: 

It  is  a  fearful  thing  to  lead  this  great,  peaceful  people  into  war, 
into  the  most  terrible  and  disastrous  of  all  wars,  civilization  itself 
seeming  to  be  in  the  balance.  But  the  right  is  more  precious  than 
peace,  and  we  shall  fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always  carried 
nearest  our  hearts,  for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those  who  submit 
to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  governments,  for  the  rights 
and  liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  dominion  of  right  by 
such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as  shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all 
nations  and  make  the  world  itself  at  last  free.  To  such  a  task  we 
can  dedicate  our  lives  and  our  fortunes,  everything  that  we  are 
and  everything  that  we  have,  with  the  pride  of  those  who  know 
that  the  day  has  come  when  America  is  privileged  to  spend  her  blood 
and  her  might  for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth  and  happine?- 


256    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

and  the  peace  which  she  has  treasured.     God  helping  her,  she  can 
do  no  other. 


I  accompanied  the  President  to  Capitol  Hill  on  the 
day  of  the  delivery  of  his  war  message,  and  on  that 
fateful  day  I  rode  with  him  from  the  Capitol  back  to 
the  White  House,  the  echo  of  applause  still  ringing  in 
my  ears. 

For  a  while  he  sat  silent  and  pale  in  the  Cabinet 
Room.  At  last  he  said:  "Think  what  it  was  they  were 
applauding"  [he  was  speaking  of  the  people  who  were  lined 
along  the  streets  on  his  way  to  the  Capitol].  "My 
message  to-day  was  a  message  of  death  for  our  young  men. 
How  strange  it  seems  to  applaud  that." 

That  simple  remark  is  one  key  to  an  understanding  of 
Woodrow  Wilson.  All  politicians  pretend  to  hate  and 
to  dread  war,  but  Woodrow  Wilson  really  hates  and 
dreads  it  in  all  the  fibres  of  his  human  soul;  hates  it  and 
dreads  it  because  he  has  an  imagination  and  a  heart; 
an  imagination  which  shows  his  sensitive  perception  the 
anguish  and  the  dying  which  war  entails;  a  heart  which 
yearns  and  aches  over  every  dying  soldier  and  bleeds 
afresh  with  each  new-made  wound. 

I  shall  never  forget  that  scene  in  the  Cabinet  Room 
between  the  President  and  myself.  He  appeared  like 
a  man  who  had  thrown  off  old  burdens  only  to  add  new 
ones. 

It  was  apparent  in  his  talk  with  me  that  he  felt 
deeply  wounded  at  the  criticism  that  for  months  had 
been  heaped  upon  him  for  his  seeming  unwillingness  to 
go  to  war  with  Germany.  As  he  discussed  the  step  he 
had  just  taken,  it  was  evident  to  me  that  he  keenly  felt 
the  full  solemnity  and  tragedy  of  it  all.  Turning  to  me, 


THE    GREAT    DECLARATION  257 

he  said:  "Tumulty,  from  the  very  beginning  I  saw  the 
end  of  this  horrible  thing;  but  I  could  not  move  faster 
than  the  great  mass  of  our  people  would  permit.  Very 
few  understood  the  difficult  and  trying  position  I  have 
been  placed  in  during  the  years  through  which  we  have 
just  passed.  In  the  policy  of  patience  and  forbearance 
I  pursued  I  tried  to  make  every  part  of  America  and  the 
varied  elements  of  our  population  understand  that  we 
were  willing  to  go  any  length  rather  than  resort  to  war 
with  Germany.  As  I  told  you  months  ago,  it  would  have 
been  foolish  for  us  to  have  been  rushed  off  our  feet  and  to 
have  gone  to  war  over  an  isolated  affair  like  the  Lusitania. 
But  now  we  are  certain  that  there  will  be  no  regrets  or 
looking  back  on  the  part  of  our  people.  There  is  but 
one  course  now  left  open  to  us.  Our  consciences  are 
clear,  and  we  must  prepare  for  the  inevitable — a  fight  to 
the  end.  Germany  must  be  made  to  understand  that 
we  have  rights  that  she  must  respect.  There  were  few 
who  understood  this  policy  of  patience.  I  do  not  mean 
to  say  this  in  a  spirit  of  criticism.  Indeed,  many  of  the 
leading  journals  of  the  country  were  unmindful  of  the 
complexities  of  the  situation  which  confronted  us." 

The  President  then  took  out  of  his  pocket  an  old  and 
worn  newspaper  clipping,  saying:  "I  wish  to  read  you 
an  analysis  of  my  position  and  my  policy  by  a  special  writer 
for  the  Manchester  Guardian,  who  seemed,  without 
consulting  me  or  ever  conferring  with  me,  to  know  just 
what  I  am  driving  at." 

This  special  writer,  commenting  upon  the  Wilson  policy, 
had  said: 

Mr.  Wilson's  patience,  now  derided  and  criticized,  will  inevitably 
be  the  means  by  which  he  will  lead  his  people  by  easy  stages  to  the 
side  of  the  Allies.  By  his  methods  of  patience  and  apparent  sub- 


258    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

servience  to  Germany,  he  will  convince  the  whole  American  people 
that  no  other  course  save  war  is  possible.  This  policy  of  Wilson's, 
now  determined  on,  will  work  a  complete  transformation  in  his  people. 
It  will  not  evidence  itself  quickly  or  overnight.  The  moral  preach 
ment  of  Wilson  before  and  after  war  will  be  the  cause  that  will  finally 
bring  his  people  to  the  side  of  the  Allies. 

Again  turning  to  me,  the  President  said:  "Our  course 
from  this  time  on  is  clear.  The  whole  business  of 
war  that  we  are  now  engaged  upon  is  fraught  with  the 
gravest  difficulties.  There  will  be  great  enthusiasm  in 
the  country  from  this  day.  I  trust  it  will  not  slacken  or 
weaken  as  the  horrors  of  the  war  and  its  tragedies  are 
disclosed.  Of  course  our  motives  will  be  misconstrued, 
our  purposes  misunderstood;  some  of  our  best  friends  will 
misinterpret  what  we  seek  to  do.  In  carrying  on  the 
war  we  will  be  obliged  to  do  certain  unusual  things, 
things  that  will  interfere  with  the  lives  and  habits  of  our 
people,  which  will  bring  down  upon  us  a  storm  of  criticism 
and  ridicule.  Our  life,  therefore,  until  this  thing  is  over, 
and  God  only  knows  when  it  will  be  over,  will  be  full  of 
tragedy  and  heartaches." 

As  he  spoke,  he  was  no  longer  Woodrow  Wilson,  the 
protagonist  of  peace,  but  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  stern 
warrior,  now  grimly  determined  to  pursue  the  great  cause 
of  America  to  the  end. 

The  President  continued  talking  to  me.  He  said:  "It 
has  not  been  easy  to  carry  these  burdens  in  these  trying 
times.  From  the  beginning  I  saw  the  utter  futility  of 
neutrality,  the  disappointment  and  heartaches  that  would 
flow  from  its  announcement,  but  we  had  to  stand  by  our 
traditional  policy  of  steering  clear  of  European  embroil 
ments.  While  I  have  appeared  to  be  indifferent  to  the 
criticism  which  has  been  my  portion  during  these  critical 


THE    GREAT   DECLARATION  259 

days,  a  few  have  tried  to  understand  my  purpose  and  have 
sympathized  throughout  with  what  I  sought  to  do." 

Then,  as  he  lowered  his  voice,  he  said:  "There  is  a  fine 
old  chap  in  Springfield,  Massachusetts,  editor  of  a  great 
paper  there,  who  understood  my  position  from  the  begin 
ning  and  who  has  sympathized  with  me  throughout  this 
whole  business."  For  a  moment  he  paused,  and  then 
went  on:  "I  want  to  read  you  the  letter  I  received  from 
this  fine  old  man."  As  he  read,  the  emotion  he  felt  at 
the  tender  sympathy  which  the  words  conveyed  gripped 
him.  The  letter  is  as  follows: 

Springfield,    Massachusetts, 

March  28,  1917. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

In  acknowledging  your  very  kind  and  appreciative  note  of  March 
22nd,  I  must  say  at  once  that  the  note  has  given  me  the  greatest 
possible  pleasure.  I  prize  this  word  from  you  all  the  more  because 
after  the  political  experience  and  conflicts  of  the  past  few  years,  I 
am  conscious  of  a  very  real  yet  peculiar  feeling  of  having  summered 
and  wintered  with  you,  in  spite  of  the  immeasurable  and  rather 
awful  distance  that  separates  our  respective  places  in  the  life  and  work 
of  our  time.  Your  note,  for  the  moment,  suddenly  annihilates  the 
distance  and  brings  to  me  what  I  recognize  as  a  very  human  touch. 
There  is  summering  and  wintering  to  come, — with  more  wintering 
perhaps  than  we  shall  enjoy; — even  so,  I  shall  hope  to  be  of  timely 
service,  as  opportunity  favours  me. 
I  have  the  honour  to  be  your  admirer  and  friend, 

Most  sincerely, 
(Signed)  WALDO  L.  COOK. 

"That  man  understood  me  and  sympathized."  As  he 
said  this,  the  President  drew  his  handkerchief  from  his 
pocket,  wiped  away  great  tears  that  stood  in  his  eyes, 
and  then  laying  his  head  on  the  Cabinet  table,  sobbed  as 
if  he  had  been  a  child. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

CARRYING   ON 

THE  critics  of  the  President  will  ask  the  question: 
"What  was  the  President  doing  to  prepare  the 
country  for  war,  which  to  him  seemed  inevitable?" 
From  the  inside,  and  without  the  blare  of  trumpets,  he 
was  quietly  engaged  in  conferring  with  the  heads  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  departments.     Indeed,  from  the  minute 
the  third  Lusitania  note  was  dispatched,  actual  prepa 
rations   for   war   were   begun.     Immediately   upon   the 
dispatch  of  the  note,  the  following  statement  was  issued 
from  the  White  House,  under  date  of  July  21, 1916. 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

July  21,  1916. 

The  President  in  association  with  the  heads  of  departments,  re 
gardless  of  present-day  conditions  or  controversies,  has  long  been 
giving  a  great  deal  of  consideration  to  the  preparation  of  a  reasonable 
and  adequate  naval  programme,  which  he  intends  to  propose  to  Con 
gress  at  the  proper  time. 

That  is  one  of  the  things  he  is  now  considering  in  the  quiet  of  Corn 
ish.  He  feels,  now  that  the  note  has  been  dispatched,  that  it  is  best, 
for  the  time  being,  to  drop  the  discussion  of  it  as  far  as  he  is  concerned 
and  is  turning  to  questions  of  permanent  national  policy. 

Of  course,  he  realizes  that  he  must  have  the  best  practical  advice 
obtainable  in  this  matter  and  is  seeking  for  it  from  every  available 
source.  In  fact,  it  is  known  that  the  best  minds  of  the  various  de 
partments  of  the  Government,  both  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  are 
now  and  have  been  at  work  on  these  important  matters  for  some 
time;  that  is,  he  is  seeking  advice  from  the  men  in  those  departments 

260 


CARRYING    ON  261 

who  have  been  most  directly  in  touch  with  the  new  conditions  of 
defence  that  have  been  evolved  out  of  modern  experience.  He  not 
only  wishes  advice  from  those  who  have  a  knowledge  of  actual 
modern  conditions  of  warfare,  but  he  is  seeking  light  from  those  who 
are  able  to  understand  and  comprehend  the  altered  conditions  of 
land  and  naval  warfare.  He  wishes  the  Navy  to  stand  upon  an  equal 
ity  with  the  most  efficient  and  serviceable. 

As  to  the  Army,  it  is  known  here  that  he  is  preparing  to  incorporate 
in  his  next  message  to  Congress  a  programme  in  regard  to  the  de 
velopment  and  equipment  of  the  Army  and  a  proper  training  of  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  to  arms  which,  while  in  every  way 
consistent  with  American  traditions  and  national  policy,  will  be  of 
such  a  character  as  to  commend  itself  to  every  patriotic  and  practical 
mind.  In  this  matter  he  is  working  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
his  professional  associates,  who,  it  is  understood,  have  reached  some 
very  definite  conclusions  on  these  exceedingly  important  matters. 
He  is  anxious  to  have  a  programme  that  will  be  definite  and  positive, 
and  wishes  to  have  the  information  in  hand  before  laying  the  matter 
before  the  committees  of  the  Senate  and  the  House. 

Contemporaneously  with  this  statement  was  issued 
the  following,  which  was  prepared  by  the  President,  but 
issued  over  my  name,  the  full  significance  of  which  was 
not  apparent  at  the  time: 

The  note  [Third  Lusitania  note]  having  been  dispatched,  the 
President  felt  that  it  was  best  to  drop  further  discussion  of  the  matter 
for  the  present,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned.  He  will  be  free  now  to 
devote  his  time  to  a  full  consideration  of  a  matter  that  the  country 
has  for  a  long  time  been  thoughtful  of,  that  is  a  reasonable  programme 
of  national  defense.  Of  course,  this  programme  will  be  considered  re 
gardless  of  present-day  conditions. 

It  is  known  that  the  President  has  been  considering  this  important 
matter  in  all  its  aspects,  and  has  been  in  touch  with  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  regarding  it.  It  is  also  known  in 
official  circles  here  that  the  President  had  taken  steps  before  leaving 
for  Cornish  to  instruct  the  Army  and  Navy  departments  to  make 
ready  for  his  consideration  a  careful  programme  of  national  defense 


262    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

in  preparation  for  the  presentation  of  his  views  to  Congress  at  the 
proper  time. 

He  desires  to  have  the  programme  based  on  the  most  practicable  lines 
obtainable  from  the  departments  and  it  is  said  that  the  best  minds 
in  the  departments  are  at  present  at  work  on  the  subject.  He  hopes 
that  the  programme  will  express  the  best  traditions  of  the  country  and 
not  lose  sight  of  modern  experience.  He  is  anxious  to  have  a  pro 
gramme  that  will  be  definite  and  positive,  and  wishes  to  have  the  in 
formation  in  hand  before  laying  the  matter  before  the  committees 
of  the  Senate  and  the  House. 

On  July  21,  1915,  he  addressed  the  following  letters  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
respectively: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

July  21,  1915. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

I  have  been  giving  scarcely  less  thought  than  you  yourself  have  to 
the  question  of  adequate  preparation  for  national  defense,  and  I  am 
anxious,  as  you  know,  to  incorporate  in  my  next  message  to  Congress 
a  programme  regarding  the  development  and  equipment  of  the  Army 
and  a  proper  training  of  our  citizens  to  arms  which,  while  in  every 
way  consistent  with  our  traditions  and  our  national  policy,  will  be 
of  such  a  character  as  to  commend  itself  to  every  patriotic  and  prac 
tical  mind. 

I  know  that  you  have  been  much  in  conference  with  your  pro 
fessional  associates  in  the  department  and  that  you  have  yourself 
come  to  some  very  definite  conclusions  on  these  exceedingly  import 
ant  matters.  I  shall  be  away  from  Washington  for  a  few  days,  but 
I  would  be  very  much  obliged  if  you  would  be  kind  enough  to  pre 
pare  for  me  a  programme,  with  estimates,  of  what  you  and  the  best- 
informed  soldiers  in  your  counsels  think  the  country  ought  to  under 
take  to  do.  I  should  like  to  discuss  this  programme  with  you  at  as 
early  a  time  as  it  can  be  made  ready.  Whether  we  can  reasonably 
propose  the  whole  of  it  to  the  Congress  immediately  or  not  we  can 
determine  when  we  have  studied  it.  The  important  thing  now  is  to 


CARRYING    ON  263 

know  and  know  fully  what  we  need.     Congress  will  certainly  welcome 
such  advice  and  follow  it  to  the  limit  of  its  opportunity. 

Cordially  and  faithfully  yours, 

WOODEOW  WILSON. 
HON.  LINDLEY  M.  GARRISON, 
Secretary  of  War. 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

July  21,  1915. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

I  have  been  giving,  as  I  am  sure  you  have  also,  a  great  deal  of 
thought  to  the  matter  of  a  wise  and  adequate  naval  programme  to  be 
proposed  to  the  Congress  at  its  next  session,  and  I  would  like  to 
discuss  the  whole  subject  with  you  at  the  earliest  possible  date. 

But  first  we  must  have  professional  advice.  I  would  be  very  much 
obliged  to  you  if  you  would  get  the  best  minds  in  the  department  to 
work  on  the  subject:  I  mean  the  men  who  have  been  most  directly 
in  contact  with  actual  modern  conditions,  who  have  most  thoroughly 
comprehended  what  the  Navy  must  be  in  the  future  in  order  to  stand 
upon  an  equality  with  the  most  efficient  and  most  practically  service 
able.  I  want  their  advice,  a  programme  by  them  formulated  in  the 
most  definite  way.  Whether  we  can  reasonably  propose  the  whole 
of  it  to  the  Congress  immediately  or  not  we  can  determine  when  we 
have  studied  it.  The  important  thing  now  is  to  know  fully  what 
we  need.  Congress  will  certainly  welcome  such  advice  and  follow 
it  to  the  limit  of  its  opportunity. 

It  should  be  a  programme  planned  for  a  consistent  and  progressive 
development  of  this  great  defensive  arm  of  the  nation  and  should  be  of 
such  a  kind  as  to  commend  itself  to  every  patriotic  and  practical  man. 

I  shall  return  to  Washington  in  a  few  days  and  shall  be  glad  to 
take  this  important  matter  up  with  you  at  your  early  convenience. 

Cordially  and  faithfully  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
HON.  JOSEPHUS  DANIELS, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Immediately  after  the  war  message  there^arose  an 
insistent  demand  for  a  coalition  cabinet.  It  was  the 


264    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

beginning  of  the  Republican  drive  for  what  was  called 
a  bi-partisan  government.  Republicans  chose  to  forget 
the  experiences  of  England  and  France  under  their  coali 
tion  cabinets,  and  when  the  President  refused  to  act 
upon  the  suggestion,  the  impression  was  subtly  conveyed 
to  the  unthinking  that  the  President's  refusal  arose  from 
his  dislike  of  counsel  and  cooperation,  and  his  unwilling 
ness  to  share  the  responsibilities  and  glories  of  the  war 
with  people  outside  his  own  party. 

As  an  historian,  the  President  knew  the  troubles  of 
Washington  with  a  coalition  cabinet,  Lincoln's  embarrass 
ments  from  Cabinet  members  not  of  his  own  party,  Me- 
Kinley's  sagacious  refusal  in  1898  to  form  a  coalition 
cabinet.  He  also  knew  human  nature;  knew  that  with 
the  best  intentions,  men  sometimes  find  it  difficult  to 
work  whole-heartedly  with  a  leader  of  a  political  party 
not  their  own.  He  could  not  risk  a  chance  of  division 
in  his  own  official  family  in  the  face  of  the  common  enemy. 

The  President  looked  upon  the  agitation  for  a  coalition 
cabinet  as  a  partisan  effort  to  hamper  and  embarrass  his 
administration,  and  so  he  coldly  turned  away  from  every 
suggestion  that  looked  toward  the  establishment  of  a 
cabinet  of  the  kind  suggested  by  his  too-solicitous  Re 
publican  friends. 

The  following  note  which  I  addressed  to  the  President, 
and  his  reply,  bear  upon  the  subject: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

The  newspaper  men  asked  me  this  morning  what  the  attitude 
of  the  Administration  was  toward  the  proposed  super-cabinet. 
I  hedged  as  much  as  I  could,  but  I  asked  if  it  was  not  the  same  propo 
sition  that  came  up  some  months  ago,  advocated  by  Senator  Weeks, 


CARRYING    ON  265 

in  a  new  disguise — if  it  was  not  the  same  kind  of  a  commission  that 
had  harassed  Mr.  Lincoln.  I  think  we  ought  to  let  our  attitude 
be  known  unofficially  for  the  guidance  of  men  who  wish  to  help  us. 
If  we  do  nothing  at  this  time  to  let  it  be  known,  it  would  seem  that 
our  opposition  to  this  kind  of  legislation  had  been  silenced  by  the 
furore  over  the  fuel  order.  In  other  words,  we  ought  to  show  by 
our  attitude  that  the  tantrums  on  the  Hill  are  making  no  impression 
on  us  whatever. 

TUMULTY. 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

Of  course,  I  am  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  "super-cabinet,"  and  regard 
it  as  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  renewal  of  the  perpetual  effort  of 
the  Republicans  to  force  representation  in  the  Administration. 
Republicans  of  the  finest  sort  and  of  the  finest  capacity  are  working 
for  and  with  the  Administration  on  all  hands  and  there  is  no  need 
whatever  for  a  change  at  the  head  of  the  administering  departments. 
I  am  utterly  opposed  to  anything  of  the  sort  and  will  never  consent 
to  it.  You  will  know  how  to  create  the  impression  on  the  minds  of 
the  newspaper  men  that  I  regard  it  as  merely  a  partisan  effort  to 
hamper  and  embarrass  the  Administration. 

THE  PRESIDENT. 

There  were  many  misgivings  in  the  minds  of  the  people 
when  war  was  declared  in  April,  1917,  and  the  nation  em 
barked  upon  the  most  gigantic  of  all  its  wars,  under  the 
leadership  of  a  college  professor,  a  doctrinaire,  who  did  not 
believe  in  war  as  a  method  of  permanently  solving  inter 
national  problems,  and  a  Secretary  of  War  who  was  an 
avowed  pacifist.  There  was  another  matter  which  greatly 
disturbed  the  peace  of  mind  of  the  average  American. 
The  political  party  that  was  conducting  the  struggle  was 
the  Democratic  party,  the  party  of  the  plain  folk,  of  the 
average  men  and  women  of  America.  Our  Republican 
friends  had  so  cleverly  "advertised"  their  conduct  of  the 
Civil  War  and  the  Spanish-American  War,  that  many 


266    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

people  in  the  country  felt  that  the  Republican  party,  be 
cause  of  its  leading  minds  and  the  business  genius  of  its 
masters,  was  the  only  political  organization  that  could  be 
depended  upon  successfully  to  carry  on  a  great  war. 

Colonel  Roosevelt's  diary,  first  made  public  on  Septem 
ber  28, 1921,  throws  interesting  light  on  Republican  claims 
of  efficient  management  by  Republicans  of  the  Spanish- 
American  War.  Under  date  of  May  7,  1898,  the  Colonel, 
then  a  lieutenant-colonel,  recorded  in  his  diary:  "The 
delays  and  stupidity  of  the  Ordnance  Department  sur 
pass  belief.  The  Quartermaster's  Department  is  better, 
but  bad.  The  Commissary  Department  is  good.  There 
is  no  management  whatever  in  the  War  Department. 
Against  a  good  nation  we  should  be  helpless,"  and  these 
animadversions  are  reiterated  in  subsequent  entries. 
Interesting  comments  from  the  greatest  of  contemporary 
Republicans  on  the  divine  right  of  the  Republican  party 
to  conduct  all  American  wars  and  transact  all  other 
American  business  of  importance.  But  doubtless  the 
Colonel  had  forgotten  all  this  in  1917,  and  many  other 
good  Americans  had  also  forgotten  what  was  notorious 
in  1898  and  the  ineptitude  of  the  Republican  War  Depart 
ment,  which,  as  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt  said  under 
date  of  May  21,  1898,  had  "no  head,  no  energy,  no 
intelligence."  But  the  old  myth  sedulously  cultivated  by 
Republicans  continued  in  1917,  that  only  Republicans  are 
fit  to  govern,  no  matter  how  badly  they  govern.  Direful 
prophecies  and  predictions  of  disaster  to  the  country  by 
reason  of  the  Democratic  auspices  under  which  the  war 
was  to  be  conducted  were  freely  made.  ~ 

It  is  an  unpleasant  fact  that  some  of  the  leading  Re 
publicans  in  the  Senate  and  the  House  harboured  for  the 
President  a  partisan  and  personal  hatred  which  made  the 


CARRYING   ON  267 

wish  father  to  the  thought.  Yet  the  expected  did  not 
happen,  to  the  amazement  and  chagrin  of  the  Republican 
enemies  of  the  President.  No  other  war  was  attended 
with  so  little  scandal  and  with  greater  expedition.  The 
cause  was  plain.  It  was  the  magnificent  and  aggressive 
leadership  of  Woodrow  Wilson  exerting  itself  all  along 
the  line,  and  that  leadership  was  based  upon  certain 
fundamental  resolutions  which  had  been  taking  form  in 
the  President's  mind  for  many  months  previous  to  his 
appearance  before  Congress  asking  for  the  passage  of  a 
war  declaration.  They  were  as  follows:  (1)  There  was 
to  be  no  "politics"  in  the  conduct  of  the  war;  (2)  no 
political  generals  would  be  selected;  (3)  every  ounce  of 
energy  and  force  in  the  nation  was  to  be  put  back  of  the 
heads  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  in  a  supreme  effort  to  make 
our  influence,  moral  and  physical,  quickly  felt.  Every 
effort  was  made  to  cut  out  scandal  and  to  put  an  absolute 
embargo  on  the  activities  of  army  speculators,  contrac 
tors,  and  profiteers. 

Speaking  to  me  one  day  about  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
shortly  after  the  delivery  of  his  war  message,  he  said: 
"We  must  not  in  our  conduct  of  this  war  repeat  the 
scandals  of  the  Civil  and  the  Spanish- American  wars. 
The  politics  of  generals  and  admirals  must  be  tabooed. 
We  must  find  the  best  trained  minds  that  we  can  get  and 
we  must  back  them  up  at  every  turn.  Our  policy  must  be 
'the  best  man  for  every  job,'  regardless  of  his  political 
affiliations.  This  must  be  the  only  test,  for,  after  all,  we 
are  the  ^trustees  of  the  boys  whose  lives  will  be  spent  in 
this  enterprise  of  war." 

This  was  not  an  easy  policy  to  pursue.  Every  kind  of 
harassing  demand  came  from  Democratic  senators  and 
representatives  to  induce  the  President  to  recognize 


268    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

political  considerations  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  the 
argument  being  that  after  all  the  responsibility  for  its 
conduct  resting  with  the  Democrats,  the  administration 
of  the  war  ought  to  be  under  Democratic  tutelage  through 
out.  But  the  President  was  firm — in  his  resolve  to  see 
the  war  through  to  the  end  without  political  considera 
tions.  The  political  predilections  of  generals,  admirals, 
and  war  workers  of  every  kind  was  ignored. 

Mr.  Creel  by  furnishing  a  list  of  Republicans  appointed 
by  the  President  to  conspicuous  office  has  disproved  the 
charge  against  the  President  of  niggard  partisanship. 
Although  the  President  would  not  tolerate  a  coalition 
cabinet,  he  gave  to  Republicans  all  manner  of  opportu 
nities  to  share  in  the  conduct  and  the  credit  of  the  war. 
I  quote  from  Mr.  Creel: 

The  search  for  "the  best  man  for  the  place"  was  instituted  without 
regard  to  party,  faction,  blood  strain,  or  creed,  and  the  result  was  a 
composite  organization  in  which  Democrats,  Republicans,  and  In 
dependents  worked  side  by  side,  partisanship  forgotten  and  service 
the  one  consideration. 

It  stood  recognized  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  soldier  selected 
to  command  our  forces  in  France  might  well  develop  into  a  presiden 
tial  possibility,  yet  this  high  place  was  given  without  question  to 
Gen.  John  J.  Pershing,  a  life-long  Republican  and  the  son-in-law  of 
Senator  Warren,  one  of  the  masters  of  the  Republican  machine. 

Admiral  William  S.  Sims,  a  vociferous  Republican,  was  sent  to 
English  waters  in  high  command,  and  while  Secretary  Daniels  was 
warned  at  the  time  that  Sims's  partisanship  was  of  the  kind  that  would 
not  recognize  the  obligations  of  loyalty  or  patriotism,  he  waved 
the  objection  aside  out  of  his  belief  that  Sims  was  "the  best  man  for 
the  job." 

For  the  head  of  the  Aircraft  Board,  with  its  task  of  launching 
America's  great  aviation  programme,  Mr.  Howard  E.  Coffin,  a 
Republican,  was  selected  and  at  his  right  hand  Mr.  Coffin  placed 
Col.  Edward  A.  Deeds,  also  a  Republican  of  vigour  and  regularity. 


CARRYING    ON  269 

It  is  to  be  remembered  also  that  when  failure  and  corruption  were 
charged  against  the  Aircraft  Board,  the  man  appointed  by  the  Presi 
dent  to  conduct  the  highly  important  investigation  was  Charles 
E.  Hughes. 

Three  Assistant  Secretaries  of  War  were  appointed  by  Mr.  Baker — 
Mr.  Benedict  Crowell,  a  Cleveland  contractor;  Doctor  F.  E.  Keppel, 
dean  of  Columbia  University,  and  Emmet  J.  Scott,  formerly  Booker 
Washington's  secretary — and  all  three  were  Republicans.  Mr. 
E.  R.  Stettinius  of  the  J.  P.  Morgan  firm  and  a  Republican  was  made 
special  assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  placed  in  charge  of 
supplies,  a  duty  that  he  had  been  discharging  for  the  Allies.  Maj. 
Gen.  George  W.  Goethals,  after  his  unfortunate  experience  in  ship 
building,  was  given  a  second  chance  and  put  in  the  War  Department 
as  an  assistant  Chief  of  staff.  The  Chief  of  Staff  himself,  Gen. 
Peyton  C.  March,  was  a  Republican  no  less  definite  and  regular  than 
General  Goethals.  Mr.  Samuel  McRoberts,  president  of  the  National 
City  Bank  and  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  Republican  party,  was  brought 
to  Washington  as  chief  of  the  procurement  section  in  the  Ordnance 
Section,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general;  Maj.  Gen.  E.  H.  Crowder 
was  appointed  Provost-Marshal-General,  although  his  Republicanism 
was  well  known,  and  no  objection  of  any  kind  was  made  when  Gen 
eral  Crowder  put  Charles  B.  Warren,  the  Republican  National 
Committeeman  from  Michigan,  in  charge  of  appeal  cases,  a  position 
of  rare  power. 

The  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  was  virtually  turned  over  to 
Republicans  under  Charles  M.  Schwab  and  Charles  Piez.  Mr. 
Vance  McCormick,  chairman  of  the  Democratic  National  Committee, 
was  made  chairman  of  the  War  Trade  Board,  but  of  the  eight  members 
the  following  five  were  Republicans:  Albert  Strauss  of  New  York, 
Alonzo  E.  Taylor  of  Pennsylvania,  John  Beaver  White,  of  New  York, 
Frank  C.  Munson  of  New  York,  and  Clarence  M.Woolleyof  Chicago. 

The  same  conditions  obtained  in  the  Red  Cross.  A  very  eminent 
Republican,  Mr.  H.  P.  Davison,  was  put  in  supreme  authority,  and 
on  the  Red  Cross  War  Council  were  placed  ex-President  Taft;  Mr. 
Charles  D.  Norton,  Mr.  Taft's  secretary  while  President;  and  Mr. 
Cornelius  N.  Bliss,  former  treasurer  of  the  Republican  National 
Committee.  Not  only  was  Mr.  Taft  thus  honoured,  but  upon  the 
creation  of  a  National  War  Labour  Board  the  ex-President  was  made 


270    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

its  chairman  and  virtually  empowered  to  act  as  the  administration's 
representative  in  its  contact  with  industry. 

Mr.  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  a  Republican  of  iron  regularity,  was  placed 
in  charge  of  the  War  Savings  Stamps  Campaign,  and  when  Mr. 
McAdoo  had  occasion  to  name  Assistant  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury 
he  selected  Prof.  L.  S.  Rowe  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and 
Mr.  H.  C.  Leffingwell  of  New  York. 

Harry  A.  Garfield,  son  of  the  Republican  President,  was  made  Fuel 
Administrator,  and  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover,  now  a  candidate  for  Presi 
dent,  on  a  platform  of  unadulterated  Republicanism,  was  nominated 
as  head  of  the  Food  Administration. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  was  an  organization  of  high  im 
portance  and  one  of  tremendous  influence  from  a  partisan  standpoint, 
yet  its  executive  body  was  divided  as  follows :  Republicans — Howard 
E.  Coffin,  Julius  Rosenwald,  Dr.  Hollis  Godfrey,  Dr.  Franklin  Martin, 
Walter  S.  Gifford,  Director;  Democrats — Daniel  Willard  and  Bernard 
M.  Baruch;  Independent — Samuel  Gompers. 

No  sooner  had  the  war  begun  than  the  preliminary  war 
work  of  the  President  began  to  bear  fruit. 

Within  a  month  from  the  declaration  of  war  the 
traditional  policy  of  the  nation  was  reversed,  by  the 
enactment  of  the  Selective  Service  Act.  A  vast  machinery 
of  registration  was  created  that  ran  without  a  hitch,  and 
on  June  5th  more  than  10,000,000  men  were  registered 
quickly  and  efficiently. 

Thirty -two  encampments — virtual  cities,  since  each  had 
to  house  40,000  men — were  built  in  ninety  days  from  the 
driving  of  the  first  nail,  complete  in  every  municipal  de 
tail,  a  feat  declared  impossible,  and  which  will  stand  for 
all  time  as  a  building  miracle. 

In  June,  scarcely  two  months  after  the  President's 
appearance  before  Congress,  General  Pershing  and  his 
staff  reached  France,  and  on  July  3rd  the  last  of  four 
groups  of  transports  landed  American  fighting  men  in  the 


CARRYING    ON  271 

home  of  La  Fayette  and  Rochambeau.  On  October  10th 
our  soldiers  went  on  the  firing-line. 

Training  camps  for  officers  started  in  June,  and  in 
August  there  were  graduated  27,341  successful  aspirants, 
ready  to  assume  the  tasks  of  leadership. 

In  a  notable  speech,  confidential  in  character,  the 
President  on  the  8th  day  of  April,  1918,  addressed  the 
foreign  correspondents  at  the  White  House  concerning 
"our  resolutions"  and  "actions  in  the  war."  The  speech 
was  as  follows: 

I  am  very  glad  to  have  this  opportunity  to  meet  you.  Some  of 
you  I  have  met  before,  but  not  all.  In  what  I  am  going  to  say  I  would 
prefer  that  you  take  it  in  this  way,  as  for  the  private  information  of 
your  minds  and  not  for  transmission  to  anybody,  because  I  just  want, 
if  I  may,  in  a  few  words  to  create  a  background  for  you  which  may  be 
serviceable  to  you.  I  speak  in  confidence. 

I  was  rendered  a  little  uneasy  by  what  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was 
quoted  as  having  said  the  other  day  that  the  Americans  have  a  great 
surprise  in  store  for  Germany.  I  don't  know  in  what  sense  he  meant 
that,  but  there  is  no  surprise  in  store.  I  want  you  to  know  the  se 
quence  of  resolves  and  of  actions  concerning  our  part  in  the  war. 
Some  time  ago  it  was  proposed  to  us  that  we,  if  I  may  use  the  expres 
sion,  feed  our  men  into  the  French  and  English  armies  in  any  units 
that  might  be  ready — companies  or  regiments  or  brigades — and  not 
wait  to  train  and  coordinate  the  larger  units  of  our  armies  before  put 
ting  them  into  action.  My  instinctive  judgment  in  the  face  of  that 
proposition  was  that  the  American  people  would  feel  a  very  much 
more  ardent  interest  in  the  war  if  their  men  were  fighting  under  their 
own  flag  and  under  their  own  general  officers,  but  at  that  time,  which 
was  some  months  ago,  I  instructed  General  Pershing  that  he  had  full 
authority  whenever  any  exigency  that  made  such  a  thing  necessary 
should  occur  to  put  the  men  in  any  units  or  in  any  numbers  or  in  any 
way  that  was  necessary — just  as  he  is  doing.  What  I  wanted  you  to 
know  was  that  that  was  not  a  new  action,  that  General  Pershing  was 
fully  instructed  about  that  all  along. 

Then,  similarly  with  regard  to  the  impression  that  we  are  now  going 


272    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

to  rush  troops  to  Europe.  Of  course,  you  cannot  rush  any  faster  than 
there  is  means  of  rushing  and,  what  I  have  said  recently  is  what  I 
have  said  all  along,  that  we  are  getting  men  over  there  just  as  fast  as 
we  can  get  them  ready  and  as  quickly  as  we  can  find  the  ships  to  trans 
port  them.  We  are  doing  that  now  and  we  have  been  doing  it  all 
along.  Let  me  point  out  some  of  the  circumstances :  Our  first  pro 
gramme  was  to  send  over  ninety  thousand  men  a  month,  but  for 
several  months  we  were  sending  over  only  thirty  thousand — one  third 
of  the  programme.  Why?  Not  because  we  didn't  have  the  men 
ready,  not  even  because  we  didn't  have  the  means  of  transportation, 
but  because — and  there  is  no  criticism  of  the  French  Government 
involved  in  this — because  the  ports  assigned  to  us  for  landing  couldn't 
take  care  of  the  supplies  we  had  to  send  over.  We  had  to  send  ma 
terials  and  engineers,  and  workmen,  even,  over  to  build  the  docks  and 
the  piers  that  would  be  adequate  to  handle  the  number  of  men  we  sent 
over,  because  this  was  happening :  We  began  with  the  ninety-thousand 
programme  and  the  result  was  that  cargo  ships  that  we  needed  were 
lying  in  those  ports  for  several  weeks  together  without  being  un 
loaded,  as  there  was  no  means  of  unloading  them.  It  was  bad 
economy  and  bad  practice  from  every  point  of  view  to  have  those 
ships  lying  there  during  a  period  when  they  could  have  made  two  or 
three  voyages.  There  is  still  this  difficulty  which  I  am  afraid  there 
is  no  means  of  overcoming  rapidly,  that  the  railroad  communication 
between  those  ports  and  the  front  is  inadequate  to  handle  very  large 
bodies  of  men.  You  may  notice  that  General  Pershing  recommended 
that  Christmas  boxes  should  not  be  sent  to  the  men.  That  sounded 
like  a  pretty  hard  piece  of  advice,  but  if  you  could  go  to  those  ports 
and  see  those  Christmas  boxes  which  are  still  there,  you  would  know 
why  he  didn't  want  them  sent.  There  was  no  means  of  getting  them 
to  the  front.  Vast  accumulations  of  these  gifts  were  piled  up  there 
with  no  means  of  storing  them  adequately  even. 

I  just  wanted  to  create  for  you  this  picture,  that  the  channels  have 
been  inevitably  choked.  Now  we  believe  that,  inasmuch  as  the  im 
pediments  on  the  other  side  are  being  largely  removed,  we  can  go 
ahead  with  the  original  programme  and  add  to  it  in  proportion  as  the 
British  can  spare  us  the  tonnage,  and  they  are  going  to  spare  us  the 
tonnage  for  the  purpose.  And  with  the  extra  tonnage  which  the 
British  are  going  to  spare  us  we  will  send  our  men,  not  to  France  but  to 


CARRYING    ON  273 

Great  Britain,  and  from  there  they  will  go  to  the  front  through  the 
channel  ports.  You  see  that  makes  a  new  line  where  the  means  of 
handling  them  are  already  established  and  where  they  are  more 
abundant  than  they  are  at  the  French  ports.  Now,  I  want  to  say 
again  that  none  of  this  involves  the  least  criticism  of  the  French  author 
ities,  because  I  think  they  have  done  their  very  best  in  every  respect, 
but  they  couldn't  make  ports  out  of  hand,  they  couldn't  build  new 
facilities  suddenly,  and  their  man  power  was  being  drawn  on  in  very 
much  larger  proportion  than  our  man  power.  Therefore,  it  was  per 
fectly  proper  that  we  should  send  men  over  there  and  send  materials 
to  make  the  means  of  handling  the  troops  and  the  cargoes  more 
expeditiously. 

I  want  you  gentlemen  to  realize  that  there  was  no  wave-like  motion 
in  this  thing  so  far  as  our  purpose  and  preparation  are  concerned. 
We  have  met  with  delays,  of  course,  in  production,  some  of  which 
might  have  been  avoided  and  ought  to  have  been  avoided,  and  which 
are  being  slowly  corrected,  but  apart  from  that  the  motive  power  has 
been  back  of  this  thing  all  the  time.  It  has  been  the  means  of  action 
that  has  oscillated,  it  has  been  sometimes  greater  and  sometimes  less 
than  was  necessary  for  the  programme. 

I  for  my  own  part  don't  like  the  idea  of  having  surprises.  I  would 
like  the  people  to  be  surprised  if  we  didn't  do  our  duty,  but  not  sur 
prised  that  we  did  do  it.  Of  course,  I  don't  mean  that  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  meant  that  we  would  surprise  everybody  by  doing  our  duty, 
but  I  don't  just  know  how  to  interpret  his  idea  of  it,  because  I  have 
said  the  same  thing  to  the  British  representatives  all  along  as  I  in 
formally  expressed  it  to  Lord  Reading,  that  we  had  been  and  always 
would  be  doing  our  damnedest,  and  there  could  not  be  a  more  definite 
American  expression  of  purpose  than  that. 

As  to  another  matter  (I  am  just  giving  you  things  to  think  about 
and  not  things  to  say,  if  you  will  be  kind  enough  to  take  it  that  way) . 
That  speech  I  made  on  Saturday  I  hope  was  correctly  understood. 
We  are  fighting,  as  I  understand  it,  for  justice  to  everybody  and  are 
ready  to  stop  just  as  soon  as  justice  to  everybody  is  everybody's 
programme.  I  have  the  same  opinion  privately  about,  I  will  not  say 
the  policy,  but  the  methods  of  the  German  Government  that  some 
gentlemen  have  who  see  red  all  the  time,  but  that  is  not  a  proper  part 
of  my  thought.  My  thought  is  that  if  the  German  Government  in- 


274    WOODROW    WILSON    AS   I    KNOW    HIM 

sist  that  the  thing  shall  be  settled  unjustly,  that  is  to  say  by  force, 
then  of  course  we  accept  that  and  will  settle  it  by  force.  Whenever 
we  see  sincere  symptoms  of  their  desire  to  settle  it  by  justice,  we  will 
not  only  accept  their  suggestions  but  we  will  be  glad  and  eager  to 
accept  them,  as  I  said  in  my  speech.  I  would  be  ashamed  to  use 
the  knock-down  and  drag-out  language;  that  is  not  the  language  of 
liberty,  that  is  the  language  of  braggadocio.  For  my  part,  I  have  no 
desire  to  march  triumphantly  into  Berlin.  If  they  oblige  us  to  march 
triumphantly  into  Berlin,  then  we  will  do  it  if  it  takes  twenty  years. 
But  the  world  will  come  to  its  senses  some  day,  no  matter  how  mad 
some  parts  of  it  may  be  now,  and  this  is  my  feeling,  that  we  ought 
when  the  thing  is  over  to  be  able  to  look  back  upon  a  course  which 
had  no  element  in  it  which  we  need  be  ashamed  of.  So  it  is  so  difficult 
in  any  kind  of  a  speech,  this  kind  or  any  other,  to  express  two  things 
that  seem  to  be  going  in  opposite  directions  that  I  wasn't  sure  that  I 
had  succeeded  in  expressing  them  on  Saturday — the  sincere  willing 
ness  to  discuss  peace  whenever  the  proposals  are  themselves  sincere 
and  yet  at  the  same  time  the  determination  never  to  discuss  it  until 
the  basis  laid  down  for  the  discussion  is  justice.  By  that  I  mean  jus 
tice  to  everybody.  Nobody  has  the  right  to  get  anything  out  of  this 
war,  because  we  are  fighting  for  peace  if  we  mean  what  we  say,  for 
permanent  peace.  No  injustice  furnishes  a  basis  for  permanent  peace. 
If  you  leave  a  rankling  sense  of  injustice  anywhere,  it  will  not  only 
produce  a  running  sore  presently  which  will  result  in  trouble  and 
probably  war,  but  it  ought  to  produce  war  somewhere.  The  sore 
ought  to  run.  It  is  not  susceptible  to  being  healed  except  by  remedy 
ing  the  injustice.  Therefore,  I  for  my  part  wouldn't  want  to  see  a 
peace  which  was  based  upon  compelling  any  people,  great  or  small,  to 
live  under  conditions  which  it  didn't  willingly  accept. 

If  I  were  just  a  sheer  Machiavelli  and  didn't  have  any  heart  but 
had  brains,  I  would  say :  "  If  you  mean  what  you  say  and  are  fighting 
for  permanent  peace,  then  there  is  only  one  way  to  get  it,  whether  you 
like  justice  or  not."  It  is  the  only  conceivable  intellectual  basis  for 
it,  because  this  is  not  like  the  time,  years  ago,  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna.  Peoples  were  then  not  willing,  but  so  speechless  and  unor 
ganized  and  without  the  means  of  self-expression,  that  the  govern 
ments  could  sit  on  their  necks  indefinitely.  They  didn't  know  how 
to  prevent  it.  But  they  are  wide  awake  now  and  nobody  is  going  to 


CARRYING    ON  275 

sit  comfortably  on  the  neck  of  any  people,  big  or  little,  and  the  more 
uncomfortable  he  is  who  tries  it,  the  more  I  am  personally  pleased. 
So  that  I  am  in  the  position  in  my  mind  of  trying  to  work  out  a  purely 
scientific  proposition:  "What  will  stay  put?" 

A  peace  is  not  going  to  be  permanent  until  that  principle  is  accepted 
by  everybody,  that,  given  a  political  unit,  every  people  has  the  right 
to  determine  its  own  life.  That,  gentlemen,  is  all  I  have  to  say  to 
you,  but  it  is  the  real  inside  of  my  mind,  and  it  is  the  real  key  to  the 
present  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  which  for  the  time  being 
is  in  my  keeping.  I  hope  it  will  be  useful  to  you,  as  it  is  welcome  to 
me  to  have  this  occasion  of  telling  you  what  I  really  think  and  what  I 
understand  we  are  really  doing. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

THE  PEN  IS  MIGHTIER  THAN  THE  SWORD 

DURING  this  time  the  President  was  constantly 
on  guard  at  the  Executive  offices,  never  for  a 
moment  out  of  touch  with  the  situation.  He 
was  the  intimate  associate  of  the  men  who  were  his  co- 
labourers  on  the  various  boards  that  had  been  set  up  to 
prosecute  the  work  of  the  war.  He  seemed  to  know  what 
was  going  on  in  every  phase.  His  evenings  were  given  to 
examination  of  the  long  dispatches  that  came  from  diplo 
matic  and  consular  representatives  of  America  at  the 
various  capitals  of  Europe,  apprising  him  of  the  develop 
ments  of  the  great  war. 

One  of  the  most  effective  measures  for  weakening  the  en 
emy  was  the  method  of  attacking  the  Central  Powers  from 
within  by  propaganda  designed  to  incite  the  masses  to  re 
bellion  and  to  drive  wedges  between  Germany  and  Aus 
tria.  As  George  Creel  says,  "The  projectile  force  of 
the  President's  idealism,  its  full  military  value  may  be 
measured  by  the  fact  that  between  April  6  and  December 
8,  1917,  sixteen  States,  great  and  small,  declared  war 
against  Germany,  or  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  her. 
From  the  very  first  the  Allies  accepted  the  President  as 
their  spokesman." 

It  was  under  the  influence  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  clear  vis 
ion  and  magic  power  of  statement  that  the  true  significance 
of  the  war  became  clear.  At  first  it  had  seemed  a  war  of 
nations,  and  the  belligerents  had  eagerly  published  official 
documents,  Red  Books,  White  Books,  Yellow  Books, 

276 


THE    PEN    IS    MIGHTIER  277 

and  so  forth,  through  all  the  colours  of  the  spectrum,  to 
show  who  had  "started  the  war."  The  question  of  who 
began  it  became  after  a  while  quite  secondary  to  the 
question  of  the  fundamental  principles  at  stake  in  the 
contest  which  was  no  longer  a  national  conflict,  but 
a  world  war,  waged  to  the  death  between  two  irrecon 
cilable  views  of  the  relationship  of  government  to  in 
dividuals,  the  autocratic  view  on  the  one  hand,  on  the 
other  the  democratic.  It  was  one  man  who  brought  the 
fundamental  principle  of  the  division  into  the  clear  light. 
A  contemporary  writer  has  said  that  the  magical  effect  of 
Woodrow  Wilson's  utterances  on  all  the  Allies  was  due,  not 
to  his  rhetoric  but  to  his  sublime  gift  of  seeing  and  stating 
a  profound  truth  after  which  others  had  been  only  groping. 
That  is  the  prophet's  power,  to  voice  the  latent,  in 
articulate  aspirations  of  the  multitude.  Proof  of  the 
value  of  the  President's  method  of  attacking  the  Central 
Powers  from  within  by  propaganda  was  disclosed  in 
General  Ludendorff's  and  Von  Tirpitz's  revelations.  In 
Ludendorff's  opinion,  the  President's  note  to  Germany  had 
forced  the  Central  Empires  to  yield  to  the  President. 
Ludendorff  says; 

In  his  answer  to  our  second  note,  Wilson  gave  us  nothing;  he  did  not 
even  tell  us  whether  the  Entente  took  its  stand  on  the  Fourteen  Points. 
He  demanded,  however,  the  suspension  of  the  submarine  campaign, 
stigmatized  our  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  west  as  a  violation  of  inter 
national  law,  and  once  again  sought  to  meddle  with  intimate  ques 
tions  of  our  domestic  politics. 

Speaking  again  of  the  answer  to  one  of  the  Wilson 
notes,  Ludendorff  says: 

The  answer  to  Wilson  was  dispatched  on  the  20th  of  October.  The 
submarine  campaign  was  abandoned.  This  concession  to  Wilson  was 


278    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  deepest  blow  to  the  army,  and  especially  to  the  navy.  The  in 
jury  to  the  morale  of  the  fleet  must  have  been  immeasurable.  The 
Cabinet  had  thrown  up  the  sponge. 

On  October  23rd,  President  Wilson  sent  the  following 
peremptory  message  to  the  Germans: 

It  is  evident  that  the  German  people  have  no  means  of  commanding 
the  acquiescence  of  the  military  authorities  of  the  Empire  in  the 
popular  will;  that  the  purpose  of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  control  the 
policy  of  the  Empire  is  still  unimpaired.  If  the  United  States  must 
deal  with  the  military  masters  and  monarchical  authorities  now,  or  if 
it  is  likely  to  have  to  deal  with  them  later  in  regard  to  international 
obligations  of  the  German  Empire,  it  must  demand  not  peace  negotia 
tions  but  surrender.  Nothing  can  be  gained  by  leaving  this  essential 
thing  unsaid. 

In  discussing  this  and  the  other  Wilson  notes,  Luden- 
dorff  says  that  they  had  dealt  a  vital  blow  at  the  heart 
of  militaristic  Germans  and  finally  loosed  the  grip  they 
held  on  the  German  people.  This  entire  situation  is 
best  expressed  in  LudendorfFs  own  words: 

On  October  23rd  or  24th  Wilson's  answer  arrived.  It  was  a  strong 
answer  to  our  cowardly  note.  This  time  he  had  made  it  quite  clear 
that  the  armistice  conditions  must  be  such  as  to  make  it  impossible 
for  Germany  to  resume  hostilities,  and  to  give  the  powers  allied 
against  her  unlimited  power  to  settle  themselves  the  details  of  the 
peace  accepted  by  Germany.  In  my  view,  there  could  no  longer 
be  doubt  in  any  mind  that  we  must  continue  the  fight.  I  felt  quite 
confident  that  the  people  were  still  to  be  won  over  to  this  course. 

On  the  evening  of  the  24th,  shortly  after  leaving  Spa  for  Berlin, 
there  was  brought  to  me  the  following  proclamation  already  signed 
by  the  Field  Marshal,  which  expressed  the  views  prevailing  at  G.  H. 
Q.  on  the  third  Wilson  note.  It  appeared  essential  that  G.  H.  Q. 
in  its  dealings  with  Berlin  should  take  up  a  definite  stand  to  the 


THE    PEN   IS   MIGHTIER  279 

note  in  order  to  eliminate  its  ill  effects  on  the  army.     The  telegram 

to  the  Army  ran  thus:  t 

\ 

"For  the  information  of  all  troops:  Wilson  says  in  his  answer 
that  he  is  ready  to  propose  to  his  allies  that  they  should 
enter  into  armistice  negotiations;  but  that  the  armistice  must 
render  Germany  so  defenseless  that  she  cannot  take  up  arms 
again.  He  will  only  negotiate  with  Germany  for  peace  if  she 
concedes  all  the  demands  of  America's  associates  as  to  the  inter 
nal  constitutional  arrangements  of  Germany;  otherwise,  there  is 
no  choice  but  unconditional  surrender. 

"  Wilson's  answer  is  a  demand  for  unconditional  surrender.  It 
is  thus  unacceptable  to  us  soldiers.  It  proves  that  our  enemies' 
desire  for  our  destruction,  which  let  loose  the  war  in  1914,  still 
exists  undiminished.  It  proves,  further,  that  our  enemies  use 
the  phrase  *  peace  of  justice'  merely  to  deceive  us  and  break  our 
resistance.  Wilson's  answer  can  thus  be  nothing  for  us  soldiers 
but  a  challenge  to  continue  our  resistance  with  all  our  strength. 

"When  our  enemies  know  that  no  sacrifices  will  achieve  the 
rupture  of  the  German  front,  then  they  will  be  ready  for  a  peace 
which  will  make  the  future  of  our  country  safe  for  the  broad 
masses  of  our  people. 

"At  the  front,  October  24th,  10  p.  M." 

This  proclamation  which  was  signed  by  Field  Marshal 
Von  Hindenburg  was  later  signed  by  Ludendorff.  It  re 
sulted  in  the  Kaiser's  immediate  orders  for  a  special 
conference  at  which  both  of  these  officials  were  dismissed 
from  the  Imperial  German  army. 

Von  Tirpitz  in  his  Memoirs  laid  stress  on  the  effect  of 
the  Wilson  submarine  notes.  Ludendorff  declares  in  his 
book  that  the  "Wilson  propaganda"  that  found  root  in 
Berlin  and  finally  grew  there  eventually  convinced  the 
German  people  that  it  was  not  they  themselves,  but  the 
Government  and  militarism  that  the  United  States  was 
warring  against.  This  was  the  seed  of  dissension  that  ruined 
German  morale  at  home. 


280    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Tirpitz  declared  that  the  beginning  of  the  end  came  when 
in  answer  to  the  President's  Sussex  note,  "We  showed  the 
world  that  we  were  going  down  before  America." 

Probably  the  most  enlightening  chapter  of  either  book 
is  that  containing  Tirpitz 's  contention  that  the  influence 
of  the  Wilson  submarine  notes  resulted  in  Japan's  stronger 
and  more  active  alliance  with  the  Allies.  In  this  con 
nection  Von  Tirpitz  says: 

Only  the  transmitting  to  Germany  of  the  threatening  notes  of 
President  Wilson,  when  he  inveighed  against  my  submarine  cam 
paign  during  the  latter  stages  of  the  war,  prevented  Japan  from 
coming  to  us  in  a  great  Germane-Japanese  alliance,  which  would 
have  ended  the  war  at  once. 

The  overtures  of  the  Pope,  in  August,  1917,  were 
rejected  and  again  the  attention  of  the  world  was  arrested 
by  the  masterly  leadership  of  the  American  President. 
On  August  16,  1917,  I  addressed  the  following  letter  to 
the  President  with  reference  to  the  offers  of  peace  made 
by  His  Holiness  Pope  Benedict  XV: 

The  White  House,  Washington, 
DEAR  GOVERNOR:  16  August,  1917. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  proposals  the  Pope  has  submitted  should 
lead  us  into  a  statement  as  to  the  terms  of  peace  beyond  that  which 
the  President  has  already  given  expression  to  in  his  address  in  the 
Senate  and  in  his  Russian  note.  In  these  two  documents  are  discussed 
the  fundamentals  of  international  peace.  Some  of  these  fundamentals 
the  Pope  recognizes  in  his  statement  to  the  belligerents.  To  go  be 
yond  a  discussion  of  these  now  might  lead  to  a  conflict  of  opinion 
even  among  our  own  allies  (for  instance,  France  hopes  for  the 
return  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  Russia,  for  Constantinople,  etc.). 

When  the  President  said  in  his  address  of  April  second,  last,  that 
we  were  not  making  war  on  the  German  people,  I  believe  he  set  the 
stage  for  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser.  And  I  think  our  whole  note 


THE    PEN    IS   MIGHTIER  281 

in  reply  to  the  Pope  should  be  so  framed  that  this  idea  would  always 
be  kept  in  the  forefront  of  our  discussion  so  as  to  bring  home  to  the 
people  of  Germany  the  distrust  and  utter  contempt  in  which  the 
ruling  powers  of  Germany  are  held  by  the  peoples  of  the  world. 

Our  note  in  reply  to  the  Pope  should,  I  believe,  embody  the  fol 
lowing  ideas : 

"First — More  important  now  than  the  terms  of  peace  are  the  spirit 
and  character  of  the  nations  who  wish  to  end  the  war. 

"Second — How  can  any  international  agreement  to  bring  an  end 
to  the  conflict  be  discussed  until  those  who  brought  it  about  can  be 
made  to  realize  the  inviolability  of  treaty  obligations? 

"Third — Attack  the  good  faith  of  the  ruling  powers  of  Germany, 
calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  Germany  brought  on  the  war; 
that  Germany  invaded  Belgium;  that  Germany  ravished  France, 
sank  the  Lusitania,  ravished  the  women  and  children  of  the  con 
quered  territories;  that  Germany  decreed  submarine  warfare,  and 
'erected  barbarism  into  a  religion.' 

"Fourth — And  the  democratic  nations  of  the  world  are  asked  to 
confide  their  future  and  the  future  of  the  world  to  a  nation  that  be 
lieves  that  force  of  arms  should  be  substituted  for  the  moral  force  of 
right.  In  other  words,  the  ruling  powers  of  Germany  must  purge 
themselves  of  contempt  before  they  shall  be  given  the  hearing  that 
the  Pope  feels  they  are  entitled  to." 

This  form  of  reply  will,  I  am  sure,  rouse  the  people  of  Germany  to 
a  realization  of  the  situation  which  confronts  them,  for  there  is 
abundant  evidence  that  they  are  gradually  arriving  at  the  conclu 
sion  that  the  Kaiser  no  longer  represents  them  or  their  ideals. 

In  other  words,  what  I  should  like  to  see  the  President  do  is  not  to 
discuss  in  extenso  our  terms  of  peace  but  rather  confine  himself  to  a 
general  attack  upon  the  lack  of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  Germany 
in  all  of  her  dealings  with  us. 

TUMULTY. 

On  August  27,  1917,  the  President,  through  his  Secre 
tary  of  State,  addressed  the  following  reply  to  the  Pope: 

To  His  HOLINESS  BENEDICTUS  XV,  POPE: 

In  acknowledgment  of  the  communication  of  Your  Holiness  to 


WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

the  belligerent  peoples,  dated  August  1,  1917,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  requests  me  to  transmit  the  following  reply : 

Every  heart  that  has  not  been  blinded  and  hardened  by  this  terri 
ble  war  must  be  touched  by  this  moving  appeal  of  His  Holiness  the 
Pope,  must  feel  the  dignity  and  force  of  the  humane  and  generous 
motives  which  prompted  it,  and  must  fervently  wish  that  we  might 
take  the  path  of  peace  he  so  persuasively  points  out.  But  it  would 
be  folly  to  take  it  if  it  does  not  in  fact  lead  to  the  goal  he  proposes. 
Our  response  must  be  based  upon  the  stern  facts  and  upon  nothing 
else.  It  is  not  a  mere  cessation  of  arms  he  desires:  it  is  a  stable  and 
enduring  peace.  This  agony  must  not  be  gone  through  with  again, 
and  it  must  be  a  matter  of  very  sober  judgment  what  will  insure  us 
against  it. 

His  Holiness  in  substance  proposes  that  we  return  to  the  status 
quo  ante  helium,  and  that  then  there  be  a  general  condonation,  dis 
armament,  and  a  concert  of  nations  based  upon  an  acceptance  of 
the  principle  of  arbitration;  that  by  a  similar  concert  freedom  of  the 
seas  be  established;  and  that  the  territorial  claims  of  France  and  Italy, 
the  perplexing  problems  of  the  Balkan  States,  and  the  restitution  of 
Poland  be  left  to  such  conciliatory  adjustments  as  may  be  possible  in 
the  new  temper  of  such  a  peace,  due  regard  being  paid  to  the  aspira 
tions  of  the  peoples  whose  political  fortunes  and  affiliations  will  be 
involved. 

It  is  manifest  that  no  part  of  this  programme  can  be  carried  out 
successfully  unless  the  restitution  of  the  status  quo  ante  furnishes  a 
firm  and  satisfactory  basis  for  it.  The  object  of  this  war  is  to  deliver 
the  free  peoples  of  the  world  from  the  menace  and  the  actual  power 
of  a  vast  military  establishment  controlled  by  an  irresponsible 
government  which,  having  secretly  planned  to  dominate  the  world,  pro 
ceeded  to  carry  the  plan  out  without  regard  either  to  the  sacred  obli 
gations  of  treaty  or  the  long-established  practices  and  long-cherished 
principles  of  international  action  and  honour;  which  chose  its  own  time 
for  the  war;  delivered  its  blow  fiercely  and  suddenly;  stopped  at  no 
barrier  either  of  law  or  mercy;  swept  a  whole  continent  within  the 
tide  of  blood — not  the  blood  of  soldiers  only,  but  the  blood  of  inno 
cent  women  and  children  also  and  of  the  helpless  poor;  and  now 
stands  balked  but  not  defeated,  the  enemy  of  four  fifths  of  the  world. 
This  power  is  not  the  German  people.  It  is  the  ruthless  master  of  the 


THE    PEN    IS   MIGHTIER 

German  people.  It  is  no  business  of  ours  how  that  great  people 
came  under  its  control  or  submitted  with  temporary  zest  to  the 
domination  of  its  purpose:  but  it  is  our  business  to  see  to  it  that  the 
history  of  the  rest  of  the  world  is  no  longer  left  to  its  handling.  [ . 

To  deal  with  such  a  power  by  way  of  peace  upon  the  plan  proposed 
by  His  Holiness  the  Pope  would,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  involve  a  re 
cuperation  of  its  strength  and  a  renewal  of  its  policy;  would  make  it 
necessary  to  create  a  permanent  hostile  combination  of  nations 
against  the  German  people  who  are  its  instruments;  and  would  result 
in  abandoning  the  newborn  Russia  to  intrigue,  the  manifold  subtle 
interference,  and  the  certain  counter-revolution  which  would  be  at 
tempted  by  all  the  malign  influences  to  which  the  German  Govern 
ment  has  of  late  accustomed  the  world.  Can  peace  be  based  upon  a 
restitution  of  its  power  or  upon  any  word  of  honour  it  could  pledge 
in  a  treaty  of  settlement  and  accommodation? 

Responsible  statesmen  must  now  everywhere  see,  if  they  never  saw 
before,  that  no  peace  can  rest  securely  upon  political  or  economic 
restrictions  meant  to  benefit  some  nations  and  cripple  or  embarrass 
others,  upon  vindictive  action  of  any  sort,  or  any  kind  of  revenge  or 
deliberate  injury.  The  American  people  have  suffered  intolerable 
wrongs  at  the  hands  of  the  Imperial  German  Government,  but  they 
desire  no  reprisal  upon  the  German  people  who  have  themselves 
suffered  all  things  in  this  war  which  they  did  not  choose.  They 
believe  that  peace  should  rest  upon  the  rights  of  peoples,  not  the 
rights  of  governments — the  rights  of  peoples  great  or  small,  weak  or 
powerful — their  equal  right  to  freedom  and  security  and  self  -govern 
ment  and  to  a  participation  upon  fair  terms  in  the  economic  oppor 
tunities  of  the  world,  the  German  people  of  course  included  if  they 
will  accept  equality  and  not  seek  domination. 

The  test,  therefore,  of  every  plan  of  peace  is  this:  Is  it  based  upon 
the  faith  of  all  the  peoples  involved  or  merely  upon  the  word  of  an 
ambitious  and  intriguing  government  on  the  one  hand  and  of  a  group 
of  free  peoples  on  the  other?  This  is  a  test  which  goes  to  the  root 
of  the  matter;  and  it  is  the  test  which  must  be  applied. 

The  purposes  of  the  United  States  in  this  war  are  known  to  the 
whole  world,  to  every  people  to  whom  the  truth  has  been  permitted 
to  come.  They  do  not  need  to  be  stated  again.  We  seek  no  material 
advantage  of  any  kind.  We  believe  that  the  intolerable  wrongs  done 


284    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

in  this  war  by  the  furious  and  brutal  power  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government  ought  to  be  repaired,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  the  sov 
ereignty  of  any  people — rather  a  vindication  of  the  sovereignty  both 
of  those  that  are  weak  and  those  that  are  strong.  Punitive  damages, 
the  dismemberment  of  empires,  the  establishment  of  selfish  and  ex 
clusive  economic  leagues,  we  deem  inexpedient  and  in  the  end  worse 
than  futile,  no  proper  basis  for  a  peace  of  any  kind,  least  of  all  for  an 
enduring  peace.  That  must  be  based  upon  justice  and  fairness  and 
the  common  rights  of  mankind. 

We  cannot  take  the  word  of  the  present  rulers  of  Germany  as  a 
guaranty  of  anything  that  is  to  endure,  unless  explicitly  supported  by 
such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  German  people 
themselves  as  the  other  peoples  of  the  world  would  be  justified  in 
accepting.  Without  such  guaranties  treaties  of  settlement,  agree 
ments  for  disarmament,  covenants  to  set  up  arbitration  in  the  place 
of  force,  territorial  adjustments,  reconstitutions  of  small  nations,  if 
made  with  the  German  Government,  no  man,  no  nation  could  now 
depend  on.  We  must  await  some  new  evidence  of  the  purposes  of 
the  great  peoples  of  the  Central  Powers.  God  grant  it  may  be  given 
soon  and  in  a  way  to  restore  the  confidence  of  all  peoples  everywhere  in 
the  faith  of  nations  and  the  possibility  of  a  coyenanted  peace. 

ROBERT  LANSING, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

COLONEL  ROOSEVELT  AND  GENERAL  WOOD 

IT  WILL  be  recalled  that  early  in  the  war  Colonel  Roose 
velt  called  at  the  White  House  to  confer  with  the 
President  regarding  his  desire  to  lead  a  brigade  to  the 
other  side.  I  recall  distinctly  every  fact  of  that  meeting. 
I  was  seated  a  few  feet  away  in  the  Red  Room  of  the  White 
House  at  the  time  these  two  men  were  conferring. .  Noth 
ing  could  have  been  pleasanter  or  more  agreeable  than 
this  meeting.  They  had  not  met  since  they  were  political 
opponents  in  1912,  but  prior  to  that  they  had  had  two 
or  three  friendly  visits  with  each  other.  Mr.  Wilson  had 
once  lunched  with  Colonel  Roosevelt  at  Sagamore  Hill, 
and  when  the  Colonel  was  President,  he  and  his  party 
had  been  luncheon  guests  of  President  and  Mrs.  Wilson 
of  Princeton  University  on  the  occasion  of  an  Army  and 
Navy  game  played  on  the  Princeton  gridiron. 

They  met  in  the  White  House  in  the  most  friendly 
fashion,  told  each  other  anecdotes,  and  seemed  to  enjoy 
together  what  the  Colonel  was  accustomed  to  call  a 
"bully  time." 

The  object  of  the  Colonel's  call  was  discussed  with 
out  heat  or  bitterness.  The  President  placed  before 
the  Colonel  his  own  ideas  regarding  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
desire  to  serve,  and  the  attitude  of  the  General  Staff 
toward  the  volunteer  system,  a  system  that  would  have 
to  be  recognized  if  the  Colonel's  ambition  was  to  be  real 
ized.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  instead  of  being  moved  by 

285 


286    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

any  ill  will  toward  the  Colonel,  the  inclination  of  the 
President  was  to  overrule  the  recommendation  of  the 
General  Staff  and  urge  that  the  Colonel  be  granted  per 
mission  to  go  over  seas.  The  salutations  at  the  end  of 
the  conference  were  most  friendly  and  the  Colonel,  on 
his  way  out,  stopped  in  to  see  me.  He  slapped  me  on  the 
back  in  the  most  friendly  way,  and  said:  "By  Jove, 
Tumulty,  you  are  a  man  after  my  own  heart!  Six 
children,  eh?  Well  now,  you  get  me  across  and  I  will 
put  you  on  my  staff,  and  you  may  tell  Mrs.  Tumulty 
that  I  will  not  allow  them  to  place  you  at  any  point  of 
danger." 

Some  weeks  later,  I  received  the  following  letter  from 
Colonel  Roosevelt: 

Oyster  Bay,  Long  Island,  N.  Y. 

April   12,   1917. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  TUMULTY: 

That  was  a  fine  speech  of  Williams.  I  shall  write  him  and  con 
gratulate  him. 

Now,  don't  forget  that  it  might  be  a  very  good  thing  to  have  you  as 
one  of  my  commissioned  officers  at  Headquarters.  You  could  do 
really  important  work  there,  and  tell  Mrs.  Tumulty  and  the  six 
children,  that  this  particular  service  would  probably  not  be  danger 
ous.  Come,  sure! 

Sincerely  yours, 
THEODORE  ROOSEVELT. 
MR.  JOSEPH  P.  TUMULTY, 
Secretary  to  the  President, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

After  the  Colonel  departed,  the  President  in  a  boy 
ish  way  said:  "Well,  and  how  did  the  Colonel  impress 
you?"  I  told  the  President  of  the  very  favourable  im 
pression  the  Colonel  had  made  upon  me  by  his  buoyancy, 
charm  of  manner,  and  his  great  good  nature.  The 


OYSTER  BAY 

LON9   ISLAND.  N 


April  12th,  1917. 


ty  dear  *jr.  Tuirulty: 

That  was  a  fine  speech  of  Willian^..         I  ahall 
v/rite  him,  and  congratulate  him, 

Now,  don't  forget  that  it  mi$it  le  a  very  good 
thing  to  have  you  as  one  of  cy  coxnrissicned  officers  at 
Headquarters.        You  could  do  really  Important  work  there, 
and  tell  Lira.  Tumulty,  and  the  six  children,  that  thia 
particular  service  would  protxibly  not  be  dangerous,       ^tr^-f    ++++JT  f 

Sincerely  yours, 


VT.   Joseph  P.  Tmaiity, 
Secretary  to  the  President, 
Washington,  r.C. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  sent  this  letter  to  Mr.  Tumulty  shortly  after  his  one 
and  only  call  upon  President  Wilson  at  the  White  House 


287 


288    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

President  replied  by  saying:  "Yes,  he  is  a  great  big 
boy.  I  was,  as  formerly,  charmed  by  his  personality. 
There  is  a  sweetness  about  him  that  is  very  compelling. 
You  can't  resist  the  man.  I  can  easily  understand  why 
his  followers  are  so  fond  of  him." 

It  was,  therefore,  with  real  pain  that  the  President 
read  the  account  of  this  interview  as  contained  in  John 
J.  Leary's  book  entitled  "Talks  with  T.  R.,"  containing 
many  slighting  references  made  by  the  Colonel  to  the 
President.  It  appears  that  Mr.  Leary  accompanied  the 
Colonel  to  the  White  House  and  immediately  upon  the 
conclusion  of  the  conference  was  the  recipient  of  a  con 
fidential  statement  of  the  Colonel's  impression  of  the 
President.  The  account  in  Mr.  Leary's  book  is  as 
follows: 

I  found  that,  though  I  had  written  plainly  enough,  there  was  con 
fusion  in  his  [Wilson's]  mind  as  to  what  I  wanted  to  do.  I  ex 
plained  everything  to  him.  He  seemed  to  take  it  well,  but — remem 
ber  I  was  talking  to  Mr.  Wilson. 

"Tumulty,  by  way  of  a  half  joke,  said  he  might  go  to  France  with 
me.  I  said:  'By  Jove,  you  come  right  along!  I'll  have  a  place  for 
you.'  I  would,  too,  but  it  wouldn't  be  the  place  he  thinks.  It  is 
possible  he  might  be  sent  along  as  sort  of  a  watchdog  to  keep  Mr. 
Wilson  informed  as  to  what  was  being  done.  He  wouldn't  be, 
though.  He'd  keep  his  distance  from  headquarters  except  when  he 
was  sent  for. 

He  [Wilson]  has  promised  me  nothing  definitely,  but  as  I  have 
said,  if  any  other  man  than  he  talked  to  me  as  he  did,  I  would  feel 
assured.  If  I  talked  to  another  man  as  he  talked  to  me  it  would 
mean  that  that  man  was  going  to  get  permission  to  fight.  But  I 
was  talking  to  Mr.  Wilson.  His  words  may  mean  much,  they  may 
mean  little.  He  has,  however,  left  the  door  open. 


ROOSEVELT   AND   WOOD  289 

Of  course,  what  ultimately  happened  is  clear  to  every 
one,  civilian  and  soldier,  who  pauses  a  moment  to  reflect; 
as  plans  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  matured,  it  became 
continually  clearer  that  it  must  be  a  professional  war, 
conducted  by  professionals  with  complete  authority  over 
subordinates.  There  could  be  no  experimenting  with 
volunteer  commanders,  no  matter  how  great  their  valour, 
how  pure  their  motives,  or  how  eminent  their  positions  in 
the  nation.  To  make  an  exception  of  Colonel  Roosevelt 
would  have  been  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  the  whole 
design.  Military  experts  and  the  majority  of  Con 
gressional  opinion  were  at  one  in  this  matter,  though 
Congress  put  upon  the  President  the  responsibility  of 
making  the  final  decision,  together  with  whatever  obloquy 
this  would  entail.  It  was  purely  as  a  step  in  the  interest  of 
waging  the  war  with  greatest  effectiveness  that  the  Presi 
dent  announced  the  decision  adverse  to  the  Colonel's 
wishes.  Personally  it  would  have  been  pleasanter  for 
the  President  to  grant  the  Colonel's  request,  but  Presi 
dent  Wilson  has  never  adopted  "the  easiest  way." 

A  great  deal  of  criticism  was  heaped  upon  the  President 
for  what  appeared  to  the  outside  as  his  refusal  to  send 
General  Leonard  Wood  to  France.  Although  a  fierce 
storm  of  criticism  beat  upon  him,  the  President  dis 
played  no  resentment,  nor,  indeed,  did  he  seem  to  notice 
what  his  critics  were  saying. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  President  played  no  part  in  the 
movement  to  keep  General  Wood  from  realizing  his  ambi 
tion  to  lead  his  division  to  France.  Mr.  George  Creel  in 
his  book,  "The  War,  The  World  and  Wilson,"  has  suc 
cinctly  summarized  this  incident;  has  told  how  the 
name  of  General  Wood  did  not  appear  in  any  of  the  lists 
of  officers  received  from  General  Pershing;  how  the  Presi- 


290    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

dent  took  this  as  a  plain  indication  that  General  Pershing 
did  not  desire  General  Wood  in  France  (the  absence  of  so 
eminent  a  name  from  the  lists  was  certainly  not  an  over 
sight  on  the  part  of  the  Commanding  General  in  France) ; 
how  President  Wilson  was  determined  to  support  General 
Pershing  in  every  detail  so  long  as  General  Pershing  in 
the  President's  opinion  was  meeting  the  requirements  of 
the  great  responsibility  laid  upon  him;  how  the  President 
was  insistent  that  General  Pershing  should  not  be  em 
barrassed  by  political  considerations  of  any  kind  in  the 
discharge  of  his  great  military  duty;  how  the  unfortunate 
feature  of  the  whole  matter  was  that  the  recall  of  Gen 
eral  Wood  did  not  come  until  "after  he  had  taken  his 
brigade  to  New  York  preparatory  to  sailing  for  the  other 
side";  how  "General  March  treated  the  circumstance  as 
one  of  military  routine  entirely,  utterly  failing  to  realize 
its  political  importance";  how  "instead  of  informing 
General  Wood  at  once  that  he  had  not  been  chosen  to  go 
to  France,  General  March  followed  the  established  pro 
cedure  and  waited  for  the  completion  of  the  training 
period  before  issuing  orders  to  the  division  commanders"; 
how  "General  Wood  left  Camp  Funston  in  advance  of 
his  division  and  without  waiting  to  receive  his  orders"; 
how  General  March  sent  these  orders  to  New  York;  how 
"in  consequence  there  was  an  appearance  of  eleventh- 
hour  action,  an  effect  of  jerking  General  Wood  from  the 
very  deck  of  the  transport";  how  "General  Wood  carried 
his  complaint  to  the  President  and  was  told  plainly  that 
the  list  would  not  be  revised  in  the  personal  interest  of  any 
soldier  or  politician." 

I  discussed  the  matter  with  General  Wood  immediately 
upon  the  conclusion  of  his  conference  with  the  President. 
Walking  into  my  office  after  his  interview,  the  General 


ROOSEVELT   AND    WOOD  291 

informed  me  that  his  talk  with  the  President  was  most 
agreeable  and  satisfactory  and  that  he  was  certain,  al 
though  the  President  did  not  intimate  it  to  him,  that  the 
reason  for  his  being  held  in  America  could  not  be  attrib 
uted  to  the  President.  Turning  to  me,  the  General  said: 
"I  know  who  is  responsible  for  this.  It  is  that  man 
Pershing."  I  assured  the  General  that  there  was  nothing 
in  the  President's  attitude  toward  him  that  was  in  the 
least  degree  unfriendly,  and  reminded  him  how  the  Presi 
dent  had  retained  him  as  Chief  of  Staff  when  he  assumed 
office  in  1913.  The  General,  very  much  to  my  sur 
prise,  intimated  that  back  of  Pershing's  attitude  toward 
him  was  political  consideration.  I  tried  to  reassure  him 
and,  indeed,  I  resented  this  characterization  of  General 
Pershing  as  an  unjust  and  unwarranted  imputation  upon 
the  Commander  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces. 

I  myself  felt  that  General  Wood  was  being  unfairly 
treated,  although  I  did  not  admit  this  to  him  in  our 
interview.  I  took  the  liberty  of  saying  this  to  the  Presi 
dent  over  the  telephone  from  my  house  that  evening. 
I  tried  to  convince  the  President  that  there  was  a  feeling 
rapidly  spreading  throughout  the  country  that  Wood 
was  being  unfairly  treated  and  that  it  was  not  just  that 
the  Administration,  which  I  knew  was  blameless  in  the 
matter,  should  be  compelled  to  bear  the  responsibility 
of  the  whole  thing  and  pay  what  I  was  certain  would  be 
a  great  price  in  the  loss  of  popular  esteem. 

The  President  in  his  reply  to  my  statement  showed  irri 
tation  at  what  I  said  in  General  Wood's  behalf,  and  used 
very  emphatic  language  in  conveying  to  me  the  idea 
that  he  would  not  interfere  in  having  the  list,  upon  which 
General  Wood's  name  appeared,  revised.  I  urged  that 
if  General  Wood  was  not  to  be  sent  to  France,  he  should 


292    WOODBOW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

be  given  a  chance  to  go  to  Italy.  Our  conversation  over 
the  telephone  in  reference  to  the  Wood  matter  was  as 
follows: 

"I  trust,  Governor,  that  you  can  see  your  way  clear 
to  send  General  Wood  either  to  France  or  to  Italy." 

Without  a  moment's  hesitation,  the  President  said:  "I 
am  sorry,  but  it  cannot  be  done." 

Whereupon,  I  said:  "It  is  not  fair  that  the  Administra 
tion  should  be  carrying  the  burden  of  this  whole  affair.  If 
General  Pershing  or  the  General  Staff  is  responsible  for 
holding  General  Wood  in  this  country,  surely  they  have 
good  reason,  and  the  public  ought  to  be  apprised  of  it, 
and  thus  remove  the  suspicion  that  we  are  playing 
politics." 

The  President  quickly  interrupted  me  and  said:  "I  am 
not  at  all  interested  in  any  squabble  or  quarrel  between 
General  Pershing  and  General  Wood.  The  only  thing 
I  am  interested  in  is  winning  this  war.  I  selected  General 
Pershing  for  this  task  and  I  intend  to  back  him  up  in 
every  recommendation  he  makes." 

When  I  tried  to  emphasize  the  feeling  of  dissatisfaction 
throughout  the  country  over  the  Wood  incident,  he  re 
plied  that  the  responsibility  of  winning  the  war  was  upon 
General  Pershing  and  himself  and  not  upon  the  critics  who 
thought  that  General  Wood  was  being  badly  treated.  I 
then  said :  "But  it  is  not  fair  to  you  to  have  it  said  that  by 
reason  of  some  feeling  that  you  may  have  against  Wood 
you  are  keeping  him  on  this  side." 

The  President  replied:  "I  am  sorry,  but  I  do  not  care  a 
damn  for  the  criticism  of  the  country.  It  would  not  be 
fair  to  Pershing  if  I  tried  to  escape  what  appears  to  be 
my  responsibility.  I  do  not  intend  to  embarrass  General 
Pershing  by  forcing  his  hand.  If  Pershing  does  not  make 


ROOSEVELT   AND    WOOD  293 

good,  I  will  recall  him,  but  it  must  not  be  said  that  I  have 
failed  to  support  him  at  every  turn." 

His  attitude  toward  Wood  and  Roosevelt  was  con 
sistently  maintained,  in  supporting  the  General  Staff 
and  the  War  Department  throughout  the  war.  The 
only  thing  that  seemed  to  interest  him  was  how  quickly 
and  effectively  to  do  the  job  and  to  find  the  man  who 
could  do  it. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

WILSON,   THE   WARRIOR 

THE  President  had  but  one  object:  to  throw  all 
the  nation's  energy  into  the  scale  for  the  defeat 
of  Germany.  Because  he  did  not  bluster  and 
voice  daily  hymns  of  hate  against  Germany,  he  was  singu 
larly  misunderstood  by  some  of  his  fellow-citizens,  who, 
in  their  own  boiling  anger  against  the  enemy,  would  some 
times  peevishly  inquire:  "Does  he  really  hate  Germany?" 
The  President  was  too  much  occupied  with  deeds  to  waste 
time  in  word-vapouring.  By  every  honourable  means  he 
had  sought  to  avoid  the  issue,  but  a  truculent  and  fatu 
ous  foe  had  made  war  necessary,  and  into  that  war  the 
peace-loving  President  went  with  the  grim  resolution 
of  an  iron  warrior.  In  his  attitude  before  and  during 
the  war  his  motto  might  have  been  the  familiar  words 
of  Polonius: 

Beware  of  entrance  to  a  quarrel;  but  being  in, 
Bear't,  that  the  opposed  may  beware  of  thee. 

Occasionally,  as  at  Baltimore,  on  April  6,  1918,  the 
public  heard  from  him  brief,  ringing  speeches  of  warlike 
resolution: 

Germany  has  once  more  said  that  force  and  force  alone  shall 
decide  whether  Justice  and  Peace  shall  reign  in  the  affairs  of  men, 
whether  Right  as  America  conceives  it  or  Dominion  as  she  con 
ceives  it  shall  determine  the  destinies  of  mankind.  There  is  there- 

294 


WILSON,    THE   WARRIOR 

fore  but  one  response  possible  from  us.  Force,  Force  to  the  utmost, 
Force  without  stint  or  limit,  the  righteous  and  triumphant  Force 
which  shall  make  Right  the  law  of  the  world,  and  cast  every  selfish 
Dominion  down  in  the  dust. 

Months  after  hostilities  had  ended,  there  appeared 
from  time  to  time  in  the  newspapers,  without  his  or 
my  knowledge  of  proposed  publication,  utterances  of  his 
to  military  men  during  the  conflict  which  showed  his 
warrior  heart  and  his  extraordinary  ability  to  grasp  a 
technical  military  problem  such  as  his  dispatch  to  Admiral 
Sims,  his  address  to  the  officers  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  and 
his  interview  with  Marshal  Joffre  in  the  White  House. 
Perhaps  it  is  not  generally  known  that  Mr.  Wilson,  who 
has  constantly  read  and  loved  the  philosophic  poetry  of 
Wordsworth,  has  also  been  an  intense  admirer  of  Shakes 
peare's  warrior-hero,  Henry  the  Fifth,  and  has  frequently 
read  aloud  to  friends,  with  exclamations  of  admiration, 
the  stirring  speeches  of  Henry  in  the  Shakespearean  play. 

The  cable  message  to  Admiral  Sims  is  as  follows: 

FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  FOR  ADMIRAL  SIMS, 

American  Embassy,  London,  July  5,  1917. 
Strictly  confidential. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  I  have  been  greatly  surprised  at  the 
failure  of  the  British  Admiralty  to  use  Great  Britain's  great  naval 
superiority  in  an  effective  way.  In  the  presence  of  the  present  sub 
marine  emergency  they  are  helpless  to  the  point  of  panic.  Every 
plan  we  suggest  they  reject  for  some  reason  of  prudence.  In  my 
view,  this  is  not  a  time  for  prudence  but  for  boldness  even  at  the 
cost  of  great  losses.  In  most  of  your  dispatches  you  have  quite  prop 
erly  advised  us  of  the  sort  of  aid  and  cooperation  desired  from  us  by 
the  Admiralty.  The  trouble  is  that  their  plans  and  methods  do  not 
seem  to  us  efficacious.  I  would  be  very  much  obliged  to  you  if  you 
would  report  to  me,  confidentially,  of  course,  exactly  what  the 
Admiralty  has  been  doing,  and  what  they  have  accomplished,  and 


296    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

add  to  the  report  your  own  comments  and  suggestions,  based 
upon  independent  thought  of  the  whole  situation,  without  regard 
to  the  judgments  of  any  one  on  that  side  of  the  water.  The  Admir 
alty  was  very  slow  to  adopt  the  protection  or  convoy  and  it  is  not 
now,  I  judge  [protecting]  convoys  on  adequate  scale  within  the 
danger  zone,  seeming  to  keep  small  craft  with  the  grand  fleet.  The 
absence  of  craft  for  convoy  is  even  more  apparent  on  the  French 
coast  than  on  the  English  coast  and  in  the  Channel.  I  do  not  see  how 
the  necessary  military  supplies  and  supplies  of  food  and  fuel  oil  are 
to  be  delivered  at  British  ports  in  any  other  way  within  the  next  few 
months  than  under  adequate  convoy.  There  will  presently  not  be 
ships  or  tankers  enough  and  our  shipbuilding  plans  may  not  begin  to 
yield  important  results  in  less  than  eighteen  months.  I  believe 
that  you  will  keep  these  instructions  absolutely  and  entirely  to 
yourself,  and  that  you  will  give  me  such  advice  as  you  would  give 
if  you  were  handling  and  if  you  were  running  a  navy  of  your  own. 

(Signed)  WOODROW  WILSON. 

For  sheer  audacity,  there  is  not  much  that  can  be 
compared  with  his  address  to  the  officers  of  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  on  August  11,  1917: 

Now,  the  point  that  is  constantly  in  my  mind,  gentlemen,  is  this: 
This  is  an  unprecedented  war  and,  therefore,  it  is  a  war  in  one  sense 
for  amateurs.  Nobody  ever  before  conducted  a  war  like  this  and 
therefore  nobody  can  pretend  to  be  a  professional  in  a  war  like  this. 
Here  are  two  great  navies,  not  to  speak  of  the  others  associated  with 
us,  our  own  and  the  British,  outnumbering  by  a  very  great  margin  the 
navy  to  which  we  are  opposed  and  yet  casting  about  for  a  way 
in  which  to  use  our  superiority  and  our  strength,  because  of  the  nov 
elty  of  the  instruments  used,  because  of  the  unprecedented  character 
of  the  war,  because,  as  I  said  just  now,  nobody  ever  before  fought  a 
war  like  this,  in  the  way  that  this  is  being  fought  at  sea,  or  on  land 
either,  for  that  matter.  The  experienced  soldier — experienced  in 
previous  wars — is  a  back  number  so  far  as  his  experience  is  concerned; 
not  so  far  as  his  intelligence  is  concerned.  His  experience  does  not 
count,  because  he  never  fought  a  war  as  this  is  being  fought,  and 
therefore  he  is  an  amateur  along  with  the  rest  of  us.  Now,  some- 


WILSON,    THE    WARRIOR  297 

body  has  got  to  think  this  war  out.  Somebody  has  got  to  think  out 
the  way  not  only  to  fight  the  submarine,  but  to  do  something  dif 
ferent  from  what  we  are  doing. 

We  are  hunting  hornets  all  over  the  farm  and  letting  the  nest  alone. 
None  of  us  know  how  to  go  to  the  nest  and  crush  it;  and  yet  I  despair 
of  hunting  for  hornets  all  over  the  sea  when  I  know  where  the  nest 
is  and  know  that  the  nest  is  breeding  hornets  as  fast  as  I  can  find 
them.  I  am  willing  for  my  part,  and  I  know  you  are  willing  because 
I  know  the  stuff  you  are  made  of — I  am  willing  to  sacrifice  half  the 
navy  Great  Britain  and  we  together  have  to  crush  out  that  nest,  be 
cause  if  we  crush  it  the  war  is  won.  I  have  come  here  to  say  that  I  do 
not  care  where  it  comes  from,  I  do  not  care  whether  it  comes  from 
the  youngest  officer  or  the  oldest,  but  I  want  the  officers  of  this  navy 
to  have  the  distinction  of  saying  how  this  war  is  going  to  be  won. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  I  have  just  been  talking  over  plans  for 
putting  the  planning  machinery  of  the  Navy  at  the  disposal  of  the 
brains  of  the  Navy  and  not  stopping  to  ask  what  rank  those  brains  have, 
because,  as  I  have  said  before  and  want  to  repeat,  so  far  as  experience 
in  this  kind  of  war  is  concerned  we  are  all  of  the  same  rank.  I  am  not 
saying  that  I  do  not  expect  the  admirals  to  tell  us  what  to  do,  but  I 
am  saying  that  I  want  the  youngest  and  most  modest  youngster  in 
the  service  to  tell  us  what  we  ought  to  do  if  he  knows  what  it  is. 
Now  I  am  willing  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  that.  I  mean  any  sacri 
fice  of  time  or  anything  else.  I  am  ready  to  put  myself  at  the  dis 
posal  of  any  officer  in  the  Navy  who  thinks  he  knows  how  to  run  this 
war.  I  will  not  undertake  to  tell  you  whether  he  does  or  not,  be 
cause  I  know  that  I  do  not,  but  I  will  undertake  to  put  him  in  com 
munication  with  those  who  can  find  out  whether  his  idea  will  work 
or  not.  I  have  the  authority  to  do  that  and  I  will  do  it  with  the 
greatest  pleasure. 

We  have  got  to  throw  tradition  to  the  wind.  Now,  as  I  have  said, 
gentlemen,  I  take  it  for  granted  that  nothing  that  I  say  here  will  be 
repeated  and  therefore  I  am  going  to  say  this :  Every  time  we  have  sug 
gested  anything  to  the  British  Admiralty  the  reply  has  come  back 
that  virtually  amounted  to  this,  that  it  had  never  been  done  that  way, 
and  I  felt  like  saying:  "  Well,  nothing  was  ever  done  so  systematically 
as  nothing  is  being  done  now."  Therefore,  I  should  like  to  see  some- 


298    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

thing  unusual  happen,  something  that  was  never  done  before;  and 
inasmuch  as  the  things  that  are  being  done  to  you  were  never  done 
before,  don't  you  think  it  is  worth  while  to  try  something  that  was 
never  done  before  against  those  who  are  doing  them  to  you.  There  is  no 
other  way  to  win,  and  the  whole  principle  of  this  war  is  the  kind  of  thing 
that  ought  to  hearten  and  stimulate  America.  America  has  always 
boasted  that  she  could  find  men  to  do  anything.  She  is  the  prize 
amateur  nation  of  the  world.  Germany  is  the  prize  professional  na 
tion  of  the  world.  Now  when  it  comes  to  doing  new  things  and  doing 
them  well,  I  will  back  the  amateur  against  the  professional  every 
time,  because  the  professional  does  it  out  of  the  book  and  the  amateur 
does  it  with  his  eyes  open  upon  a  new  world  and  with  a  new  set  of 
circumstances.  He  knows  so  little  about  it  that  he  is  fool  enough  to 
try  to  do  the  right  thing.  The  men  that  do  not  know  the  danger  are 
the  rashest  men,  and  I  have  several  times  ventured  to  make  this  sug 
gestion  to  the  men  about  me  in  both  arms  of  the  service.  Please 
leave  out  of  your  vocabulary  altogether  the  word  "prudent."  Do 
not  stop  to  think  about  what  is  prudent  for  a  moment.  Do  the  thing 
that  is  audacious  to  the  utmost  point  of  risk  and  daring,  because  that 
is  exactly  the  thing  that  the  other  side  does  not  understand,  and  you 
will  win  by  the  audacity  of  method  when  you  cannot  win  by  circum 
spection  and  prudence.  I  think  that  there  are  willing  ears  to  hear 
this  in  the  American  Navy  and  the  American  Army  because  that 
is  the  kind  of  folk  we  are.  We  get  tired  of  the  old  ways  and  covet  the 
new  ones. 

So,  gentlemen,  besides  coming  down  here  to  give  you  my  personal 
greeting  and  to  say  how  absolutely  I  rely  on  you  and  believe  in  you, 
I  have  come  down  here  to  say  also  that  I  depend  on  you,  depend  on 
you  for  brains  as  wejl  as  training  and  courage  and  discipline. 

When  Marshal  Joffre  visited  the  President  in  the 
spring  of  1917,  he  was  surprised,  as  he  afterward  said 
to  Secretary  Daniels,  "to  find  that  President  Wilson 
had  such  a  perfect  mastery  of  the  military  situation.  He 
had  expected  to  meet  a  scholar,  a  statesman,  and  an 
idealist;  he  had  not  expected  to  meet  a  practical  strate 
gist  fully  conversant  with  all  the  military  movements. 


WILSON,    THE    WARRIOR  299 

In  answer  to  my  question  as  to  whether  it  would  be 
feasible  to  send  in  advance  of  his  army  the  general  who 
was  to  command  American  troops  in  France,  the  Presi 
dent  said  at  once  that  it  could  be  arranged." 

The  President  and  Marshal  Joffre  considered  together 
a  number  of  technical  military  problems.  General 
Joffre  gave  the  President  his  expert  opinion  as  to  what 
should  be  done  in  every  instance  and  was  surprised  at 
the  promptness  with  which  in  each  case  the  President 
said:  "It  shall  be  done." 

A  little  incident  at  the  White  House  at  the  luncheon 
given  by  the  President  to  the  members  of  the  Demo 
cratic  National  Committee  throws  light  upon  the  fighting 
qualities  of  the  man.  He  asked  Mr.  Angus  W.  McLean, 
a  warm  and  devoted  friend  from  North  Carolina,  who 
was  seated  near  him  at  the  table,  what  the  Scots  down 
in  North  Carolina  were  saying  about  the  war.  Mr. 
McLean  replied  he  could  best  answer  the  question  by 
repeating  what  a  friend  of  the  President's  father  and  an 
ardent  admirer  of  the  President  had  said  about  the  Presi 
dent's  attitude  a  few  days  previous.  "I  am  afraid  our 
President  is  not  a  true  Scot,  he  doesn't  show  the  fighting 
spirit  characteristic  of  the  Scots. ' '  The  President  promptly 
replied:  "You  tell  our  Scotch  friend,  McLean,  that  he 
does  not  accurately  interpret  the  real  Scottish  character. 
If  he  did,  he  would  understand  my  attitude.  The  Scots 
man  is  slow  to  begin  to  fight  but  when  once  he  begins  he 
never  knows  when  to  quit." 

Two  capital  policies  which  contributed  enormously  to 
the  winning  of  the  war  received  their  impulse  from  Wood- 
row  Wilson — the  unification  of  command  of  the  Allied 
armies  on  the  western  front  and  the  attack  of  sub 
marines  at  their  base  in  the  North  Sea.  On  November 


300    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

18,  1918,  Colonel  House  let  it  be  known  in  London  that 
he  had  received  a  cable  from  President  Wilson  stating 
emphatically  that  the  United  States  Government  con 
sidered  unity  of  plan  and  control  between  the  Allies  and 
the  United  States  to  be  essential  in  order  to  win  the  war 
and  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace. 

It  was  Woodrow  Wilson,  a  civilian,  who  advised,  urged, 
and  insisted  that  a  mine  barrage  be  laid  across  the  North 
Sea  to  check  German  submarine  activities  at  their  source. 
Naval  experts  pronounced  the  plan  impossible:  it  would 
take  too  long  to  lay  the  barrage,  and,  when  laid,  it  would 
not  hold.  A  great  storm  would  sweep  it  away.  But  the 
President  insisted  that  the  thing  could  be  done,  and  that 
nothing  else  could  check  the  submarine  devastation 
amounting  by  July,  1917,  to  600,000  tons  a  month  of 
destroyed  shipping.  The  President's  audacity  and  persist 
ence  prevailed,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  his 
plan  ended  the  submarine  menace. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  European  newspapers  carried 
a  story  of  a  farewell  reception  to  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  in  which 
he  paid  his  compliments  to  his  chief,  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
saying,  in  substance,  that  he  had  seen  Lloyd  George  dis 
couraged  only  once.  It  was  on  the  morningwhen  the  news 
came  of  the  great  German  offensive  in  March,  1918. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  told  Mr.  Bonar  Law  that  morning 
that  only  a  vast  increase  in  American  reinforcements 
could  save  the  Allies.  A  cable  was  immediately  framed, 
asking  Mr.  Wilson  to  send  the  number  of  reinforcements 
necessary.  Mr.  Bonar  Law  stated  in  his  speech  that  an 
affirmative  answer  was  received  from  Mr.  Wilson  the 
same  day. 

A  prominent  Englishman,  discussing  the  President's 
work  in  connection  with  the  war,  while  criticizing  what 


WILSON,    THE    WARRIOE  301 

he  characterized  as  the  President's  ignorance  of  European 
conditions,  said:  "I  feel  ashamed  to  be  criticizing  Presi 
dent  Wilson  for  anything  when  I  remember  his  practical 
services  in  prosecuting  the  war.  No  other  man  in  any 
country  gave  such  firm  and  instant  support  to  every 
measure  for  making  operations  effective.  His  decisions 
were  fearless  and  prompt  and  he  stood  by  them  like  a 
rock.  In  sending  troops  promptly  and  in  sending  plenty 
of  them,  in  cooperating  in  the  naval  effort,  in  insisting 
on  the  unity  of  command  under  Foch,  in  backing  the 
high  command  in  the  field,  and  in  every  other  practical 
detail  Mr.  Wilson  had  big,  clear  conceptions  and  the 
courage  to  carry  them  out." 

Those  who  were  critical  of  the  President's  conduct  of 
the  war  forget  the  ringing  statement  that  came  from  Lloyd 
George  when  the  great  offensive  was  on,  when  he  said: 
"The  race  is  now  between  Von  Hindenburg  and  Wilson." 
And  Wilson  won. 

The  most  important  speech  made  by  the  President 
during  the  war  was  delivered  at  the  Metropolitan  Opera 
House,  New  York  City,  on  September  27,  1918,  opening 
the  campaign  for  the  Fourth  Liberty  Loan. 

I  recall  a  talk  the  President  had  with  me  on  the  way 
to  New  York  on  the  afternoon  of  the  delivery  of  this 
speech  when  he  requested  me  to  read  the  manuscript. 
As  he  gave  it  to  me  he  said:  "They  [meaning  the  Allies] 
will  not  like  this  speech,  for  there  are  many  things  in  it 
which  will  displease  the  Imperialists  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Italy.  The  world  must  be  convinced  that 
we  are  playing  no  favourites  and  that  America  has  her 
own  plan  for  a  world  settlement,  a  plan  which  does  not 
contain  the  germs  of  another  war.  What  I  greatly  fear, 
now  that  the  end  seems  inevitable,  is  that  we  shall  go 


302    WOODROW    WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

back  to  the  old  days  of  alliances  and  competing  arma 
ments  and  land  grabbing.  We  must  see  to  it,  therefore, 
that  there  is  not  another  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  that  when 
peace  finally  comes,  it  shall  be  a  permanent  and  a  lasting 
peace.  We  must  now  serve  notice  on  everybody  that 
our  aims  and  purposes  are  not  selfish.  In  order  to  do 
this  and  to  make  the  right  impressions,  we  must  be  bru 
tally  frank  with  friends  and  foes  alike." 

As  we  discussed  the  subject  matter  of  this  momentous 
speech,  I  gathered  from  the  President's  statements  to 
me  that  he  clearly  foresaw  the  end  of  the  war  and  of  the 
possible  proposal  for  a  settlement  that  might  be  made 
by  the  Allies.  Therefore,  he  felt  it  incumbent  upon  him 
frankly  to  discuss  America's  view  of  what  a  just  and 
lasting  settlement  should  be.  As  one  examines  this 
speech  to-day,  away  from  the  excitement  of  that  critical 
hour  in  which  it  was  delivered,  he  can  easily  find  in  it 
statements  and  utterances  that  must  have  caused  sharp 
irritation  in  certain  chancelleries  of  Europe.  In  nearly 
every  line  of  it  there  was  a  challenge  to  European  Imperial 
ism  to  come  out  in  the  open  and  avow  its  purposes  as  to 
peace.  Many  of  the  Allied  leaders  had  been  addressing 
their  people  on  the  matter  of  peace;  now  they  were  being 
challenged  by  an  American  president  to  place  their 
cards  face  up  on  the  table.  An  examination  of  the  speech, 
in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  reemphasizes  the 
President's  pre-vision : 

At  every  turn  of  the  war  we  gain  a  fresh  consciousness  of  what 
we  mean  to  accomplish  by  it.  When  our  hope  and  expectation  are 
most  excited  we  think  more  definitely  than  before  of  the  issues  that 
hang  upon  it  and  of  the  purposes  which  must  be  realized  by  means 
of  it.  For  it  has  positive  and  well-defined  purposes  which  we  did 
not  determine  and  which  we  cannot  alter.  No  statesman  or  assem- 


WILSON,    THE    WARRIOB  303 

bly  created  them;  no  statesman  or  assembly  can  alter  them.  They 
have  arisen  out  of  the  very  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  war. 
The  most  that  statesmen  or  assemblies  can  do  is  to  carry  them  out 
or  be  false  to  them.  They  were  perhaps  not  clear  at  the  outset; 
but  they  are  clear  now.  The  war  has  lasted  more  than  four  years 
and  the  whole  world  has  been  drawn  into  it.  The  common  will  of 
mankind  has  been  substituted  for  the  particular  purposes  of  individ 
ual  states.  Individual  statesmen  may  have  started  the  conflict, 
but  neither  they  nor  their  opponents  can  stop  it  as  they  please.  It 
has  become  a  peoples'  war,  and  peoples  of  all  sorts  and  races,  of  every 
degree  of  power  and  variety  of  fortune,  are  involved  in  its  sweeping 
processes  of  change  and  settlement.  We  came  into  it  when  its  char 
acter  had  become  fully  defined  and  it  was  plain  that  no  nation  could 
stand  apart  or  be  indifferent  to  its  outcome.  Its  challenge  drove  to 
the  heart  of  everything  we  cared  for  and  lived  for.  The  voice  of  the 
war  had  become  clear  and  gripped  our  hearts.  Our  brothers  from 
many  lands,  as  well  as  our  own  murdered  dead  under  the  sea,  were 
calling  to  us,  and  we  responded,  fiercely  and  of  course. 

The  air  was  clear  about  us.  We  saw  things  in  their  full,  con 
vincing  proportions  as  they  were ;  and  we  have  seen  them  with  steady 
eyes  and  unchanging  comprehension  ever  since.  Wre  accepted  the 
issues  of  the  war  as  facts,  not  as  any  group  of  men  either  here  or  else 
where  had  defined  them,  and  we  can  accept  no  outcome  which  does 
not  squarely  meet  and  settle  them.  Those  issues  are  these: 

Shall  the  military  power  of  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  be  suf 
fered  to  determine  the  fortunes  of  peoples  over  whom  they  have 
no  right  to  rule  except  the  right  of  force? 

Shall  strong  nations  be  free  to  wrong  weak  nations  and  make  them 
subject  to  their  purpose  and  interest? 

Shall  peoples  be  ruled  and  dominated,  even  in  their  own  internal 
affairs,  by  arbitrary  and  irresponsible  force  or  by  their  own  will  and 
choice? 

Shall  there  be  a  common  standard  of  right  and  privilege  for  all 
peoples  and  nations  or  shall  the  strong  do  as  they  will  and  the  weak 
suffer  without  redress? 

Shall  the  assertion  of  right  be  haphazard  and  by  casual  alliance  or 
shall  there  be  a  common  concert  to  oblige  the  observance  of  common 
rights? 


304    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

No  man,  no  group  of  men,  chose  these  to  be  the  issues  of  the  strug 
gle.  They  are  issues  of  it;  and  they  must  be  settled — by  no  arrange 
ment  or  compromise  or  adjustment  of  interests,  but  definitely  and 
once  for  all  and  with  a  full  and  unequivocal  acceptance  of  the  princi 
ple  that  the  interest  of  the  weakest  is  as  sacred  as  the  interest  of  the 
strongest. 

That  is  what  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  a  permanent  peace,  if  we 
speak  sincerely,  intelligently,  and  with  a  real  knowledge  and  com 
prehension  of  the  matter  we  deal  with. 

As  I  have  said,  neither  I  nor  any  other  man  in  governmental  au 
thority  created  or  gave  form  to  the  issues  of  this  war.  I  have  simply 
responded  to  them  with  such  vision  as  I  could  command.  But  I  have 
responded  gladly  and  with  a  resolution  that  has  grown  warmer  and 
more  confident  as  the  issues  have  grown  clearer  and  clearer.  It  is 
now  plain  that  they  are  issues  which  no  man  can  pervert  unless  it 
be  wilfully.  I  am  bound  to  fight  for  them,  and  happy  to  fight  for 
them  as  time  and  circumstance  have  revealed  them  to  me  as  to  all 
the  world.  Our  enthusiasm  for  them  grows  more  and  more  irre 
sistible  as  they  stand  out  in  more  and  more  vivid  and  unmistakable 
outline. 

And  the  forces  that  fight  for  them  draw  into  closer  and  closer 
array,  organize  their  millions  into  more  and  more  unconquerable 
might,  as  they  become  more  and  more  distinct  to  the  thought  and 
purposes  of  the  peoples  engaged.  It  is  the  peculiarity  of  this  great 
war  that  while  statesmen  have  seemed  to  cast  about  for  definitions 
of  their  purpose  and  have  sometimes  seemed  to  shift  their  ground  and 
their  point  of  view,  the  thought  of  the  mass  of  men,  whom  statesmen 
are  supposed  to  instruct  and  lead,  has  grown  more  and  more  un 
clouded,  more  and  more  certain  of  what  it  is  that  they  are  fighting 
for.  National  purposes  have  fallen  more  and  more  into  the  back 
ground  and  the  common  purpose  of  enlightened  mankind  has  taken 
their  place.  The  counsels  of  plain  men  have  become  on  all  hands 
more  simple  and  straightforward  and  more  unified  than  the  counsels 
of  sophisticated  men  of  affairs,  who  still  retain  the  impression  that 
they  are  playing  a  game  of  power  and  playing  for  high  stakes.  That 
is  why  I  have  said  that  this  is  a  peoples'  war,  not  a  statesmen's. 
Statesmen  must  follow  the  clarified  common  thought  or  be  broken. 


WILSON,    THE    WARRIOR  305 

I  take  that  to  be  the  significance  of  the  fact  that  assemblies  and 
associations  of  many  kinds  made  up  of  plain  workaday  people  have 
demanded,  almost  every  time  they  came  together,  and  are  still  de 
manding,  that  the  leaders  of  their  governments  declare  to  them 
plainly  what  it  is,  exactly  what  it  is,  that  they  were  seeking  in  this 
war,  and  what  they  think  the  items  of  the  final  settlement  should  be. 
They  are  not  yet  satisfied  with  what  they  have  been  told.  They  still 
seem  to  fear  that  they  are  getting  what  they  ask  for  only  in  states 
men's  terms — only  in  the  terms  of  territorial  arrangements  and 
divisions  of  power,  and  not  in  terms  of  broad-visioned  justice  and 
mercy  and  peace  and  the  satisfaction  of  those  deep-seated  longings 
of  oppressed  and  distracted  men  and  women  and  enslaved  peoples 
that  seem  to  them  the  only  things  worth  fighting  a  war  for  that  en 
gulfs  the  world.  Perhaps  statesmen  have  not  always  recognized 
this  changed  aspect  of  the  whole  world  of  policy  and  action.  Perhaps 
they  have  not  always  spoken  in  direct  reply  to  the  questions  asked 
because  they  did  not  know  how  searching  those  questions  were  and 
what  sort  of  answers  they  demanded. 

But  I,  for  one,  am  glad  to  attempt  the  answer  again  and  again,  in 
the  hope  that  I  may  make  it  clearer  and  clearer  that  my  one  thought 
is  to  satisfy  those  who  struggle  in  the  ranks  and  are,  perhaps  above 
all  others,  entitled  to  a  reply  whose  meaning  no  one  can  have  any 
excuse  for  misunderstanding,  if  he  understands  the  language  in  which 
it  is  spoken  or  can  get  someone  to  translate  it  correctly  into  his  own. 
And  I  believe  that  the  leaders  of  the  governments  with  which  we  are 
associated  will  speak,  as  they  have  occasion,  as  plainly  as  I  have  tried 
to  speak.  I  hope  that  they  will  feel  free  to  say  whether  they  think 
I  am  in  any  degree  mistaken  in  my  interpretation  of  the  issues  in 
volved  or  in  my  purpose  with  regard  to  the  means  by  which  a  satis 
factory  settlement  of  those  issues  may  be  obtained.  Unity  of  pur 
pose  and  of  counsel  are  as  imperatively  necessary  as  was  unity  of  com 
mand  in  the  battlefield,  and  with  perfect  unity  of  purpose  and  counsel 
will  come  assurance  of  complete  victory.  It  can  be  had  in  no  other 
way.  "Peace  drives"  can  be  effectively  neutralized  and  silenced 
only  by  showing  that  every  victory  of  the  nations  associated  against 
Germany  brings  the  nations  nearer  the  sort  of  peace  which  will  bring 
security  and  reassurance  to  all  peoples  and  make  the  recurrence  of 
another  such  struggle  of  pitiless  force  and  bloodshed  for  ever  impossi- 


306    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

ble,  and  that  nothing  else  can.  Germany  is  constantly  intimating 
the  "terms"  she  will  accept;  and  always  finds  that  the  world  does 
not  want  terms.  It  wishes  the  final  triumph  of  justice  and  fair 
dealing. 

When  I  had  read  the  speech,  I  turned  to  the 
President  and  said:  "This  speech  will  bring  Germany 
to  terms  and  will  convince  her  that  we  play  no  favourites 
and  will  compel  the  Allies  openly  to  avow  the  terms  upon 
which  they  will  expect  a  war  settlement  to  be  reached. 
In  my  opinion,  it  means  the  end  of  the  war."  The  Presi 
dent  was  surprised  at  the  emphasis  I  laid  upon  the 
speech,  but  he  was  more  surprised  when  I  ventured  the 
opinion  that  he  would  be  in  Paris  within  six  months 
discussing  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 

The  Washington  Post,  a  critic  of  the  President,  char 
acterized  this  speech,  in  an  editorial  on  September  29, 
1918,  as  "a  marvellous  intellectual  performance,  and  a 
still  more  marvellous  exhibition  of  moral  courage." 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

GERMANY  CAPITULATES 

GERMANY  had  begun  to  weaken,  and  suddenly 
aware  of  the  catastrophe  that   lay  just   ahead, 
changed   her   chancellor,   and    called    upon    the 
President  for  an  armistice  upon  the  basis  of  the  Four 
teen  Points.     The  explanation  of  Germany's  attitude  in 
this  matter  was  simply  that  she  knew  she  was  beaten 
and  she  recognized  that  Wilson  was  the  only  hope  of  a 
reasonable  peace  from  the  Berlin  point  of  view.     Ger 
many  professed  to  be  a  liberal  and  was  asking  Wilson  for 
the  "benefit  of  clergy." 

On  the  6th  day  of  October,  1918,  the  following  note  from 
Prince  Max  of  Baden  was  delivered  to  the  President  by 
the  Secretary  of  State: 

The  German  Government  requests  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  to  take  steps  for  the  restoration  of  peace,  to  notify 
all  belligerents  of  this  request,  and  to  invite  them  to  delegate  pleni 
potentiaries  for  the  purpose  of  taking  up  negotiations.  The  German 
Government  accepts,  as  a  basis  for  the  peace  negotiations,  the  pro 
gramme  laid  down  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his 
Message  to  Congress  of  January  8, 1918,  and  in  his  subsequent  pro 
nouncements  particularly  in  his  address  of  September  27,  1918.  In 
order  to  avoid  further  bloodshed,  the  German  Government  requests 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  bring  about  the 
immediate  conclusion  of  a  general  armistice  on  land,  on  water,  and 
in  the  air. 

(Signed)  MAX,  Prince  of  Baden, 
Imperial   Chancellor. 

307 


308    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

The  President  was  not  surprised  when  the  offer  of  peace 
came  for  on  all  sides  there  was  abundant  evidence  of  the 
decline  of  Germany  and  of  the  weakening  of  her  morale. 
The  President  felt  that  Germany,  being  desperate,  it 
would  be  possible  for  him,  when  she  proposed  a  settle 
ment,  like  that  proposed  by  Prince  Max,  to  dictate  our 
own  terms,  and  to  insist  that  America  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with  any  settlement  in  which  the  Kaiser  or  his 
brood  should  play  a  leading  part.  I  stated  to  him  that  the 
basis  of  our  attitude  toward  Germany  should  be  an  in 
sistence,  in  line  with  his  speech  of  September  27,  1918, 
wherein  he  said: 

We  are  all  agreed  that  there  can  be  no  peace  obtained  by  any  kind 
of  bargain  or  compromise  with  the  governments  of  the  Central  Em 
pires,  because  we  have  dealt  with  them  already  and  have  seen  them 
deal  with  other  governments  that  were  parties  to  this  struggle,  at 
Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucharest.  They  have  convinced  us  that  they 
were  without  honour  and  do  not  intend  justice.  They  observe  no 
covenants,  accept  no  principle  but  force  and  their  own  interest.  We 
cannot  come  to  terms  with  them.  They  have  made  it  impossible. 
The  German  people  must  by  this  time  be  fully  aware  that  we 
cannot  accept  the  word  of  those  who  forced  this  war  upon  us.  We 
do  not  think  the  same  thoughts  or  speak  the  same  language  of  agree 
ment. 

At  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  Prince  Max's  note  by 
the  State  Department,  on  October  5,  1918,  the  Presi 
dent  was  in  New  York,  staying  at  the  Waldorf-Astoria, 
preparatory  to  attending  a  concert  given  by  the  Royal 
Italian  Grenadiers.  A  message  from  the  Army  Intelli 
gence  Department,  conveyed  to  me  by  General  Churchill, 
at  the  Knickerbocker  Hotel,  in  New  York,  where  I  was 
staying,  was  the  first  word  we  had  of  Germany's  desire  for 
an  armistice.  General  Churchill  read  me  the  German 


GERMANY   CAPITULATES  309 

proposal  over  the  'phone  and  I  carried  it  to  the  Presi 
dent,  who  was  in  conference  with  Colonel  House  /  at  the 
Waldorf.  The  offer  of  Germany  was  so  frank  and 
unequivocal  in  seeming  to  meet  the  terms  of  the 
President's  formal  proposals  of  peace,  that  when  Colonel 
House  read  it  to  the  President,  he  turned  and  said: 
"This  means  the  end  of  the  war."  When  I  was  interro 
gated  as  to  my  opinion,  I  replied  that,  while  the  German 
offer  of  peace  seemed  to  be  genuine,  in  my  opinion  no 
offer  from  Germany  could  be  considered  that  bore  the 
Hohenzollern-Hapsburg  brand.  For  a  moment  this 
seemed  to  irritate  the  President,  and  he  said:  "But,  at 
least,  we  are  bound  to  consider  in  the  most  serious  way 
any  offer  of  Germany  which  is  practically  an  acceptance 
of  my  proposals  of  peace."  There  our  first  discussion 
regarding  the  German  peace  offer  ended. 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  talk  I  was  invited  to  take 
dinner  with  the  President  and  Colonel  House  and  with 
the  members  of  the  President's  family,  but  the  matter 
of  the  note  which  we  had  just  received  weighed  so  heavily 
upon  me  that  my  digestive  apparatus  was  not  in  good 
working  order,  and  yet  the  President  was  seemingly  un 
mindful  of  it,  and  refused  to  permit  the  evening  to  be 
interfered  with  because  of  the  note,  attending  the  con 
cert  and  apparently  enjoying  every  minute  of  the  even 
ing,  and  applauding  the  speeches  that  were  made  by  the 
gentlemen  who  addressed  us. 

After  the  concert  began,  I  left  the  Presidential  box  and, 
following  a  habit  I  had  acquired  since  coming  to  the 
Executive  offices,  I  conferred  with  the  newspaper  men 
in  our  party,  endeavouring  to  obtain  from  them,  without 
expressing  any  personal  opinion  of  my  own,  just  how  they 
felt  toward  the  terms  proposed  in  the  Max  note.  I  then 


310    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

called  up  the  State  Department  and  discussed  the  note 
with  Mr.  Polk,  expressing  the  same  opinion  to  him  that 
I  had  already  expressed  to  the  President,  to  the  effect  that 
we  could  not  accept  a  German  offer  which  came  to  us 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 

Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  concert,  we  left  the  Metro 
politan  Opera  House,  I  accompanying  the  President  to 
the  Waldorf.  As  I  took  my  place  in  the  automobile,  the 
President  leaned  over  to  Mrs.  Wilson  and  whispered  to 
her  the  news  of  the  receipt  of  the  German  note.  Then, 
turning  to  me,  he  said:  "Have  you  had  any  new  reaction 
on  the  note  since  I  last  talked  with  you?"  I  told  him  I 
had  not,  but  that  what  I  had  learned  since  talking  with 
him  earlier  in  the  evening  had  only  confirmed  me  in  the 
opinion  that  I  had  already  expressed,  that  it  would  not  be 
right  or  safe  for  us  to  accept  the  German  proposals. 
When  we  arrived  at  the  Waldorf  it  was  12:30  A.  M.  and  the 
President  asked  me  to  his  rooms,  and  there,  for  an  hour 
and  a  half,  we  indulged  in  a  long  discussion  of  the  German 
offer.  As  was  usual  with  the  President  in  all  these 
important  matters,  his  mind  was,  to  use  his  own  phrase, 
"open  and  to  let." 

I  emphasized  the  idea  that  we  could  not  consider  a 
peace  proposal  in  which  the  Kaiser  and  his  brood  played  a 
part,  and  that  the  only  proffer  we  could  consider  must 
come  from  the  German  people  themselves;  that  in  his 
Mexican  policy  he  had  proclaimed  the  doctrine  that  no 
ruler  who  came  to  power  by  murder  or  assassination  would 
ever  receive  the  recognition  of  the  United  States;  that  we 
must  broaden  the  morality  which  underlay  this  policy, 
and  by  our  attitude  say  to  the  European  rulers  who  started 
this  war,  that  guilt  is  personal  and  that  until  they  had 
purged  themselves  from  the  responsibility  of  war,  we 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  311 

could  not  consider  any  terms  of  peace  that  came  through 
them. 

The  next  day  the  President  left  for  Cleveland  Dodge's 
home  on  the  Hudson,  with  Colonel  House  and  Doctor 
Gray  son.  I  remained  in  New  York  at  the  Knickerbocker 
Hotel,  busily  engaged  in  poring  over  the  newspaper  files 
to  find  out  what  the  editorial  attitude  of  the  country  was 
toward  the  German  proposal  of  peace,  and  in  preparing  a 
brief  on  the  whole  matter  for  the  President's  consideration. 
Before  Colonel  House  left,  I  again  impressed  upon  him 
my  view  of  the  note  and  my  conviction  that  it  would  be  a 
disastrous  blunder  for  us  to  accept  it. 

The  President  returned  to  Washington  in  the  early 
afternoon,  Colonel  House  accompanying  him.  I  was 
eager  and  anxious  to  have  another  talk  with  him  and 
was  given  an  opportunity  while  in  the  President's 
compartment  in  the  train  on  our  way  back  to  Wash 
ington.  As  I  walked  into  the  compartment,  the  Presi 
dent  was  conferring  with  Colonel  House,  and  as  I  took 
a  seat,  the  President  asked  me  if  I  still  felt  that  the 
German  proposal  should  be  rejected.  I  replied,  that,  if 
anything,  I  was  stronger  in  the  judgment  I  had  already 
expressed.  He  said :  "  But  it  is  not  an  easy  matter  to  turn 
away  from  an  offer  like  this.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the 
form  of  it  may  be  open  to  objection,  but  substantially  it 
represents  the  wishes  of  the  German  people,  even  though 
the  medium  through  which  it  may  be  conveyed  is  an 
odious  and  hateful  one,  but  I  must  make  up  my  own 
mind  on  this  and  I  must  not  be  held  off  from  an  accept 
ance  by  any  feeling  of  criticism  that  may  come  my  way. 
The  gentlemen  in  the  Army  who  talk  about  going  to  Berlin 
and  taking  it  by  force  are  foolish.  It  would  cost  a  million 
American  lives  to  accomplish  it,  and  what  lies  in  my 


312    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

thoughts  now  is  this :  If  we  can  accept  this  offer,  the  war 
will  be  at  an  end,  for  Germany  cannot  begin  a  new  one, 
and  thus  we  would  save  a  great  deal  of  bloodshed." 

I  remember,  as  I  pointed  out  to  him  the  disappoint 
ment  of  the  people  were  he  to  accept  the  German  offer,  he 
said:  "If  I  think  it  is  right  to  accept  it,  I  shall  do  so  regard 
less  of  consequences.  As  for  myself,  I  can  go  down  in  a 
cyclone  cellar  and  write  poetry  the  rest  of  my  days,  if 
necessary."  He  called  my  attention  to  the  fact  that 
John  Jay,  who  negotiated  the  famous  treaty  with  Great 
Britain,  was  burned  in  effigy  and  Alexander  Hamilton 
was  stoned  while  defending  the  Jay  Treaty  on  the  steps 
of  the  Treasury  Building  in  New  York  City.  I  pointed 
out  to  him  that  there  was  no  comparison  between  the  two 
situations;  that  our  case  was  already  made  up  and  that 
to  retreat  now  and  accept  this  proposal  would  be  to  leave 
intact  the  hateful  dynasty  that  had  brought  on  the  war. 

As  was  his  custom  and  habit,  he  was  considering  all 
the  facts  and  every  viewpoint  before  he  finally  took  the 
inevitable  step. 

Never  before  was  the  bigness  of  the  President  shown 
better  than  in  this  discussion;  never  was  he  more  open- 
minded  or  more  anxious  to  obtain  all  the  facts  in  the 
grave  situation  with  which  he  was  called  upon  to  deal.  In 
the  action  upon  which  his  mind  was  now  at  work  he  was 
not  thinking  of  himself  or  of  its  effect  upon  his  own 
political  fortunes.  All  through  the  discussion  one  could 
easily  see  the  passionate  desire  of  the  man  to  bring  this 
bloody  thing  of  war  honourably  to  an  end. 

Mr.  Edward  N.  Hurley  furnishes  me  with  a  charac 
teristic  anecdote  connected  with  a  session  of  the  War 
Conference  Board,  which  Mr.  Hurley  calls  "one  of  the 
most  historic  conferences  ever  held  at  the  White  House/' 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  313 

"The  question,"  says  Mr.  Hurley,  "was  whether  the 
President  would  be  justified  in  agreeing  to  an  armistice. 
Many  people  throughout  the  country  were  demanding 
an  insistence  upon  unconditional  surrender.  Very  little 
news  was  coming  from  abroad."  Mr.  Hurley  says  that 
the  President  met  the  Conference  Board  with  the  state 
ment:  "Gentlemen,  I  should  like  to  get  an  expression  from 
each  man  as  to  what  he  thinks  we  should  or  should  not 
do  regarding  an  unconditional  surrender  or  an  armistice." 
Mr.  Hurley  says  that  "every  man  at  the  meeting  except 
one  was  in  favour  of  an  armistice."  After  the  President 
had  ascertained  the  opinion  of  each  he  said  in  a  quiet  way : 
"I  have  drawn  up  a  tentative  note  to  Germany  which 
I  should  like  to  submit  for  your  approval."  After  the 
paper  had  been  passed  around  one  member  of  the  Board 
said:  "Mr.  President,  I  think  it  would  be  better  politics 
if  you  were  to  change  this  paragraph" — indicating  a  par 
ticular  paragraph  in  the  document.  The  President  re 
plied,  in  what  Mr.  Hurley  calls  "a  slow  and  deliberate 
manner":  "I  am  not  dealing  in  politics,  I  am  dealing  in 
human  lives." 

While  the  President  was  engaged  in  conference  with 
Colonel  House,  I  addressed  a  letter  to  him,  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

October  8,  1918. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  do  not  know  what  your  attitude  is  toward  the  late  German  and 
Austrian  offers.  The  record  you  have  made  up  to  this  time,  how 
ever,  is  so  plain  that  in  my  judgment  there  can  be  only  one  answer 
and  that  is  an  absolute  and  unqualified  rejection  of  these  proposals. 
There  is  no  safer  counsellor  in  the  country  than  the  Springfield 
Republican.  Speaking  of  the  peace  programme  of  the  new  German 
Chancellor,  the  Republican  says: 


314    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

"It  [referring  to  the  offer  of  Prince  Max]  does  not  meet  the 
minimum  requirements  for  the  opening  of  negotiations.  These  have 
been  variously  stated,  but  in  general  may  be  reduced  to  restitution, 
reparation  and  guarantees.  Under  none  of  these  heads  has  Germany 
yet  come  even  measurably  near  meeting  the  plain  requirements  of  the 
Allies,  which  have  not  been  reduced  in  defeat  and  will  not  be  increased 
with  victory.  Take,  for  example,  the  question  of  Belgium,  now  that 
Germany  knows  it  cannot  be  kept,  it  makes  a  merit  of  giving  it  up, 
but  beyond  that  Prince  Maximilian  is  not  authorized  more  than  to 
say  that  'an  effort  shall  also  be  made  to  reach  an  understanding 
on  the  question  of  indemnity*  .  .  .  What  is  needed  first  of  all 
from  Germany  is  a  clear,  specific  and  binding  pledge  in  regard  to  the 
essential  preliminaries.  It  does  not  advance  matters  an  inch  for  the 
Chancellor,  like  Baron  Burian,  to  offer  to  take  President  Wilson's 
points  as  a  'basis'  for  negotiations.  They  will  make  a  first-rate  basis, 
but  only  when  Germany  has  offered  definite  preliminary  guarantees." 

I  beg  to  call  your  attention  to  another  editorial  in  the  Springfield 
Republican,  entitled  "Why  Germany  Must  Surrender,"  hereto  at 
tached. 

Speaking  of  Germany's  promises,  I  mention  still  another  editorial 
from  the  Springfield  Republican  which  concludes  by  saying,  "Even 
Mr.  Wilson  is  not  so  simple-minded  as  the  Kaiser  may  once  have 
thought  him  to  be." 

It  is  the  hand  of  Prussianism  which  offers  this  peace  to  America. 
As  long  ago  as  last  June  you  exposed  the  hollowness  of  peace  offered 
under  such  conditions  as  are  now  set  forth  by  the  German  Chan 
cellor.  Referring  to  the  German  Government,  you  said:  It  wishes 
to  close  its  bargain  before  it  is  too  late  and  it  has  little  left  to  offer  for 
the  pound  of  flesh  it  will  demand." 

In  your  speech  of  September  27th,  you  said: 

"We  are  all  agreed  that  there  can  be  no  peace  obtained  by  any  kind 
of  bargain  or  compromise  with  the  governments  of  the  Central  Em 
pires,  because  we  have  dealt  with  them  already  and  have  seen  them 
deal  with  other  governments  that  were  parties  to  this  struggle,  at 
Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucharest.  They  have  convinced  us  that  they 
were  without  honour  and  do  not  intend  justice.  They  observe  no 
covenants,  accept  no  principle  but  force  and  their  own  interest. 
We  cannot  'come  to  terms'  with  them.  They  have  made  it  impos- 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  315 

sible.  The  German  people  must  by  this  time  be  fully  aware  that  we 
cannot  accept  the  word  of  those  who  forced  this  war  upon  us.  We 
do  not  think  the  same  thoughts  or  speak  the  same  language  of  agree 
ment." 

Certainly,  the  German  people  are  not  speaking  through  the  German 
Chancellor.  It  is  the  Kaiser  himself.  He  foresees  the  end  and  will 
not  admit  it.  He  is  still  able  to  dictate  conditions,  for,  in  the  state 
ment  which  appeared  in  the  papers  yesterday,  he  said:  "It  will  only 
be  an  honourable  peace  for  which  we  extend  our  hand." 

The  other  day  you  said:  "We  cannot  accept  the  word  of  those  who 
forced  this  war  upon  us."  If  this  were  true  then,  how  can  we  accept 
this  offer  now?  Certainly  nothing  has  happened  since  that  speech 
that  has  changed  the  character  of  those  in  authority  in  Germany. 
Defeat  has  not  chastened  Germany  in  the  least.  The  tale  of  their 
retreat  is  still  a  tale  of  savagery,  for  they  have  devastated  the  country 
and  carried  off  the  inhabitants;  burned  churches,  looted  homes, 
wreaking  upon  the  advancing  Allies  every  form  of  vengeance  that 
cruelty  can  suggest. 

In  my  opinion,  your  acceptance  of  this  offer  will  be  disastrous,  for 
the  Central  Powers  have  made  its  acceptance  impossible  by  their 
faithlessness. 

TUMULTY. 

While  the  President  was  conferring  with  Secretaries 
Lansing,  Daniels,  Baker,  and  Colonel  House,  I  addressed 
the  following  letter  to  President  Wilson  and  a  practically 
identic  letter  to  Colonel  House: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

7  October,  1918. 
DEAR  MB.  PRESIDENT  : 

Since  I  returned,  every  bit  of  information  that  comes  to  me  is  along 
one  line  and  that  is,  that  an  agreement  in  which  the  Kaiser  is  to  play 
the  smallest  part  will  be  looked  upon  with  grave  suspicion  and  I  be 
lieve  its  results  will  be  disastrous.  In  my  opinion,  it  will  result  in 
the  election  of  a  Republican  House  and  the  weakening,  if  not  impair 
ing  of  your  influence  throughout  the  world.  I  am  not  on  the  inside 


316    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

and  so  I  do  not  know,  but  I  am  certain  that  Lloyd  George  and  Clem- 
enceau  will  take  full  advantage  of  this  opportunity  in  declaring  that, 
so  far  as  they  are  concerned,  they  are  not  going  to  sit  down  at  the 
Council  Table  with  William  the  Second,  and  you  may  be  put  in  a 
position  before  the  world,  by  your  acceptance  of  these  conditions,  of 
seeming  to  be  sympathetic  with  the  Kaiser  and  his  brood. 

May  not  Germany  be  succeeding  in  splitting  the  Allies  by  this 
offer,  just  as  Talleyrand  succeeded,  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  in 
splitting  the  allies  who  had  been  victorious  over  Napoleon?  You 
cannot  blot  out  the  record  you  have  made  in  your  speeches,  which 
in  every  word  and  line  showed  a  distrust  of  this  particular  autocracy, 
with  which  you  are  now  asked  to  deal.  Have  you  considered  the 
possibility  that  as  soon  as  Germany  read  your  New  York  speech  of 
September  27th,  knowing,  as  they  did,  that  it  was  neither  palatable 
to  the  Allies  nor  in  accordance  with  that  which  they  had  hitherto 
stood  for,  promptly  accepted  your  attitude  as  a  means  of  dividing 
the  Entente  at  a  critical  moment  and  robbing  her  of  the  benefits  of 
the  military  triumph?  Did  not  Talleyrand  do  the  very  same  thing 
to  them,  as  the  representative  of  defeated  France,  when  he  sided  with 
Russia  and  Prussia  as  against  England  and  thus  made  possible  the 
return  of  Napoleon? 

I  realize  the  great  responsibility  that  rests  upon  the  President. 
In  any  other  matter,  not  so  vital  as  this,  you  could  be  wrong  and  time 
would  correct  it,  but  in  a  thing  like  this,  when  you  are  dealing  with 
a  question  which  goes  to  the  very  depths  of  international  action  and 
world  progress,  you  are  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  If  you  wish  to 
erect  a  great  structure  of  peace,  you  must  be  sure  and  certain  that 
every  brick  in  it,  that  every  ounce  of  cement  that  goes  in  it  is  solid 
and  lasting,  and  above  all,  you  must  preserve  your  prestige  for  the 
bigger  moments  to  come. 

Sincerely, 
TUMULTY. 

Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  conference,  I  had  a  talk 
with  Colonel  House  and  Secretaries  Daniels,  Lansing,  and 
Baker,  and  again  urged  the  necessity  of  a  refusal  on  the 
part  of  the  President  to  accept  the  German  peace  terms. 
Secretary  Lansing  informed  me  that  the  President  had 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  317 

read  my  letter  to  the  conference  and  then  said:  "We  will 
all  be  satisfied  with  the  action  the  President  takes  in  this 
matter." 

While  at  luncheon  that  afternoon,  the  President  sent 
for  me  to  come  to  the  White  House.  I  found  him  in 
conference  with  Secretary  Lansing,  Colonel  House,  and 
Mr.  Polk.  The  German  reply  was  discussed  and  I  was 
happy  when  I  found  that  it  was  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 
President  to  accept  the  German  proposal. 

The  gist  of  the  President's  reply  was  a  demand  from 
him  of  evidence  of  a  true  conversion  on  the  part  of 
Germany,  and  an  inquiry  on  the  part  of  the  President  in 
these  words: 

"Does  the  Imperial  Chancellor  mean  that  the  German 
Government  accepts  the  Fourteen  Points?"  "Do  the 
military  men  of  Germany  agree  to  withdraw  all  their 
armies  from  occupied  territories?",  and  finally:  "The 
President  wishes  to  know  whether  the  Chancellor  speaks 
for  the  old  group  who  have  conducted  the  war,  or  does  he 
speak  for  the  liberated  peoples  of  Germany?" 

Commenting  upon  the  receipt  of  the  President's  reply 
to  the  Germans,  Andre  Tardieu  says: 


It  is  a  brief  reply  which  throws  the  recipients  into  consternation 
they  cannot  conceal.  No  conversation  is  possible,  declares  the 
President,  either  on  peace  or  on  an  armistice  until  preliminary  guar 
antees  shall  have  been  furnished.  These  are  the  acceptation  pure 
and  simple  of  the  bases  of  peace  laid  down  on  January  8,  1918,  and 
in  the  President's  subsequent  addresses;  the  certainty  that  the 
Chancellor  does  not  speak  only  in  the  names  of  the  constituted  au 
thorities  who  so  far  have  been  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  war; 
the  evacuation  of  all  invaded  territories.  The  President  will  trans 
mit  no  communication  to  his  associates  before  having  received  full 
satisfaction  on  these  three  points. 


318    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

What  must  be  the  thought  of  those  partisans  in  America 
who  were  crying  out  against  the  preliminary  course  of  the 
President  in  dealing  with  Germany,  who  read  this  para 
graph  from  Tardieu's  book  as  to  the  impressions  made  in 
France  and  Germany  by  the  notes  which  the  President 
from  week  to  week  addressed  to  the  Germans  with 
reference  to  the  Armistice? 

Again  Tardieu  says: 

Then  comes  the  thunderbolt.  President  Wilson  refuses  to  fall  into 
the  trap  and,  crossing  swords  in  earnest,  presses  his  attack  to  the 
utmost  in  the  note  of  October  14.  A  mixed  commission  for  evacua 
tion?  No!  These  are  matters  which  like  the  Armistice  itself  "must 
be  left  to  the  judgment  and  advice  of  the  military  advisers  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments."  Besides  no  armistice  is  possi 
ble  if  it  does  not  furnish  "absolutely  satisfactory  safeguards  and 
guarantees  of  the  maintenance  of  the  present  military  supremacy  of 
the  armies  of  the  United  States  and  of  its  allies."  Besides,  no  armis 
tice  "so  long  as  the  armed  forces  of  Germany  continue  the  illegal  and 
inhuman  practices  which  they  still  persist  in."  Finally,  no  armistice 
so  long  as  the  German  nation  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  military  power 
which  has  disturbed  the  peace  of  the  world.  As  to  Austria-Hungary, 
Germany  has  no  interest  therein  and  the  President  will  reply  directly. 
In  a  single  page  the  whole  poor  scaffolding  of  the  German  Great 
General  Staff  is  overthrown.  The  Armistice  and  peace  are  not  to  be 
the  means  of  delaying  a  disaster  and  of  preparing  revenge.  On  the 
main  question  itself  the  reply  must  be  Yes  or  No ! 

In  the  books  of  Ludendorff  and  Hindenburg  we  see  the 
shattering  effect  of  the  President's  answer  upon  the 
German  military  mind.  Whatever  misunderstanding 
and  misrepresentation  of  the  President's  position  there 
might  be  in  his  own  country,  whatever  false  rumours 
spread  by  party  malice  to  the  effect  that  he  had  entered 
into  negotiations  with  Germany  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Allies  and  was  imposing  "soft"  terms  on  Germany 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  319 

to  prevent  a  march  to  Berlin,  the  German  commanders 
were  under  no  illusions.  They  knew  that  the  President 
meant  capitulation  and  that  in  his  demand  he  had  the 
sanction  of  his  European  associates. 

Says  Ludendorff: 

This  time  he  made  it  quite  clear  that  the  Armistice  conditions  must 
be  such  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  Germany  to  resume  hostilities 
and  to  give  the  powers  allied  against  her  unlimited  power  to  settle 
themselves  the  details  of  the  peace  accepted  by  Germany.  In  my 
view,  there  could  no  longer  be  doubt  in  any  mind  that  we  must  con 
tinue  the  fight. 

Said  Hindenburg  in  an  order  "for  the  information  of 
all  troops,"  an  order  never  promulgated: 

He  [Wilson]  will  negotiate  with  Germany  for  peace  only  if  she 
concedes  all  the  demands  of  America's  allies  as  to  the  internal  consti 
tutional  arrangements  of  Germany.  .  .  .  Wilson's  answer  is  a 
demand  for  unconditional  surrender.  It  is  thus  unacceptable  to  us 
soldiers. 

In  Andre  Tardieu's  book  we  read  that  from  October  5th, 
the  day  when  Germany  first  asked  for  an  armistice,  Presi 
dent  Wilson  remained  in  daily  contact  with  the  European 
governments,  and  that  the  American  Government  was  in 
favour  of  writing  into  the  Armistice  harsher  terms  than  the 
Allies  thought  it  wise  to  propose  to  the  Germans.  It  will 
be  recalled  that  the  popular  cry  at  the  time  was  "On  to  Ber 
lin!"  and  an  urgent  demand  upon  the  part  of  the  enemies 
of  the  President  on  Capitol  Hill  that  he  should  stand  pat 
for  an  unconditional  surrender  from  Germany;  that  there 
should  be  no  soft  peace  or  compromise  with  Germany,  and 
that  we  should  send  our  soldiers  to  Berlin.  At  the  time 
we  discussed  this  attitude  of  mind  of  certain  men  on  the 
Hill,  the  President  said:  "How  utterly  foolish  this  is! 


320    WOODROW   WILSON   AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

Of  course,  some  of  our  so-called  military  leaders,  for 
propaganda  purposes  only,  are  saying  that  it  would  be 
more  advantageous  for  us  to  decline  the  offer  of  Germany 
and  to  go  to  Berlin.  They  do  not,  however,  give  our 
people  any  estimate  of  the  cost  in  blood  and  money  to 
consummate  this  enterprise." 

The  story  was  also  industriously  circulated  that  Marshal 
Foch  was  demurring  to  any  proposition  for  a  settlement 
with  Germany. 

It  appears  now  that  in  the  negotiations  for  the  Armistice 
Colonel  House,  representing  the  President's  point  of  view 
in  this  vital  matter,  asked  this  fundamental  question  of 
Foch:  "Will  you  tell  us,  Marshal,  purely  from  a  military 
point  of  view  and  without  regard  to  any  other  condition, 
whether  you  would  prefer  the  Germans  to  reject  or  sign 
the  Armistice  as  outlined  here?"  Marshal  Foch  replied: 
"The  only  aim  of  war  is  to  obtain  results.  If  the  Ger 
mans  sign  an  armistice  now  upon  the  general  lines  we  have 
just  determined,  we  shall  have  obtained  the  results  we 
asked.  Our  aims  being  accomplished,  no  one  has  the 
right  to  shed  another  drop  of  blood." 

It  was  said  at  the  time  that  the  President  was  forcing 
settlement  upon  the  military  leaders  of  the  Allies.  General 
Foch  disposed  of  this  by  saying,  in  answer  to  a  question 
by  Colonel  House  and  Lloyd  George:  "The  conditions 
laid  down  by  your  military  leaders  are  the  very  con 
ditions  which  we  ought  to  and  could  impose  after  the 
success  of  our  further  operations,  so  that  if  the  Germans 
accept  them  now,  it  is  useless  to  go  on  fighting." 

It  was  all  over,  and  the  protagonist  of  the  grand  climax 
of  the  huge  drama  was  Woodrow  Wilson,  the  accepted 
spokesman  of  the  Allies,  the  Nemesis  of  the  Central 
Powers,  who  by  first  isolating  them  through  his  moral 


GERMANY    CAPITULATES  321 

appeal  to  the  neutral  world  was  now  standing  before  them 
as  the  stern  monitor,  demanding  that  they  settle  not  on 
their  terms,  but  on  his  terms,  which  the  Allies  had  ac 
cepted  as  their  terms. 

I  shall  never  forget  how  happy  he  looked  on  the  night 
of  the  Armistice  when  the  throngs  surged  through  Penn 
sylvania  Avenue,  in  Washington,  and  he,  unable  to  remain 
indoors,  had  come  to  the  White  House  gates  to  look  on, 
in  his  face  a  glow  of  satisfaction  of  one  who  realizes  that 
he  has  fought  for  a  principle  and  won.  In  his  countenance 
there  was  an  expression  not  so  much  of  triumph  as  of  vin 
dication. 

As  a  light  ending  to  a  heavy  matter,  I  may  say  here 
that  when  the  Armistice  terms  were  finally  accepted,  the 
President  said:  "Well,  Tumulty,  the  war's  over,  and  I  feel 
like  the  Confederate  soldier  General  John  B.  Gordon  used 
to  tell  of,  soliloquizing  on  a  long,  hard  march,  during  the 
Civil  War:  'I  love  my  country  and  I  am  fightin'  for  my 
country,  but  if  this  war  ever  ends,  I'll  be  dad-burned  if 
I  ever  love  another  country." 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

APPEAL  FOB  A  DEMOCRATIC  CONGRESS 

THE  President's  appeal  to  the  country  of  October 
24,  1918,  asking  for  the  election  of  a  Democratic 
Congress,  brought  down  upon  him  a  storm  of 
criticism  and  ridicule.  Many  leading  Democrats  who  had 
strongly  urged  an  appeal  by  the  President  as  a  necessary 
and  proper  thing  in  the  usual  war  situation  which  con 
fronted  him,  as  the  criticism  directed  toward  it  grew  more 
bitter,  turned  away  from  it  and  criticized  what  they  said 
was  the  ineptitude  and  lack  of  tact  of  the  President  in 
issuing  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  opinion  in  the  Democratic 
ranks  as  to  the  wisdom  and  necessity  of  a  general  appeal 
was  unanimous  prior  to  the  issuance  of  the  statement. 
What  the  President  was  seeking  to  do  when  he  asked  the 
support  of  the  country  through  the  election  of  a  Demo 
cratic  Congress  was  to  prevent  divided  leadership  at  a 
moment  when  the  President's  undisputed  control  was  a 
necessity  because  of  the  effect  a  repudiation  of  his  ad 
ministration  would  work  upon  the  Central  Powers.  He 
realized  that  the  defeat  of  his  administration  in  the  midst 
of  the  World  War  would  give  aid  and  comfort  to  the 
Central  Powers,  and  that  the  Allied  governments  would 
themselves  interpret  it  as  a  weakening  of  our  war  power 
and  while  the  enemy  would  be  strengthened,  our  associates 
would  be  distressed  and  disheartened. 

He  looked  upon  it,  therefore,  not  as  a  partisan  matter 
but  as  a  matter  involving  the  good  faith  of  America. 

322     \ 


APPEAL  FOR  DEMOCRATIC   CONGRESS     323 

At  previous  elections  the  White  House  had  been  inun 
dated  with  requests  from  particular  senators  and  con 
gressmen,  urging  the  President  to  write  letters  in  their 
behalf,  and  this  had  resulted  in  so  much  embarrassment 
to  the  Chief  Executive  that  as  the  critical  days  of  the 
November  elections  of  1918  approached,  the  President 
was  forced  to  consider  a  more  general  and,  if  possible, 
a  more  diplomatic  method  of  handling  this  difficult 
situation.  The  gentlemen  who  criticized  the  appeal  as 
outrageously  partisan  evidently  forgot  that  for  months 
Will  Hays,  chairman  of  the  Republican  National  Com 
mittee,  had  been  busily  engaged  in  visiting  various  parts 
of  the  country  and,  with  his  coadjutors  in  the  Republican 
National  Committee,  openly  and  blatantly  demanding 
an  emphatic  repudiation  of  the  Administration  from  the 
country. 

The  President  and  I  discussed  the  situation  in  June, 
1918,  and  I  was  asked  by  him  to  consider  and  work 
out  what  might  be  thought  a  tactful,  effective  plan  by 
which  the  President,  without  arousing  party  rancour  or 
bitterness,  might  make  an  appeal  to  the  country,  asking 
for  its  support.  I  considered  the  matter,  and  under 
date  of  June  18,  1918, 1  wrote  him  a  letter,  part  of  which 
was  given  over  to  a  discussion  of  the  way  the  matter 
might  discreetly  be  handled: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

June  18, 1918. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  think  the  attitude  of  the  leaders  of  the  Republican  party,  as 
reflected  in  the  speeches  of  Will  Hays,  National  Chairman,  and  Sena 
tor  Penrose,  on  Saturday  last,  will  give  you  the  opportunity  at  the 
psychological  moment  to  strike  and  to  define  the  issue  in  this  cam 
paign.  I  think  for  the  present  our  policy  should  be  one  of  silence 


324    WOODROW   WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

and  even  a  show  of  indifference  to  what  the  leaders  on  the  other  side, 
Messrs.  Hay  and  Penrose,  are  saying  and  doing.  This  will,  no  doubt, 
embolden  them  to  make  rash  statements  and  charges  and  by  the  time 
you  are  ready  to  make  your  general  appeal,  the  whole  country  will 
realize  how  necessary  it  is  for  you  frankly  to  ask  for  the  reelection  of 
the  Democratic  Congress.  In  a  speech  on  Friday  night,  delivered  at 
Philadelphia,  in  urging  the  election  of  a  Republican  Congress,  Will 
Hays  said:  "We  will  bring  the  Government  back  to  the  limitations 
and  principles  of  the  Constitution  in  time  of  peace  and  establish 
policies  which  will  again  bind  up  the  wounds  of  war,  renew  our  pros 
perity,  administer  the  affairs  of  government  with  the  greatest  econ 
omy,  enlarge  our  strength  at  home  and  abroad,  etc.  .  .  ." 

Senator  Penrose  at  the  same  time  urging  a  Republican  Congress 
said:  "Let  us  keep  up  an  efficient  Republican  organization  in  Penn 
sylvania  and  all  through  the  United  States,  and  make  a  successful 
Republican  contest  at  every  opportunity  in  every  congressional  dis 
trict  and  at  the  next  Presidential  election,  and  endeavour  to  assure  the 
election  of  Republican  candidates." 

I  think  these  speeches  will  give  you  an  opportunity  some  time  in 
September  or  October  frankly  to  state  just  what  your  attitude  is 
toward  the  coming  campaign,  and  thus  lay  before  the  country  what 
the  Republicans  hope  to  gain  by  bringing  about  the  election  of  a  Re 
publican  Congress.  I  would  suggest  that  some  man  of  distinction 
in  the  country  write  you  a  letter,  calling  your  attention  to  partisan 
speeches  of  this  character,  emphasizing  the  parts  I  have  mentioned, 
and  ask  your  opinion  with  reference  to  the  plan  of  the  Republican 
party  to  regain  power.  In  other  words,  we  ought  to  accept  these 
speeches  charging  incompetency  and  inefficiency  as  a  challenge,  and 
call  the  attention  of  the  country  to  the  fact  that  the  leadership  of  the 
Republican  party  is  still  reactionary  and  standpat,  laying  particular 
emphasis  on  what  the  effect  in  Europe  would  be  of  a  divided  leader 
ship  at  this  time.  I  think  a  letter  along  the  lines  of  the  Indiana  plat 
form  which  I  suggested  a  few  weeks  ago  would  carry  to  the  country 
just  the  impression  we  ought  to  make.  This  letter  should  be  issued,  in 
my  opinion,  some  time  in  September  or  October. 

While  it  would  seem  from  a  reading  of  my  confidential 
letter  to  the  President  that  we  were  engaged  in  preparing 


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326    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  way  for  an  appeal,  we  were  simply  doing  what  other 
administrations  had  done. 

Some  time  after  this  the  President  conferred  with 
Colonel  House,  and  when  I  next  discussed  the  matter  with 
the  President,  he  informed  me  that  he  and  Colonel  House 
had  finally  agreed  that  the  thing  to  do  was  frankly  to 
come  out  without  preliminaries  of  any  kind  and  boldly 
ask  for  the  election  of  a  Democratic  Congress.  I  told 
him  that  I  thought  the  method  I  had  proposed  for  bring 
ing  him  into  the  discussion  was  one  that  would  be  most 
effective  and  would  cause  least  resentment;  but  he  was 
firm  in  his  resolve  to  follow  the  course  he  finally  pursued. 
He  was  of  the  opinion  that  this  was  the  open  and  honour 
able  way  to  ask  for  what  he  thought  would  be  a  vote  of 
confidence  in  his  administration. 

It  has  often  been  stated  that  in  this  matter  the 
President  had  acted  upon  the  advice  of  Postmaster 
General  Burleson,  and  many  of  those  individuals  through 
out  the  country  who  criticized  the  President's  appeal, 
pointed  an  accusing  finger  at  General  Burleson  and 
held  him  responsible  for  what  they  said  were  the  evil 
consequences  of  this  ill-considered  action.  Simply  by 
way  of  explanation,  it  can  be  truthfully  said,  in  fair 
ness  to  General  Burleson,  that  he  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  appeal  and  that  he  had  never  been  consulted 
about  it. 

These  facts  are  now  related  by  me  not  by  way  of 
apology  for  what  the  President  did,  for  in  openly  appeal 
ing  to  the  country  he  had  many  honourable  precedents, 
of  which  the  gentlemen  who  criticized  him  were  evidently 
ignorant.  As  Mr.  George  Creel,  in  his  book,  "The  War, 
the  World,  and  Wilson,"  says:  "In  various  elections 
George  Washington  pleaded  for  'united  leadership,'  and 


APPEAL  FOR  DEMOCRATIC   CONGRESS     327 

Lincoln  specifically  urged  upon  the  people  the  unwisdom 
of  'swapping  horses  in  midstream.'" 

In  a  paragraph  in  Herndon's  "Life  of  Lincoln,"  I  find 
the  following  appeal: 

He  did  his  duty  as  President,  and  rested  secure  in  the  belief  that  he 
would  be  reflected  whatever  might  be  done  for  or  against  him. 
The  importance  of  retaining  Indiana  in  the  column  of  Republican 
States  was  not  to  be  overlooked.  How  the  President  viewed  it,  and 
how  he  proposed  to  secure  the  vote  of  the  state  is  shown  in  the  fol 
lowing  letter  written  to  General  Sherman: 


Executive  Mansion, 
Washington,  September  19,  1864. 
MAJOR  GENERAL  SHERMAN: 

The  State  election  of  Indiana  occurs  on  the  llth  of  October  and 
the  loss  of  it  to  the  friends  of  the  Government  would  go  far  toward 
losing  the  whole  Union  cause.  The  bad  effect  upon  the  November 
election,  and  especially  the  giving  the  State  Government  to  those 
who  will  oppose  the  war  in  every  possible  way,  are  too  much  to  risk 
if  it  can  be  avoided.  The  draft  proceeds,  notwithstanding  its  strong 
tendency  to  lose  us  the  State.  Indiana  is  the  only  important  State 
voting  in  October  whose  soldiers  cannot  vote  in  the  field.  Anything  you 
can  safely  do  to  let  her  soldiers  or  any  part  of  them  go  home  and  vote 
at  the  State  election  will  be  greatly  in  point.  They  need  not  remain 
for  the  Presidential  election,  but  may  return  to  you  at  once.  This  is 
in  no  sense  an  order,  but  is  merely  intended  to  impress  you  with  the 
importance  to  the  army  itself  of  your  doing  all  you  safely  can,  your 
self  being  the  judge  of  what  you  can  safely  do. 

Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 


Mr.  Creel  shows  that  the  precedents  established  by 
Washington  and  Lincoln  were  followed  by  Presidents 
McKinley,  Roosevelt,  and  Taft: 


328    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Boone,  Iowa,  October  11,  1898,  President 
McKinley  pleaded  for  a  Republican  Congress  in  these  words: 

This  is  no  time  for  divided  councils.  If  I  would  have  you  remember 
anything  I  have  said  in  these  desultory  remarks,  it  would  be  to  re 
member  at  this  critical  hour  in  the  nation's  history  we  must  not  be 
divided.  The  triumphs  of  the  war  are  yet  to  be  written  in  the  ar 
ticles  of  peace. 


In  the  same  year  Theodore  Roosevelt,  argued  for 
Republican  Congress  as  follows: 


a 


Remember  that  whether  you  will  or  not,  your  votes  this  year  will 
be  viewed  by  the  nations  of  Europe  from  one  standpoint  only.  They 
will  draw  no  fine  distinctions.  A  refusal  to  sustain  the  President  this 
year  will,  in  their  eyes,  be  read  as  a  refusal  to  sustain  the  war  and  to 
sustain  the  efforts  of  our  peace  commission  to  secure  the  fruit  of  war. 
Such  a  refusal  may  not  inconceivably  bring  about  a  rupture  of  the 
peace  negotiations.  It  will  give  heart  to  our  defeated  antagonists; 
it  will  make  possible  the  interference  of  those  doubtful  neutral  na 
tions  who  in  this  struggle  have  wished  us  ill. 

Ex-President  Benjamin  Harrison  besought  the  people  to 
"stand  behind  the  President,"  saying: 

If  the  word  goes  forth  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  are 
standing  solidly  behind  the  President,  the  task  of  the  peace  commis 
sioners  will  be  easy,  but  if  there  is  a  break  in  the  ranks — if  the  Demo 
crats  score  a  telling  victory,  if  Democratic  Senators,  Congressmen, 
and  governors  are  elected — Spain  will  see  in  it  a  gleam  of  hope,  she 
will  take  fresh  hope,  and  a  renewal  of  hostilities,  more  war,  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  to  us  what  we  have  already  won. 

When  Colonel  Roosevelt  himself  became  President,  he 
followed  the  usual  precedent  without  even  the  excuse  of  a 
war  emergency.  In  a  letter  dated  August  18,  1906,  to 
James  E.  Watson,  he  wrote: 


APPEAL  FOR  DEMOCRATIC   CONGRESS     329 

If  there  were  only  partisan  issues  involved  in  this  contest,  I  should 
hesitate  to  say  anything  publicly  in  reference  thereto.  But  I  do 
not  feel  that  such  is  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  I  feel  that  all  good  citi 
zens  who  have  the  welfare  of  America  at  heart  should  appreciate  the 
immense  amount  that  has  been  accomplished  by  the  present  Con 
gress,  organized  as  it  is,  and  the  urgent  need  of  keeping  this  organiza 
tion  in  power.  To  change  the  leadership  and  organization  of  the 
House  at  this  time  means  to  bring  confusion  to  those  who  have  been 
successfully  engaged  in  the  steady  working  out  of  a  great  and  com 
prehensive  scheme  for  the  betterment  of  our  social,  industrial,  and 
civic  conditions.  Such  a  change  would  substitute  a  purposeless 
confusion,  a  violent  and  hurtful  oscillation  between  the  positions  of 
the  extreme  radical  and  the  extreme  reactionary  for  the  present  or 
derly  progress  along  the  lines  of  a  carefully  thought  out  policy. 

Is  it  not  clear  in  the  light  of  the  events  that  followed 
the  repudiation  of  the  President  and  his  administration 
in  1918  that  he  was  justified  by  reason  of  the  unusual 
circumstances  of  a  great  world  war,  in  asking  for  a  "team" 
that  would  work  in  cooperation  with  him?  Some  of 
those  who  most  indignantly  criticized  him  for  his  partisan 
appeal  attacked  him  and  the  measures  which  he  recom 
mended  for  the  peace  of  the  world  with  a  partisanship 
without  parallel  in  the  history  of  party  politics.  Some 
who  most  bitterly  condemned  what  he  did  gave  the 
most  emphatic  proof  that  what  he  did  was  necessary. 
Nor  can  they  honestly  defend  themselves  by  saying  that 
their  partisan  attacks  on  the  treaty  were  justifiable  re 
prisal.  Before  he  ever  made  his  appeal  they  were  doing 
all  in  their  power  to  undermine  his  influence  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  he  knew  it.  The  appeal  was  no  reflection 
on  Republicans  as  such,  nor  any  minimization  of  the 
heroic  service  rendered  in  the  war  by  Republicans  and 
Democrats  alike  in  the  fighting  and  civilian  services,  but 
the  President  knew  that  Republicans  organized  in  party 


330    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

opposition  in  Congress  would  not  assist  but  obstruct  the 
processes  of  peace-making  under  his  leadership.  And 
all  the  world  now  knows  that  his  judgment  was  correct. 
It  will  be  interesting  to  read  the  President's  appeal 
to  the  country,  written  by  him  on  the  typewriter: 

My  Fellow  Countrymen:  The  Congressional  elections  are  at  hand. 
They  occur  in  the  most  critical  period  our  country  has  ever  faced 
or  is  likely  to  face  in  our  time.  If  you  have  approved  of  my  leader 
ship  and  wish  me  to  continue  to  be  your  unembarrassed  spokesman 
in  affairs  at  home  and  abroad,  I  earnestly  beg  that  you  will  express 
yourself  unmistakably  to  that  effect  by  returning  a  Democratic  ma 
jority  to  both  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives.  I  am 
your  servant  and  will  accept  your  judgment  without  cavil,  but  my 
power  to  administer  the  great  trust  assigned  me  by  the  Constitution 
would  be  seriously  impaired  should  your  judgment  be  adverse,  and  I 
must  frankly  tell  you  so  because  so  many  critical  issues  depend  upon 
your  verdict.  No  scruple  of  taste  must  in  grim  times  like  these  be 
allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  speaking  the  plain  truth. 

I  have  no  thought  of  suggesting  that  any  political  party  is  para 
mount  in  matters  of  patriotism.  I  feel  too  keenly  the  sacrifices 
which  have  been  made  in  this  war  by  all  our  citizens,  irrespective  of 
party  affiliations,  to  harbour  such  an  idea.  I  mean  only  that  the 
difficulties  and  delicacies  of  our  present  task  are  of  a  sort  that  makes 
it  imperatively  necessary  that  the  nation  should  give  its  undivided 
support  to  the  Government  under  a  unified  leadership,  and  that  a 
Republican  Congress  would  divide  the  leadership. 

The  leaders  of  the  minority  in  the  present  Congress  have  unques 
tionably  been  pro- war,  but  they  have  been  anti-Administration.  At 
almost  every  turn,  since  we  entered  the  war,  they  have  sought  to  take 
the  choice  of  policy  and  the  conduct  of  the  war  out  of  my  hands  and 
put  it  under  the  control  of  instrumentalities  of  their  own  choosing. 
This  is  no  time  either  for  divided  counsel  or  for  divided  leadership. 
Unity  of  command  is  as  necessary  now  in  civil  action  as  it  is  upon  the 
field  of  battle.  If  the  control  of  the  House  and  Senate  should  be 
taken  away  from  the  party  now  in  power,  an  opposing  majority 
could  assume  control  of  legislation  and  oblige  all  action  to  be  taken 
amidst  contest  and  obstruction. 


&L  IS-IllK  £o££l.£££.Jp  '•  The  Congressional 
are  at  h~and.   They  occur  in  the  most  critical  per 
iod  oar  country  has  ever  faoad  or  is  likely  to 
face  in  oar  time.   If  you  have  approved  of  my  lead 
ership  and  wish  me  to  continue  to  be  your  aneabar- 
rassed  spokesman  in  affairs  at  home  and  abroad,  I 
earnestly  beg  that  you  will  express  yourselves  un- 
ff.istakably  to  that  effect  by  returning  a  Democrat- 
is  majority  to  both  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives.   I  am  your  servant  and  will  ac 
cept  your  judgment  without  cavil,  but  my  power  to 
administer  the  great  trust  assigned  me  by  the  Con 
stitution  would  be  seriously  impaired  should  your 
judgment  be  adverse,  and  I  must  frankly  tell  you 
so  because  so  many  critical  issues  depend  upon 
your  verdict.  4^r^^^iy^^H!t^g^'i-n m v^^^wr^f^^^^^^^^r^' 

-Mftfefel^gjM*   -io  scruple  of  taste  must  in  grim 
times  like  these  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  speaking  the  plain  truth. 

I  have  no  thought  of  suggesting  that  any  po 
litical  party  is  paramount  in  matters  of  patriot 
ism.   I  fa-el  too  keenly  the  sacrifices  which  have 
been  made  in  this  war  by  all  our  citizens,  irre 
spective  of  party  affiliations,  to  harbour  such 
an  idea*   I  mean  only  that  the  difficulties  and 
delicacies  of  our  present  task  are  of  a  sort  that 
makes  it  imperatively  necessary  that  the  nation 
should  give  its  undivided  support  to  the  govern- 

The  President's  appeal  for  a  Democratic  Congress,  as  he  wrote  it  on  his 
typewriter  and  with  his  corrections 


331 


332    WOODROW   WILSON   AS    I   KNOW    HIM 

The  return  of  a  Republican  majority  to  either  House  of  the  Congress 
would,  moreover,  certainly  be  interpreted  on  the  other  side  of  the 
water  as  a  repudiation  of  my  leadership.  Spokesmen  of  the  Repub 
lican  party  are  urging  you  to  elect  a  Republican  Congress  in  order  to 
back  up  and  support  the  President,  but  even  if  they  should  in  this  way 
impose  upon  some  credulous  voters  on  this  side  of  the  water,  they 
would  impose  on  no  one  on  the  other  side.  It  is  well  understood  there 
as  well  as  here  that  the  Republican  leaders  desire  not  so  much  to 
support  the  President  as  to  control  him.  The  peoples  of  the  Allied 
countries  with  whom  we  are  associated  against  Germany  are  quite 
familiar  with  the  significance  of  elections.  They  would  find  it  very 
difficult  to  believe  that  the  voters  of  the  United  States  had  chosen  to 
support  their  President  by  electing  to  the  Congress  a  majority  con 
trolled  by  those  who  are  not  in  fact  in  sympathy  with  the  attitude  and 
action  of  the  Administration. 

I  need  not  tell  you,  my  fellow  countrymen,  that  I  am  asking  your 
support  not  for  my  own  sake  or  for  the  sake  of  a  political  party,  but 
for  the  sake  of  the  nation  itself,  in  order  that  its  inward  unity  of 
purpose  may  be  evident  to  all  the  world.  In  ordinary  times  I  would 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  make  such  an  appeal  to  you.  In  ordinary  times 
divided  counsels  can  be  endured  without  permanent  hurt  to  the 
country.  But  these  are  not  ordinary  times.  If  in  these  critical  days 
it  is  your  wish  to  sustain  me  with  undivided  minds,  I  beg  that  you 
will  say  so  in  a  way  which  it  will  not  be  possible  to  misunderstand 
either  here  at  home  or  among  our  associates  on  the  other  side  of  the 
sea.  I  submit  my  difficulties  and  my  hopes  to  you. 

In  an  address  at  the  White  House  to  members  of  the 
Democratic  National  Committee,  delivered  February 
28,  1919,  which  was  never  published,  the  President 
expressed  his  own  feelings  with  reference  to  the  defeat 
of  the  Democratic  party  at  the  Congressional  elections 
a  few  months  before.  Discussing  this  defeat,  he  said: 

Personally,  I  am  not  in  the  least  discouraged  by  the  results  of  the 
last  Congressional  election.  Any  party  which  carries  out  through  a 
long  series  of  years  a  great  progressive  and  constructive  programme 


APPEAL  FOR  DEMOCRATIC  CONGRESS     333 

is  sure  to  bring  about  a  reaction,  because  while  in  the  main  the  re 
forms  that  we  have  accomplished  have  been  sound  reforms,  they  have 
necessarily  in  the  process  of  being  made  touched  a  great  many  definite 
interests  in  a  way  that  distressed  them,  in  a  way  that  was  counter  to 
what  they  deemed  their  best  and  legitimate  interests.  So  that  there 
has  been  a  process  of  adaptation  in  the  process  of  change.  There  is 
nothing  apparently  to  which  the  human  mind  is  less  hospitable  than 
change,  and  in  the  business  world  that  is  particularly  true  because 
if  you  get  in  the  habit  of  doing  your  business  a  particular  way  and  are 
compelled  to  do  it  in  a  different  way,  you  think  that  somebody  in 
Washington  does  not  understand  business,  and,  therefore,  there  has 
been  a  perfectly  natural  reaction  against  the  changes  we  have  made 
in  the  public  policies  of  the  United  States.  In  many  instances,  as  in 
the  banking  and  currency  reform,  the  country  is  entirely  satisfied  with 
the  wisdom  and  permanency  of  the  change,  but  even  there  a  great 
many  interests  have  been  disappointed  and  many  of  their  plans  have 
been  prevented  from  being  consummated.  So  that,  there  is  that 
natural  explanation.  And  then  I  do  not  think  that  we  ought  to  con 
ceal  from  ourselves  the  fact  that  not  the  whole  body  of  our  partisans 
are  as  cordial  in  the  support  of  some  of  the  things  that  we  have  done 
as  they  ought  to  be. 

You  know  that  I  heard  a  gentleman  from  one  of  the  southern 
States  say  to  his  Senator  (this  gentleman  was  himself  a  member 
of  the  State  Legislature) — he  said  to  his  Senator:  "We  have  the  ad 
vantage  over  you  because  we  have  no  publication  corresponding 
with  the  Congressional  Record  and  all  that  is  recorded  in  our  state  is 
the  vote,  and  while  you  have  always  voted  right  we  know  what  hap 
pened  in  the  meantime  because  we  read  the  Congressional  Record.'9 
Now,  with  regard  to  a  great  many  of  our  fellow  partisans  in  Wash 
ington,  the  Congressional  Record  shows  what  happened  between 
the  beginning  of  the  discussion  and  the  final  vote,  and  our  opponents 
were  very  busy  in  advertising  what  the  Congressional  Record  dis 
closed.  And  to  be  perfectly  plain,  there  was  not  in  the  minds  of  the 
country  sufficient  satisfactory  evidence  that  we  had  supported  some 
of  the  great  things  that  they  were  interested  in  any  better  than  the 
other  fellows.  The  voting  record  was  all  right  and  the  balance  in 
our  favour;  but  they  can  show  a  great  many  things  that  discount  the 
final  record  of  the  vote. 


334    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Now,  I  am  in  one  sense  an  uncompromising  partisan.  Either  a 
man  must  stand  by  his  party  or  not.  Either  he  has  got  to  play  the 
game  or  he  has  got  to  get  out  of  the  game,  and  I  have  no  more  suffer 
ance  for  such  a  man  than  the  country  has.  Not  a  bit.  Some  of  them 
got  exactly  what  was  coming  to  them  and  I  haven't  any  bowels  of 
compassion  for  them.  They  did  not  support  the  things  they  pre 
tended  to  support.  And  the  country  knew  they  didn't, — the  country 
knew  that  the  tone  of  the  cloakroom  and  the  tone  of  the  voting  were 
different  tones.  Now,  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  say  that  I  think  it  is 
wise  to  judge  of  party  loyalty  by  the  cloakroom,  and  not  by  the  vote 
and  the  cloakroom  was  not  satisfactory.  I  am  not  meaning  to  imply 
that  there  was  any  kind  of  blameworthy  insincerity  in  this.  I  am  not 
assessing  individuals.  That  is  not  fair.  But  in  assessing  the  cause 
of  our  defeat  we  ought  to  be  perfectly  frank  and  admit  that  the  coun 
try  was  not  any  more  sure  of  us  than  it  ought  to  be.  So  that  we  have 
got  to  convince  it  that  the  ranks  have  closed  up  and  that  the  men 
who  constitute  those  ranks  are  all  on  the  war-path  and  mean  the  things 
they  say  and  that  the  party  professes.  That  is  the  main  thing. 

Now,  I  think  that  can  be  accomplished  by  many  processes.  Un 
fortunately,  the  members  of  Congress  have  to  live  in  Washington, 
and  Washington  is  not  a  part  of  the  United  States.  It  is  the  most 
extraordinary  thing  I  have  ever  known.  If  you  stay  here  long 
enough  you  forget  what  the  people  of  your  own  district  are  thinking 
about.  There  is  one  reason  on  the  face  of  things.  The  wrong  opin 
ion  is  generally  better  organized  than  the  right  opinion.  If  some 
special  interest  has  an  impression  that  it  wants  to  make  on  Congress 
it  can  get  up  thousands  of  letters  with  which  to  bombard  its  Senators 
and  Representatives,  and  they  get  the  impression  that  that  is  the 
opinion  at  home  and  they  do  not  hear  from  the  other  fellow;  and  the 
consequence  is  that  the  unspoken  and  uninsisted-on  views  of  the 
country,  which  are  the  views  of  the  great  majority,  are  not  heard  at 
this  distance.  If  such  an  arrangement  were  feasible  I  think  there 
ought  to  be  a  Constitutional  provision  that  Congressmen  and  Sena 
tors  ought  to  spend  every  other  week  at  home  and  come  back  here  and 
talk  and  vote  after  a  fresh  bath  in  the  atmosphere  of  their  home  dis 
tricts  and  the  opinions  of  their  home  folks. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

THE    GREAT   ADVENTURE 

AWE  conferred  together  for  the  last  time  before 
the  President  left  Washington  for  the  other  side, 
I  had  never  seen  him  look  more  weary  or  care 
worn.  It  was  plain  to  me  who  had  watched  him  from  day 
to  day  since  the  Armistice,  that  he  felt  most  keenly  the 
heavy  responsibility  that  now  lay  upon  him  of  trying 
to  bring  permanent  peace  to  the  world.  He  was  not 
unmindful  of  the  criticism  that  had  been  heaped  upon 
him  by  his  enemies  on  the  Hill  and  throughout  the 
country.  The  only  thing  that  distressed  him,  however, 
was  the  feeling  that  a  portion  of  the  American  people 
were  of  the  opinion  that,  perhaps,  in  making  the  trip 
to  Paris  there  lay  back  of  it  a  desire  for  self -exploitation, 
or,  perhaps,  the  idea  of  garnering  certain  political  advan 
tages  to  himself  and  his  party.  If  one  who  held  this 
ungenerous  opinion  could  only  have  come  in  contact  with 
this  greatly  overworked  man  on  the  night  of  our  final 
talk  and  could  understand  the  handsome,  unselfish  pur 
pose  that  really  lay  behind  his  mission  to  France  and  could 
know  personally  how  he  dreaded  the  whole  business,  he 
would  quickly  free  himself  of  this  opinion.  Discussing 
the  object  of  the  trip  with  me  in  his  usually  intimate 
way,  he  said:  "Well,  Tumulty,  this  trip  will  either  be 
the  greatest  success  or  the  supremest  tragedy  in  all  history; 
but  I  believe  in  a  Divine  Providence.  If  I  did  not  have 
faith,  I  should  go  crazy.  If  I  thought  that  the  direction 

335 


WOODROW   WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

of  the  affairs  of  this  disordered  world  depended  upon 
our  finite  intelligence,  I  should  not  know  how  to  reason 
my  way  to  sanity;  but  it  is  my  faith  that  no  body  of  men 
however  they  concert  their  power  or  their  influence  can 
defeat  this  great  world  enterprise,  which  after  all  is  the 
enterprise  of  Divine  mercy,  peace  and  good  will." 

As  he  spoke  these  fateful  words,  he  clearly  foresaw  the 
difficulties  and  dangers  and  possible  tragedy  of  reaction  and 
intrigue  that  would  soon  exert  themselves  in  Paris,  perhaps 
to  outwit  him  and  if  possible  to  prevent  the  consummation 
of  the  idea  that  lay  so  close  to  his  heart:  that  of  setting 
up  a  concert  of  powers  that  would  make  for  ever  impossible 
a  war  such  as  we  had  just  passed  through.  Indeed, 
he  was  ready  to  risk  everything — his  own  health,  his  own 
political  fortunes,  his  place  in  history,  and  his  very  life 
itself — for  the  great  enterprise  of  peace.  "This  intoler 
able  thing  must  never  happen  again,"  he  said. 

No  one  more  than  Woodrow  Wilson  appreciated  the 
tragedy  of  disappointment  that  might  eventually  follow 
out  of  his  efforts  for  peace,  but  he  was  willing  to  make  any 
sacrifice  to  attain  the  end  he  had  so  close  to  his  heart. 

He  realized  better  than  any  one  the  great  expectations 
of  the  American  people.  Discussing  these  expectations 
with  Mr.  Creel,  who  was  to  accompany  him,  he  said: 
"It  is  to  America  that  the  whole  world  turns  to-day, 
not  only  with  its  wrongs  but  with  its  hopes  and  griev 
ances.  The  hungry  expect  us  to  feed  them,  the  home 
less  look  to  us  for  shelter,  the  sick  of  heart  and  body 
depend  upon  us  for  cure.  All  of  these  expectations 
have  in  them  the  quality  of  terrible  urgency.  There 
must  be  no  delay.  It  has  been  so  always.  People  will 
endure  their  tyrants  for  years,  but  they  tear  their  de 
liverers  to  pieces  if  a  millennium  is  not  created  immedi- 


THE    GREAT   ADVENTURE  337 

ately.  Yet,  you  know  and  I  know  that  these  ancient 
wrongs,  these  present  unhappinesses,  are  not  to  be  rem 
edied  in  a  day  or  with  a  wave  of  the  hand.  What  I 
seem  to  see — with  all  my  heart  I  hope  that  I  am  wrong 
— is  a  tragedy  of  disappointment." 

The  President  and  I  had  often  discussed  the  personnel 
of  the  Peace  Commission  before  its  announcement,  and  I 
had  taken  the  liberty  of  suggesting  to  the  President  the 
name  of  ex-Secretary  of  State  Elihu  Root.  The  Presi 
dent  appeared  to  be  delighted  with  this  suggestion  and 
asked  me  to  confer  with  Secretary  Lansing  in  regard  to 
the  matter.  I  conferred  with  Mr.  Lansing,  to  whom  the 
suggestion,  much  to  my  surprise,  met  with  hearty  re 
sponse.  At  this  conference  Mr.  Lansing  said  that  he 
and  the  President  were  attempting  to  induce  some 
members  of  the  Supreme  Court — I  think  it  was  either  Mr. 
Justice  Day  or  Chief  Justice  White — to  make  the  trip 
to  Paris  as  one  of  the  Commission;  but  that  they  were 
informed  that  Chief  Justice  White  was  opposed  to  the 
selection  of  a  Supreme  Court  Judge  to  participate  in  any 
conference  not  connected  with  the  usual  judicial  work  of 
the  Supreme  Court. 

After  this  conference  I  left  for  New  York,  there  to  re 
main  with  my  father  who  lay  seriously  ill,  and  when  I 
returned  to  the  White  House  the  President  informed  me 
that  he  and  Mr.  Lansing  had  had  a  further  conference 
with  reference  to  the  Root  suggestion  and  that  it  was 
about  concluded  that  it  would  be  inadvisable  to  make 
Mr.  Root  a  member  of  the  Commission.  The  President 
felt  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  take  Mr.  Root,  fearing  that 
the  reputation  which  Mr.  Root  had  gained  of  being  rather 
conservative,  if  not  reactionary,  would  work  a  prejudice 
toward  the  Peace  Commission  at  the  outset. 


338    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Mr.  Taft's  name  was  considered,  but  it  was  finally 
decided  not  to  include  him  among  the  commissions  to 
accompany  the  President. 

The  personnel  of  the  Commission,  as  finally  constituted, 
has  been  much  criticized,  but  the  President  had  what  were 
for  him  convincing  reasons  for  each  selection:  he  had 
formed  a  high  opinion  of  Col.  E.  M.  House's  ability  to 
judge  clearly  and  dispassionately  men  and  events;  Mr. 
Robert  Lansing  as  Secretary  of  State  was  a  natural 
choice;  Mr.  Henry  White,  a  Republican  unembittered  by 
partisanship,  had  had  a  life-long  and  honourable  exper 
ience  in  diplomacy;  General  Tasker  Bliss  was  eminently 
qualified  to  advise  in  military  matters,  and  was  quite 
divorced  from  the  politics  of  either  party.  The  President 
believed  that  these  gentlemen  would  cooperate  with  him 
loyally  in  a  difficult  task. 

I  quote  from  Mr.  Creel : 

The  truly  important  body — and  this  the  President  realized  from 
the  first — was  the  group  of  experts  that  went  along  with  the  Com 
mission,  the  pick  of  the  country's  most  famous  specialists  in  finance, 
history,  economics,  international  law,  colonial  questions,  map-mak 
ing,  ethnic  distinctions,  and  all  those  other  matters  that  were  to  come 
up  at  the  Peace  Conference.  They  constituted  the  President's 
arsenal  of  facts,  and  even  on  board  the  George  Washington,  in  the  very 
first  conference,  he  made  clear  his  dependence  upon  them.  "You  are 
in  truth,  my  advisers,"  he  said,  "for  when  I  ask  you  for  information 
I  will  have  no  way  of  checking  it  up,  and  must  act  upon  it  unquestion- 
ingly.  We  will  be  deluged  with  claims  plausibly  and  convincingly 
presented.  It  will  be  your  task  to  establish  the  truth  or  falsity  of 
these  claims  out  of  your  specialized  knowledges,  so  that  my  positions 
may  be  taken  fairly  and  intelligently." 

It  was  this  expert  advice  that  he  depended  upon  and  it  was  a  well  of 
information  that  never  failed  him.  At  the  head  of  the  financiers  and 
economists  were  such  men  as  Bernard  Baruch,  Herbert  Hoover, 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  339 

Norman  Davis,  and  Vance  McCormick.  As  head  of  the  War  In 
dustries  Board,  in  many  respects  the  most  powerful  of  all  the  civil 
organizations  called  into  being  by  the  war,  Mr.  Baruch  had  won  the 
respect  and  confidence  of  American  business  by  his  courage,  honesty, 
and  rare  ability.  At  his  side  were  such  men  as  Frank  W.  Taussig, 
chairman  of  the  Tariff  Commission;  Alex.  Legg,  general  manager  of 
the  International  Harvester  Company;  and  Charles  McDowell,  man 
ager  of  the  Fertilizer  and  Chemical  departments  of  Armour  &  Co. — 
both  men  familiar  with  business  conditions  and  customs  in  every  coun 
try  in  the  world;  Leland  Summers,  an  international  mechanical  engineer 
and  an  expert  in  manufacturing,  chemicals,  and  steel;  James  C. 
Pennie,  the  international  patent  lawyer;  Frederick  Neilson  and 
Chandler  Anderson,  authorities  on  international  law;  and  various 
others  of  equal  calibre. 

Mr.  Hoover  was  aided  and  advised  by  the  men  who  were  his  rep 
resentatives  in  Europe  throughout  the  war,  and  Mr.  McCormick, 
head  of  the  War  Trade  Board,  gathered  about  him  in  Paris  all  of  the 
men  who  had  handled  trade  matters  for  him  in  the  various  countries 
of  the  world. 

Mr.  Davis,  representing  the  Treasury  Department,  had  as  his 
associates  Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  Mr.  Albert  Strauss,  and  Jeremiah 
Smith  of  Boston. 

Dr.  Sidney  E.  Mezes,  president  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  went  with  the  President  at  the  head  of  a  brilliant  group  of 
specialists,  all  of  whom  had  been  working  for  a  year  and  more  on  the 
problems  that  would  be  presented  at  the  Peace  Conference.  Among 
the  more  important  may  be  mentioned:  Prof.  Charles  H.  Haskins, 
dean  of  the  Graduate  School  of  Harvard  University,  specialist  on 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  Belgium;  Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  director  of  the 
American  Geographical  Society,  general  territorial  specialist;  Prof. 
Allyn  A.  Young,  head  of  the  Department  of  Economics  at  Cornell; 
George  Louis  Beer,  formerly  of  Columbia,  and  an  authority  on  colonial 
possessions;  Prof.  W.  L.  Westermann,  head  of  the  History  Depart 
ment  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin  and  specialist  on  Turkey;  R.  H. 
Lord,  professor  of  History  at  Harvard,  specialist  on  Russia  and 
Poland;  Roland  B.  Dixon,  professor  of  Ethnography  at  Harvard; 
Prof.  Clive  Day,  head  of  the  Department  of  Economics  at  Yale, 
specialist  on  the  Balkans;  W.  E.  Lunt,  professor  of  History  at  Haver- 


340    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

ford  College,  specialist  on  northern  Italy;  Charles  Seymour,  pro 
fessor  of  History  at  Yale,  specialist  on  Austria-Hungary;  Mark  Jef 
ferson,  professor  of  Geography  at  Michigan  State  Normal,  and 
Prof.  James  T.  Shotwell,  professor  of  History  at  Columbia.  These 
groups  were  the  President's  real  counsellors  and  advisers  and  there 
was  not  a  day  throughout  the  Peace  Conference  that  he  did  not  call 
upon  them  and  depend  upon  them. 

No  man  ever  faced  a  more  difficult  or  trying  job  than 
the  President,  when  he  embarked  upon  the  George  Wash 
ington  on  his  voyage  to  the  other  side.  The  adverse 
verdict  rendered  against  the  President  in  the  Congres 
sional  elections  was  mighty  dispiriting.  The  growing 
bitterness  and  hostility  of  the  Republican  leaders,  and 
the  hatred  of  the  Germans  throughout  the  country, 
added  more  difficulties  to  an  already  trying  situation. 
America  had  seemed  to  do  everything  to  weaken  him  at  a 
time  when  united  strength  should  have  been  behind 
him.  Again  I  quote  from  Mr.  Creel : 

On  November  27th,  five  days  before  the  President's  departure,  Mr. 
Roosevelt  had  cried  this  message  to  Europe,  plain  intimation  that 
the  Republican  majority  in  the  Senate  would  support  the  Allies  in 
any  repudiation  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Fourteen  Points: 

"Our  allies  and  our  enemies  and  Mr.  Wilson  himself  should  all  under 
stand  that  Mr.  Wilson  has  no  authority  whatever  to  speak  for  the 
American  people  at  this  time.  His  leadership  has  just  been  emphati 
cally  repudiated  by  them.  The  newly  elected  Congress  comes  far 
nearer  than  Mr.  Wilson  to  having  a  right  to  speak  the  purposes  of  the 
American  people  at  this  moment.  Mr.  Wilson  and  his  Fourteen 
Points  and  his  four  supplementary  points  and  his  five  complementary 
points  and  all  his  utterances  every  which  way  have  ceased  to  have 
any  shadow  of  right  to  be  accepted  as  expressive  of  the  will  of  the 
American  people. 

"He  is  President  of  the  United  States.  He  is  a  part  of  the  treaty- 
making  power;  but  he  is  only  a  part.  If  he  acts  in  good  faith  to  the 
American  people,  he  will  not  claim  on  the  other  side  of  the  water  any 


THE    GREAT   ADVENTURE  S41 

representative  capacity  in  himself  to  speak  for  the  American  people. 
He  will  say  frankly  that  his  personal  leadership  has  been  repudiated 
and  that  he  now  has  merely  the  divided  official  leadership  which  he 
shares  with  the  Senate." 

What  Mr.  Roosevelt  did,  in  words  as  plain  as  his  pen  could 
marshal,  was  to  inform  the  Allies  that  they  were  at  liberty  to  disregard 
the  President,  the  League  of  Nations,  and  tke  Fourteen  Points,  and 
that  the  Republican  party  would  stand  as  a  unit  for  as  hard  a  peace 
as  Foch  chose  to  dictate. 

As  the  President  left  his  office  on  the  night  of  his  de 
parture  for  New  York,  preparatory  to  sailing  for  the  other 
side,  he  turned  to  me  and  said:  "Well,  Tumulty,  have 
you  any  suggestions  before  I  leave?"  "None,  my  dear 
Governor,"  I  replied,  "except  to  bid  you  Godspeed  on 
the  great  journey."  Then,  coming  closer  to  me,  he  said: 
"I  shall  rely  upon  you  to  keep  me  in  touch  with  the  situa 
tion  on  this  side  of  the  water.  I  know  I  can  trust  you 
to  give  me  an  exact  size-up  of  the  situation  here.  Re 
member,  I  shall  be  far  away  and  what  I  will  want  is  a  frank 
estimate  from  you  of  the  state  of  public  opinion  on  this 
side  of  the  water.  That  is  what  I  will  find  myself  most 
in  need  of.  When  you  think  I  am  putting  my  foot  in  it, 
please  say  so  frankly.  I  am  afraid  I  shall  not  be  able  to 
rely  upon  much  of  the  advice  and  suggestions  I  will  get 
from  the  other  end." 

Before  the  President  left  he  had  discussed  with  me 
the  character  of  the  Peace  Conference,  and  after  his  de 
parture  I  kept  him  apprised  by  cable  of  opinion  in  this 
country.  Appendix  "A",  which  contains  this  cabled  cor 
respondence  shows  how  he  welcomed  imformation  and 
suggestion. 

As  my  duty  held  me  in  Washington,  I  am  dependent 
upon  others,  especially  Mr.  Creel  and  Mr.  Ray  Stannard 


The  Secretary  thinks  the 
President  would  like  to 
read  this  letter. 


/„> 


7       ++~ — •— ~ •" 
W-M-ti^K 

0S  *&**^- 


Dear  Tumulty: 

There  is  absolutely  nothing  new  in 
Root* s  speech  and  1  do  not  see  any  necessity  to 
answer  it.  Certainly  I  would  not  be  willing  to 
hare  BO  conspicuous  a  representative  of  the  Ad 
ministration  as  Hr.  Colby  take  any  notice  of  it. 
Let  me  say  again  that  I  am  not  willing  that 
answers  to  Republican  speakers  or  writers  should 
emanate  from  the  White  House  or  the  Admini  strati  cm 

The  President. 
C.L.3. 

Some  characteristic  White  House  memoranda 
342 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  343 

Baker,  a  member  of  the  President's  official  family,  for  a 
connected  narrative  of  events  in  Europe. 

Speaking  of  his  attitude  in  the  trials  that  confronted  the 
President  on  the  other  side,  Mr.  Baker  said: 

No  one  who  really  saw  the  President  in  action  in  Paris,  saw  what  he 
did  in  those  grilling  months  of  struggle,  fired  at  in  front,  sniped  at 
from  behind — and  no  one  who  saw  what  he  had  to  do  after  he  came 
home  from  Europe  in  meeting  the  great  new  problems  which  grew  out 
of  the  war — will  for  a  moment  belittle  the  immensity  of  his  task,  or 
underrate  his  extraordinary  endurance,  energy,  and  courage. 

More  than  once,  there  in  Paris,  going  up  in  the  evening  to  see  the 
President,  I  found  him  utterly  worn  out,  exhausted,  often  one  side 
of  his  face  twitching  with  nervousness.  No  soldier  ever  went  into 
battle  with  more  enthusiasm,  more  aspiration,  more  devotion  to  a 
sacred  cause  than  the  President  had  when  he  came  to  Paris;  but 
day  after  day  in  those  months  we  saw  him  growing  grayer  and 
grayer,  grimmer  and  grimmer,  with  the  fighting  lines  deepening  in  his 
face. 

Here  was  a  man  63  years  old — a  man  always  delicate  in  health. 
When  he  came  to  the  White  House  in  1913,  he  was  far  from  being  well. 
His  digestion  was  poor  and  he  had  a  serious  and  painful  case  of  neuri 
tis  in  his  shoulder.  It  was  even  the  opinion  of  so  great  a  physician  as 
Dr.  Weir  Mitchell,  of  Philadelphia,  that  he  could  probably  not  com 
plete  his  term  and  retain  his  health.  And  yet  such  was  the  iron 
self-discipline  of  the  man  and  such  was  the  daily  watchful  care  of 
Doctor  Grayson,  that  instead  of  gradually  going  down  under  the 
tremendous  tasks  of  the  Presidency  in  the  most  crowded  moments  of 
our  national  history,  he  steadily  gained  strength  and  working  capa 
city,  until  in  those  months  in  Paris  he  literally  worked  everybody  at 
the  Peace  Conference  to  a  stand-still. 

It  is  so  easy  and  cheap  to  judge  people,  even  presidents,  without 
knowing  the  problems  they  have  to  face.  So  much  of  the  President's 
aloofness  at  Paris,  so  much  of  his  unwillingness  to  expend  energy  upon 
unnecessary  business,  unnecessary  conferences,  unnecessary  visiting — 
especially  the  visitors — was  due  directly  to  the  determination  to 
husband  and  expend  his  too  limited  energies  upon  tasks  that  seemed  to 
him  essential. 


344    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

As  I  say,  he  worked  everybody  at  the  Peace  Conference  to  a  stand 
still.  He  worked  not  only  the  American  delegates,  but  the  way  he 
drove  the  leisurely  diplomats  of  Europe  was  often  shameful  to  see. 
Sometimes  he  would  actually  have  two  meetings  going  on  at  the  same 
time.  Once  I  found  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  Big  Four  going  on 
in  his  study,  and  a  meeting  of  the  financial  and  economic  experts — 
twenty  or  thirty  of  them — in  full  session  upstairs  in  the  drawing 
room — and  the  President  oscillating  between  the  two. 

It  was  he  who  was  always  the  driver,  the  initiator,  at  Paris:  he 
worked  longer  hours,  had  more  appointments,  granted  himself  less 
recreation,  than  any  other  man,  high  or  low,  at  the  Peace  Confer 
ence.  For  he  was  the  central  figure  there.  Everything  headed  up  in 
him. 

Practically  all  of  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  Four  were  held 
in  his  study  in  the  Place  des  Etats-Unis.  This  was  the  true  capitol 
of  the  Peace  Conference;  here  all  the  important  questions  were 
decided.  Everyone  who  came  to  Paris  upon  any  mission  whatsoever 
aimed  first  of  all  at  seeing  the  President.  Representatives  of  the 
little,  downtrodden  nationalities  of  the  earth — from  eastern  Europe, 
Asia,  and  Africa — thought  that  if  they  could  get  at  the  President, 
explain  their  pathetic  ambitions,  confess  their  troubles  to  him,  all 
would  be  well. 

While  the  President  was  struggling  in  Europe,  his  friends 
in  America  had  cause  for  indignation  against  the  course 
adopted  by  the  Republican  obstructionists  in  the  Senate, 
which  course,  they  saw,  must  have  a  serious  if  not  fatal 
effect  upon  developments  overseas.  Occurrences  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  became  so  closely  interwoven  that  it 
is  better  not  to  separate  the  two  narratives,  and  as  Mr. 
Creel,  upon  whose  history  I  have  already  drawn,  tells  the 
story  with  vigour  and  a  true  perception  of  the  significance 
of  events,  I  quote  at  length  from  him: 

The  early  days  of  February,  1919,  were  bright  with  promise.  The 
European  press,  seeming  to  accept  the  President's  leadership  as  un 
shakable,  was  more  amiable  in  its  tone,  the  bitterness  bred  by  the 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  345 

decision  as  to  the  German  colonies  had  abated.  Fiume  and  the 
Saar  Basin  had  taken  discreet  places  in  the  background  with  other 
deferred  questions,  and  the  voice  of  French  and  English  and  Italian 
liberalism  was  heard  again.  On  February  14th  the  President  reported 
the  first  draft  of  the  League  constitution — a  draft  that  expressed  his 
principles  without  change — and  it  was  confirmed  amid  acclaim.  It 
was  at  this  moment,  unfortunately,  that  the  President  was  com 
pelled  to  return  to  the  United  States  to  sign  certain  bills,  and  for  the 
information  of  the  Senate  he  carried  with  him  the  Covenant  as  agreed 
upon  by  the  Allies. 

;  We  come  now  to  a  singularly  shameful  chapter  in  American  history. 
At  the  time  of  the  President's  decision  to  go  to  Paris  the  chief  point 
of  attack  by  the  Republican  Senators  was  that  such  a  "desertion  of 
duty"  would  delay  the  work  of  government  and  hold  back  the  entire 
programme  of  reconstruction.  Yet  when  the  President  returned  for 
the  business  of  consideration  and  signature,  the  same  Republican  Sena 
tors  united  in  a  filibuster  that  permitted  Congress  to  expire  without 
the  passage  of  a  single  appropriation  bill.  This  exhibition  of  sheer 
malignance,  entailing  an  ultimate  of  confusion  and  disaster,  was  not 
only  approved  by  the  Republican  press,  but  actually  applauded. 

The  draft  of  the  League  Constitution  was  denounced  even  before 
its  contents  were  known  or  explained.  The  bare  fact  that  the 
document  had  proved  acceptable  to  the  British  Empire  aroused 
the  instant  antagonism  of  the  "professional"  Irish- Americans, 
the  "professional"  German- Americans,  the  "professional"  Italian- 
Americans,  and  all  those  others  whose  political  fortunes  depended 
upon  the  persistence  and  accentuation  of  racial  prejudices.  Where 
one  hyphen  was  scourged  the  year  before  a  score  of  hyphens  was  now 
encouraged  and  approved.  In  Washington  the  President  arranged 
a  conference  with  the  Senators  and  Representatives  in  charge  of  foreign 
relations,  and  laid  the  Covenant  frankly  before  them  for  purposes  of 
discussion  and  criticism.  The  attitude  of  the  Republican  Senators 
was  one  of  sullenness  and  suspicion,  Senator  Lodge  refusing  to  state 
his  objections  or  to  make  a  single  recommendation.  Others,  however, 
pointed  out  that  no  express  recognition  was  given  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine;  that  it  was  not  expressly  provided  that  the  League  should 
have  no  authority  to  act  or  express  a  judgment  on  matters  of  domestic 
policy;  that  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  League  was  not  expressly 


346    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

recognized;  and  that  the  constitutional  right  of  the  Congress  to  deter 
mine  all  questions  of  peace  and  war  was  not  sufficiently  safeguarded. 

The  President,  in  answer,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  these  points 
were  already  covered  satisfactorily  in  the  Covenant,  but  that  he  would 
be  glad  to  make  the  language  more  explicit,  and  entered  a  promise  to 
this  effect.  Mr.  Root  and  Mr.  Taft  were  also  furnished  with  copies 
of  the  Covenant  and  asked  for  their  views  and  criticism,  and  upon 
receipt  of  them  the  President  again  gave  assurance  that  every  pro 
posed  change  and  clarification  would  be  made  upon  his  return  to 
Paris.  On  March  4th,  immediately  following  these  conferences, 
and  the  day  before  the  sailing  of  the  President,  Senator  Lodge  rose 
in  his  place  and  led  his  Republican  colleagues  in  a  bold  and  open 
attack  upon  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  war  aims  of  America. 
The  following  account  of  the  proceedings  is  taken  from  the  Congres 
sional  Record: 

Mr.  Lodge:  Mr.  President,  I  desire  to  take  only  a  moment  of  the 
time  of  the  Senate.  I  wish  to  offer  the  resolution  which  I  hold  in  my 
hand,  a  very  brief  one : 

Whereas  under  the  Constitution  it  is  a  function  of  the  Senate  to 
advise  and  consent  to,  or  dissent  from,  the  ratification  of  any  treaty 
of  the  United  States,  and  no  such  treaty  can  become  operative  with 
out  the  consent  of  the  Senate  expressed  by  the  affirmative  vote  of 
two  thirds  of  the  Senators  present;  and 

Whereas  owing  to  the  victory  of  the  arms  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  nations  with  whom  it  is  associated,  a  Peace  Conference 
was  convened  and  is  now  in  session  at  Paris  for  the  purpose  of  set 
tling  the  terms  of  peace;  and 

Whereas  a  committee  of  the  Conference  has  proposed  a  constitu 
tion  for  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  proposal  is  now  before  the 
Peace  Conference  for  its  consideration;  Now,  therefore,  be  it 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  the  discharge  of  its 
constitutional  duty  of  advice  in  regard  to  treaties,  That  it  is  the  sense 
of  the  Senate  that  while  it  is  then*  sincere  desire  that  the  nations  of  the 
world  should  unite  to  promote  peace  and  general  disarmament,  the 
constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  form  now  proposed  to  the 
Peace  Conference  should  not  be  accepted  by  the  United  States;  and 
be  it 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  347 

Resolved  further,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that  the  negotia 
tions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  should  immediately  be  di 
rected  to  the  utmost  expedition  of  the  urgent  business  of  negotiating 
peace  terms  with  Germany  satisfactory  to  the  United  States  and  the 
nations  with  whom  the  United  States  is  associated  in  the  war  against 
the  German  Government,  and  that  the  proposal  for  a  League  of 
Nations  to  insure  the  permanent  peace  of  the  world  should  be  then 
taken  up  for  careful  and  serious  consideration. 

I  ask  unanimous  consent  for  the  present  consideration  of  this  resolu 
tion. 

Mr.  Swanson:  I  object  to  the  introduction  of  the  resolution. 
Mr.  Lodge:  Objection  being  made,  of  course  I  recognize  the  ob 
jection.     I  merely  wish  to  add,  by  way  of  explanation,  the  following: 
The  undersigned  Senators  of  the  United  States,  Members  and 
Members-Elect  of  the  Sixty-sixth  Congress,  hereby  declare  that, 
if  they  had  had  the  opportunity,  they  would  have  voted  for  the  fore 
going  resolution: 

Henry  Cabot  Lodge  James  E.  Watson 

Philander  C.  Knox  Thomas  Sterling 

Lawrence  Y.  Sherman  J.  S.  Frelinghuysen 

Harry  S.  New  W.  G.  Harding 

George  H.  Moses  Frederick  Hale 

J.  W.  Wadsworth,  Jr.  William  E.  Borah 

Bert  M.  Fernald  Walter  E.  Edge 

Albert  B.  Cummins  Reed  Smoot 

F.  E.  Warren  Asle  J.  Gronna 

Frank  B.  Brandegee  Lawrence  C.  Phipps 

William  M.  Calder  Selden  P.  Spencer 

Henry  W.  Keyes  Hiram  W.  Johnson 

Boies  Penrose  Charles  E.  Townsend 

Carroll  S.  Page  William  P.  Dillingham 

George  P.  McLean  I.  L.  Lenroot 

Joseph  Irwin  France  Miles  Poindexter 

Medill  McCormick  Howard  Sutherland 

Charles  Curtis  Truman  H.  Newberry 

L.  Heisler  Ball 

I  ought  to  say  in  justice  to  three  or  four  Senators  who  are  absent  at 
great  distances  from  the  city  that  we  were  not  able  to  reach  them; 


348    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

but  we  expect  to  hear  from  them  to-morrow,  and  if,  as  we  expect, 
their  answers  are  favourable  their  names  will  be  added  to  the  list. 

A  full  report  of  this  action  was  cabled  to  Europe,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  and  when  the  President  arrived  in  Paris  on  March  14th,  ten 
days  later,  he  was  quick  to  learn  of  the  disastrous  consequences.  The 
Allies,  eagerly  accepting  the  orders  of  the  Republican  majority,  had 
lost  no  time  in  repudiating  the  President  and  the  solemn  agreements 
that  they  had  entered  into  with  him.  The  League  of  Nations  was  not 
discarded  and  the  plan  adopted  for  a  preliminary  peace  with  Germany 
was  based  upon  a  frank  division  of  the  spoils,  the  reduction  of  Ger 
many  to  a  slave  state,  and  the  formation  of  a  military  alliance  by  the 
Allies  for  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  gains.  Not  only  this,  but 
an  Allied  army  was  to  march  at  once  to  Russia  to  put  down  the  Bol 
shevists  and  the  Treaty  itself  was  to  be  administered  by  the  Allied  high 
command,  enforcing  its  orders  by  an  army  of  occupation.  The 
United  States,  as  a  rare  favour,  was  to  be  permitted  to  pay  the  cost  of 
the  Russian  expedition  and  such  other  incidental  expenses  as  might  arise 
in  connection  with  the  military  dictatorship  that  was  to  rule  Europe. 

While  primarily  the  plan  of  Foch  and  the  other  generals,  it  had 
the  approval  of  statesmen,  even  those  who  were  assumed  to  represent 
the  liberal  thought  of  England  being  neck-deep  in  the  conspiracy. 
Not  a  single  party  to  the  cabal  had  any  doubt  as  to  its  success.  Was 
it  not  the  case  that  the  Republican  Senators,  now  in  the  majority, 
spoke  for  America  rather  than  the  President?  Had  the  Senators  not 
stated  formally  that  they  did  not  want  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
was  the  Republican  party  itself  not  on  record  with  the  belief  that 
the  Allies  must  have  the  right  to  impose  peace  terms  of  their  own 
choosing,  and  that  these  terms  should  show  no  mercy  to  the  "ac 
cursed  Hun"?  .  .  .  The  President  allowed  himself  just  twenty- 
four  hours  in  which  to  grasp  the  plot  in  all  its  details,  and  then  he 
acted,  ordering  the  issuance  of  this  statement: 

"The  President  said  to-day  that  the  decision  made  at  the  Peace 
Conference  in  its  Plenary  Session,  January  25, 1919,  to  the  effect  that 
the  establishment  of  a  League  of  Nations  should  be  made  an  integral 
part  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  is  of  final  force  and  that  there  is  no  basis 
whatever  for  the  reports  that  a  change  in  this  decision  was  con 
templated." 


THE    GREAT   ADVENTURE  349 

-..  Vi ..•  .  .  On  March  26th,  it  was  announced,  grudgingly  enough,  that 
there  would  be  a  league  of  nations  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Peace 
Treaty.  It  was  now  the  task  of  the  President  to  take  up  the  changes 
that  had  been,  suggested  by  his  Republican  enemies,  and  this  was  the 
straw  that  broke  his  back.  There  was  not  a  single  suggested  change 
that  had  honesty  back  of  it.  The  League  was  an  association  of 
sovereigns,  and  as  a  matter  of  course  any  sovereign  possessed  the 
right  of  withdrawal.  The  League,  as  an  international  advisory  body, 
could  not  possibly  deal  with  domestic  questions  under  any  construc 
tion  of  the  Covenant.  No  power  of  Congress  was  abridged,  and 
necessarily  Congress  would  have  to  act  before  war  could  be  declared 
or  a  single  soldier  sent  out  of  the  country.  Instead  of  recognizing  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  American  policy,  the  League  legitimized  it  as 
a  world  policy.  The  President,  however,  was  bound  to  propose  that 
these  plain  propositions  be  put  in  kindergarten  language  for  the 
satisfaction  of  his  enemies,  and  it  was  this  proposal  that  gave  Clemen- 
ceau,  Lloyd  George,  and  their  associates  a  new  chance  for  resistance. 

All  of  the  suggested  changes  were  made  without  great  demur  until 
the  question  of  the  Monroe  Dictrine  was  reached,  and  then  French 
and  English  bitterness  broke  all  restraints.  Why  were  they  expected 
to  make  every  concession  to  American  prejudice  when  the  President 
would  make  none  to  European  traditions?  They  had  gone  to  the 
length  of  accepting  the  doctrine  of  Monroe  for  the  whole  of  the  earth, 
but  now,  because  American  pride  demanded  it,  they  must  make  public 
confession  of  America's  right  to  give  orders.  No !  A  thousand  times 
no !  It  was  high  time  for  the  President  to  give  a  little  consideration 
to  French  and  English  and  Italian  prejudices — time  for  him  to  realize 
that  the  lives  of  these  governments  were  at  stake  as  well  as  his  own, 
and  that  Lloyd  George,  Clemenceau,  and  Sonnino  had  parliaments  to 
deal  with  that  were  just  as  unreasonable  as  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States.  If  the  President  asked  he  must  be  willing  to  give. 

As  if  at  a  given  signal,  France  renewed  her  claim  for  the  Rhine 
Valley  and  the  Saar  Basin;  Italy  clamoured  anew  for  Fiume  and  the 
Dalmatian  coast;  and  Japan,  breaking  a  long  silence,  rushed  to  the 
fore  with  her  demand  for  Shantung  in  fee  simple  and  the  right  of  her 
nationals  to  full  equality  in  the  United  States. 

Around  this  time  the  President  fell  suddenly  ill  and 


350    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

took  to  his  bed.     That  the  illness  was  serious  is  evidenced 
by  the  following  letter  which  Doctor  Grayson  wrote  me : 

Paris,  10  April  1919. 
DEAR  MR.  TUMULTY: 

While  the  contents  of  this  letter  may  possibly  be  somewhat  out  of 
date  by  the  time  it  reaches  you,  nevertheless  you  may  find  something 
in  it  of  interest. 

This  has  been  one  of  the  most  complexing  and  trying  weeks  of 
my  existence  over  here.  The  President  was  taken  violently  sick 
last  Thursday.  The  attack  was  very  sudden.  At  three  o'clock  he 
was  apparently  all  right;  at  six  he  was  seized  with  violent  paroxysms 
of  coughing,  which  were  so  severe  and  frequent  that  it  interfered 
with  his  breathing.  He  had  a  fever  of  103  and  a  profuse  diarrhoea. 
I  was  at  first  suspicious  that  his  food  had  been  tampered  with,  but 
it  turned  out  to  be  the  beginning  of  an  attack  of  influenza.  That 
night  was  one  of  the  worst  through  which  I  have  ever  passed.  I  was 
able  to  control  the  spasms  of  coughing  but  his  condition  looked  very 
serious.  Since  that  time  he  has  been  gradually  improving  every  day 
so  that  he  is  now  back  at  work — he  went  out  for  the  first  time  yester 
day.  This  disease  is  so  treacherous,  especially  in  this  climate,  that 
I  am  perhaps  over-anxious  for  fear  of  a  flare-back — and  a  flare-back 
in  a  case  of  this  kind  often  results  in  pneumonia.  I  have  been  spend 
ing  every  minute  of  my  time  with  him,  not  only  as  physician  but  as 
nurse.  Mrs.  Wilson  was  a  perfect  angel  through  it  all. 

Sincerely, 
GARY  T.    GRAYSON. 

Continuing  the  narrative  Mr.  Creel  writes : 

On  April  7th,  the  President  struggled  to  his  feet  and  faced  the 
Council  in  what  everyone  recognized  as  a  final  test  of  strength.  There 
must  be  an  end  to  this  dreary,  interminable  business  of  making  agree 
ments  only  to  break  them.  An  agreement  must  be  reached  once  for 
all.  If  a  peace  of  justice,  he  would  remain;  if  a  peace  of  greed,  then 
he  would  leave.  He  had  been  second  to  none  in  recognizing  the 
wrongs  of  the  Allies,  the  state  of  mind  of  their  peoples,  and  he  stood 
as  firmly  as  any  for  a  treaty  that  would  bring  guilt  home  to  the 
Germans,  but  he  could  not,  and  would  not,  agree  to  the  repudiation 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  351 

of  every  war  aim  or  to  arrangements  that  would  leave  the  world 
worse  off  than  before.  The  George  Washington  was  in  Brooklyn.  By 
wireless  the  President  ordered  it  to  come  to  Brest  at  once. 

The  gesture  was  conclusive  as  far  as  England  and  France  were 
concerned.  Lloyd  George  swung  over  instantly  to  the  President's 
side,  and  on  the  following  day  Le  Temps  carried  this  significant 
item: 

"  Contrary  to  the  assertions  spread  by  the  German  press  and  taken 
up  by  other  foreign  newspapers,  we  believe  that  the  Government  has 
no  annexationist  pretensions,  openly  or  under  cover,  in  regard  to  any 
territory  inhabited  by  a  German  population.  This  remark  applies 
peculiarly  to  the  regions  comprised  between  the  frontier  of  1871  and 
the  frontier  of  1814." 

Again,  in  the  lock  of  wills,  the  President  was  the  victor,  and  the 
French  and  English  press,  exhausted  by  now,  could  only  gasp  their 
condemnation  of  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George. 

The  statement  of  Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller,  the  legal 
adviser  of  the  American  Peace  Commission,  with  refer 
ence  to  the  debate  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  which  the 
President  played  the  leading  part,  is  conclusive  on  this 
point.  Mr.  Miller  speaks  of  the  President's  devotion  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  these  words: 

But  the  matter  was  not  at  an  end,  for  at  the  next  meeting,  the 
last  of  all,  the  French  sought  by  amendment  to  obtain  some  definition, 
some  description  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  that  would  limit  the  right 
of  the  United  States  to  insist  upon  its  own  interpretation  of  that 
Doctrine  in  the  future  as  in  the  past.  The  French  delegates,  hoping 
for  some  advantage  for  their  own  proposals,  urged  such  a  definition : 
and  at  that  last  meeting  I  thought  for  a  moment,  in  despair,  that 
President  Wilson  would  yield  to  the  final  French  suggestion,  which 
contained  only  a  few  seemingly  simple  words:  but  he  stood  by  his 
position  through  the  long  discussion,  and  the  meeting  and  the  pro 
ceedings  of  the  Commission  ended  early  in  the  morning  in  an  atmos 
phere  of  constraint  and  without  any  of  the  speeches  of  politeness 
customary  on  such  an  occasion. 


352    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Of  all  the  false  reports  about  the  President's  attitude 
none  was  more  erroneous  than  the  combined  statements 
that  he  was  lukewarm  about  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
that  he  declined  to  ask  for  or  receive  advice  from  eminent 
Americans  outside  of  his  own  party. 

In  Appendix  "B"  there  will  be  found  a  series  of  letters 
and  cable  messages,  too  long  for  insertion  in  the  chapter, 
which  will  support  the  statement  that  he  not  only  lis 
tened  to  but  had  incorporated  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  suggestions  from  Mr.  Taft,  including 
important  reservations  concerning  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  suggestions  from  Mr.  Root  as  to  the  establishment  of 
an  International  Court  of  Justice. 

Former-President  Taft  had  intimated  to  me  a  desire 
to  make  certain  suggestions  to  Mr.  Wilson,  and,  upon 
my  notification,  Mr.  Wilson  cabled  me  that  he  would 
"appreciate  Mr.  Taft's  offer  of  suggestions  and  would 
welcome  them.  The  sooner  they  are  sent  the  better." 
Whereupon,  Mr.  Taft's  suggestions  were  cabled  to  the 
President  together  with  Mr.  Taft's  statement  that, 
"My  impression  is  that  if  the  one  article  already  sent,  on 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  be  inserted  in  the  Treaty,  sufficient 
Republicans  who  signed  the  Round  Robin  would  probably 
retreat  from  their  position  and  vote  for  ratification  so 
that  it  would  carry.  If  the  other  suggestions  were 
adopted,  I  feel  confident  that  all  but  a  few  who  oppose 
any  league  would  be  driven  to  accept  them  and  to  stand 
for  the  League." 

Mr.  Taft's  recommendations  were  in  substance  incor 
porated  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Emphasizing  further  the  President's  entire  willingness 
to  confer  with  leading  Republicans,  even  those  outside  of 
official  relationship,  on  March  27,  1919,  Mr.  Polk,  Acting 


THE    GREAT    ADVENTURE  353 

Secretary  of  State,  dispatched  to  Secretary  of  State 
Lansing,  for  the  President,  proposed  amendments  offered 
by  Mr.  Root  to  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
involving  the  establishment  of  a  Court  of  Justice.  Im 
mediately  upon  receipt  of  Mr.  Folk's  cable,  the  President 
addressed  to  Colonel  House,  a  member  of  the  Peace  Com 
mission,  the  following  letter,  marked  "Confidential." 

Paris.   March  30,   1919. 
MY  DEAR  HOUSE  : 

Here  is  a  dispatch  somewhat  belated  in  transmission  stating  Mr. 
Root's  ideas  as  to  amendments  which  should  be  made  to  the  Covenant. 
I  think  you  will  find  some  of  these  very  interesting.     Perhaps  you 
have  already  seen  it. 
In  haste. 

Affectionately  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
COLONEL  E.  M.  HOUSE, 
Hotel  Crillon, 
Paris. 

A  comparison  of  the  suggestions  presented  by  Mr.  Taft 
and  Mr.  Root,  which  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix, 
with  the  existing  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
will  readily  convince  any  person  desiring  to  reach  the  truth 
of  the  matter,  that  all  the  material  amendments  proposed 
by  these  eminent  Republicans  which  had  any  essential 
bearing  on  the  business  in  hand  were  embodied  in  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  brought  back 
by  President  Wilson. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

WILSON THE   LONE   HAND 

IT  HAS  often  been  said  by  certain  gentlemen  who 
were  associated  with  President  Wilson  on  the  other 
side  that  he  was  unyielding  and  dogmatic,  that  he 
insisted  upon  playing  a  "lone  hand,"  that  he  was  secretive 
and  exclusive,  and  that  he  ignored  the  members  of  the 
Peace  Commission  and  the  experts  who  accompanied  him 
to  the  Conference. 

Contrary  to  this  criticism,  after  an  uninterrupted,  con 
tinuous,  and  most  intimate  association  with  him  for  eleven 
years,  an  association  which  brought  me  into  close  contact 
with  him  in  the  most  delicate  crises  through  which  his 
administration  and  the  nation  passed,  a  time  which  threw 
upon  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  nation  a  task  unparalleled 
in  the  history  of  the  world,  I  wish  to  say  that  there  is  no 
franker  or  more  open-minded  man,  nor  one  less  dogmatic 
in  his  opinion  than  Woodrow  Wilson.  In  him  the  desire 
for  information  and  guidance  is  a  passion.  Indeed, 
the  only  thing  he  resents  is  a  lack  of  frankness  upon  the 
part  of  his  friends,  and  no  man  is  more  ready  courage 
ously  to  act  and  to  hold  to  his  opinions  after  he  has  ob 
tained  the  necessary  information  upon  which  he  bases 
his  position.  It  is  his  innate  modesty  and  a  certain 
kind  of  shyness  that  people  mistake  for  coldness  and 
aloofness.  He  is  not  a  good  fellow  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  that  term.  His  friendship  does  not  wear  the  cheap  or 
tawdry  trappings  of  the  politician,  but  there  is  about 

354 


WILSON  — THE    LONE    HAND  355 

it  a  depth  of  genuineness  and  sincerity,  that  while  it  does 
not  overwhelm  you,  it  wins  you  and  holds  you.  But 
the  permanent  consideration  upon  which  this  friendship 
is  based  is  sincerity  and  frankness. 

No  man  ever  worked  under  greater  handicaps  than  did 
Woodrow  Wilson  at  Paris.  Repudiated  by  his  own 
people  in  the  Congressional  elections;  harassed  on  every 
side  and  at  every  turn  by  his  political  enemies,  he  still 
pursued  the  even  tenor  of  his  way  and  accomplished 
what  he  had  in  mind,  against  the  greatest  odds. 

In  the  murky  atmosphere  of  the  Peace  Conference, 
where  every  attitude  of  the  President  was  grossly  exagger 
ated,  in  order  that  his  prestige  might  be  lessened,  it  was 
not  possible  to  judge  him  fairly,  but  it  is  now  possible 
in  a  calmer  day  to  review  the  situation  from  afar  through 
the  eyes  of  those  who  were  actual  participants  with  him 
in  the  great  assembly,  onlookers,  as  it  were,  who  saw  every 
move  and  witnessed  every  play  of  the  Peace  Conference 
from  the  side  lines,  and  who  have  not  allowed  petty 
motives  to  warp  their  judgments. 

This  testimony,  which  forms  part  of  "What  Really 
Happened  in  Paris,"  edited  by  Edward  M.  House  and 
Charles  Seymour,  comes  from  gentlemen  who  were  his 
friends  and  co-labourers  and  who  daily  conferred  with 
him  upon  the  momentous  questions  that  came  up  for 
consideration  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  a  member  of  the  great  bank 
ing  house  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Company,  one  of  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  United  States  Treasury  with  the  Ameri 
can  Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace,  gives  the  lie  to  the 
unfair  criticisms  uttered  about  the  President,  to  the  effect 
that  he  was  exclusive,  secretive,  and  refused  to  confer 
with  those  associated  with  him.  Mr.  Lamont  in  speaking 


356    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

of  the  President's  attitude  throughout  the  Peace  Con 
ference  said: 

I  am  going  to  take  this  opportunity  to  say  a  word,  in  general,  as 
to  President  Wilson's  attitude  at  the  Peace  Conference.  He  is  ac 
cused  of  having  been  unwilling  to  consult  his  colleagues.  I  never  saw 
a  man  more  ready  and  anxious  to  consult  than  he.  He  has  been 
accused  of  having  been  desirous  to  gain  credit  for  himself  and  ignore 
others.  I  never  saw  a  man  more  considerate  of  those  of  his  coad 
jutors  who  were  working  immediately  with  him,  nor  a  man  more 
ready  to  give  them  credit  with  the  other  chiefs  of  state.  Again  and 
again  would  he  say  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  or  Mr.  Clemenceau:  "My 
expert  here,  Mr.  So-and-So,  tells  me  such-and-such,  and  I  believe 
he  is  right.  You  will  have  to  argue  with  him  if  you  want  me  to  change 
my  opinion."  President  Wilson  undoubtedly  had  his  disabilities. 
Perhaps,  in  a  trade,  some  of  the  other  chiefs  of  state  could  have 
"out-jockeyed"  him;  but  it  seldom  reached  such  a  situation,  because 
President  Wilson,  by  his  manifest  sincerity  and  open  candour,  always 
saying  precisely  what  he  thought,  would  early  disarm  his  opponents 
in  argument.  President  Wilson  did  not  have  a  well-organized 
secretarial  staff.  He  did  far  too  much  of  the  work  himself,  studying 
until  late  at  night  papers  and  documents  that  he  should  have  largely 
delegated  to  some  discreet  aides.  He  was,  by  all  odds,  the  hardest 
worked  man  at  the  Conference;  but  the  failure  to  delegate  more  of 
his  work  was  not  due  to  any  inherent  distrust  he  had  of  men — and 
certainly  not  any  desire  to  "run  the  whole  show"  himself — but  simply 
to  his  lack  of  facility  in  knowing  how  to  delegate  work  on  a  large 
scale.  In  execution,  we  all  have  a  blind  spot  in  some  part  of  our  eye. 
President  Wilson's  was  in  his  inability  to  use  men;  and  inability, 
mind  you,  not  a  refusal.  On  the  contrary,  when  any  one  of  us 
volunteered  or  insisted  upon  taking  responsibility  off  his  shoulders 
he  was  delighted.  Throughout  the  Peace  Conference,  Mr.  Wilson 
never  played  politics.  I  never  witnessed  an  occasion  when  I  saw  him 
act  from  unworthy  conception  or  motive.  His  ideals  were  of  the 
highest,  and  he  clung  to  them  tenaciously  and  courageously.  Many 
of  the  so-called  "Liberals"  in  England  have  assailed  Mr.  Wilson 
bitterly  because,  as  they  declare,  he  yielded  too  much  to  their  own 
Premier,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  to  Mr.  Clemenceau.  But  could 


WILSON— THE    LONE    HAND  357 

he  have  failed  to  defer  to  them  on  questions  in  which  no  vital  prin 
ciple  was  involved?  I  well  remember  his  declaration  on  the  question 
whether  the  Allies  should  refuse,  for  a  period  of  five  years  during  the 
time  of  France's  recuperation,  to  promise  Germany  reciprocal  tariff 
provisions.  What  Mr.  Wilson  said  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr. 
Clemenceau  was  this:  "Gentlemen,  my  experts  and  I  both  regard  the 
principle  involved  as  an  unwise  one.  We  believe  it  will  come  back 
to  plague  you.  But  when  I  see  how  France  has  suffered,  how  she 
has  been  devastated,  her  industries  destroyed — who  am  I  to  refuse 
to  assent  to  this  provision,  designed,  wisely  or  unwisely,  to  assist  in 
lifting  France  again  to  her  feet. " 

The  question  has  often  been  asked,  whether  the  Presi 
dent  freely  consulted  his  experts  on  the  other  side,  or 
ignored  them.  The  experience  of  the  gentlemen  who  con 
ferred  with  him  is  the  best  refutation  of  this  insinuation 
against  the  President.  Charles  Homer  Haskins,  Chief 
of  the  Division  of  Western  Europe,  a  member  of  the 
American  Peace  Conference,  answers  this  question  in 
these  words: 

The  President  was  anxious  to  have  the  exact  facts  before  him  in 
every  situation.  Doubtless,  there  were  a  number  of  occasions  when 
he  could  not  consult  with  experts  at  a  particular  moment,  but,  in 
general,  the  President  sought  such  advice,  although  he  naturally 
had  to  use  his  own  judgment  whether  that  advice  was  to  be  adopted 
in  any  particular  case. 

Answering  this  same  question,  Mr.  Douglas  Wilson 
Johnson,  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Boundary  Geography* 
and  a  member  of  the  Peace  Commission,  says: 

Whenever  we,  in  our  capacity  as  specialists,  thought  we  had  found 
something  that  the  President  ought  to  know  about,  and  believed 
we  could  not  get  it  across  effectively  in  any  other  manner,  we  could 
ask  for  a  personal  conference  with  him,  He  was,  of  course,  a  very 


358    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

busy  man  because,  unlike  the  experts  who  usually  had  only  one  prob 
lem  to  consider,  he  had  to  do  not  only  with  all  the  territorial  problems 
but  in  addition  with  all  the  problems  bearing  on  the  League  of  Na 
tions,  the  economic  problems,  and  many  other  aspects  of  the  peace. 
Despite  this  fact  I  wish  to  state  that  while  I  repeatedly  asked  for 
personal  conferences  with  the  President  on  this  and  certain  other 
problems,  he  never  failed  to  respond  immediately  with  an  appoint 
ment.  He  had  a  private  wire  and  on  occasion  he  would  call  us  at 
the  Crillon  to  make  appointments  on  his  own  initiative  or  to  secure 
papers,  maps,  or  other  documents  that  he  needed  in  his  studies.  I 
will  not  forget  that  in  one  instance  he  called  me  on  the  telephone  late 
at  night  in  my  bedroom,  asking  for  some  papers  which  I  had  promised 
to  supply  him,  and  which  had  not  reached  him  with  sufficient  prompt 
ness.  You  can  judge  from  this  that  he  kept  closely  in  touch  with 
the  problems  he  was  called  upon  to  consider. 

Another  question  that  has  been  asked  is:  Did  the 
President  have  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  complicated 
questions  that  came  before  him  like  the  Adriatic  problem, 
for  instance?  That  criticism  was  answered  by  Mr.  Douglas 
Wilson  Johnson  in  these  words: 

In  answer  to  that  question  I  will  say  that  the  President  kept  in 
constant  touch  with  the  experts  on  the  Adriatic  problem,  not  only 
through  the  memoranda  furnished  by  the  experts  but  in  other  ways. 
I  can  assure  you  that  there  wras  sent  to  him  a  voluminous  quantity 
of  material,  and  I  want  to  say  that  when  we  had  personal  discussions 
with  him  upon  the  question  it  immediately  became  apparent  that  he 
had  studied  these  memoranda  most  carefully.  It  is  only  fair  to  say 
that  of  the  details  and  intricacies  of  this  most  difficult  problem  the  Presi 
dent  possessed  a  most  astonishing  command. 

It  has  also  been  said  that  the  President  in  his  attitude 
toward  Germany  was  ruthless,  and  yet  we  have  the  testi 
mony  of  Mr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  Chief  Territorial  Adviser 
of  the  Peace  Commission  who,  in  answer  to  the  direct 


WILSON— THE    LONE    HAND  359 

question:  "Was  there  not  a  time  when  it  looked  as  if  the 
Peace  Conference  might  break  up  because  of  the  extreme 
policy  of  one  of  the  Allies?"  said:  "Yes,  there  were  a 
number  of  occasions  when  the  Peace  Conference  might 
have  broken  up.  Almost  anything  might  have  happened 
with  so  many  nations  represented,  so  many  personalities 
and  so  many  experts — perhaps  half  a  thousand  in  all! 
Owing  to  the  fact  that  President  Wilson  has  been  charged 
on  the  one  hand  with  outrageous  concessions  to  the  Allies 
and  on  the  other  hand  that  he  had  always  been  soft  with 
the  Germans,  particularly  with  Bulgaria,  let  us  see  just 
how  soft  he  was !  On  a  certain  day  three  of  us  were  asked 
to  call  at  the  President's  house,  and  on  the  following  morn 
ing  at  eleven  o'clock  we  arrived.  President  Wilson  wel 
comed  us  in  a  very  cordial  manner.  I  cannot  under 
stand  how  people  get  the  idea  that  he  is  cold.  He  does 
not  make  a  fuss  over  you,  but  when  you  leave  you  feel 
that  you  have  met  a  very  courteous  gentleman.  You 
have  the  feeling  that  he  is  frank  and  altogether  sincere. 
He  remarked:  'Gentlemen,  I  am  in  trouble  and  I  have 
sent  for  you  to  help  me  out.  The  matter  is  this:  the 
French  want  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  I  told 
M.  Clemenceau  that  I  could  not  consent  to  such  a  so 
lution  of  the  problem.  He  became  very  much  excited  and 
then  demanded  ownership  of  the  Saar  Basin.  I  told  him 
I  could  not  agree  to  that  either  because  it  would  mean 
giving  300,000  Germans  to  France.'  Whereupon  Presi 
dent  Wilson  further  said:  'I  do  not  know  whether  I  shall 
see  M.  Clemenceau  again.  I  do  not  know  whether  he  will 
return  to  the  meeting  this  afternoon.  In  fact,  I  do  not 
know  whether  the  Peace  Conference  will  continue.  M. 
Clemenceau  called  me  a  pro-German  and  abruptly  left 
the  room.  I  want  you  to  assist  me  in  working  out  a 


360    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

solution  true  to  the  principles  we  are  standing  for  and  to 
do  justice  to  France,  and  I  can  only  hope  that  France  will 
ultimately  accept  a  reasonable  solution.  I  want  to  be 
fair  to  M.  Clemenceau  and  to  France,  but  I  cannot  con 
sent  to  the  outright  transfer  to  France  of  300,000  Ger 
mans.'  A  solution  was  finally  found — the  one  that 
stands  in  the  Treaty  to-day." 

Among  the  unfair  things  said  about  the  President  during 
the  last  campaign  and  uttered  by  a  senator  of  the  United 
States,  was  that  the  President  promised  Premier  Bratiano 
of  Rumania  to  send  United  States  troops  to  protect  the 
new  frontiers.  Mr.  Charles  Seymour,  a  member  of  the 
American  Peace  Commission,  answers  this  charge  in  the 
following  way: 

The  evidence  against  it  is  overwhelming.  The  stenographic  notes 
taken  during  the  session  indicate  that  nothing  said  by  President  Wil 
son  could  be  construed  into  a  promise  to  send  United  States  troops 
abroad  to  protect  frontiers.  The  allegation  is  based  upon  the  report 
of  the  interpreter,  Mantoux,  and  a  book  by  a  journalist,  Dr.  E.  W. 
Dillon,  called  "The  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace  Conference,"  M. 
Mantoux,  though  a  brilliant  and  cultivated  interpreter,  whose  work 
enormously  facilitated  the  progress  of  the  Conference,  did  not  take 
stenographic  notes  and  his  interpretations  sometimes  failed  to  give 
the  exact  meaning  of  the  original.  Doctor  Dillon's  evidence  is  sub 
ject  to  suspicion,  since  his  book  is  based  upon  gossip,  and  replete 
with  errors  of  fact.  The  stenographic  report,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
worthy  of  trust.  I  have  heard  the  President  on  more  than  one  occa 
sion  explain  to  M.  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  that  if  troops  were 
necessary  to  protect  any  troubled  area,  they  must  not  look  to  the  United 
States  for  assistance,  for  public  opinion  in  this  country  would  not  permit 
the  use  of  American  forces. 

Even  Mr.  Lansing  himself  in  his  book  testified  to  the 
open-mindedness  and  candour  of  the  President  in  these 
words: 


WILSON— THE    LONE    HAND  361 

It  had  always  been  my  practice  as  Secretary  of  State  to  speak  to 
him  with  candour  and  to  disagree  with  him  whenever  I  thought  he 
was  reaching  a  wrong  decision  in  regard  to  any  matter  pertaining 
to  foreign  affairs.  There  was  a  general  belief  that  Mr.  Wilson  was 
not  open-minded  and  that  he  was  quick  to  resent  any  opposition 
however  well  founded.  I  had  not  found  him  so  during  the  years 
we  had  been  associated.  Except  in  a  few  instances  he  listened  with 
consideration  to  arguments  and  apparently  endeavoured  to  value 
them  correctly. 


No  men  ever  winced  less  under  the  criticism  or  bitter 
ridicule  of  his  enemies  than  did  Woodrow  Wilson. 
Whether  the  criticism  was  directed  at  him  or  at  some 
member  of  his  Cabinet,  or,  mayhap,  at  a  subordinate  like 
myself,  for  some  act,  statement,  or  even  an  indiscretion, 
he  bore  up  under  the  criticism  like  a  true  sportsman.  I 
remember  how  manfully  he  met  the  storm  of  criticism 
that  was  poured  upon  him  after  the  issuance  of  the 
famous  Garfield  Fuel  Order.  While,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
he  had  not  been  consulted  regarding  it,  he  courageously 
took  the  responsibility  for  the  issuance  of  the  order  and 
stood  by  Doctor  Garfield  to  the  last. 

It  will  be  recalled  what  a  tremendous  impression  and 
reaction  the  Garfield  order  caused  when  it  was  published 
throughout  the  country.  Many  about  the  President 
were  greatly  worried  and  afraid  of  the  disastrous  effect 
of  it  upon  the  country.  Cabinet  officers  rushed  in  upon 
him  and  endeavoured  to  persuade  him  to  recall  it  and 
even  to  repudiate  Garfield  for  having  issued  the  order 
without  consulting  the  Cabinet,  but  their  remonstrances 
fell  unheeded  upon  the  President's  ears.  I  remember  at 
the  time  that  I  wrote  the  President  regarding  the  matter 
and  called  his  attention  to  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  the 
calamitous  results  of  the  issuance  of  the  Fuel  Order, 


362    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 


My  letter  to  the  President  is  as  follows : 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

17  January,  1918. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

At  twelve  o'clock  last  night,  Mr.  Lincoln  of  the  New  York  World 
called  me  out  of  bed  by  telephone  to  notify  me  that  the  Fuel  Admin 
istration  had  issued  a  drastic  order  shutting  down  the  factories  of  the 
country  for  five  days,  etc. 

I  do  not  know  about  the  details  of  the  order.  I  assume  of  course 
that  it  was  necessary  because  of  the  tremendous  shortage  throughout 
the  country.  But  what  I  am  afraid  of  is  that  my  own  readiness  to 
accept  this  assumption  may  not  be  shared  by  people  outside.  In 
other  words,  has  the  groundwork  been  laid  for  this  radical  step? 
Do  the  people  know  how  much  coal  we  have  on  hand  and  what  the 
real  shortage  is?  Have  they  not  been  led  to  believe  that  our  chief 
ill  was  transportation  and  that  by  subjecting  themselves  to  hard 
ships  by  cutting  down  trains,  etc.,  enough  cars  have  been  provided 
to  carry  coal? 

In  other  words,  I  am  afraid  the  country  will  want  to  be  shown  that 
the  step  just  taken  was  absolutely  necessary  and  if  this  cannot  be 
proved,  I  greatly  fear  the  consequences  upon  the  morale  of  the  people. 
I  am  so  afraid  that  it  will  weaken  their  confidence  in  any  action  the 
Government  may  take  hereafter  which  depends  for  its  execution 
on  the  voluntary  cooperation  of  the  people.  Again,  it  seems  to 
me  unjust  that  all  industries  are  put  on  the  same  footing.  It  is  a 
difficult  thing  I  know  to  distinguish  between  the  essential  and  non- 
essential  industries,  but  I  am  sure  the  country  will  understand  if 
such  a  distinction  is  made  of,  for  instance,  institutions  that  make 
pianos  and  talking  machines  and  candy  and  articles  that  are  not 
immediately  necessary  for  our  life,  were  cut  down  altogether  and 
things  necessary  to  our  sustenance  kept. 

Sincerely  yours, 

TUMULTY. 
THE  PRESIDENT. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 


17  January  1918. 


Dear  Governor: 

At  twelve  o'clock  last  night,  Ur.  Lincoln, of  the  New  York  World 
called  r.ie  out  of  b*d  by  telephone  to  notify  me  that  the  Fuel  Administratlen 
had  issued  a  drsitic  order  •butting  down  the  factories  of  the  country 
for  five  days,  etc. 

'l  do  not  know  about  the  details  of  the  order.  I  assume  ef  course 
that  it  was  necessary  because  of  the  tremendous  shortage  throughout  the 
Country.   But  what  I  am  afraid  is  that  my  own  readiness  to  accept  this 
assumption  may  not  be  shared  by  people  outside.   In  other  words,  has 
the  ground-work  been  laid  for  this  radical  stepJ   Do  the  people  know 
how  ouch  coal  we  have  on  hand  and  what  the  real  shortage  is!   Have  they 
not  been  led  to  believe  that  our  chief  ill  was  transportation  and  that 
by  subjecting  themselves  to  hardships  by  cutting  down  trains,  etc.,  enough 
cars  have  been  provided  to  carry  coal? 

In  other  words  I  an  afraid  -the  country  will  want  to  be  shown  that 
the  step  Just  taken  was  absolutely  necessary  and  if  this  cannot  be  proved, 
f  greatly  fear  the  consequences  upon  the  morale  of  the  people.  I  am  so 
afraid  that  it  will  weaken  their  confidence  in  any  action  the  Government 
nay  take  hereafter  which  depends -for  its  execution  on  the  voluntary  co 
operation  of  the  people.   Again,  it  seems  to  me  unjust  that  all  industries 
are  put  on  the  same  footing.  It  is  a  difficult  thing  I  know  to  distinguish 
•between  essential  and  non-essential  industries,  but  I  am  sure  the  country 
^ill -understand  If  such -a  distinction  is  made  if,  for  instance,  institutions 
that  make  piano*  and  talking  machines'  and  candy  and  articles  that  are  not 
^Immediately  necessary  for  our  life,*  were  cut  down  altogether  and  things 
.necessary  to  .our  sustenance  kept. 

Sincerely  yours, 


'-? 


•"Ihe  .President, 

An  inside  view  of  a  well-remembered  national  crisis 


364    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

The  President's  reply,  written  on  his  own  typewriter,  is 
as  follows: 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

Of  course,  this  is  a  tremendous  matter  and  has  given  me  the  deepest 
concern,  but  I  really  think  this  direct  road  is  the  road  out  of  difficulties 
which  never  would  have  been  entirely  remedied  if  we  had  not  taken 
some  such  action.  We  must  just  bow  our  heads  and  let  the  storm 
beat. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

Even  to  Mr.  James  M.  Beck,  a  prominent  Republican 
lawyer  and  one  of  his  bitterest  opponents  and  critics,  he 
showed  a  tolerance  and  magnanimity  that  were  worthy  of 
the  man  himself.  It  appears  that  Mr.  Beck  was  invited  to 
confer  at  the  White  House  on  a  matter  having  to  do  with 
the  war,  and  the  question  was  presented  to  the  President 
by  Mr.  Creel  as  to  whether  the  President  considered  Mr. 
Beck  persona  non  grata.  The  President  at  once  sent  me 
the  following  note: 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

Mr.  James  M.  Beck  expressed  some  hesitation  about  coming  with 
the  committee  which  Creel  has  organized  and  which  is  coming  to  see 
me  on  Monday  afternoon,  because  he  was  not  sufficiently  persona 
grata  at  the  White  House.  I  think  his  criticism  and  his  whole  atti 
tude  before  we  went  into  the  war  were  abominable  and  inexcusable, 
but  I  "ain't  harbouring  no  ill  will"  just  now  and  I  hope  that  you 
will  have  the  intimation  conveyed  to  him  through  Mr.  Creel  or  other 
wise  that  he  will  be  welcomed. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

While  the  President  was  busily  engaged  in  France  in 
laying  the  foundation  stones  of  peace,  his  partisan  enemies 
were  busily  engaged  in  destroying  the  things  he  held  so 
dear,  and  had  industriously  circulated  the  story  that  the 


WILSON—THE    LONE    HAND  365 

mission  to  France  was  a  mere  political  one,  that  the 
purpose  back  of  it  was  personal  exploitation,  or  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  President  to  thrust  himself 
into  the  councils  of  the  Democratic  party  as  an  active 
and  aggressive  candidate  for  a  third  term.  The  Presi 
dent's  attitude  in  this  matter,  his  fear  that  talk  of  this 
kind  would  embarrass  the  League  of  Nations,  is  disclosed 
by  the  following  correspondence: 

Received  at  the  White  House, 

June  2,  1919. 
Paris. 
TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington. 

Have  just  read  the  editorial  in  the  Springfield  Republican,  discussing 
"Wilson  the  Third  Term  and  the  Treaty,"  and  would  very  much 
value  your  opinion  with  regard  to  the  situation  as  it  analyzes  it. 
Please  talk  with  Glass,  Secretary  Baker,  Secretary  Wilson,  and  Cum- 
mings  and  let  me  know  what  your  opinion  is  and  what  theirs  is. 
We  must  let  nothing  stand  in  the  way  of  the  Treaty  and  the  adoption 
of  the  League.  I  will,  of  course,  form  no  resolution  until  I  reach  home 
but  wish  to  think  the  matter  out  in  plenty  of  time. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 

WASHINGTON 

2  June,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Cummings  on  campaign  trip  covering  Middle  West  and  coast.  Will 
be  away  six  weeks.  My  own  opinion  is  that  it  would  be  unwise  at 
this  time  to  act  upon  suggestion  contained  in  Springfield  Republican 
editorial.  [The  editorial  suggested  that  the  President  withdraw 
his  name  from  consideration  in  connection  with  a  third  term.]  This 
is  not  the  time  to  say  anything  about  your  attitude  toward  matter 
discussed  in  editorial  because  there  is  a  depression  in  our  ranks  and 
a  feeling  that  our  prospects  for  1920  are  not  bright.  Republicans 
would  say  you  had  retreated  under  the  threat  of  defeat  and  the  cause 


366    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

of  the  League  of  Nations  would  be  weakened  instead  of  strengthened. 
The  issue  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  so  clear-cut  that  your  attitude 
toward  a  third  term  at  present  is  not  a  real  cause  of  embarrassment. 
In  fact,  I  can  see  great  advantage  to  be  gained  for  the  ratification 
of  the  League  by  giving  the  impression  that  you  are  seriously  consider 
ing  going  to  the  country  on  the  League  of  Nations.  Am  strongly 
of  belief,  as  you  know,  that  you  should  not  under  any  circumstances 
consider  or  accept  nomination  for  third  term.  In  this  matter  I 
have  very  few  supporters  in  our  party.  A  trip  I  just  made  to  Illinois 
and  St.  Louis  over  Decoration  Day  convinces  me  that  a  big  drive 
will  be  made  to  induce  you  to  allow  your  name  to  be  used  again. 
The  Presidency  for  another  four  years  would  not  add  one  whit  to 
the  honour  that  will  be  yours  and  the  place  of  dignity  that  you  will 
occupy  in  the  hearts  of  our  people  when  the  League  of  Nations  is  con 
summated  and  your  present  term  expires. 

Upon  your  return  to  this  country  and  with  a  clearer  perception 
of  what  you  are  trying  to  do,  there  will  come  a  turn  of  the  tide  in  our 
favour.  Many  factors  not  now  very  clear  are  leading  in  that  direc 
tion.  The  Republicans  by  the  selection  of  Penrose  have  made  the 
Republican  party  again  the  stand-pat  party  of  America  and  their 
failure,  which  will  become  more  evident  as  the  days  pass,  to  correct 
abuses  that  some  months  ago  they  called  grave,  will  prove  more  and 
more  the  strength  and  value  of  Democratic  policies. 

Prosperity  now  sweeping  in  from  coast  and  Middle  West  will  soon 
be  upon  us.  Even  business  which  turned  away  from  us  in  last  cam 
paign  in  the  hope  that  Excess  Profit  Tax  and  other  burdensome  taxes 
would  be  reduced,  will  soon  find  out  how  fatuous  and  futile  is  the 
Republican  policy.  Many  Progressive  leaders  will  soon  come  to 
the  front  and  will  take  up  the  work  left  undone  by  Roosevelt.  My 
opinion,  therefore,  is  that  what  action  you  take  in  this  matter  should 
await  the  turn  of  the  tide  so  that  as  the  hopes  of  Democracy  rise 
and  success  for  1920  looks  more  promising  than  it  does  to-day,  then 
that  time  in  my  opinion  will  offer  the  psychological  moment  for  you 
to  say  what  really  is  in  your  heart  about  a  third  term  and  thus  help 
not  only  the  party  but  the  League  of  Nations.  Therefore,  until  the 
psychological  moment  comes,  the  politic  thing  to  do  is  to  keep  "mum" 
about  this  matter  and  await  the  happenings  of  the  future. 

TUMULTY. 


WILSON— THE    LONE    HAND  367 

A  clear,  inside  view  of  the  feeling  of  the  man  toward 
the  Treaty,  his  deep  heart  interest  in  it,  and  his  charac 
terization  of  the  opposition  were  disclosed  in  a  speech 
delivered  by  him  to  the  members  of  the  Democratic 
National  Committee  at  the  White  House  on  February 
28,  1919.  This  speech  is  now  published  for  the  first 
time,  and  is  as  follows: 

The  real  issue  of  the  day,  gentlemen,  is  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
I  think  we  must  be  very  careful  to  serve  the  country  in  the  right  way 
with  regard  to  that  issue.  We  ought  not,  as  I  know  you  already 
feel  from  the  character  of  the  action  you  have  just  taken— -we  ought 
not  even  to  create  the  appearance  of  trying  to  make  that  a  party 
issue.  And  I  suggested  this  to  Mr.  Cummings  and  the  others  who 
sat  by  me :  I  think  it  would  be  wise  if  the  several  National  Committee- 
men  were  to  get  in  touch  with  their  state  organizations  upon  returning 
home  and  suggest  this  course  of  action — that  the  Democratic  state 
organizations  get  into  conference  with  the  Republican  state  organiza 
tions  and  say  to  them:  "Here  is  this  great  issue  upon  which  the 
future  peace  of  the  world  depends;  it  ought  not  to  be  made  a  party 
issue  or  to  divide  upon  party  lines;  the  country  ought  to  support 
it  regardless  of  party  (as  you  stated  in  your  resolution) ;  now  we  pro 
pose  to  you  that  you  pass  resolutions  supporting  it,  as  we  intend 
to  do,  and  we  will  not  anticipate  you  in  the  matter  if  you  agree  to 
that  policy;  let  us  stand  back  of  it  and  not  make  a  party  issue  of  it." 
Of  course,  if  they  decline,  then  it  is  perfectly  legitimate,  it  seems  to 
me,  for  the  Democratic  organization  if  it  pleases  to  pass  resolutions, 
framing  these  resolutions  in  as  non-partisan  language  as  is  possible, 
but  nevertheless  doing  what  citizens  ought  to  do  in  matters  of  this 
sort.  But  not  without  first  making  it  a  matter  of  party  record  that 
it  has  made  these  approaches  to  the  Republican  organizations  and 
has  proposed  this  similarity  of  action.  In  that  way  we  accomplish 
a  double  object.  We  put  it  up  to  them  to  support  the  real  opinion 
of  their  own  people  and  we  get  instructed  by  the  resolutions,  and 
we  find  where  the  weak  spots  are  and  where  the  fighting  has  to  be 
done  for  this  great  issue.  Because,  believe  me,  gentlemen,  the 
civilized  world  cannot  afford  to  have  us  lose  this  fight.  I  tried  to 


368    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

state  in  Boston  what  it  would  mean  to  the  people  of  the  world  if  the 
United  States  did  not  support  this  great  ideal  with  cordiality,  but 
I  was  not  able  to  speak  when  I  tried  fully  to  express  my  thoughts. 
I  tell  you,  frankly,  I  choked  up;  I  could  not  do  it.  The  thing  reaches 
the  depth  of  tragedy.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  I  can  see  that  the 
hope  entertained  by  the  people  of  the  world  with  regard  to  us  is  a 
tragical  hope — tragical  in  this  sense,  that  it  is  so  great,  so  far-reaching, 
it  runs  out  to  such  depths  that  we  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things 
satisfy  it.  The  world  cannot  go  as  fast  in  the  direction  of  ideal 
results  as  these  people  believe  the  United  States  can  carry  them,  and 
that  is  what  makes  me  choke  up  when  I  try  to  talk  about  it — the 
consciousness  of  what  they  want  us  to  do  and  of  our  relative  inade 
quacy.  And  yet  there  is  a  great  deal  that  we  can  do,  and  the  immedi 
ate  thing  that  we  can  do  is  to  have  an  overwhelming  national  endorse 
ment  of  this  great  plan.  If  we  have  that  we  will  have  settled  most 
of  the  immediate  political  difficulties  in  Europe.  The  present  danger 
of  the  world — of  course,  I  have  to  say  this  in  the  confidence  of  this 
company — but  the  present  danger  in  this  world  is  that  the  peoples 
of  the  world  do  not  believe  in  their  own  governments.  They  believe 
these  governments  to  be  made  up  of  the  kind  of  men  who  have  always 
run  them,  and  who  did  not  know  how  to  keep  them  out  t)f  this  war, 
did  not  know  how  to  prepare  them  for  war,  and  did  not  know  how  to 
settle  international  controversies  in  the  past  without  making  all  sorts 
of  compromising  concessions.  They  do  not  believe  in  them,  and 
therefore  they  have  got  to  be  buttressed  by  some  outside  power  in 
which  they  do  not  believe.  Perhaps  it  would  not  do  for  them  to 
examine  us  too  narrowly.  We  are  by  no  means  such  ideal  people 
as  they  believe  us  to  be,  but  I  can  say  that  we  are  infinitely  better 
than  the  others.  We  do  purpose  these  things,  we  do  purpose  these 
great  unselfish  things;  that  is  the  glory  of  America,  and  if  we  can 
confirm  that  belief  we  have  steadied  the  whole  process  of  history 
in  the  immediate  future;  whereas  if  we  do  not  confirm  that  belief 
I  would  not  like  to  say  what  would  happen  in  the  way  of  utter  dissolu 
tion  of  society. 

The  only  thing  that  that  ugly,  poisonous  thing  called  Bolshevism 
feeds  on  is  the  doubt  of  the  man  on  the  street  of  the  essential  integrity 
of  the  people  he  is  depending  on  to  do  his  governing.  That  is  what 
it  feeds  on.  No  man  in  his  senses  would  think  that  a  lot  of  local 


WILSON  — THE    LONE    HAND 

Soviets  could  really  run  a  government,  but  some  of  them  are  in  a  tem 
per  to  have  anything  rather  than  the  kind  of  thing  they  have  been 
having;  and  they  say  to  themselves:  "Well,  this  may  be  bad  but  it 
is  at  least  better  and  more  immediately  in  touch  with  us  than  the 
other,  and  we  will  try  it  and  see  whether  we  cannot  work  something 
out  of  it." 

So  that  our  immediate  duty,  not  as  Democrats,  but  as  American 
citizens,  is  to  concert  the  most  powerful  campaign  that  was  ever 
concerted  in  this  country  in  favour  of  supporting  the  League  of 
Nations  and  to  put  it  up  to  everybody — the  Republican  organizations 
and  every  other  organization — to  say  where  they  stand,  and  to  make 
a  record  and  explain  this  thing  to  the  people. 

In  one  sense  it  does  not  make  any  difference  what  the  Constitution 
of  the  League  of  Nations  is.  This  present  constitution  in  my  judg 
ment  is  a  very  conservative  and  sound  document.  There  are  some 
things  in  it  which  I  would  have  phrased  otherwise.  I  am  modest  enough 
to  believe  that  the  American  draft  was  better  than  this,  but  it  is  the 
result  of  as  honest  work  as  I  ever  knew  to  be  done.  Here  we  sat 
around  the  table  where  there  were  representatives  of  fourteen  nations. 
The  five  great  powers,  so-called,  gave  themselves  two  delegates  apiece 
and  they  allowed  the  other  nine  one  delegate  apiece.  But  it  did 
not  count  by  members — it  counted  by  purpose. 

For  example,  among  the  rest  was  a  man  whom  I  have  come  to 
admire  so  much  that  I  have  come  to  have  a  personal  affection  for  him, 
and  that  is  Mr.  Venizelos,  Prime  Minister  of  Greece,  as  genuine  a 
friend  of  man  as  ever  lived  and  as  able  a  friend  honest  people  ever 
had,  and  a  man  on  whose  face  a  glow  comes  when  you  state  a  great 
principle,  and  yet  who  is  intensely  practical  and  who  was  there  to  in 
sist  that  nothing  was  to  be  done  which  would  put  the  small  nations  of 
the  world  at  the  disposal  of  the  big  nations.  So  that  he  was  the  most 
influential  spokesman  of  what  may  be  called  the  small  powers  as 
contrasted  with  the  great.  But  I  merely  single  him  out  for  the 
pleasure  of  paying  him  this  tribute,  and  not  because  the  others  were 
less  earnest  in  pursuing  their  purpose.  They  were  a  body  of  men  who 
all  felt  this.  Indeed,  several  of  them  said  this  to  us:  "The  world 
expects  not  only,  but  demands  of  us  that  we  shall  do  this  thing  suc 
cessfully,  and  we  cannot  go  away  without  doing  it."  There  is  not 
a  statesman  in  that  conference  who  would  dare  to  go  home  saying 


370    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

that  he  had  merely  signed  a  treaty  of  peace  no  matter  how  excel 
lent  the  terms  of  that  treaty  are,  because  he  has  received  if  not 
an  official  at  least  an  influential  mandate  to  see  to  it  that  some 
thing  is  done  in  addition  which  will  make  the  thing  stand  after  it 
is  done;  and  he  dare  not  go  home  without  doing  that.  So  that 
all  around  that  table  there  was  cooperation — generous  cooperation 
of  mind  to  make  that  document  as  good  as  we  could  make  it.  And 
I  believe  it  is  a  thoroughly  sound  document.  There  is  only  one  mis 
leading  sentence  in  it — only  one  sentence  that  conveys  a  wrong  impres 
sion.  That  can,  I  dare  say,  be  altered,  though  it  is  going  to  be 
extremely  difficult  to  set  up  that  fourteen-nation  process  again  as 
will  have  to  be  done  if  any  alteration  is  made. 

The  particular  and  most  important  thing  to  which  every  nation 
that  joins  the  League  agrees  is  this:  That  it  won't  fight  on  any  ques 
tion  at  all  until  it  has  done  one  of  two  things.  If  it  is  about  a  ques 
tion  that  it  considers  suitable  for  arbitration  it  will  submit  it  to 
arbitration.  You  know,  Mr.  Taft  and  other  serious  advocates  of 
this  general  idea  have  tried  to  distinguish  between  justiciable  and  non- 
justiciable  subjects,  and  while  they  have  had  more  or  less  success 
with  it,  the  success  has  not  been  satisfactory.  You  cannot  define 
expressly  the  questions  which  nations  would  be  willing  to  submit 
to  arbitration.  Some  question  of  national  pride  may  come  in  to 
upset  the  definition.  So  we  said  we  would  make  them  promise  to 
submit  every  question  that  they  considered  suitable  to  arbitration 
and  to  abide  by  the  result.  If  they  do  not  regard  it  as  suitable  for 
arbitration  they  bind  themselves  to  submit  it  to  the  consideration 
of  the  Executive  Council  for  a  period  not  exceeding  six  months,  but 
they  are  not  bound  by  the  decision.  It  is  an  opinion,  not  a  decision. 
But  if  a  decision,  a  unanimous  decision,  is  made,  and  one  of  the  parties 
to  the  dispute  accepts  the  decision,  the  other  party  does  bind  itself 
not  to  attack  the  party  that  accepts  the  opinion.  Now  in  discussing 
that  we  saw  this  difficulty.  Suppose  that  Power  B  is  in  possession 
of  a  piece  of  territory  which  Power  A  claims,  and  Power  A  wins  its 
claim  so  far  as  the  opinion  of  the  Executive  Council  is  concerned. 
And  suppose  that  the  power  in  possession  of  the  territory  accepts 
the  decision  but  then  simply  stands  pat  and  does  nothing.  It  has 
got  the  territory.  The  other  party,  inasmuch  as  the  party  that  has 
lost  has  accepted  the  decision,  has  bound  itself  not  to  attack  it  and 


WILSON— THE   LONE   HAND  371 

cannot  go  by  force  of  arms  and  take  possession  of  the  country.  In 
order  to  cure  that  quandary  we  used  a  sentence  which  said  that  in 
case — I  have  forgotten  the  phraseology  but  it  means  this — in  case 
any  power  refuses  to  carry  out  the  decision  the  Executive  Council 
was  to  consider  the  means  by  which  it  could  be  enforced.  Now  that 
apparently  applies  to  both  parties  but  was  intended  to  apply  to  the 
non-active  party  which  refuses  to  carry  it  out.  And  that  sentence 
is  open  to  a  misconstruction.  The  Commission  did  not  see  that  until 
after  the  report  was  made  and  I  explained  this  to  the  General  Con 
ference.  I  made  an  explanation  which  was  substantially  the  same 
as  I  have  made  to  you,  and  that  this  should  be  of  record  may  be  suf 
ficient  to  interpret  that  phrase,  but  probably  not.  It  is  not  part 
of  the  Covenant  and  possibly  an  attempt  ought  to  be  made  to 
alter  it. 

But  I  am  wandering  from  my  real  point.  My  point  is  that  this 
is  a  workable  beginning  of  a  thing  that  the  world  insists  on.  There 
is  no  foundation  for  it  except  the  good  faith  of  the  parties,  but  there 
could  not  be  any  other  foundation  for  an  arrangement  between  nations. 

The  other  night  after  dinner  Senator  Thomas,  of  Colorado,  said: 
"Then  after  all  it  is  not  a  guarantee  of  peace."  Certainly  not. 
Who  said  that  it  was?  If  you  can  invent  an  actual  guarantee  of 
peace  you  will  be  a  benefactor  of  mankind,  but  no  such  guarantee 
has  been  found.  But  this  comes  as  near  being  a  guarantee  of  peace 
as  you  can  get. 

I  had  this  interesting  experience  when  the  Covenant  was  framed. 
I  found  that  I  was  the  only  member  of  the  Committee  who  did  not 
take  it  for  granted  that  the  members  of  the  League  would  have  the 
right  to  secede.  I  found  there  was  a  universal  feeling  that  this 
treaty  could  be  denounced  in  the  usual  way  and  that  a  state  could 
withdraw.  I  demurred  from  that  opinion  and  found  myself  in  a 
minority  of  one,  and  I  could  not  help  saying  to  them  that  this  would 
be  very  interesting  on  the  other  side  of  the  water,  that  the  only 
Southerner  on  this  conference  should  deny  the  right  of  secession. 
But  nevertheless  it  is  instructive  and  interesting  to  learn  that  this  is 
taken  for  granted;  that  it  is  not  a  covenant  that  you  would  have  to 
continue  to  adhere  to.  I  suppose  that  is  a  necessary  assumption 
among  sovereign  states,  but  it  would  not  be  a  very  handsome  thing 
to  withdraw  after  we  had  entered  upon  it.  The  point  is  that  it  does 


372    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

rest  upon  the  good  faith  of  all  the  nations.     Now  the  historic  signi 
ficance  of  it  is  this: 

We  are  setting  up  right  in  the  path  that  German  ambition  ex 
pected  to  tread  a  number  of  new  states  that,  chiefly  because  of  their 
newness,  will  for  a  long  time  be  weak  states.  We  are  carving  a  piece 
of  Poland  out  of  Germany's  side;  we  are  creating  an  independent 
Bohemia  below  that,  an  independent  Hungary  below  that,  and  en 
larging  Rumania,  and  we  are  rearranging  the  -territorial  divisions 
of  the  Balkan  States.  We  are  practically  dissolving  the  Empire 
of  Turkey  and  setting  up  under  mandatories  of  the  League  of  Nations 
a  number  of  states  in  Asia  Minor  and  Arabia  which,  except  for  the 
power  of  the  mandatories,  would  be  almost  helpless  against  any 
invading  or  agressive  force,  and  that  is  exactly  the  old  Berlin-to- 
Bagdad  route.  So  that  when  you  remember  that  there  is  at  present 
a  strong  desire  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  unite  with  Germany,  you  have 
the  prospect  of  an  industrial  nation  with  seventy  or  eighty  millions 
of  people  right  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  and  to  the  southeast  of  it 
nothing  but  weakness,  unless  it  is  supported  by  the  combined  power 
of  the  world. 

Unless  you  expect  this  structure  built  at  Paris  to  be  a  house  of  cards, 
you  have  got  to  put  into  it  the  structural  iron  which  will  be  afforded 
by  the  League  of  Nations.  Take  the  history  of  the  war  that  we  have 
just  been  through.  It  is  agreed  by  everybody  that  has  expressed 
an  opinion  that  if  Germany  had  known  that  England  would  go  in, 
she  never  would  have  started.  What  do  you  suppose  she  would 
have  done  if  she  had  known  that  everybody  else  would  have  gone  in? 
Of  course  she  would  never  have  started.  If  she  had  known  that  the 
world  would  have  been  against  her,  this  war  would  not  have  occurred ; 
and  the  League  of  Nations  gives  notice  that  if  anything  of  that  sort 
is  tried  again,  the  world  will  be  against  the  nation  that  tries  it,  and 
with  that  assurance  given  that  such  a  nation  will  have  to  fight  the 
world,  you  may  be  sure  that  whatever  illicit  ambitions  a  nation 
may  have,  it  cannot  and  will  not  attempt  to  realize  them.  But  if 
they  have  not  that  assurance  and  can  in  the  meantime  set  up  an 
infinite  network  of  intrigue  such  as  we  now  know  ran  like  a  honeycomb 
through  the  world,  then  any  arrangement  will  be  broken  down. 
This  is  the  place  where  intrigue  did  accomplish  the  disintegration 
which  made  the  realization  of  Germany's  purposes  almost  possible. 


WILSON  — THE    LONE    HAND  373 

So  that  those  people  will  have  to  make  friends  with  their  powerful 
neighbour  Germany  unless  they  have  already  made  friends  with  all 
the  rest  of  the  world.  So  that  we  must  have  the  League  of  Nations 
or  else  a  repetition  of  the  catastrophe  we  have  just  gone  through. 

Now  if  you  put  that  case  before  the  people  of  the  United  States 
and  show  them  that  without  the  League  of  Nations  it  is  not  worth 
while  completing  the  treaty  we  are  making  in  Paris,  then  you  have 
got  an  argument  which  even  an  unidealistic  people  would  respond 
to,  and  ours  is  not  an  unidealistic  people  but  the  most  idealistic  people 
in  the  world.  Just  let  them  catch  the  meaning  which  really  under 
lies  this  and  there  won't  be  any  doubt  as  to  what  the  response  will 
be  from  the  hearts  and  from  the  judgments  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States. 

I  would  hope,  therefore,  that  forgetting  elections  for  the  time 
being  we  should  devote  our  thought  and  our  energies  and  our  plans 
to  this  great  business,  to  concert  bi-partisan  and  non-partisan  action, 
and  by  whatever  sort  of  action,  to  concert  every  effort  in  support 
of  this  thing.  I  cannot  imagine  an  orator  being  afforded  a  better 
theme,  so  trot  out  your  orators  and  turn  them  loose,  because  they 
will  have  an  inspiration  in  this  that  they  have  never  had  before,  and 
I  would  like  a  guarantee  that  the  best  vocabulary  they  can  mobilize 
won't  be  equal  to  the  job.  It  surpasses  past  experience  in  the  world 
and  seems  like  a  prospect  of  realizing  what  once  seemed  a  remote 
hope  of  international  morale.  And  you  notice  the  basis  of  this  thing. 
It  guarantees  the  members  of  the  League,  guarantees  to  each  their 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  as  against  external 
aggression. 

I  found  that  all  the  other  men  around  the  conference  table  had  a 
great  respect  for  the  right  of  revolution.  We  do  not  guarantee  any 
state  against  what  may  happen  inside  itself,  but  we  do  guarantee 
against  aggression  from  the  outside,  so  that  the  family  can  be  as  lively 
as  it  pleases,  and  we  know  what  generally  happens  to  an  interloper 
if  you  interfere  in  a  family  quarrel.  There  was  a  very  interesting 
respect  for  the  right  of  revolution;  it  may  be  because  many  of  them 
thought  it  was  nearer  at  hand  than  they  had  supposed  and  this 
immediate  possibility  breathed  a  respect  in  their  minds.  But  what 
ever  the  reason  was,  they  had  a  very  great  respect  for  it.  I  read  the 
Virginia  Bill  of  Rights  very  literally  but  not  very  elegantly  to  mean 


374    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

that  any  people  is  entitled  to  any  kind  of  government  it  pleases 
and  that  it  is  none  of  our  business  to  suggest  or  to  influence  the 
kind  that  it  is  going  to  have.  Sometimes  it  will  have  a  very  riotous 
form  of  government,  but  that  is  none  of  our  business.  And  I  find 
that  that  is  accepted,  even  with  regard  to  Russia.  Even  conservative 
men  like  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain  say  it  is  not  our  business 
to  dictate  what  kind  of  government  Russia  shall  have.  The  only 
thing  to  do  is  to  see  if  we  can  help  them  by  conference  and  suggestion 
and  recognition  of  the  right  elements  to  get  together  and  not  leave 
the  country  in  a  state  of  chaos. 

It  was  for  that  reasonable  purpose  that  we  tried  to  have  the  Con 
ference  at  a  place  I  had  never  heard  of  before — a  place  called  Prin- 
kipos.  I  understand  it  is  a  place  on  the  Bosphorus  with  fine  summer 
hotels,  etc.,  and  I  was  abashed  to  admit  that  I  had  never  heard  of  it 
— but  having  plenty  of  house  room,  we  thought  that  we  could  get 
the  several  Russian  elements  together  there  and  see  if  we  could 
not  get  them  to  sit  down  in  one  room  together  and  tell  us  what  it  was 
all  about  and  what  they  intended  to  do.  The  Bolshevists  had  ac 
cepted,  but  had  accepted  in  a  way  that  was  studiously  insulting. 
They  said  they  would  come,  and  were  perfectly  ready  to  say  before 
hand  that  they  were  ready  to  pay  the  foreign  debt  and  ready  to  make 
concessions  in  economic  matters,  and  that  they  were  even  ready  to 
make  territorial  readjustments,  which  meant,  "we  are  dealing  with 
perjured  governments  whose  only  interest  is  in  striking  a  bargain, 
and  if  that  is  the  price  of  European  recognition  and  cooperation, 
we  are  ready  to  pay  it." 

I  never  saw  anybody  more  angered  than  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who 
said:  "We  cannot  let  that  insult  go  by.  We  are  not  after  their 
money  or  their  concessions  or  their  territory.  That  is  not  the  point. 
We  are  their  friends  who  want  to  help  them  and  must  tell  them 
so."  We  did  not  tell  them  so  because  to  some  of  the  people  we 
had  to  deal  with  the  payment  of  the  foreign  debt  was  a  more  in 
teresting  and  important  matter,  but  that  will  be  made  clear  to 
them  in  conference,  if  they  will  believe  it.  But  the  Bolshevists, 
so  far  as  we  could  get  any  taste  of  their  flavour,  are  the  most  con 
summate  sneaks  in  the  world.  I  suppose  because  they  know  they 
have  no  high  motives  themselves,  they  do  not  believe  that  anybody 
else  has.  And  Trotsky,  having  lived  a  few  months  in  New  York, 


WILSON— THE   LONE   HAND  375 

was  able  to  testify  that  the  United  States  is  in  the  hands  of  capital 
ists  and  does  not  serve  anybody  else's  interests  but  the  capitalists'. 
And  the  worst  of  it  is,  I  think  he  honestly  believes  it.  It  would  not 
have  much  effect  if  he  didn't.  Having  received  six  dollars  a  week 
to  write  for  a  socialistic  and  anarchistic  paper  which  believed  that 
and  printed  it,  and  knowing  how  difficult  it  is  to  live  on  nothing  but 
the  wages  of  sin,  he  believes  that  the  only  wages  paid  here  are  the 
wages  of  sin. 

But  we  cannot  rescue  Russia  without  having  a  united  Europe. 
One  of  my  colleagues  in  Paris  said:  "We  could  not  go  home  and  say 
we  had  made  peace  if  we  left  half  of  Europe  and  half  of  Asia  at  war — 
because  Russia  constitutes  half  of  Europe  and  Siberia  constitutes 
half  of  Asia."  And  yet  we  may  have  to  go  home  without  composing 
these  great  territories,  but  if  we  go  home  with  a  League  of  Nations, 
there  will  be  some  power  to  solve  this  most  perplexing  problem. 

And  so  from  every  point  of  view,  it  is  obvious  to  the  men  in  Paris, 
obvious  to  those  who  in  their  own  hearts  are  most  indifferent  to 
the  League  of  Nations,  that  we  have  to  tie  in  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  with  the  League  of  Nations  because  the  League  of  Nations 
is  the  heart  of  the  Treaty.  It  is  the  only  machinery.  It  is  the  only 
solid  basis  of  masonry  that  is  in  the  Treaty,  and  in  saying  that  I  know 
that  I  am  expressing  the  opinion  of  all  those  with  whom  I  have  been 
conferring.  I  cannot  imagine  any  greater  historic  glory  for  the  party 
than  to  have  it  said  that  for  the  time  being  it  is  thinking  not  of 
elections,  but  of  the  salvation  of  the  plain  people  of  the  world,  and 
the  plain  people  of  the  world  are  looking  to  us  who  call  ourselves 
Democrats  to  prove  to  the  utmost  point  of  sacrifice  that  we  are  indeed 
Democrats,  with  a  small  d  as  well  as  a  large  D,  that  we  are  ready 
to  put  the  whole  power  and  influence  of  America  at  the  disposal 
of  free  men  everywhere  in  the  world  no  matter  what  the  sacrifice 
involved,  no  matter  what  the  danger  to  the  cause. 

And  I  would  like,  if  I  am  not  tiresome,  to  leave  this  additional 
thought  in  your  mind.  I  was  one  of  the  first  advocates  of  the  manda 
tory.  I  do  not  at  all  believe  in  handing  over  any  more  territory 
than  has  already  been  handed  over  to  any  sovereign.  I  do  not  be 
lieve  in  putting  the  people  of  the  German  territories  at  the  disposition, 
unsubordinated  disposition,  of  any  great  power,  and  therefore  I 
was  a  warm  advocate  of  the  idea  of  General  Smuts — who,  by  the  way, 


376    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

is  an  extraordinary  person — who  propounded  the  theory  that  the 
pieces  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  and  the  pieces  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  and  the  German  colonies  were  all  political  units  or  territorial 
units  which  ought  to  be  accepted  in  trust  by  the  family  of  nations, 
and  not  turned  over  to  any  member  of  the  family,  and  that  therefore 
the  League  of  Nations  would  have  as  one  of  its  chief  functions  to  act 
as  trustee  for  these  great  areas  of  dismembered  empires.  And  yet 
the  embarrassing  moment  came  when  they  asked  if  the  United  States 
would  be  willing  to  accept  a  mandatory.  I  had  to  say  off-hand 
that  it  would  not  be  willing.  I  have  got  to  say  off-hand  that  in 
the  present  state  of  American  opinion,  at  any  rate,  it  wTants  to  ob 
serve  what  I  may  call  without  offense  Pharisaical  cleanliness  and 
not  take  anything  out  of  the  pile.  It  is  its  point  of  pride  that  it 
does  not  want  to  seem  to  take  anything  even  by  way  of  superinten 
dence.  And  of  course  they  said:  "That  is  very  disappointing,  for  this 
reason"  (The  reason  they  stated  in  as  complimentary  terms  as  I  could 
have  stated  it  myself) :  "You  would  be  the  most  acceptable  mandatory 
to  any  one  of  these  peoples,  and  very  few  of  us,  if  any,  would  be  ac 
ceptable."  They  said  that  in  so  many  words,  and  it  would  greatly 
advance  the  peace  of  the  world  and  the  peace  of  mind  of  Europe  if 
the  United  States  would  accept  mandatories.  I  said:  "I  am  perfectly 
willing  to  go  home  and  stump  the  country  and  see  if  they  will  do  it," 
but  I  could  not  truthfully  say  off-hand  that  they  would,  because  I 
did  not  know. 

Now  what  I  wanted  to  suggest  is  this :  Personally,  and  just  within 
the  limits  of  this  room,  I  can  say  very  frankly  that  I  think  we  ought 
to.  I  think  there  is  a  very  promising  beginning  in  regard  to  countries 
like  Armenia.  The  whole  heart  of  America  has  been  engaged  for 
Armenia.  They  know  more  about  Armenia  and  its  sufferings  than 
they  know  about  any  other  European  area;  we  have  colleges  out 
there;  we  have  great  missionary  enterprises,  just  as  we  have  had 
Robert  College  in  Constantinople.  That  is  a  part  of  the  world  where 
already  American  influence  extends,  a  saving  influence  and  an  educat 
ing  and  an  uplifting  influence.  Colleges  like  Beirut  in  Syria  have 
spread  their  influence  very  much  beyond  the  limits  of  Syria,  all 
through  the  Arabian  country  and  Mesopotamia  and  in  the  distant 
parts  of  Asia  Minor,  and  I  am  not  without  hope  that  the  people  of 
the  United  States  would  find  it  acceptable  to  go  in  and  be  the  trustee 


WILSON— THE   LONE   HAND  377 

of  the  interests  of  the  Armenian  people  and  see  to  it  that  the  unspeak 
able  Turk  and  the  almost  equally  difficult  Kurd  had  their  necks  sat 
on  long  enough  to  teach  them  manners  and  give  the  industrious  and 
earnest  people  of  Armenia  time  to  develop  a  country  which  is  natur 
ally  rich  with  possibilities. 

Now  the  place  where  they  all  want  us  to  accept  a  mandate  most 
is  at  Constantinople.  I  may  say  that  it  seems  to  be  rather  the  con 
sensus  of  opinion  there  that  Constantinople  ought  to  be  international 
ized.  So  that  the  present  idea  apparently  is  to  delimit  the  territory 
around  Constantinople  to  include  the  Straits  and  set  up  a  mandate 
for  that  territory  which  will  make  those  Straits  open  to  the  nations 
of  the  world  without  any  conditions  and  make  Constantinople 
truly  international — an  internationalized  free  city  and  a  free  port — 
and  America  is  the  only  nation  in  the  world  that  can  undertake  that 
mandate  and  have  the  rest  of  the  world  believe  that  it  is  undertaken 
in  good  faith  that  we  do  not  mean  to  stay  there  and  set  up  our  own 
sovereignty.  So  that  it  would  be  a  very  serious  matter  for  the  con 
fidence  of  the  world  in  this  treaty  if  the  United  States  did  not  accept 
a  mandate  for  Constantinople. 

What  I  have  to  suggest  is  that  questions  of  that  sort  ought  to  be 
ventilated  very  thoroughly.  This  will  appeal  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States :  Are  you  going  to  take  advantage  of  this  and  not  any 
of  the  burden?  Are  you  going  to  put  the  burden  on  the  bankrupt 
states  of  Europe?  For  almost  all  of  them  are  bankrupt  in  the  sense 
that  they  cannot  undertake  any  new  things.  I  think  that  will  appeal 
to  the  American  people:  that  they  ought  to  take  the  burdens — for 
they  are  burdens.  Nobody  is  going  to  get  anything  out  of  a  manda 
tory  of  Constantinople  or  Armenia.  It  is  a  work  of  disinterested 
philanthropy.  And  if  you  first  present  that  idea  and  then  make 
tentative  expositions  of  where  we  might  go  in  as  a  mandatory,  I 
think  that  the  people  will  respond.  If  we  went  in  at  Constantinople, 
for  example,  I  think  it  is  true  that  almost  all  the  influential  men  who 
are  prominent  in  the  affairs  of  Bulgaria  and  were  graduates  of  Robert 
College  would  be  immediately  susceptible  to  American  interests. 
They  would  take  American  guidance  when  they  would  not  take  any 
other  guidance. 

But  I  wish  I  could  stay  home  and  tackle  this  job  with  you.  There 
is  nothing  I  would  like  to  do  so  much  as  really  to  say  in  parliamentary 


378    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

language  what  I  think  of  the  people  that  are  opposing  it.  I  would 
reserve  the  right  in  private  to  say  in  unparliamentary  language  what 
I  think  of  them,  but  in  public  I  would  try  to  stick  to  parliamentary 
language.  Because  of  all  the  blind  and  little,  provincial  people,  they 
are  the  littlest  and  most  contemptible.  It  is  not  their  character  so 
much  that  I  have  a  contempt  for,  though  that  contempt  is  thorough 
going,  but  their  minds.  They  have  not  got  even  good  working 
imitations  of  minds.  They  remind  me  of  a  man  with  a  head  that  is 
not  a  head  but  is  just  a  knot  providentially  put  there  to  keep  him 
from  ravelling  out,  but  why  the  Lord  should  not  have  been  willing 
to  let  them  ravel  out  I  do  not  know,  because  they  are  of  no  use,  and 
if  I  could  really  say  what  I  think  about  them,  it  would  be  picturesque. 
But  the  beauty  of  it  is  that  their  ignorance  and  their  provincialism 
can  be  made  so  perfectly  visible.  They  have  horizons  that  do  not 
go  beyond  their  parish;  they  do  not  even  reach  to  the  edges  of  the 
parish,  because  the  other  people  know  more  than  they  do.  The 
whole  impulse  of  the  modern  time  is  against  them.  They  are  going 
to  have  the  most  conspicuously  contemptible  names  in  history. 
The  gibbets  that  they  are  going  to  be  executed  on  by  future  histori 
ans  will  scrape  the  heavens,  they  will  be  so  high.  They  won't  be 
turned  in  the  direction  of  heaven  at  all,  but  they  will  be  very  tall, 
and  I  do  not  know  any  fate  more  terrible  than  to  be  exhibited  in  that 
future  catalogue  of  the  men  who  are  utterly  condemned  by  the  whole 
spirit  of  humanity.  If  I  did  not  despise  them,  I  would  be  sorry  for 
them. 

Now  I  have  sometimes  a  very  cheering  thought.  On  the  fifth 
of  March,  1921,  I  am  going  to  begin  to  be  an  historian  again  instead 
of  an  active  public  man,  and  I  am  going  to  have  the  privilege  of  writ 
ing  about  these  gentlemen  without  any  restraints  of  propriety.  The 
President,  if  my  experience  is  a  standard,  is  liable  some  day  to  burst 
by  merely  containing  restrained  gases.  Anybody  in  the  Senate  or 
House  can  say  any  abusive  thing  he  pleases  about  the  President,  but 
it  shocks  the  sense  of  propriety  of  the  whole  country  if  the  President 
says  what  he  thinks  about  them.  And  that  makes  it  very  fortunate 
that  the  term  of  the  President  is  limited,  because  no  president  could 
stand  it  for  a  number  of  years.  But  when  the  lid  is  off,  I  am  going 
to  resume  my  study  of  the  dictionary  to  find  adequate  terms  in  which 
to  describe  the  fatuity  of  these  gentlemen  with  their  poor  little 


WILSON— THE   LONE   HAND  379 

minds  that  never  get  anywhere  but  run  around  in  a  circle  and  think 
they  are  going  somewhere.  I  cannot  express  my  contempt  for  their 
intelligence,  but  because  I  think  I  know  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  I  can  predict  their  future  with  absolute  certainty.  I  am  not 
concerned  as  to  the  ultimate  outcome  of  this  thing  at  all,  not  for  a 
moment,  but  I  am  concerned  that  the  outcome  should  be  brought 
about  immediately,  just  as  promptly  as  possible.  So  my  hope  is 
that  we  will  all  put  on  our  war  paint,  not  as  Democrats  but  as  Ameri 
cans,  get  the  true  American  pattern  of  war  paint  and  a  real  hatchet 
and  go  out  on  the  war  path  and  get  a  collection  of  scalps  that  has  never 
been  excelled  in  the  history  of  American  warfare. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

JAPAN — SHANTUNG 

ONE  of  the  settlements  embodied  in  the  Versailles 
Treaty  upon  which  the  enemies  of  the  President 
in  this  country  concentrated  their  fires  of  wrath 
and  hatred  against  the  President  was  the  so-called  Shan 
tung  settlement.  The  partisan  enemies  of  the  President, 
realizing  the  irreconcilable  antagonism  of  certain  of  our 
people  to  the  Japanese,  did  everything  they  could  to 
intensify  this  antagonism,  picturing  the  President  as  one 
who  had  conceded  something  to  Japan  at  the  expense  of 
helpless  China. 

Not  love  of  China,  but  hatred  of  Woodrow  Wilson  led 
partisan  Republicans,  without  careful  investigation  of  the 
actual  situation,  to  seize  on  the  Shantung  affair  as  an 
opportunity  to  embarrass  the  President.  The  ignorances 
and  prejudices  of  many  of  our  people  on  the  subject  of 
China  played  into  the  hands  of  those  Republicans,  whose 
main  object  was  to  injure  the  President  and  defeat  the 
Treaty.  Very  few  sought  to  understand  the  settlement 
or  to  ascertain  the  facts  that  formed  the  historic  back 
ground  of  it. 

These  facts  were  clearly  set  forth  by  the  President  him 
self  in  a  speech  delivered  at  Los  Angeles,  California,  on 
September  20,  1919.  The  President  said: 

Let  me  recall  some  circumstances  which  probably  most  of  you  have 
forgotten.  I  have  to  go  back  to  the  year  1898,  for  it  was  in  March 
of  that  year  that  these  cessions  which  formerly  belonged  to  Germany 

380 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  381 

were  transferred  to  her  by  the  Government  of  China.  What  had 
happened  was  that  two  German  missionaries  in  China  had  been 
murdered.  The  Central  Government  at  Peking  had  done  everything 
that  was  in  its  power  to  do  to  quiet  the  local  disturbances,  to  allay 
the  local  prejudice  against  foreigners  which  led  to  the  murders,  but 
had  been  unable  to  do  so,  and  the  German  Government  held  them 
responsible,  nevertheless,  for  the  murder  of  the  missionaries.  It 
was  not  the  missionaries  that  the  German  Government  was  inter 
ested  in.  That  was  a  pretext.  Germany  insisted  that,  because  this 
thing  had  happened  for  which  the  Peking  Government  could  not 
really  with  justice  be  held  responsible,  a  very  large  and  important 
part  of  one  of  the  richest  provinces  of  China  should  be  ceded  to  her 
for  sovereign  control,  for  a  period  of  99  years,  that  she  should  have 
the  right  to  penetrate  the  interior  of  that  province  with  a  railway, 
and  that  she  should  have  the  right  to  exploit  any  ores  that  lay  within 
30  miles  either  side  of  that  railway.  She  forced  the  Peking  Govern 
ment  to  say  that  they  did  it  in  gratitude  to  the  German  Government 
for  certain  services  which  she  was  supposed  to  have  rendered  but  never 
did  render.  That  was  the  beginning.  I  do  not  know  whether  any 
of  the  gentlemen  who  are  criticizing  the  present  Shantung  settlement 
were  in  public  affairs  at  that  time  or  not,  but  I  will  tell  you  what 
happened,  so  far  as  this  Government  was  concerned. 

One  of  the  most  enlightened  and  humane  presidents  we  have  ever 
had  was  at  the  head  of  the  Government — William  McKinley,  a  man 
who  loved  his  fellow  men  and  believed  in  justice — and  associated 
with  him  was  one  of  our  ablest  secretaries  of  state — Mr.  John  Hay. 
The  state  of  international  law  was  such  then  that  they  did  not  feel 
at  liberty  to  make  even  a  protest  against  these  concessions  to  Ger 
many.  Neither  did  they  make  any  protest  when,  immediately 
following  that,  similar  concessions  were  made  to  Russia,  to  Great 
Britain,  and  to  France.  It  was  almost  immediately  after  that  that 
China  granted  to  Russia  the  right  of  the  possession  and  control 
of  Port  Arthur  and  a  portion  of  the  region  of  Talienwan.  Then 
England,  not  wishing  to  be  outdone,  although  she  had  similar  rights 
elsewhere  in  China,  insisted  upon  a  similar  concession  and  got  Wei- 
haiwei.  Then  France  insisted  that  she  must  have  a  port,  and  got 
it  for  99  years.  Not  against  one  of  those  did  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  make  any  protest  whatever.  They  only  insisted 


382    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

that  the  door  should  not  be  shut  in  any  of  these  regions  against  the 
trade  of  the  United  States.  You  have  heard  of  Mr.  "Hay's  policy 
of  the  open  door.  That  was  his  policy  of  the  open  door — not  the 
open  door  to  the  rights  of  China,  but  the  open  door  to  the  goods  of 
America.  I  want  you  to  understand,  my  fellow  countrymen,  I  am  not 
criticizing  this  because,  until  we  adopt  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  it  is  an  unfriendly  act  for  any  government  to  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  any  other  unless  its  own  interests  are  immediately 
concerned.  The  only  thing  Mr.  McKinley  and  Mr.  Hay  were  at 
liberty  to  do  was  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  might  be  unfavourably  affected  and  insist  that  in  no 
circumstances  it  should  be.  They  got  from  all  of  these  powers  the 
promise  that  it  should  not  be  a  promise  which  was  more  or  less  kept. 
Following  that  came  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan,  and  at  the 
close  of  that  war  Japan  got  Port  Arthur  and  all  the  rights  which  Russia 
enjoyed  in  China,  just  as  she  is  now  getting  Shantung  and  the  rights 
her  recently  defeated  enemy  had  in  China — an  exactly  similar  opera 
tion.  That  peace  that  gave  her  Port  Arthur  was  concluded,  as 
you  know,  on  the  territory  of  the  United  States — at  Portsmouth, 
N.  H.  Nobody  dreamed  of  protesting  against  that.  Japan  had 
beaten  Russia.  Port  Arthur  did  not  at  that  time  belong  to 
China;  it  belonged  for  the  period  of  the  lease  to  Russia,  and  Japan 
was  ceded  what  Japan  had  taken  by  the  well-recognized  processes 
of  war. 

Very  well,  at  the  opening  of  this  war,  Japan  went  and  took  Kiau- 
chow  and  supplanted  Germany  in  Shantung  Province.  The  whole 
process  is  repeated,  but  repeated  with  a  new  sanction.  In  the 
meantime,  after  this  present  war  began,  England  and  France,  not  at 
the  same  time,  but  successively,  feeling  that  it  was  essential  that  they 
should  have  the  assistance  of  Japan  on  the  Pacific,  agreed  that  if 
Japan  would  go  into  this  war  and  take  whatever  Germany  had  in 
the  Pacific  she  should  retain  everything  north  of  the  equator  which 
had  belonged  to  Germany.  That  treaty  now  stands.  That  treaty 
absolutely  binds  Great  Britain  and  France.  Great  Britain  and 
France  can  not  in  honour,  having  offered  Japan  this  inducement  to 
enter  the  war  and  continue  her  operations,  consent  to  an  elimination 
of  the  Shantung  provision  from  the  present  treaty.  Very  well,  let 
us  put  these  gentlemen  who  are  objecting  to  the  Shantung  settlement 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  383 

to  the  test.  Are  they  ready  to  fight  Great  Britain  and  France  and 
Japan,  who  will  have  to  stand  together,  in  order  to  get  this  province 
back  for  China?  I  know  they  are  not,  and  their  interest  in  China  is 
not  the  interest  of  assisting  China,  but  of  defeating  the  Treaty.  They 
know  beforehand  that  a  modification  of  the  Treaty  in  that  respect 
cannot  be  obtained,  and  they  are  insisting  upon  what  they  know  is 
impossible;  but  if  they  ratify  the  Treaty  and  accept  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations  they  do  put  themselves  in  a  position  to  assist 
China.  They  put  themselves  in  that  position  for  the  very  first  time 
in  the  history  of  international  engagements.  They  change  the  whole 
faith  of  international  affairs,  because  after  you  have  read  the  much- 
debated  Article  10  of  the  Covenant,  I  advise  you  to  read  Article  11. 
Article  11  says  that  it  shall  be  the  friendly  right  of  any  member  of 
the  League  to  call  attention  at  any  time  to  anything,  anywhere,  that 
threatens  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world  or  the  good  understanding 
between  nations  upon  which  the  peace  of  the  world  depends.  That  in 
itself  constitutes  a  revolution  in  international  relationships.  Any 
thing  that  affects  the  peace  of  any  part  of  the  world  is  the  business  of 
every  nation.  It  does  not  have  simply  to  insist  that  its  trade  shall 
not  be  interfered  with;  it  has  the  right  to  insist  that  the  rights  of  man 
kind  shall  not  be  interfered  with.  Not  only  that,  but  back  of  this 
provision  with  regard  to  Shantung  lies,  as  everybody  knows  or  ought 
to  know,  a  very  honourable  promise  which  was  made  by  the  Govern 
ment  of  Japan  in  my  presence  in  Paris,  namely,  that  just  as  soon  as 
possible  after  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  they  will  return  to  China 
all  sovereign  rights  in  the  Province  of  Shantung.  Great  Britain  has 
not  promised  to  return  Weihaiwei;  France  has  not  promised  to  return 
her  part.  Japan  has  promised  to  relinquish  all  the  sovereign  rights 
which  were  acquired  by  Germany  for  the  remaining  78  of  the  99 
years  of  the  lease,  and  to  retain  only  what  other  governments  have 
in  many  other  parts  of  China,  namely,  the  right  to  build  and  operate 
the  railway  under  a  corporation  and  to  exploit  the  mines  in  the  im 
mediate  neighbourhood  of  that  railway.  In  other  words,  she  retains 
only  the  rights  of  economic  concessionaries.  Personally,  I  am  frank 
to  say  that  I  think  all  of  these  nations  have  invaded  some  of  the 
essential  rights  of  China  by  going  too  far  in  the  concessions  which  they 
have  demanded,  but  that  is  an  old  story  now,  and  we  are  beginning 
a  new  story.  In  the  new  story  we  all  have  the  right  to  balk  about 


384    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

what  they  have  been  doing  and  to  convince  them,  by  the  pressure 
of  the  public  opinion  of  the  world,  that  a  different  course  of  action 
would  be  just  and  right.  I  am  for  helping  China  and  not  turning 
away  from  the  only  way  in  which  I  can  help  her.  Those  are  the  facts 
about  Shantung. 

Of  all  the  important  decisions  of  the  Peace  Conference, 
none  worried  the  President  so  much  as  that  relating  to  the 
Shantung  settlement,  and  in  a  speech  at  Des  Moines, 
on  September  6,  1919,  he  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  in 
the  following  words: 

There  is  the  settlement,  which  you  have  heard  so  much  discussed, 
about  that  rich  and  ancient  province  of  Shantung  in  China.  I  do  not 
like  that  settlement  any  better  than  you  do,  but  these  were  the  circum 
stances:  In  order  to  induce  Japan  to  cooperate  in  the  war  and  clear 
the  Pacific  of  the  German  power,  England,  and  subsequently  France, 
bound  themselves  without  any  qualifications  to  see  to  it  that  Japan 
got  anything  in  China  that  Germany  had  and  that  Japan  would 
take  it  away  from  her,  upon  the  strength  of  which  promise  Japan 
proceeded  to  take  away  Kiauchow  and  occupy  the  portions  of  Shan 
tung  Province  which  had  been  ceded  by  China  for  a  term  of  years 
to  Germany.  The  most  that  could  be  got  out  of  it  was  that  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  America  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  the  Japanese 
were  ready  to  promise  that  they  would  give  up  every  item  of  sover 
eignty  which  Germany  would  otherwise  have  enjoyed  in  Shantung 
Province  and  return  it  without  restriction  to  China,  and  that  they 
would  retain  in  the  province  only  the  economic  concessions  such  as 
other  nations  already  had  elsewhere  in  China — though  you  do  not 
hear  anything  about  that — concessions  in  the  railway  and  the  mines 
which  had  become  attached  to  the  railway  for  operative  purposes. 
But  suppose  that  you  say  that  is  not  enough.  Very  well,  then,  stay 
out  of  the  Treaty,  and  how  will  that  accomplish  anything?  England 
and  France  are  bound  and  cannot  escape  their  obligation.  Are  you 
going  to  institute  a  war  against  Japan  and  France  and  England  to 
get  Shantung  back  for  China?  That  is  an  operation  which  does  not 
commend  itself  to  the  present  generation. 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  385 

Mr.  Ray  Stannard  Baker,  in  his  book  "What  Wilson 
Did  in  Paris,"  says: 

Of  all  the  important  decisions  at  the  Peace  Conference  none  worried 
the  President  so  much  as  that  relating  to  the  disposition  of  the  Shan 
tung  peninsula — and  none,  finally,  satisfied  him  less.  Not  one  of 
the  problems  he  had  to  meet  at  Paris,  serious  as  they  all  were,  did  he 
take  more  personally  to  heart  than  this.  He  told  me  on  one  occasion 
that  he  had  been  unable  to  sleep  on  the  previous  night  for  thinking 
of  it. 

Those  last  days  before  the  Treaty  was  finished  were  among  the 
hardest  of  the  entire  Conference.  As  I  have  said  before,  the  most 
difficult  and  dangerous  problems  had  inevitably  been  left  to  the  last, 
and  had  all  to  be  finally  settled  in  those  crowded  days  of  late  April. 

Consider,  for  a  moment,  the  exact  situation  at  Paris  on  April  29th, 
when  the  Japanese-Chinese  crises  reached  the  explosive  point. 

It  was  on  that  very  day  that  the  German  delegates  were  coming 
morosely  into  Versailles,  ready  for  a  treaty  that  was  not  yet  finished. 
The  Three — for  Orlando  had  then  withdrawn  from  the  Conference — 
had  been  gradually  lengthening  their  sessions,  the  discussions  were 
longer  and  more  acrimonious.  They  were  tired  out.  Only  six  days 
before,  on  April  23rd,  the  High  Council  had  been  hopelessly  dead 
locked  on  the  Italian  question.  The  President  had  issued  his  bold 
message  to  the  world  regarding  the  disposition  of  Fiume  and  the 
Italian  delegation  departed  from  Paris  with  the  expectation  that 
their  withdrawal  would  either  force  the  hands  of  the  Conference,  or 
break  it  up. 

While  this  crisis  was  at  its  height  the  Belgian  delegation,  which  had 
long  been  restive  over  the  non-settlement  of  Belgian  claims  for 
reparations,  became  insistent.  They  had  no  place  in  the  Supreme 
Council  and  they  were  worried  lest  the  French  and  British — neither 
of  whom  could  begin  to  get  enough  money  out  of  Germany  to  pay 
for  its  losses — would  take  the  lion's  share  and  leave  Belgium  unre- 
stored.  The  little  nations  were  always  worried  at  Paris  lest  the  big 
ones  take  everything  and  leave  them  nothing!  Very  little  appeared 
in  the  news  at  the  time  concerning  the  Belgian  demands,  but  they 
reached  practically  an  ultimatum :  if  Belgium  were  not  satisfied  she  also 
would  withdraw  from  the  Conference  and  refuse  to  sign  the  Treaty. 


386    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

It  was  at  this  critical  moment  that  the  Chinese-Japanese  question 
had  to  be  settled.  It  had  to  be  settled  because  the  disposition  of 
German  rights  in  China  (unlike  Italian  claims  in  the  Adriatic)  had  to 
go  into  the  German  Treaty  before  it  was  presented  to  Brockdorff 
Rantzau  and  his  delegates  at  Versailles;  and  because  the  Japanese 
would  not  sign  the  Treaty  unless  it  was  settled.  The  defection  of 
Japan,  added  to  that  of  Italy  and  the  possible  withdrawal  of  Belgium, 
would  have  made  the  situation  desperate. 

The  two  principal  things  that  Japan  wanted  at  the  Peace  Confer 
ence  were:  first,  a  recognition  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Na 
tions  of  the  "equality  of  the  nations  and  the  just  treatment  of  their 
nationals";  and,  second,  the  recognition  of  certain  rights  over  the 
former  German  concessions  in  China  (Shantung.) 

After  a  struggle  lasting  all  through  the  Conference,  Japan  had 
finally  lost  out,  in  the  meeting  of  the  League  of  Nations  Commis 
sion  on  April  llth,  in  her  first  great  contention.  She  was  refused 
the  recognition  of  racial  or  even  national  equality  which  she  demanded 
although  a  majority  of  the  nations  represented  on  the  League  of 
Nations  Commission  agreed  with  her  that  her  desire  for  such  recogni 
tion  was  just  and  should  find  a  place  in  the  Covenant.  .  .  . 

Few  people  realize  how  sharply  the  Japanese  felt  this  hurt  to  their 
pride :  and  few  people  realize  the  meaning  of  this  struggle,  as  a  fore 
runner  of  one  of  the  great  coming  struggles  of  civilization — the  race 
struggle.  .  .  . 

Having  lost  out  in  their  first  great  contention  the  Japanese  came 
to  the  settlement  of  their  second  demand  with  a  feeling  of  irrita 
tion  but  with  added  determination.  The  Japanese  delegates  were  the 
least  expressive  of  any  at  the  Conference :  they  said  the  least :  but 
they  were  the  firmest  of  any  in  hewing  to  the  line  of  their  interests 
and  their  agreements.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  also,  in  all  fairness, 
that  the  Japanese  delegates,  not  less  than  the  British,  French,  and 
American,  had  their  own  domestic  political  problems,  and  opposition, 
and  that  there  was  a  powerful  demand  in  Japan  that,  while  all  the 
other  nations  were  securing  some  return  for  their  losses  and  sacrifices 
in  the  war,  Japan  should  also  get  some  return. 

At  the  same  time  Japan  was  in  a  stronger  position  than  any  other 
of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  except  the  United  States.  She 
had  been  little  hurt,  and  much  strengthened  by  the  war.  She  was 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  387 

far  distant  from  danger;  she  did  not  need  the  League  of  Nations  as 
much  as  did  the  countries  of  Europe;  and,  more  than  anything  else, 
she  occupied  a  strong  legal  status,  for  her  claims  were  supported 
by  treaties  both  with  China  and  the  Allies;  and  she  was,  moreover,  in 
a  position,  if  she  were  rendered  desperate,  to  take  by  force  what  she 
considered  to  be  her  rights  if  the  Allies  refused  to  accord  them. 

At  a  dark  moment  of  the  war,  the  spring  of  1917,  the  British  and 
French,  in  order  to  sharpen  Japanese  support  of  the  allied  cause,  made 
private  agreements  to  sustain  the  claims  of  Japan  at  the  Peace  Con 
ference  to  German  rights  in  Shantung.  It  thus  happened,  in  the 
Council  of  Three,  for  Orlando  had  then  gone  home,  that  two  of  the 
powers,  Great  Britain  and  France,  were  bound  by  their  pledged  word 
to  Japan.  Indeed,  the  British  argued  that  they  felt  themselves  in 
debted  to  the  Japanese  not  only  as  a  long-friendly  ally  but  for  help 
ing  to  keep  the  Pacific  free  of  the  enemy  while  Australian  troops  were 
being  transported  to  Europe  and  thus  relieving  a  great  burden  for  the 
British  fleet.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  China  was  also  bound 
by  the  Treaty  and  Notes  of  1915  and  the  Notes  of  1918  with  Japan— 
although  China  vigorously  asserted  that  all  of  these  agreements  were 
entered  into  upon  her  part  under  coercion  by  Japan.  In  fact,  one 
of  the  Chinese  delegates  at  Paris  had  actually  signed  one  of  the  agree 
ments  which  he  was  now  asking  the  Conference  to  overthrow. 

It  was  not  only  this  wire  entanglement  of  treaties  which  Mr. 
Wilson  found  in  his  advance,  but  it  must  be  said,  in  all  frankness,  that, 
in  opposing  Japan's  demands  for  economic  privileges  and  a  "sphere 
of  influence"  in  China,  he  was  also  opposing  a  principle  which  every 
other  strong  nation  at  the  Conference  believed  in  and  acted  upon, 
if  not  in  China,  then  elsewhere  in  the  world.  Japan  asserted  that 
she  was  only  asking  for  the  rights  already  conceded  to  other  nations. 
Japan  was  thus  in  a  very  strong  position  in  insisting  upon  her  claims, 
and  China  in  a  very  weak  position. 

In  this  crisis  Mr.  Wilson  was  face  to  face  with  difficult  alternatives. 
If  he  stood  stiffly  for  immediate  justice  to  China,  he  would  have  to 
force  Great  Britain  and  France  to  break  their  pledged  word  with 
Japan.  Even  if  he  succeeded  in  doing  this,  he  still  would  have  had 
to  face  the  probability,  practically  the  certainty,  that  Japan  would 
withdraw  from  the  Conference  and  go  home.  This  would  not  only 
keep  Japan  out  of  the  League,  but  it  would  go  far  toward  eventually 


WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

disrupting  the  Peace  Conference,  already  shaken  by  the  withdrawal 
of  Italy  and  the  dangerous  defection  of  Belgium.  Such  a  weakening 
of  the  Peace  Conference  and  of  the  Alliance  of  the  Great  Powers 
would  have  the  immediate  effect  of  encouraging  the  Germans  not  to 
sign  the  Treaty  and  of  holding  off  in  the  hope  that  the  forces  of  in 
dustrial  unrest  then  spreading  all  over  Europe  might  overwhelm 
France  or  Italy.  It  would  also  have  a  highly  irritating  effect  upon 
all  the  bolshevist  elements  in  Europe — increasing  uncertainty,  and 
the  spread  of  anarchical  conditions.  With  Japan  out  of  the  associa 
tion  of  western  nations  there  was  also  the  possibility,  voiced  just  at 
this  time  in  both  French  and  British  newspapers,  that  she  would 
begin  building  up  alliances  of  her  own  in  the  East — possibly  with 
Germany  and  Russia.  Indeed,  if  the  truth  were  told,  this  was  prob 
ably  the  most  important  consideration  of  all  in  shaping  the  final 
decision.  It  was  the  plain  issue  between  the  recrudescence,  in  a  new 
and  more  dangerous  form,  of  the  old  system  of  military  alliances 
and  balances  of  power,  and  the  new  system  of  world  organization 
in  a  league  of  nations.  It  was  the  militaristic  Prussian  idea  against 
the  American  Wilsonian  idea. 

No  statesman  probably  ever  had  a  more  difficult  problem  pre 
sented  to  him  than  did  Mr.  Wilson  upon  the  momentous  29th  of 
April,  1919.  At  that  moment  three  things  seemed  of  extreme  im 
portance  if  anything  was  to  be  saved  out  of  the  wreckage  of  the  world. 
The  first  was  a  speedy  peace,  so  that  men  everywhere  might  return 
to  the  work  of  production  and  reconstruction  and  the  avenues  of 
trade  everywhere  be  opened.  Peace  and  work!  The  second  was  of 
supreme  importance — keeping  the  great  Allies  firmly  welded  together 
to  steady  a  world  which  was  threatened  with  anarchy.  It  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  keep  a  going  concern  in  the  world!  The 
third  was  to  perpetuate  this  world  organization  in  a  league  of  nations: 
this  the  most  important  of  all,  for  it  had  reference  to  the  avalanche 
of  new  problems  which  were  just  ahead. 

If  the  Conference  were  broken  up,  or  even  if  Italy  remained  out, 
and  Japan  went  out,  these  things  would  be  impossible.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  Allies  could  be  kept  firmly  together,  peace  established, 
and  a  league  of  nations  brought  into  being,  there  was  a  chance  of 
going  forward  with  world  reconstruction  on  the  broadest  lines,  and 
of  the  full  realization  of  the  principles  of  justice  laid  down  in  the 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  389 

Armistice  terms  and  accepted  by  all  nations.  The  Treaty,  after  all, 
is  no  final  settlement;  it  is  only  one  step  in  the  great  process  of  world 
reconstruction . 

It  was  with  all  these  considerations  in  view  that  the  Shantung 
settlement  was  made  by  the  Council  of  Three  sitting  in  the  President's 
house  in  the  Place  des  Etats-Unis — with  the  Japanese  in  full  agree 
ment. 

This  settlement  was  in  two  parts,  the  first  set  forth  in  the  Treaty 
itself,  and  the  second  a  special  agreement  of  the  three  Great  Powers 
with  Japan.  I  find  that  this  fact  is  not  clear  to  many  people,  who 
look  for  the  entire  settlement  in  the  Treaty  itself. 

Under  sections  156,  157,  and  158  of  the  Treaty  all  the  rights  at 
Kiauchow  and  in  Shantung  Province  formerly  belonging  to  Ger 
many  are  transferred  without  reservation  to  Japan.  This  conforms 
broadly  with  the  various  treaties,  and  gives  a  proud  nation  what  it 
considered  its  full  rights. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  delegates  at  the  Conference,  on 
behalf  of  their  government,  made  a  voluntary  agreement  "to  hand 
back  the  Shantung  peninsula  in  full  sovereignty  to  China,  retaining 
only  the  economic  privileges  granted  to  Germany  and  the  right  to 
establish  a  settlement  under  the  usual  conditions  at  Tsingtao. 

Under  this  agreement,  by  which  Japan  makes  an  unqualified  reces 
sion  of  the  sovereign  rights  in  Shantung  to  China,  she  also  agrees 
to  remove  all  Japanese  troops  remaining  on  the  peninsula  "at  the 
earliest  possible  time." 

Japan  thus  gets  only  such  rights  as  an  economic  concessionaire  as 
are  already  possessed  by  one  or  two  great  powers  and  the  whole 
future  relationship  between  the  two  countries  falls  at  once  under 
the  guarantee  of  the  League  of  Nations,  by  the  provisions  of  which 
the  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  of  China  will 
be  insured. 

If  the  President  had  risked  everything  in  standing  for  the  im 
mediate  and  complete  realization  of  the  Chinese  demands,  and  had 
broken  up  the  Conference  upon  that  issue,  it  would  not  have  put 
Japan  either  politically  or  economically  out  of  China.  Neither  our 
people  nor  the  British  would  go  to  war  with  Japan  solely  to  keep  her 
out  of  Shantung.  The  only  hope  of  China  in  the  future — and  Wilson 
looks  not  only  to  the  removal  of  the  sphere  of  influence  which  Japan 


390    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

controls  but  to  the  removal  of  all  other  spheres  of  foreign  influence 
in  China — is  through  a  firm  world  organization,  a  league  of  nations 
in  which  these  problems  can  be  brought  up  for  peaceful  settlement. 
.  ;  .  "The  settlement,  of  course,  was  a  compromise:  a  balance 
of  considerations.  It  was  the  problem  of  the  President,  all  through 
the  Conference,  when  to  'accommodate'  and  when  to  use  decided 
policies.  'The  wisdom  of  the  statesman,'  said  Cavour  (quoted  by 
Thayer  in  his  admirable  'Life'),  'consists  in  discerning  when  the 
time  has  come  for  the  one  or  the  other.' ' 

"The  Shantung  decision  is  about  as  good  a  settlement  as  could  be 
had  out  of  a  dirty  past." 

Even  I  felt  bitterly  critical  of  what  seemed  to  me  to 
be  the  President's  surrender  to  Japan  in  the  matter  of 
Shantung.  But  when  he  returned  and  told  me  the  whole 
story  and  explained  the  complicated  and  delicate  world 
situation  which  confronted  him,  I  agreed  with  him  that  he 
had  obtained  out  of  a  bad  mess  the  best  possible  settle 
ment. 

In  addition  to  the  various  cabled  messages  which  passed 
between  the  President  and  myself,  which  will  be  found  in 
Appendix  "C,"  was  the  following: 

Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington, 

April  30,  1919. 
Paris 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 

Washington. 

The  Japanese-Chinese  matter  has  been  settled  in  a  way  which 
seems  to  me  as  satisfactory  as  could  be  got  out  of  the  tangle  of  treat 
ies  in  which  China  herself  was  involved,  and  it  is  important  that 
the  exact  facts  should  be  known.  I  therefore  send  you  the  follow 
ing  for  public  use  at  such  time  as  the  matter  may  come  under  public 
discussion.  In  the  Treaty  all  the  rights  at  Kiao-Chau  and  in  Shan 
tung  Province  belonging  to  Germany  are  to  be  transferred  with 
out  opposition  to  Japan,  but  Japan  voluntarily  engages,  in  answer 


JAPAN  — SHANTUNG  391 

to  the  questions  put  in  Conference,  that  it  will  be  her  immediate 
policy  to  Quote  hand  back  the  surveyed  peninsula  in  full  sovereignty 
to  China,  retaining  only  the  economic  privileges  granted  to  Germany 
and  the  right  to  establish  a  settlement  under  the  usual  conditions 
at  Tsingtau.  Owners  of  the  railway  will  use  special  police  only  to 
insure  security  for  traffic.  They  will  be  used  for  no  other  purpose. 
The  police  force  will  be  composed  of  Chinese  and  such  Japanese  in 
structors  as  the  directors  of  the  railway  may  select  will  be  appointed 
by  the  Chinese  government  End  quote. 

It  was  understood  in  addition  that  inasmuch  as  the  sovereign 
rights  receded  to  China  were  to  be  unqualified,  all  Japanese  troops 
remaining  on  the  peninsula  should  be  withdrawn  at  the  earliest 
possible  time.  Japan  thus  gets  only  such  rights  as  an  economic 
concessionaire  as  are  possessed  by  one  or  two  other  great  powers 
and  are  only  too  common  in  China,  and  the  future  relationship 
between  the  two  countries  falls  at  once  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
League  of  Nations  of  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence. 
I  find  a  general  disposition  to  look  with  favour  upon  the  proposal 
that  at  an  early  date  throughout  the  mediation  of  the  League  of 
Nations  all  extraordinary  foreign  rights  in  China  and  all  spheres  of 
influence  should  be  abrogated  by  the  common  consent  of  all  the  na 
tions  concerned.  I  regard  the  assurances  given  by  Japan  as  very 
satisfactory  in  view  of  the  complicated  circumstances.  Please  do 
not  give  out  any  of  the  above  as  a  quotation  from  me,  but  use  it  in 
some  other  form  for  public  information  at  the  right  time. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

IRELAND 

NO  ONE  standing  on  the  side-lines  in  the  capital  of 
the  nation  and  witnessing  the  play  of  the  ardent 
passions  of  the  people  of  the  Irish  race,  demanding 
that  some  affirmative  action  be  taken  by  our  government 
to  bring  about  the  realization  of  the  right  of  self-determi 
nation  for  Ireland,  it  seemed  as  if  the  American  President, 
Woodrow  Wilson,  who  first  gave  utterance  to  the  ideal  of 
self-determination  for  all  the  oppressed  peoples  of  the 
world,  was  woefully  unmindful  of  the  age-long  struggle 
that  Irishmen  had  been  making  to  free  their  own  beloved 
land  from  British  domination.  But  to  those,  like  myself, 
who  were  on  the  inside  of  affairs,  it  was  evident  that  in 
every  proper  and  legitimate  way  the  American  President 
was  cautiously  searching  for  efficient  means  to  advance 
the  cause  of  self-government  in  Ireland  and  to  bring  about 
a  definite  and  satisfactory  solution  of  this  complicated 
problem. 

Embarrassed  as  he  was  by  a  delicate  diplomatic  situ 
ation,  which  to  a  great  extent  governed  his  conduct,  he 
was  not  free  openly  to  espouse  the  cause  of  Ireland.  To 
have  done  so  would  have  been  to  add  difficulties  to  an 
already  chaotic  world  situation.  He  was  compelled  in 
what  he  was  seeking  to  do  for  Ireland  to  move  quietly 
and  by  informal  conferences  impressively  to  lay  the  case 
of  Ireland  before  those  who  sought  his  counsel  in  the 
matter.  Unfortunately,  these  quiet  methods  of  helpful- 

392 


IRELAND  393 

ness  which  he  brought  to  the  task  were  the  things  that 
drew  the  fire  of  criticism  and  even  distrust  of  many  men  of 
the  Irish  race  in  America,  who  in  their  passionate  devotion 
to  the  cause  which  lay  so  close  to  their  hearts  could  see 
only  a  direct  route  to  accomplishing  what  they  had  in 
mind. 

Long  before  the  European  war  the  President  and  I  had 
often  discussed  the  Irish  cause  and  how  to  make  his 
influence  felt  in  a  way  that  would  bring  results  without 
becoming  involved  in  diplomatic  snarls  with  Great  Britain. 
He  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  Irish  problem  could  not  be 
settled  by  force,  for  the  spirit  of  Ireland,  which  for 
centuries  had  been  demanding  justice,  was  unconquerable. 
He  pointed  out  to  me  on  many  occasions  when  we  dis 
cussed  this  delicate  matter,  that  the  policy  of  force  and 
reprisal  which  the  English  Government  had  for  centuries 
practised  in  had  but  strengthened  the  tenacious  purpose 
of  the  Irish  people  and  had  only  succeeded  in  keeping 
under  the  surface  the  seething  dissatisfaction  of  that  in 
domitable  race. 

I  recall  that  at  the  conclusion  of  one  of  our  talks  after 
a  Cabinet  meeting,  shaking  his  head  as  if  he  despaired  of  a 
settlement,  the  President  said:  "European  statesmen  can 
never  learn  that  humanity  can  be  welded  together  only 
by  love,  by  sympathy,  and  by  justice,  and  not  by  jealousy 
and  hatred."  He  was  certain  that  the  failure  of  England 
to  find  an  adjustment  was  intensifying  feeling  not  only  in 
our  own  country,  but  throughout  the  world,  and  that  the 
agitation  for  a  settlement  would  spread  like  a  contagion 
and  would  inevitably  result  in  a  great  national  crisis. 

An  interesting  comment  on  the  President's  attitude 
toward  the  Irish  question  appears  in  an  article  in  the 
Atlantic  Monthly  for  October,  1921.  The  article  is  by 


WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Joseph  Fort  Newton,  in  his  series,  "Preaching  in  Lon 
don.'  '     The  comment  is  as  follows : 

To-day  a  distinguished  London  minister  told  me  a  story  about 
the  President,  for  which  he  vouches.  He  had  it  from  the  late  Syl 
vester  Home — Member  of  Parliament  and  minister  of  Whitefield's 
Chapel — who  had  known  the  President  for  years  before  he  was  ele 
vated  to  his  high  office.  Home  happened  to  be  in  America — where 
he  was  always  a  welcome  guest — before  the  war,  shortly  after  the 
President  was  inaugurated,  and  he  called  at  the  White  House  to  pay 
his  respects.  In  the  course  of  the  talk,  he  expressed  satisfaction 
that  the  relations  between  England  and  America  would  be  in  safe 
hands  while  the  President  was  in  office.  The  President  said  nothing, 
and  Home  wondered  at  it.  Finally  he  forced  the  issue,  putting  it 
as  a  question  point-blank.  The  President  said,  addressing  him  in  the 
familiar  language  of  religious  fellowship :  "  Brother  Home,  one  of  the 
greatest  calamities  that  has  befallen  mankind  will  come  during  my  term 
of  office.  It  will  come  from  Germany.  Go  home  and  settle  the  Irish 
question,  and  there  will  be  no  doubt  as  to  where  America  will  stand. 

In  discussing  the  matter  with  me,  he  said:  "The  whole 
policy  of  Great  Britain  in  its  treatment  of  the  Irish  ques 
tion  has  unfortunately  been  based  upon  a  policy  of  fear 
and  not  a  policy  of  trusting  the  Irish  people.  How 
magnificently  the  policy  of  trust  and  faith  worked  out  in 
the  case  of  the  Boers.  Unfortunately,  the  people  of 
Ireland  now  believe  that  the  basis  of  England's  policy 
toward  them  is  revenge,  malice,  and  destruction.  You 
remember,  Tumulty,  how  the  haters  of  the  South  in  the 
days  of  reconstruction  sought  to  poison  Lincoln's  mind  by 
instilling  into  it  everything  that  might  lead  him  in  his 
treatment  of  the  South  toward  a  policy  of  reprisal,  but  he 
contemptuously  turned  away  from  every  suggestion  as  a 
base  and  ignoble  thing.  Faith  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  deep  humanity  and  inherent  generosity  of 
the  Irish  people  is  the  only  force  that  will  ever  lead  to  a 


IRELAND  395 

settlement  of  this  question.  English  statesmen  must  real 
ize  that  in  the  last  analysis  force  never  permanently  settles 
anything.  It  only  produces  hatreds  and  resentments  that 
make  a  solution  of  any  question  difficult  and  almost  im 
possible.  I  have  tried  to  impress  upon  the  Englishmen 
with  whom  I  have  discussed  this  matter  that  there  never 
can  be  a  real  comradeship  between  America  and  England 
until  this  issue  is  definitely  settled  and  out  of  the  way." 

Many  times  in  informal  discussions  with  British  repre 
sentatives  that  came  to  the  White  House  the  President 
sought  to  impress  upon  them  the  necessity  for  a  solution, 
pointing  out  to  them  how  their  failure  was  embarrassing 
our  relations  with  Great  Britain  at  every  point.  I  am 
sure  that  if  he  could  with  propriety  have  done  so,  Wood- 
row  Wilson  would  long  ago  have  directly  suggested  to 
Great  Britain  a  settlement  of  the  Irish  question,  but, 
unfortunately,  serious  diplomatic  obstacles  lay  in  the 
way  of  an  open  espousal  of  the  Irish  cause.  He  was 
sadly  aware  that  under  international  law  no  nation  has 
the  right  to  interest  itself  in  anything  that  directly  con 
cerns  the  affairs  of  another  friendly  nation,  for  by  the 
traditions  of  diplomacy  such  "interference"  puts  in 
jeopardy  the  cordial  relations  of  the  nations  involved  in 
such  controversy. 

Long  before  he  became  president,  Woodrow  Wilson  had 
eloquently  declared  his  attitude  with  reference  to  self- 
government  for  Ireland  and  had  openly  espoused  the 
cause  of  Irish  freedom.  In  a  speech  delivered  at  New 
Brunswick,  New  Jersey,  on  October  26,  1910,  he  said: 

Have  you  read  the  papers  recently  attentively  enough  to  notice 
the  rumours  that  are  coming  across  the  waters?  What  are  the 
rumours?  The  rumours  are  that  the  English  programme  includes, 
not  only  self-government  for  Ireland,  but  self-government  for  Scot- 


396    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

land,  and  the  drawing  together  in  London  or  somewhere  else  of  a 
parliament  which  will  represent  the  British  Empire  in  a  great  con 
federated  state  upon  the  model,  no  doubt,  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  having  its  power  to  the  end  of  the  world.  What  is 
at  the  bottom  of  that  programme?  At  the  bottom  of  it  is  the  idea 
that  no  little  group  of  men  like  the  English  people  have  the  right 
to  govern  men  in  all  parts  of  the  world  without  drawing  them  into 
real  substantial  partnership,  where  their  voice  will  count  with  equal 
weight  with  the  voice  of  other  parts  of  the  country. 

This  voice  that  has  been  crying  in  Ireland,  this  voice  for  home 
rule,  is  a  voice  which  is  now  supported  by  the  opinion  of  the  world; 
this  impulse  is  a  spirit  which  ought  to  be  respected  and  recognized 
in  the  British  Constitution.  It  means  not  mere  vague  talk  of  men's 
rights,  men's  emotions,  and  men's  inveterate  and  traditional  prin 
ciples,  but  it  means  the  embodiment  of  these  things  in  something 
that  is  going  to  be  done,  that  will  look  with  hope  to  the  programme 
that  may  come  out  of  these  conferences. 

If  those  who  conduct  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  are  not 
careful  the  restlessness  will  spread  with  rapid  agitation  until  the 
whole  country  is  aflame,  and  then  there  will  be  revolution  and  a  change 
of  government. 

In  this  speech  he  plainly  indicated  that  his  plan  for  the 
settlement  of  the  Irish  question  was  the  establishment  of 
some  forum  to  which  the  cause  of  Ireland  might  be 
brought,  where  the  full  force  of  the  public  opinion  of  the 
world,  including  the  United  States,  could  be  brought  to 
play  in  a  vigorous  and  whole-hearted  insistence  upon  a 
solution  of  this  world-disturbing  question. 

As  we  read  the  daily  papers,  containing  accounts  of  the 
disturbances  in  Ireland,  what  a  prophetic  vision  underlay 
the  declaration  contained  in  the  speech  of  Woodrow 
Wilson  in  1910! 

If  those  who  conduct  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  are  not 
careful  the  restlessness  will  spread  with  rapid  agitation  until  the 
whole  country  is  aflame,  and  then  there  will  be  revolution  and  a 
change  of  government. 


IRELAND  397 

I  recall  his  passionate  resentment  of  the  attitude  and 
threats  of  Sir  Edward  Carson,  leader  of  the  Unionist 
forces  in  the  British  Parliament,  when  he  read  the  follow 
ing  statement  of  Carson  carried  in  the  American  Press, 
after  the  passage  of  Home  Rule  through  the  House  of 
Lords:  "In  the  event  of  this  proposed  parliament  being 
thrust  upon  us,  we  solemnly  and  mutually  pledge  our 
selves  not  to  recognize  its  authority.  I  do  not  care  two 
pence  whether  this  is  treason  or  not." 

Discussing  Carson's  utterance  the  President  said:  "I 
would  like  to  be  in  Mr.  Asquith's  place.  I  would  show 
this  rebel  whether  he  would  recognize  the  authority  of  the 
Government  or  flaunt  it.  He  ought  to  be  hanged  for 
treason.  If  Asquith  does  not  call  this  gentleman's  bluff, 
the  contagion  of  unrest  and  rebellion  in  Ireland  will 
spread  until  only  a  major  operation  will  save  the  Empire. 
Dallying  with  gentlemen  of  this  kind  who  openly  advocate 
revolution  will  only  add  to  the  difficulties.  If  those  in 
authority  in  England  will  only  act  firmly  now,  their 
difficulties  will  be  lessened.  A  little  of  the  firmness  and 
courage  of  Andrew  Jackson  would  force  a  settlement  of 
the  Irish  question  right  now." 

The  President  did  not  agree  with  the  friends  of  Irish 
freedom  in  America  that  coercive  methods  put  upon 
England  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  United 
States  could  accomplish  anything.  When  he  left  for  the 
other  side  to  take  part  in  the  Peace  Conference,  the  future 
of  Ireland  was  much  in  his  thoughts,  but  his  solution  of 
the  problem  lay  in  the  establishment  of  a  forum  under  the 
League  of  Nations  before  which  not  only  the  cause  of  Ire 
land  but  the  cause  of  any  oppressed  people  might  be 
brought  to  the  judgment  of  mankind. 

Ireland's  affairs  were  always  in  the  background  of  the 


398    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

President's  thoughts  and  he  welcomed  conversations  with 
those  who  were  in  a  position  to  offer  helpful  suggestions. 
I  append  a  correspondence,  intimate  in  character  and  now 
for  the  first  time  "exposed  to  the  public  view,"  between 
the  President,  Mr.  Sidney  Brooks,  a  noted  English  writer, 
and  myself: 

Friday,  April  20,  1917. 
DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

After  several  months  in  America  I  am  now  returning  to  England, 
returning,  I  need  not  say,  in  a  very  happy  mood  and  with  the  con 
sciousness  that  the  relations  between  our  two  countries  are  at  length 
set  fair.  There  is  nothing  nearer  to  my  heart  than  improving  them, 
and  I  believe  I  see  how  they  could  be  improved  and  particularly 
how  the  last  great  obstacle  to  their  betterment — I  mean,  of  course, 
Ireland — could  be  lessened,  if  not  removed.  I  should  very  greatly 
value  an  opportunity  of  setting  before  you  some  views  I  have  formed 
on  the  matter,  if  an  opportunity  could  be  found  before  the  arrival 
of  the  British  Commission. 

I  leave  Washington  on  Sunday  and  sail  for  England  on  the  fol 
lowing  Saturday,  but  not,  I  trust,  without  being  able  to  pay  you  my 
respects  and  say  my  adieux  in  person. 

Believe  me,  dear  Mr.  President, 

Yours  very  sincerely, 

SIDNEY  BROOKS. 
The  President, 

The  White  House. 

In  forwarding  this  letter  to  the  President,  I  accompanied 
it  by  the  following  note: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

April  20,  1917. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

I  just  had  a  little  talk  with  Sidney  Brooks  who  says  he  has  been 
in  correspondence  with  Lloyd  George  and  Lord  Northcliffe  with  ref 
erence  to  the  Home  Rule  question.  He  believes  that  just  a  little 


IRELAND  399 

push  by  you  in  your  private  talk  with  Mr.  Balfour  would  put  over 
home  rule.  He  says  if  you  could  bring  home  to  Balfour  the  amount 
of  American  public  sentiment  which  favours  it  and  how  a  denial  of 
it  is  working  to  the  disadvantage  of  England  in  this  country,  it  w^ould 
make  a  great  impression.  He  says  after  the  war  there  will  of  course 
be  a  great  and  generous  cooperation  between  England  and  this  coun 
try;  but  that  there  will  never  be  genuine  cooperation  between  the 
people  of  America  and  the  people  of  England  until  the  Irish  question 

is  settled.  0.          , 

Sincerely  yours, 

TUMULTY. 
The  President  replied  to  me  in  the  following  note: 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

Confidentially  (for  I  beg  that  you  will  be  careful  not  to  speak  of 
or  intimate  this),  I  have  been  doing  a  number  of  things  about  this 
which  I  hope  may  bear  fruit. 

THE  PRESIDENT. 

Mr.  John  D.  Crimmins,  a  leading  Irish  sympathizer, 
addressed  the  following  letter  to  the  President : 

Washington,  D.  C.,  April  28,  1917. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

The  press  this  morning  leads  to  the  impression  that  at  some  timely 
hour,  in  your  own  manner,  you  will  have  a  word  on  the  Irish  problem 
that  at  this  moment  appears  to  be  near  solution. 

It  would  be  most  timely  and  would  have  the  heartfelt  gratitude 
of  millions  of  people  in  this  and  other  lands  who  have  long  hoped, 
and  many  prayed,  for  Ireland  as  a  small  nation  to  have  autonomy, 
thereby  establishing  peace  with  England  and  among  English-speaking 
people.  Then  if  an  emergency  should  arise  there  would  be  all  for 
one  and  one  for  all.  Mr.  President,  you  have  gone  a  long  step  in 
that  direction  in  declaring  the  rights  of  small  nations — another  step 
may  be  the  means  of  reaching  the  goal  for  the  Irish  people. 

Faithfully  yours, 

TT.   ^      „  JOHN  D.  CRIMMINS. 

His  Excellency, 

Woodrow  Wilson. 


400    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 


The  President  read  this  letter  with  a  great  deal  of  inter 
est  and  sent  me  the  following  note,  evidencing  his  sincere 
interest  in  all  that  Mr.  Crimmins  had  said: 

DEAR  TUMULTY: 

You  are  right  about  Mr.  Crimmins  having  been  a  good  friend, 
but  I  don't  like  to  write  any  letters  on  this  subject  at  present.  I 
would  appreciate  it  very  much  if  you  would  assure  him  of  my  interest 
and  of  your  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  I  am  showing  in  every  way 
I  possibly  can  my  sympathy  with  the  claim  of  Ireland  for  home  rule. 

THE  PRESIDENT. 

On  December  3,  1919,  Bishop  Shahan,  of  the  Catholic 
University,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President  in  behalf 
of  the  rector  and  faculties  of  the  Catholic  University  of 
America  with  reference  to  the  question  of  Home  Rule,  to 
which  the  President  replied : 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

3  December,  1919. 
MY  DEAR  BISHOP  SHAHAN: 

Allow  me  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  November  30th  written 
in  behalf  of  the  rector  and  faculties  of  the  Catholic  University 
of  America,  and  to  say  that  it  will  be  my  endeavour  in  regard  to 
every  question  which  arises  before  the  Peace  Conference  to  do  my 
utmost  to  bring  about  the  realization  of  the  principles  to  which  your 
letter  refers.  The  difficulties  and  delicacy  of  the  task  are  very  great, 
and  I  cannot  confidently  forecast  what  I  can  do.  I  can  only  say 
that  I  shall  be  watchful  of  every  opportunity  to  insist  upon  the 
principles  I  have  enunciated. 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
The  Rt.  Rev.  Thomas  J.  Shahan,  Rector, 

Catholic  University  of  America, 

Washington,  D.  C 


IRELAND  401 

On  December  3,  1918,  he  addressed  a  letter  to  Senator 
Thomas  J.  Walsh,  of  Montana,  as  follows: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

3  December,  1919. 
MY  DEAR  SENATOR: 

I  appreciate  the  importance  of  a  proper  solution  of  the  Irish  ques 
tion  and  thank  you  for  the  suggestions  of  your  letter  of  yesterday. 
Until  I  get  on  the  other  side  and  find  my  footing  in  delicate  matters 
of  this  sort  I  cannot  forecast  with  any  degree  of  confidence  what 
influence  I  can  exercise,  but  you  may  be  sure  that  I  shall  keep  this 
important  interest  in  mind  and  shall  use  my  influence  at  every  oppor 
tunity  to  bring  about  a  just  and  satisfactory  solution. 

I  greatly  value  the  expressions  of  your  confidence  and  feel  very 
much  strengthened  by  them. 

With  the  best  wishes, 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
Hon.  Thomas  J.  Walsh, 
United  States  Senate. 

While  the  President  was  in  Paris,  I  constantly  kept 
him  in  touch  with  the  situation  in  this  country,  and  that 
he  was  interested  in  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the  Peace 
Conference  the  cause  of  Ireland  is  made  clear  by  the 
following  cables  that  were  exchanged  between  us. 

On  June  7,  1919,  I  cabled  Admiral  Grayson,  for  the 
President  as  follows: 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

7  June,  1919. 

You  cannot  overestimate  real  intensity  of  feeling  behind  Irish 
question  here.  It  is  growing  every  day  and  is  not  at  all  confined 
to  Irishmen.  The  passage  of  resolution  of  sympathy  with  almost 
unanimous  vote  in  Senate  last  night  is  but  a  slight  evidence  of  in 
terest  here.  I  wish  the  President  could  do  just  a  little  for  I  fear 


402    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

reaction  here  upon  League  of  Nations.     If  this  situation  could  be 
straightened  out,  it  would  help  a  great  deal. 

TUMULTY. 

The  President  himself  replied  to  this  cable,  showing 
the  depth  of  his  interest  in  the  matter: 

Paris,  8  June,  1919. 

I  have  tried  to  help  in  the  Irish  matter,  but  the  extraordinary 
indiscretion  of  the  American  delegation  over  here  has  almost  com 
pletely  blocked  everything. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

On  June  9,  1919,  I  received  a  further  cable  from  the 
President,  as  follows: 

Paris,  9  June,  1919. 

The  American  Committee  of  Irishmen  have  made  it  exceedingly 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  render  the  assistance  we  were  dili 
gently  trying  to  render  in  the  matter  of  bringing  the  Irish  aspirations 
to  the  attention  of  the  Peace  Conference.  By  our  unofficial  activity 
in  the  matter  we  had  practically  cleared  the  way  for  the  coming  of 
the  Irish  Representatives  to  Paris  when  the  American  Commission 
went  to  Ireland  and  behaved  in  a  way  which  so  inflamed  British 
opinion  that  the  situation  has  got  quite  out  of  hand,  and  we  are 
utterly  at  a  loss  how  to  act  in  the  matter  without  involving  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  with  the  Government  of  Great  Britain 
in  a  way  which  might  create  an  actual  breach  between  the  two. 
I  made  an  effort  day  before  yesterday  in  this  matter  which  shows,  I 
am  afraid,  the  utter  futility  of  further  efforts.  I  am  distressed 
that  the  American  Commission  should  have  acted  with  such  ex 
treme  indiscretion  and  lack  of  sense,  and  can  at  the  moment  see 
nothing  further  to  do. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

To  this  cable  I  replied  as  follows : 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

9  June,  1919. 

Thanks  for  message  about  Ireland,  Hope  you  will  not  allow 
indiscretions  of  American  Commission  to  influence  your  judgment 


IRELAND  403 

against  Ireland.  Lloyd  George's  mistakes  in  handling  this  will  be 
his  undoing,  for  it  has  in  it  the  elements  of  a  revolution.  It  is  our 
own  political  situation  here  and  the  fate  of  the  Treaty  itself  that  con 
cern  me.  In  this  country  the  Irish  are  united  in  this  matter  and  in 
every  large  city  and  town  are  carrying  on  a  propaganda,  asking 
that  Ireland  be  given  the  right  of  self-determination.  George  Creel, 
in  a  powerful  article  yesterday  in  the  newspapers,  said :  Quote  The  ques 
tion  of  Ireland  cannot  be  ignored,  either  in  honour  or  decency  End 
quote.  I  trust  you  can  say  a  word.  Could  you  not  ask  that  Irish  dele 
gates  be  give  a  chance  to  present  their  case  to  the  Conference? 

TUMULTY. 

On  June  25,  1919,  I  sent  the  following  cable  to  the 
President : 

General  Maurice,  in  wonderful  article  in  New  York  Times  on 
League  of  Nations,  says  about  Ireland :  Quote  One  obvious  need  to  com 
plete  the  process  of  bringing  all  nations  together  is  that  we  should 
show  that  we  know  what  America  did  in  the  war,  but  there  is  another 
obvious  need,  which  presents  greater  difficulties.  We  must  have  a 
policy  in  regard  to  Ireland,  which  we  can  explain  to  the  American 
people.  At  present  Ireland  threatens  to  reopen  all  the  rifts  which 
comradeship  in  the  war  is  closing  End  quote. 

The  New  York  Evening  Post  of  last  night  prints  the  following 
editorial : 

Quote  Self-Government  for  the  Irish  people,  short  of  independence,  is 
a  right  and  a  necessity,  and  it  is  a  satisfaction  that  once  more  a  move 
ment  is  under  way  for  the  establishment  of  Ireland  on  the  basis  which 
logic  and  history  have  determined — a  dominion  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  other  dominions  under  the  British  crown  End  quote. 

Frankly,  this  represents  the  opinion  of  the  average  man  in  America, 
without  regard  to  race  or  religion.  The  arrival  of  De  Valera  in 
America  is  going  to  intensify  the  feeling  and  the  Republicans  will 
take  full  advantage  of  it.  Now  that  the  League  of  Nations  is  on  its 
feet,  we  should  take  the  lead  in  this  matter.  It  would  do  more  toward 
bringing  about  a  real  comradeship  between  England  and  America 
than  anything  that  could  happen.  I  think  that  the  situation  in 
Africa,  India,  and  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  in  Canada,  will  in 
evitably  force  England  to  consider  these  matters.  It  is  in  anticipa- 


404    WOODROW   WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

tion  of  this  that  I  am  anxious  to  have  you  play  a  leading  part  in  this 
situation.  It  would  do  much  to  make  the  League  of  Nations  a  living, 
vital  force  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  There  are  no  boundary  lines 
between  free  peoples  any  more. 

TUMULTY. 

TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington.  Paris,  June  27,  1919. 

I  entirely  agree  with  the  general  tenor  of  your  cable  of  the  twenty- 
fifth  about  the  Irish  question  and  I  firmly  believe  when  the  League 
of  Nations  is  once  organized  it  will  afford  a  forum  not  now  available 
for  bringing  the  opinion  of  the  world  and  of  the  United  States  in 
particular  to  bear  on  just  such  problems. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

Of  course,  the  thing  which  lay  close  to  Woodrow 
Wilson's  heart  was  the  setting  up  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Unless  England  and  France  should  consent  to  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  league  as  part  of  a  world  settlement,  any 
solution  of  the  Irish  question  through  the  influence  of 
world  opinion  was  not  in  the  reckoning.  The  wise, 
prudent  thing,  therefore,  to  do  was  first  to  establish  a 
world  court  before  which  the  cause  of  any  oppressed 
peoples  might  be  brought.  This  is  just  what  he  had  in 
mind  and  what  he  succeeded  in  doing.  To  have  thrust 
a  settlement  of  Ireland's  affairs  into  the  foreground  of  the 
Peace  Conference  and  to  have  made  it  a  sine  qua  non 
would  have  been  futile  and  foolish  and  might  have  re 
sulted  in  disaster.  Unfortunately,  the  friends  of  Irish 
freedom,  deprecating  and  bitterly  resenting  well-con 
sidered  methods  like  this,  were  desirous  of  having  the 
matter  thrust  into  the  early  conferences  at  Paris.  The 
President  knew  that  England  would  never  consent  to  this 
and  would  resent  any  attempt  on  his  part  to  carry  out 
this  idea.  If  the  President  had  done  so,  England  would 


IRELAND  405 

undoubtedly  have  withdrawn  from  the  Conference  and 
thus  the  great  cause  of  the  League  of  Nations,  which 
formed  the  foundation  stone  upon  which  the  Armistice 
was  based,  would  have  gone  by  the  board.  The  Presi 
dent  was  looking  far  beyond  a  mere  recognition  of  the 
Irish  Republic.  He  was  seeking  to  accomplish  its  se 
curity  and  guarantee  its  permanency  through  the  instru 
mentality  of  a  world  court  like  the  League  of  Nations. 
What  would  it  have  availed  Ireland  to  have  been  granted 
Dominion  government  or  independence  unless  con 
temporaneously  with  the  grant  there  was  set  up  an 
instrumentality  that  would  guarantee  and  protect  it? 
The  only  thing  upon  which  the  Peace  Conference  func 
tioned  was  the  settlement  of  the  affairs  of  those  nations 
affected  by  the  war. 

Why  didn't  Wilson  bring  Ireland's  cause  to  the  at 
tention  of  the  Peace  Conference?  was  the  query  which 
frequently  reached  us  at  the  White  House.  The  President 
in  his  Western  speeches  discussed  this  matter  in  the 
following  way: 

"It  was  not  within  the  privilege  of  the  Conference  of 
peace  to  act  upon  the  right  of  self-determination  of  any 
peoples  except  those  which  had  been  included  in  the 
territories  of  the  defeated  empires — that  is  to  say,  it  was 
not  then  within  their  power — but  the  moment  the  Cove 
nant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  adopted  it  becomes  their 
right.  If  the  desire  for  self-determination  of  any  people 
in  the  world  is  likely  to  affect  the  peace  of  the  world  or  the 
good  understanding  between  nations  it  becomes  the  busi 
ness  of  the  League;  it  becomes  the  right  of  any  member  of 
the  League  to  call  attention  to  it;  it  becomes  the  function 
of  the  League  to  bring  the  whole  process  of  the  opinion  of 
the  world  to  bear  upon  that  very  matter. 


406    WOODROW   WILSON    AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

"Article  XI  is  the  favourite  article  in  the  Treaty  so  far 
as  I  am  concerned.  It  says  that  every  matter  which  is 
likely  to  affect  the  peace  of  the  world  is  everybody's 
business;  that  it  shall  be  the  friendly  right  of  any  nation 
to  call  attention  of  the  League  to  anything  that  is  likely 
to  affect  the  peace  of  the  world  or  the  good  understanding 
between  nations,  upon  which  the  peace  of  the  world 
depends,  whether  that  matter  immediately  concerns 
the  nation  drawing  attention  to  it  or  not.  In  other 
words,  at  present  we  have  to  mind  our  own  business, 
under  the  rules  of  diplomacy  and  established  custom. 
Under  the  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  we  can 
mind  other  people's  business,  and  anything  that  affects 
the  peace  of  the  world,  whether  we  are  parties  to  it  or  not, 
can  by  our  delegates  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  man 
kind.  We  can  force  a  nation  on  the  other  side  of  the 
globe  to  bring  to  that  bar  of  mankind  any  wrong  that 
is  afoot  in  that  part  of  the  world  which  is  likely  to  affect 
the  good  understanding  between  nations,  and  we  can 
oblige  them  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be  remedied. 
There  is  not  an  oppressed  people  in  the  world  which  cannot 
henceforth  get  a  hearing  at  that  forum,  and  you  know 
what  a  hearing  will  mean  if  the  cause  of  those  people  is 
just.  The  one  thing  that  those  doing  injustice  have  most 
reason  to  dread  is  publicity  and  discussion.  At  present 
what  is  the  state  of  international  law  and  understanding? 
No  nation  has  the  right  to  call  attention  to  anything  that 
does  not  directly  affect  its  own  affairs.  If  it  does,  it 
cannot  only  be  told  to  mind  its  own  business,  but  it  risks 
the  cordial  relationship  between  itself  and  the  nation 
whose  affairs  it  draws  under  discussion;  whereas,  under 
Article  XI,  which  I  had  the  honour  of  advocating,  the 
very  sensible  provision  is  made  that  the  peace  of  the  world 


IRELAND  407 

transcends  all  the  susceptibilities  of  nations  and  govern 
ments,  and  that  they  are  obliged  to  consent  to  discuss  and 
explain  anything  which  does  affect  the  good  understanding 
between  nations." 

Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  in  his  valuable  work  on  the 
League  of  Nations,  comments  pointedly  on  this  privilege: 

Various  Irish  writers,  including  some  who  deserve  serious  atten 
tion,  have  raised  the  question  whether  the  standing  problem  of  Irish 
autonomy  can  come  before  the  League  of  Nations.  There  is  only 
one  way  in  which  this  could  happen — namely,  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  should  declare  Irish-American  sympathy  with 
unsatisfied  nationalist  claims  in  Ireland  to  be  capable  of  disturbing 
good  understanding  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
That  is  a  possible  event  if  a  solution  is  not  reached  within  a  reason 
able  time,  but  it  is  more  likely  that  a  confidential  intimation  from  the 
United  States  would  not  only  precede  a  formal  reference  to  the  Coun 
cil,  but  avoid  the  necessity  for  it. 

The  friends  of  Ireland  in  this  country  have  often  asked 
me  the  question:  "Would  Woodrow  Wilson  have  inter 
vened  in  behalf  of  Ireland?" 

I  can  answer  this  question  only  by  saying  that  Ireland 
has  never  had  a  truer  friend  than  Woodrow  Wilson. 
From  the  day  that  we  went  to  war  it  has  been  his  stead 
fast  purpose  to  induce  the  Government  of  England  to 
settle  the  Irish  question  justly  and  permanently.  His 
statesmanlike  approach  to  a  settlement  of  the  problem  is 
the  only  one  that  holds  hope  of  success. 

As  I  completed  this  chapter,  an  article  appeared  in  a 
Washington  newspaper  apparently  confirmatory  -of  the 
President's  foresight,  showing  that  by  September,  1921, 
Mr.  De  Valera  had  arrived  at  the  same  view.  The  article 
seems  to  show  Mr.  De  Valera  as  insisting  that  the  British 


408    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Government  grant  Ireland  membership  in  the  League  of 
Nations  as  one  of  the  guarantees  of  autonomy. 

As  for  myself,  I  believe  that  Ireland  is  going  to  be  free 
in  company  with  the  rest  of  the  world  and  in  accordance 
with  a  new  world  order  which  shall  function  through  the 
machinery  for  justice  and  liberty  which  is  provided  for 
in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  is  provided 
for  nowhere  else. 


CHAPTER  XL 

PROHIBITION 

ONE  of  the  things  for  which  the  Wilson  Administra 
tion  was  held  to  "strict  accountability"  was  the 
passage  of  the  Eighteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fed 
eral  Constitution,  establishing  nation-wide  prohibition. 

Unfair  critics  of  the  President,  in  their  foolish  attempt 
to  charge  the  Administration  with  every  unusual  happen 
ing  in  the  eight  years  of  Democratic  control,  had  stated 
that  the  President  was  the  real  motive  force  that  lay  back 
of  the  movement  to  establish  the  Eighteenth  Amendment 
as  part  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  country.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  during  the  discussion  of  this  amendment 
in  the  Senate  and  House,  the  President  maintained  toward 
it  an  attitude  of  absolute  neutrality.  While  he  was  an 
ardent  advocate  of  temperance,  he  felt  that  Congress  in 
enforcing  the  amendment  by  the  passage  of  the  Volstead 
Act,  so  extreme  and  unreasonable  in  character,  had  gone 
a  long  way  toward  alienating  the  support  of  every  temper 
ance-loving  citizen  in  the  country,  and  that  certain  of  its 
provisions  had  struck  at  the  foundation  of  our  government 
by  its  arbitrary  interference  with  personal  liberty  and 
freedom.  He  felt  that  the  practical  unanimity  with 
which  the  Eighteenth  Amendment  was  supported  arose 
from  a  nation-wide  resentment  against  abuses  by  the 
American  saloon  and  the  economic  evils  that  had  grown 
out  of  the  unorganized  liquor  traffic.  He  felt  that  it  was 
unreasonable  for  Congress,  in  the  Volstead  Act,  to  declare 

409 


410    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I   KNOW   HIM 

any  beverage  containing  an  excess  of  one  half  of  one  per 
cent,  of  alcohol  intoxicating  and  that  to  frame  a  law  which 
arbitrarily  places  intoxicating  and  non-intoxicating  bever 
ages  within  the  same  classification  was  openly  to  invite 
mental  resentment  against  it.  He  was  of  the  opinion 
that  it  required  no  compromise  or  weakening  of  the 
Eighteenth  Amendment  in  order  to  deal  justly  and  fairly 
with  the  serious  protests  that  followed  the  enactment  into 
law  of  the  Volstead  Act.  He  was,  therefore,  in  favour  of 
permitting  the  manufacture  and  sale,  under  proper 
governmental  regulations,  of  light  wines  and  beers,  which 
action  in  his  opinion  would  make  it  much  easier  to  enforce 
the  amendment  in  its  essential  particulars  and  would  help 
to  end  the  illicit  traffic  in  liquor  which  the  Volstead  Act 
fostered  by  its  very  severity.  This  would  put  back  of  the 
enforcement  of  the  Eighteenth  Amendment  the  public 
sentiment  always  necessary  to  the  execution  of  laws. 
Satisfied  with  a  reasonable  recognition  of  their  rights  to 
personal  liberty  and  control  of  their  personal  habits,  he 
believed  that  the  American  people  would  be  the  readier  to 
turn  their  attention  to  the  grave  issues  of  reconstruction 
and  steadier  in  meeting  these  issues  which  would  test  to 
the  utmost  our  capacity  for  progressive  self-government. 

Time  and  time  again  when  we  discussed  the  Volstead 
Act,  he  would  say:  "The  wrong  way  of  doing  the  right 
thing.  You  cannot  regulate  the  morals  and  habits  of  a 
great  cosmopolitan  people  by  placing  unreasonable  restric 
tions  upon  their  liberty  and  freedom.  All  such  attempts 
can  only  end  in  failure  and  disappointment.  In  the  last 
analysis,  in  these  matters  that  seek  to  regulate  personal 
habits  and  customs,  public  opinion  is  the  great  regulator." 

In  New  Jersey,  where  he  served  as  governor,  the 
liquor  question  had  been  for  many  years  a  burning  issue 


PROHIBITION  411 

and  had  been  thrust  into  every  gubernatorial  campaign  up 
to  the  time  when  Woodrow  Wilson  as  governor  took  hold 
of  the  situation.  Many  political  futures  had  been 
wrecked  and  wasted  by  ambitious  politicians  who  tried  to 
"pussyfoot"  on  this  issue.  But  there  was  no  shying 
away  from  it  by  Woodrow  Wilson.  When  the  question 
was  presented  to  him  by  the  ardent  advocates  of  the 
Anti-Saloon  League  early  in  his  administration  as  gover 
nor,  without  evasion  of  any  kind,  he  stated  his  views  in 
the  following  letter  addressed  to  the  head  of  the  Anti- 
Saloon  League: 

Executive  Office, 
Trenton,  New  Jersey. 

I  am  in  favour  of  local  option.  I  am  a  thorough  believer  in  local 
self-government  and  believe  that  every  self-governing  community 
which  constitutes  a  social  unit  should  have  the  right  to  control 
the  matter  of  the  regulation  or  the  withholding  of  licenses. 

But  the  questions  involved  are  social  and  moral,  not  political, 
and  are  not  susceptible  of  being  made  parts  of  a  party  programme. 
Whenever  they  have  been  made  the  subject  matter  of  party  contests, 
they  have  cut  the  lines  of  party  organization  and  party  action 
athwart,  to  the  utter  confusion  of  political  action  in  every  other  field. 
They  have  thrown  every  other  question,  however  important,  into 
the  background  and  have  made  constructive  party  action  impossible 
for  long  years  together. 

So  far  as  I  am  myself  concerned,  therefore,  I  can  never  consent 
to  have  the  question  of  local  option  made  an  issue  between  political 
parties  in  this  state.  My  judgment  is  very  clear  in  this  matter. 
I  do  not  believe  that  party  programmes  of  the  highest  consequence 
to  the  political  life  of  the  state  and  the  nation  ought  to  be  thrust 
to  one  side  and  hopelessly  embarrassed  for  long  periods  together  by 
making  a  political  issue  of  a  great  question  that  is  essentially  non- 
political,  non-partisan,  moral  and  social  in  its  nature. 

Holding  these  views,  that  the  liquor  question  was  one 
which  was  "essentially  non-political,  non-partisan,  moral 
and  social  in  its  nature, "  the  President  refused  by  any  act 


412    WOODROW   WILSON    AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

of  his  to  influence  public  opinion  when  the  Eighteenth 
Amendment  was  up  for  consideration  in  the  Senate  and 
House. 

He  deeply  resented  and  strenuously  opposed  the  passage 
of  war-time  prohibition  as  uncalled  for  and  unnecessary. 
In  his  opinion,  it  was  not  a  food-conservation  measure,  but 
an  out-and-out  attempt  by  the  anti-saloon  forces  to  use 
the  war  emergency  to  declare  the  country  "dry"  by 
Congressional  action.  There  was  another  reason  for 
his  attitude  of  opposition  to  war-time  prohibition.  He 
believed  with  an  embargo  placed  upon  beer,  the  con 
sumption  of  whiskey,  of  which  there  were  large  stocks 
in  the  country,  would  be  stimulated  and  increased  to  a 
great  extent.  In  this  opinion  he  was  supported  by  Mr 
Herbert  Hoover,  Food  Administrator.  In  a  letter  of 
May  28,  1918,  to  Senator  Sheppard,  the  leader  of  the 
prohibition  forces  in  the  Senate,  he  explained  his  oppo 
sition  to  war-time  prohibition  in  these  words: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

May  28,  1918. 
HON.  MORRIS  SHEPPARD, 
United  States  Senate. 

MY  DEAR  SENATOR: 

I  was  very  much  distressed  by  the  action  of  the  House.  I  do 
not  think  that  it  is  wise  or  fair  to  attempt  to  put  such  compulsion 
on  the  Executive  in  a  matter  in  which  he  has  already  acted  almost 
to  the  limit  of  his  authority.  What  is  almost  entirely  overlooked 
is  that  there  were,  as  I  am  informed,  very  large  stocks  of  whiskey 
in  this  country,  and  it  seems  to  me  quite  certain  that  if  the  brewing 
of  beer  were  prevented  entirely,  along  with  all  other  drinks,  many 
of  them  harmless,  which  are  derived  from  food  and  food  stuffs,  the 
consumption  of  whiskey  would  be  stimulated  and  increased  to  a  very 
considerable  extent. 

My  own  judgment  is  that  it  is  wise  and  statesmanlike  to  let  the 


PROHIBITION  413 

situation  stand  as  it  is  for  the  present,  until  at  any  rate  I  shall  be 
apprised  by  the  Food  Administration  that  it  is  necessary  in  the  way 
suggested  still  further  to  conserve  the  supply  of  food  and  food  stuffs. 
The  Food  Administration  has  not  thought  it  necessary  to  go  any 
further  than  we  have  in  that  matter  already  gone. 

I  thank  you  most  cordially,  Senator,  for  your  kindness  in  con 
sulting  me  in  this  matter,  which  is  of  very  considerable  importance, 
and  has  a  very  distinct  bearing  upon  many  collateral  questions. 
Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

War-time  prohibition  was  ingenuously  made  part  of  the 
Agricultural  Appropriation  Bill,  which  contained  many 
items  necessary  for  the  effective  prosecution  of  the  war. 
So  strongly  did  the  President  feel  about  the  matter,  that 
I  am  frank  to  say  that  if  war-time  prohibition  had  stood 
alone  and  was  disconnected  from  any  other  bill,  I  believe 
it  would  have  been  vetoed. 

After  the  Armistice,  agitation  at  once  began,  inspired 
by  the  "dry"  advocates  throughout  the  country,  to  pro 
long  war-time  prohibition,  but  the  President  felt  that  the 
object  and  purpose  of  war-time  prohibition,  if  any  ever 
existed,  having  been  served,  it  was  only  right,  proper,  and 
fair  that  there  should  be  an  immediate  repeal  of  it,  and 
that  only  resentment  and  restlessness  throughout  the 
country  would  follow  the  attempt  to  prolong  war-time 
prohibition  beyond  the  time  provided  in  the  statute  which 
created  it. 

It  was  unfortunate  that  the  "dry"  advocates  did  not 
see  the  thing  through  the  eyes  of  the  President.  Ap 
parently  not  fully  satisfied  with  the  victory  they  had  won 
through  the  adoption  of  the  Eighteenth  Amendment, 
they  sought  to  push  the  advantage  thus  gained  still 
further,  and  through  war-time  prohibition  to  establish 
their  policy  of  restriction  as  a  permanent  policy  of  the 


414    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW   HIM 

country.  Realizing  that  prohibition  as  a  permanent 
policy  and  by  constitutional  amendment  had  been 
definitely  established  in  a  constitutional  way,  the  Presi 
dent  was  reluctant  to  take  a  stand  that  would  even  in 
spirit  be  a  violation  of  this,  but  he  also  felt  that  the  "dry" 
advocates  were  simply  using  a  war  crisis  ruthlessly  to  press 
forward  their  views  and  to  cajole  vacillating  congressmen 
into  supporting  it  because  it  was  known  as  a  "dry" 
measure.  In  a  letter  which  I  addressed  to  the  President 
on  September  7, 1918, 1  strongly  urged  the  veto  of  the  Agri 
cultural  Appropriation  Bill  containing  war-time  prohi 
bition: 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

September  7,  1918. 
MY  DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

In  the  discussion  we  had  a  few  days  ago  with  reference  to  the 
pending  "dry"  legislation,  I  tried  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  under 
the  Food  Control  Law  you  had  the  power  to  do  what  Congress  is 
now  seeking  to  do  in  a  way  that  will  cause  great  irritation.  Your 
action  of  yesterday  fixing  December  first  as  the  day  on  which  the 
prohibition  of  the  manufacture  of  beer  is  to  take  place,  I  believe, 
strengthens  what  I  said.  Your  action  and  the  action  of  the  Senate 
a  day  or  two  ago  in  giving  you  the  right  to  establish  zones  about 
shipyards  and  munitions  plants  again  shows  the  unnecessary  character 
of  this  legislation.  You  are,  therefore,  now  in  a  strong  position 
to  veto  this  legislation  as  unnecessary  and  unwarranted. 

In  view  of  all  of  this,  I  wish  to  emphasize  the  dangers,  both  of  a 
political  and  industrial  character,  that  confront  us  should  we  agree 
to  go  forward  with  those  who  favour  legislation  of  this  radical  and 
restricted  character.  Even  the  most  ardent  prohibitionists  fear 
the  reactionary  effect  of  this  legislation  upon  the  pending  consti 
tutional  amendment.  I  am  afraid  of  its  effects  upon  the  voters  of 
our  party  in  the  large  centres  of  population  throughout  the  country, 
and  of  the  deep  resentment  from  all  classes  that  is  bound  to  follow. 

In  matters  of  legislation  that  seek  to  regulate  the  morals  and 


PROHIBITION  415 

habits  of  the  people,  the  average  American  feels  the  only  safe  course 
to  follow  is  the  method  set  forth  in  the  Constitution  for  the  regula 
tion  of  these  vital  matters.  The  proponents  of  this  measure  agree 
that  it  is  not  a  conservation  measure,  but  that  it  is  an  out-and-out 
attempt  to  declare  the  country  "dry."  In  my  opinion,  it  is  mob 
legislation,  pure  and  simple. 

The  danger  of  submitting  quietly  to  any  class  legislation  that 
has  its  basis  in  intolerance,  especially  at  a  time  like  this  where  the 
emotions  of  people  can  be  whipped  into  a  fury,  is  obvious.  Your 
strength  in  the  country  comes  from  the  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
people  that  under  no  circumstances  can  you  be  "hazed"  by  any  class. 
If  you  yield  in  this  instance,  similar  demands  from  other  sources 
will  rise  to  harass  and  embarrass  you. 

The  viewpoint  of  the  gentlemen  on  the  Hill  in  charge  of  this  bill 
is  provincial.  They  have  no  idea  of  the  readjustments  that  will 
have  to  come  in  the  finances  of  our  largest  cities  and  municipalities 
through  the  country.  Tax  rates  are  bound  to  go  up.  Increased 
taxation  in  large  cities,  coming  at  a  time  when  federal  taxes  are 
growing  more  burdensome,  is  bound  to  play  a  large  part  in  the  opinion 
of  the  people,  and  we  cannot  escape  our  responsibility  if  we  seem  to 
be  afraid  to  oppose  legislation  of  this  kind.  Our  policy  in  every 
matter  at  this  time  should  be  one  based  upon  magnanimity  and 
tolerance  toward  every  class  and  interest  in  the  country. 

Under  date  of  May  9,  1919,  I  sent  the  following  cable 
to  the  President  who  was  then  in  Paris: 

I  sincerely  hope  you  will  consider  the  advisability  of  raising  the 
embargo  on  beer.  The  most  violent  reaction  has  taken  place 
throughout  the  country  since  the  enactment  of  this  law,  especially 
in  the  larger  cities.  It  is  not,  I  assure  you,  the  result  of  brewery 
propaganda.  It  comes  from  many  of  the  humbler  sort  who  resent 
this  kind  of  federal  interference  with  their  rights.  We  are  being 
blamed  for  all  this  restrictive  legislation  because  you  insist  upon 
closing  down  all  breweries  and  thus  making  prohibition  effective 
July  first.  The  country  would  be  more  ready  to  accept  prohibition 
brought  about  by  Constitutional  amendment  than  have  it  made 
effective  by  Presidential  ukase.  The  psychological  effect  of  raising 
this  embargo  would  be  of  incalculable  benefit  to  America  in  every 


416    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

way  at  this  time.  The  Springfield  Republican  says,  Quote  The  establish 
ment  of  national  prohibition  by  Federal  statute,  through  the  mere 
act  of  Congress,  does  not  appeal  to  one  as  so  desirable  as  the  establish 
ment  of  national  prohibition  by  the  direct  action  of  three  fourths  of  the 
states  End  Quote.  The  war-time  Prohibition  Law,  according  to  the  text 
of  the  Act,  was  enacted  for  the  purpose  of  conserving  the  man-power 
of  the  nation  and  to  increase  the  efficiency  in  the  production  of  arms, 
munitions,  ships,  and  for  the  Army  and  Navy. 

The  New  York  World,  in  an  editorial,  says :  Quote  This  war-time  pro 
hibition  act  is  breeding  social,  industrial,  and  economic  discontent 
every  day.  What  makes  it  still  more  infamous  is  that  under  its 
provisions  the  rich  man,  because  he  has  money,  can  accumulate 
for  his  personal  consumption  whatever  stocks  of  wines  and  liquors 
he  pleases,  but  the  workingman,  because  he  cannot  afford  to  lay 
in  a  supply  of  anything,  is  deprived  even  of  a  glass  of  beer  with 
his  evening  meal.  There  has  never  been  another  such  measure  of 
outrageous  class  and  social  discrimination  on  the  statute  books  of 
the  United  States.  It  should  never  have  been  enacted  by  Con 
gress.  It  should  never  have  been  signed  by  the  President.  If  it 
is  not  repealed  it  is  bound  to  cause  more  trouble  than  any  other 
piece  of  Federal  legislation  since  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  End  Quote. 

By  taking  vigorous  action  in  this  matter,  you  would  do  more  for 
the  cause  of  real  temperance  and  hearten  those  people  who  feel  the 
sting  of  the  wave  of  intolerance  which  is  now  spreading  over  the 
country  than  anything  you  could  think  of.  I  wish  I  could  meet  you 
face  to  face  and  try  to  impress  upon  you  the  utter  necessity  for  this 
action.  You  will  have  to  take  action  soon. 

TUMULTY. 

On  May  12, 1919, 1  received  the  following  cable  from  the 
President : 

Paris. 

TUMULTY,  White  House, 

Washington. 

Please  ask  the  Attorney  General  to  advise  me  what  action  I  can 
take  with  regard  to  removing  the  ban  from  the  manufacture  of  drink 
and  as  to  the  form  the  action  should  take. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


PROHIBITION  417 

On  May  12,  1919, 1  replied  to  this  cable  as  follows: 

White   House,   Washington, 

May  12,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris,  France. 

Have  consulted  Attorney  General  with  regard  to  removing  ban 
upon  manufacture  of  alcoholic  liquor.  Am  in  receipt  of  a  letter 
from  him  in  which  he  says :  Quote  The  only  action  you  can  take  until 
demobilization  may  be  determined  and  proclaimed,  will  be  to  issue 
a  public  statement  or  send  a  message  to  Congress  declaring  that  since 
the  purpose  of  the  Act  has  been  entirely  satisfied,  nothing  prevents 
your  lifting  the  ban  on  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  beer,  wine,  or 
other  intoxicating  malt  or  vinous  liquors  except  the  limitations 
imposed  by  the  Act  which  maintains  it  in  force  until  demobilization 
is  terminated  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  End  Quote 

TUMULTY. 

On  May  20,  1919,  in  a  message  to  Congress,  the  Presi 
dent  made  the  following  recommendation  with  reference  to 
war-time  prohibition: 

The  demobilization  of  the  military  forces  of  the  country  has  pro 
gressed  to  such  a  point  that  it  seems  to  me  entirely  safe  now  to  re 
move  the  ban  upon  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  wines  and  beers, 
but  I  am  advised  that  without  further  legislation  I  have  not  the 
legal  authority  to  remove  the  present  restrictions.  I  therefore 
recommend  that  the  Act  approved  November  21,  1918,  entitled  "an 
Act  to  enable  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  to  carry  out,  during  the 
fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1919,  the  purposes  of  the  Act,  entitled 
'An  Act  to  provide  further  for  the  national  security  and  defense 
by  stimulating  agriculture  and  facilitating  the  distribution  of  agricul 
tural  products,  and  for  other  purposes,'  be  amended  and  repealed 
in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  wines  and  beers." 

Congress  refused  to  act  upon  the  President's  recom 
mendation. 


418    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Under  date  of  June  27,  1919,  I  sent  the  following  cable 
to  the  President : 

There  are  only  four  days  left  until  nation-wide  prohibition  be 
comes  effective  and  the  country  will  go  on  a  whiskey  basis  unless 
you  act  to  suspend  it.  Everything  that  has  happened  in  the  last 
few  weeks  confirms  the  views  I  expressed  to  you  in  May  excepting 
that  added  force  has  been  given  to  every  argument  made,  especially 
by  the  action  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labour  whose  member 
ship  almost  unanimously  voted  at  its  convention  for  lifting  the  ban. 
The  action  of  Canada  in  lifting  the  ban  is  regarded  by  the  country 
as  significant.  Workingmen  and  common  people  all  over  the  country 
cannot  understand  why  light  wines  and  beer  cannot  be  permitted 
until  the  Constitutional  amendment  becomes  effective.  Only 
this  week  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  voted  to  legalize  two  and 
three-quarters  per  cent,  beer  and  light  wines.  Similar  action  will 
follow  in  other  states.  The  consensus  of  opinion  in  the  press  is  that 
if  prohibition  is  to  be  effective,  it  might  better  be  by  action  of  three 
quarters  of  the  states  rather  than  by  Presidential  proclamation  for 
which  you  alone  and  our  party  would  bear  the  responsibility.  The 
prohibitionists  in  Congress  are  fearful  that  the  enforcement  of  war 
time  prohibition  will  cause  a  harmful  reaction  on  real  prohibition, 
and  I  believe  that  they  are  secretly  in  favour  of  your  lifting  the  ban 
for  this  reason.  Demobilization  figures  officially  announced  by  the 
War  Department  show  that  the  number  of  troops  now  remaining 
in  service  is  practically  only  the  number  of  troops  in  the  Regular 
Army.  Samuel  Gompers,  Mary  Roberts  Rinehart,  Mrs.  Douglass 
Robinson,  sister  of  the  late  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Miss  Gertrude 
Atherton,  Frank  J.  Goodnow,  president  of  Johns  Hopkins  University, 
and  Cardinal  Gibbons  out  in  strong  statement  favouring  retention 
of  beer  and  light  wines.  If  you  do  not  intend  to  lift  the  ban  on 
July  first,  you  can  announce  your  intention  to  suspend  it  as  soon  as 
the  War  Department  notifies  you  demobilization  is  accomplished 
which,  the  best  opinion  says,  will  be  August  first.  The  feeling  all 
over  the  country  is  one  of  harmful  uncertainty  and  I  strongly  recom 
mend  that  a  definite  announcement,  of  some  nature  which  will  clear 
the  atmosphere,  be  made. 

TUMULTY. 


PROHIBITION  419 

On  June  28,  1919,  I  again  cabled  the  President,  as 
follows: 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

28  June,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Received  your  message  saying  that  you  do  not  intend  to  lift 
the  ban.  The  Republicans  have  been  industriously  spreading  the 
story  throughout  the  country  that  you  in  fact  have  power  under 
the  Act  of  November  21,  1918,  to  lift  the  ban.  I  think  it  important, 
wise,  and  politic,  therefore,  for  you  to  make  a  statement  which  we 
can  issue  from  the  White  House  along  the  following  lines :  Quote  I  am 
convinced  that  I  have  no  legal  power  at  this  time  in  the  matter  of 
the  ban  of  liquor.  Under  the  Act  of  November  21,  1918,  my  power 
to  take  action  is  restricted.  The  Act  provides  that  after  June  30, 
1919,  until  the  conclusion  of  the  present  war  and  thereafter  until  the 
termination  of  demobilization,  the  date  of  which  shall  be  determined 
and  proclaimed  by  the  President,  it  shall  be  unlawful,  etc.  This  law 
does  not  specify  that  the  ban  shall  be  lifted  with  the  signing  of  peace 
but  with  the  termination  of  the  demobilization  of  the  troops,  and 
I  cannot  say  that  that  has  been  accomplished.  My  information 
from  the  War  Department  is  that  there  are  still  a  million  men  in 
the  service  under  the  emergency  call.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the 
failure  of  Congress  to  act  upon  the  suggestion  contained  in  my 
message  of  the  20th  of  May,  1919,  asking  for  a  repeal  of  the  Act  of 
November  21,  1918,  so  far  as  it  applies  to  wines  and  beers,  makes  it 
impossible  to  act  in  this  matter  at  this  time.  If  course  when  demo 
bilization  is  terminated,  my  power  to  act  without  congressional  action 

will  be  exercised  End  quote.  .- 

TUMULTY. 

The  President  replied  to  my  cables  as  follows: 

TUMULTY,  Paris,  June  28,  1919. 

White  House,  Washington. 

Please  issue  following  statement:  I  am  convinced  that  the  At 
torney  General  is  right  in  advising  me  that  I  have  no  legal  power 
at  this  time  in  the  matter  of  the  ban  on  liquor.  Under  the  act  of 
November,  1918,  my  power  to  take  action  is  restricted.  The  act 


420    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

provides  that  after  June  30,  1919,  until  the  conclusion  of  the  present 
war  and  thereafter  until  the  termination  of  demobilization,  the  date 
of  which  shall  be  determined  and  proclaimed  by  the  President,  it 
shall  be  unlawful,  etc.  This  law  does  not  specify  that  the  ban  shall 
be  lifted  with  the  signing  of  peace  but  with  the  termination  of  the 
demobilization  of  the  troops  and  I  cannot  say  that  that  has  been 
accomplished.  My  information  from  the  War  Department  is  that 
there  are  still  a  million  men  in  the  service  under  the  emergency  call. 
It  is  clear  therefore  that  the  failure  of  Congress  to  act  upon  the 
suggestion  contained  in  my  message  of  the  twentieth  of  May,  1919, 
asking  for  a  repeal  of  the  Act  of  November  21,  1918,  so  far  as  it  ap 
plies  to  wines  and  beers  makes  it  impossible  to  act  in  this  matter 
at  this  time.  When  demobilization  is  terminated  my  power  to  act 
without  congressional  action  will  be  exercised. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

When  the  Volstead  Act  reached  the  President,  he  found, 
upon  examining  it,  that  it  in  no  way  repealed  war-time 
prohibition,  and  so  he  vetoed  it. 

In  vetoing  it,  he  admonished  Congress,  that  "in  all 
matters  having  to  do  with  the  personal  habits  and  cus 
toms  of  large  numbers  of  people,  we  must  be  certain  that 
the  established  processes  of  legal  change  are  followed.  In 
no  other  way  can  the  salutary  object  sought  to  be  accom 
plished  by  great  reforms  of  this  character  be  made  satis 
factory  and  permanent." 

The  House  of  Representatives  with  its  overwhelming 
"dry"  majority  passed  the  Volstead  Act  over  the  Presi 
dent's  veto.  The  President  clearly  foresaw  the  inevitable 
reaction  that  would  follow  its  passage  and  its  enforcement 
throughout  the  country. 

As  the  days  of  the  San  Francisco  Convention  ap 
proached,  he  felt  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Democratic 
party  frankly  to  speak  out  regarding  the  matter  and 
boldly  avow  its  attitude  toward  the  unreasonable  features 
of  the  Volstead  enforcement  act.  In  his  conferences  with 


PROHIBITION  421 

the  Democratic  leaders  he  took  advantage  of  every 
opportunity  to  put  before  them  the  necessity  for  frank 
and  courageous  action.  So  deep  were  his  convictions 
about  this  vital  matter,  that  it  was  his  intention,  shortly 
after  the  passage  of  the  Volstead  Act  over  his  veto,  to  send 
a  special  message  to  Congress  regarding  the  matter,  asking 
for  the  repeal  of  the  Volstead  Act  and  the  passage  of 
legislation  permitting  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  light 
wines,  or  at  least  a  modification  of  the  Volstead  Act, 
changing  the  alcoholic  content  of  beer. 

Upon  further  consideration  of  the  matter  it  was  agreed 
that  it  would  be  unwise  to  ask  for  any  change  at  the 
hands  of  a  congress  that  had  so  overwhelmingly  ex 
pressed  its  opinion  in  opposition  to  any  such  modification. 
We,  therefore,  thought  it  wise  to  conserve  our  energies 
and  to  await  the  psychological  moment  at  the  Convention 
for  putting  forward  the  President's  programme. 

A  few  days  before  the  Convention  the  President  de 
livered  to  a  trusted  friend  a  copy  of  a  proposed  "wet" 
plank,  and  asked  his  friend  to  submit  it  to  the  Committee 
on  Resolutions  at  the  Convention  in  San  Francisco.  The 
tentative  draft  of  the  plank  was  as  follows: 

We  recognize  that  the  American  saloon  is  opposed  to  all  social, 
moral,  and  economic  order,  and  we  pledge  ourselves  to  its  absolute 
elimination  by  the  passage  of  such  laws  as  will  finally  and  effectually 
exterminate  it.  But  we  favour  the  repeal  of  the  Volstead  Act  and 
the  substitution  for  it  of  a  law  permitting  the  manufacture  and  sale 
of  light  wines  and  beer. 

Evidently,  the  trusted  friend  who  had  this  matter  in 
charge  felt  that  the  "dry"  atmosphere  of  the  Convention 
was  unfavourable  and  so  the  President's  plank,  prepared 
by  himself,  was  not  even  given  a  hearing  before  the 
Committee  on  Resolutions. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

THE   TREATY   FIGHT 

UPON  his  return  home  from  Paris,  the  President 
immediately  invited,  in  most  cordial  fashion,  the 
members  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com 
mittee  to  confer  with  him  at  the  White  House.  Some  of 
those  who  received  the  invitation  immediately  announced 
that  as  a  condition  precedent  to  their  acceptance  they 
would  insist  that  the  conference  should  not  be  secret  in 
character  and  that  what  would  happen  there  should  be 
disclosed  to  the  public.  The  President  quickly  accepted 
the  conditions  proposed  by  the  Republican  senators  and 
made  a  statement  from  the  White  House  that  the  con 
ditions  which  the  conferees  named  were  highly  acceptable 
to  him  and  that  he  was  willing  and  anxious  to  give  to  the 
public  a  stenographic  report  of  everything  that  transpired. 
In  view  of  subsequent  history,  the  conversation  between 
the  President  and  Senator  Harding  about  the  distinction 
between  " legal"  and  "moral"  obligations,  which  was  in 
teresting  at  the  time,  takes  on  an  added  interest.  Said 
Senator  Harding:  "If  there  is  nothing  more  than  a  moral 
obligation  on  the  part  of  any  member  of  the  league,  what 
avail  articles  X  and  XI?" 

The  President:  Why,  Senator,  it  is  surprising  that  that 
question  should  be  asked.  If  we  undertake  an  obligation, 
we  are  bound  in  the  most  solemn  way  to  carry  it  out. 

Senator  Harding:  If  you  believe  there  is  nothing  more 
to  this  than  a  moral  obligation,  any  nation  will  assume  a 

422 


THE   TREATY   FIGHT  423 

moral  obligation  on  its  own  account.  Is  it  a  moral 
obligation?  The  point  lam  trying  to  get  at  is:  Suppose 
something  arises  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world,  and  the 
council  takes  steps  as  provided  here  to  conserve  or  pre 
serve,  and  announces  its  decision,  and  every  nation  in  the 
League  takes  advantage  of  the  construction  that  you  place 
upon  these  articles  and  says :  "  Well,  this  is  only  a  moral 
obligation,  and  we  assume  that  the  nation  involved  does 
not  deserve  our  participation  or  protection,"  and  the  whole 
thing  amounts  to  nothing  but  an  expression  of  the  league 
council. 

The  President:  There  is  a  national  good  conscience  in 
such  a  matter.  I  should  think  that  was  one  of  the  most 
serious  things  that  could  possibly  happen.  When  I  speak 
of  a  legal  obligation,  I  mean  one  that  specifically  binds  you 
to  do  a  particular  thing  under  certain  sanctions.  That 
is  a  legal  obligation,  and,  if  I  may  say  so,  has  a  greater 
binding  force;  only  there  always  remains  in  the  moral 
obligation  the  right  to  exercise  one's  judgment  as  to 
whether  it  is  indeed  incumbent  upon  one  in  those 
circumstances  to  do  that  thing.  In  every  moral  obligation 
there  is  an  element  of  judgment.  In  a  legal  obligation 
there  is  no  element  of  judgment. 

Never  before  did  the  President  show  himself  more 
tactful  or  more  brilliant  in  repartee.  Surrounded  by 
twenty  or  thirty  men,  headed  by  Senator  Lodge,  who 
hated  him  with  a  bitterness  that  was  intense,  the  President, 
with  quiet  courtesy,  parried  every  blow  aimed  at  him. 

No  question,  no  matter  how  pointed  it  was,  seemed  to 
disturb  his  serenity.  He  acted  like  a  lawyer  who  knew  his 
case  from  top  to  bottom,  and  who  had  confidence  in  the 
great  cause  he  was  representing.  His  cards  were  frankly 
laid  upon  the  table  and  he  appeared  like  a  fighting  cham 
pion,  ready  to  meet  all  comers.  Indeed,  this  very  attitude 
of  frankness,  openness,  sincerity,  and  courtesy,  one  could 
see  from  the  side-lines,  was  a  cause  of  discomfort  to 


424    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

Senator  Lodge  and  the  Republicans  grouped  about  him, 
and  one  could  also  see  written  upon  the  faces  of  the 
Democratic  senators  in  that  little  room  a  look  of  pride 
that  they  had  a  leader  who  carried  himself  so  gallantly  and 
who  so  brilliantly  met  every  onslaught  of  the  enemy. 
The  President  anticipated  an  abrupt  adjournment  of  the 
conference  with  a  courteous  invitation  to  luncheon. 
Senator  Lodge  had  just  turned  to  the  President  and  said: 
"Mr.  President,  I  do  not  wish  to  interfere  in  any  way,  but 
the  conference  has  now  lasted  about  three  hours  and  a 
half,  and  it  is  half  an  hour  after  the  lunch  hour."  Where 
upon,  the  President  said:  "Will  not  you  gentlemen  take 
luncheon  with  me?  It  will  be  very  delightful." 

It  was  evident  that  this  invitation,  so  cordially  con 
veyed,  broke  the  ice  of  formality  which  up  to  that  time 
pervaded  the  meeting,  and  like  boys  out  of  school,  for 
getting  the  great  affair  in  which  they  had  all  played  promi 
nent  parts,  they  made  their  way  to  the  dining  room,  the 
President  walking  by  the  side  of  Senator  Lodge.  Instead 
of  fisticuffs,  as  some  of  the  newspaper  men  had  predicted, 
the  lion  and  the  lamb  sat  down  together  at  the  dining 
table,  and  for  an  hour  or  two  the  question  of  the  ratifi 
cation  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  forgotten  in  the 
telling  of  pleasant  stories  and  the  play  of  repartee. 

Although,  at  this  conference  of  August  19,  1919,  the 
President  had  frankly  opened  his  mind  and  heart  to  the 
enemies  of  the  Treaty,  the  opposition  instead  of  moderat 
ing  seemed  to  grow  more  intense  and  passionate.  The 
President  had  done  everything  humanly  possible  to  soften 
the  opposition  of  the  Republicans,  but,  alas,  the  informa 
tion  brought  to  him  from  the  Hill  by  his  Democratic 
friends  only  confirmed  the  opinion  that  the  opposition  to 
the  Treaty  was  growing  and  could  not  be  overcome  by 


THE    TREATY    FIGHT  425 

personal  contact  of  any  kind  between  the  President  and 
members  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee. 

It  is  plain  now,  and  will  become  plainer  as  the  years 
elapse,  that  the  Republican  opposition  to  the  League  was 
primarily  partisan  politics  and  a  rooted  personal  dislike  of 
the  chief  proponent  of  the  League,  Mr.  Wilson.  His 
reelection  in  1916,  the  first  reelection  of  an  incumbent 
Democratic  President  since  Andrew  Jackson,  had  greatly 
disturbed  the  Republican  leaders.  The  prestige  of  the 
Republican  party  was  threatened  by  this  Democratic 
leader.  His  reception  in  Europe  added  to  their  distress. 
For  the  sake  of  the  sacred  cause  of  Republicanism,  this 
menace  of  Democratic  leadership  must  be  destroyed,  even 
though  in  destroying  it  the  leaders  should  swallow  their 
own  words  and  reverse  their  own  former  positions  on 
world  adjustment. 

An  attempt  was  made  by  enemies  of  the  President  to 
give  the  impression  to  the  country  that  an  association  of 
nations  was  one  of  the  "fool  ideas"  of  Woodrow  Wilson; 
that  in  making  it  part  of  his  Fourteen  Points,  he  was 
giving  free  rein  to  his  idealism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
idea  did  not  originate  with  Woodrow  Wilson.  If  its 
American  origin  were  traced,  it  would  be  found  that  the 
earliest  supporters  of  the  idea  were  Republicans. 

I  remember  with  what  reluctance  the  President  ac 
cepted  the  invitation  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
tendered  by  Mr.  Taft,  to  deliver  an  address  on  May  27., 
1916,  at  the  New  Willard  Hotel,  Washington,  a  meeting  at 
which  one  of  the  principal  speakers  was  no  less  a  personage 
than  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  with  Mr.  Taft  pre 
siding.  For  many  months  the  President  had  been  revolv 
ing  this  idea  in  his  mind  and  for  a  long  time  he  was 
reluctant  to  accept  any  invitation  that  would  seem  to  give 


126    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

approval  to  the  idea.  He  patiently  waited  to  make  a 
complete  survey  of  the  whole  world  situation,  to  be  con 
vinced  that  the  permanent  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  world  affairs  was  a  necessity  if  peace  was  to  be 
secured. 

It  was  not  an  easy  thing  to  draw  the  President  away 
from  the  traditional  policy  of  aloofness  and  isolation  which 
had  characterized  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  all 
international  affairs.  But  the  invitation  to  discuss  uni 
versal  peace,  urged  upon  the  President  by  ex-President 
William  H.  Taft,  was  finally  accepted. 

In  that  speech  he  said:  "We  are  participants,  whether 
we  would  or  not,  in  the  life  of  the  world,  and  the  interests 
of  all  nations  are  our  own;  henceforth,  there  must  be  a 
common  agreement  for  a  common  object,  and  at  the 
heart  of  that  common  object  must  lie  the  inviolable  rights 
of  peoples  and  of  mankind.  We  believe  these  funda 
mental  things:  First,  that  every  people  has  a  right  to 
choose  the  sovereignty  under  which  they  shall  live. 
Second,  that  the  small  states  of  the  world  have  a  right 
to  enjoy  the  same  respect  for  their  sovereignty  and  for 
their  territorial  integrity  that  great  and  powerful  nations 
expect  and  insist  upon.  [This  idea  was  substantially 
embodied  in  Article  X];  and  third,  that  the  world  has  a 
right  to  be  free  from  every  disturbance  of  its  peace  that 
has  its  origin  in  aggression  and  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
peoples  and  nations." 

These  statements  were  uttered  in  the  presence  of 
Senator  Lodge  and  applauded  by  Mr.  Taft  and  his  Re 
publican  associates  gathered  at  the  banquet. 

The  President,  continuing  his  address,  then  gave  ex 
pression  to  his  views  regarding  the  means  to  attain  these 
ends.  He  was  convinced  that  there  should  be  an  "uni- 


THE   TREATY   FIGHT 

versal  association  of  the  nations  to  maintain  the  inviolate 
security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  common  use  of 
all  nations  of  the  world,  and  to  prevent  any  war  begun 
either  contrary  to  treaty  agreements  or  without  warning 
and  full  submission  of  the  causes  to  the  opinion  of  the 
world — a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence."  And  he  ventured  to  assert,  in 
the  presence  of  Senator  Lodge,  who  afterward  became  the 
leader  of  the  opposition  to  these  very  ideas,  "that  the 
United  States  is  willing  to  become  a  partner  in  any  feasible 
association  of  nations  formed  in  order  to  realize  these 
objects  and  make  them  secure  against  violation." 

Woodrow  Wilson  believed  that  the  League  of  Nations 
was  the  first  modern  attempt  to  prevent  war  by  discussion 
in  the  open  and  not  behind  closed  doors  or  "within  the 
cloistered  retreats  of  European  diplomacy."  To  him  the 
League  of  Nations  was  the  essence  of  Christianity.  Yet 
when  he  took  up  the  advocacy  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
Senator  Lodge,  the  spokesman  of  the  Republican  party  at 
the  dinner  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  became  the 
leader  in  bitter  opposition  to  it. 

Senator  Lodge  at  this  very  dinner  on  May  27,  1916, 
delivered  the  following  address: 

I  know,  and  no  one,  I  think,  can  know  better  than  one  who  has 
served  long  in  the  Senate,  which  is  charged  with  an  important  share  of 
the  ratification  and  confirmation  of  all  treaties;  no  one  can,  I  think,  feel 
more  deeply  than  I  do  the  difficulties  which  confront  us  in  the  work 
which  this  league — that  is,  the  great  association  extending  throughout 
the  country,  known  as  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace — undertakes, 
but  the  difficulties  cannot  be  overcome  unless  we  try  to  overcome 
them.  I  believe  much  can  be  done.  Probably  it  will  be  impossible 
to  stop  all  wars,  but  it  certainly  will  be  possible  to  stop  some  wars, 
and  thus  diminish  their  number.  The  way  in  which  this  problem 
must  be  worked  out  must  be  left  to  this  league  and  to  those  who  are 


428    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

giving  this  great  subject  the  study  which  it  deserves.  I  know  the 
obstacles.  I  know  how  quickly  we  shall  be  met  with  the  statement 
that  this  is  a  dangerous  question  which  you  are  putting  into  your 
argument,  that  no  nation  can  submit  to  the  judgment  of  other  nations, 
and  we  must  be  careful  at  the  beginning  not  to  attempt  too  much. 
I  know  the  difficulties  which  arise  when  we  speak  of  anything  which 
seems  to  involve  an  alliance,  but  I  do  not  believe  that  when  Washing 
ton  warned  us  against  entangling  alliances  he  meant  for  one  moment 
that  we  should  not  join  with  the  other  civilized  nations  of  the  world 
if  a  method  could  be  found  to  diminish  war  and  encourage  peace. 

It  was  a  year  ago  in  delivering  the  chancellor's  address  at  Union 
College  I  made  an  argument  on  this  theory,  that  if  we  were  to  pro 
mote  international  peace  at  the  close  of  the  present  terrible  war,  if 
we  were  to  restore  international  law  as  it  must  be  restored,  we  must 
find  some  way  in  which  the  united  forces  of  the  nations  could  be  put 
behind  the  cause  of  peace  and  law.  I  said  then  that  my  hearers 
might  think  that  I  was  picturing  a  Utopia,  but  it  is  in  the  search  of 
Utopias  that  great  discoveries  are  made.  Not  failure,  but  low  aim, 
is  the  crime.  This  league  certainly  has  the  highest  of  all  aims  for 
the  benefits  of  humanity,  and  because  the  pathway  is  sown  with 
difficulties  is  no  reason  that  we  should  turn  from  it. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  in  his  Nobel  Prize  thesis,  also 
expressed  himself  as  follows,  with  reference  to  an  associa 
tion  of  nations: 

The  one  permanent  move  for  obtaining  peace  which  has  yet  been 
suggested  with  any  reasonable  chance  of  obtaining  its  object  is  by  an 
agreement  among  the  great  powers,  in  which  each  should  pledge  itself 
not  only  to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  a  common  tribunal,  but  to  back 
with  force  the  decision  of  that  common  tribunal.  The  great  civilized 
nations  of  the  world  which  do  not  possess  force,  actual  or  immediately 
potential,  should  combine  by  solemn  agreement  in  a  great  world 
league  for  the  peace  of  righteousness. 

Upon  the  President  taking  up  the  League  of  Nations 
fight,  Senator  Lodge  drew  away  from  it  as  if  in  fear  and 
trembling  and  began  discussing  our  responsibilities  abroad, 


THE    TREATY    FIGHT  429 

evidencing  a  complete  change  of  heart.     He  no  longer 
asked  Americans  to  be  generous  and  fearless,  but  said: 

The  hearts  of  the  vast  majority  of  mankind  would  beat  on  strongly 
without  any  quickening  if  the  League  were  to  perish  altogether. 

The  first  objection  to  the  League  of  Nations,  urged  by 
Senator  Lodge,  was  that  it  involved  the  surrender  of  our 
sovereignty.  There  is  a  striking  analogy  between  the 
argument  of  Senator  Lodge  and  those  put  forth  by  gentle 
men  in  Washington's  day  who  feared  that  the  proposed 
Constitution  which  was  designed  to  establish  a  federal 
union  would  mean  danger,  oppression,  and  disaster. 

Mr.  Singletary  of  Massachusetts,  Mr.  Lowndes  of 
South  Carolina,  Mr.  Grayson  of  Virginia,  even  Patrick 
Henry  himself,  foresaw  the  virtual  subjugation  of  the 
States  through  a  Constitution  which  at  that  time  was 
often  called  the  Treaty  between  the  Thirteen  States. 

As  Senator  Brandegee  and  others  contended  that  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  was  a  "muddy,  murky, 
and  muddled  document,"  so  Mr.  Williams  of  New  York, 
in  1788,  charged  "ambiguity"  against  the  proposed  Con 
stitution,  saying  that  it  was  "absolutely  impossible  to 
know  what  we  give  up  and  what  we  retain." 

Mandates  and  similar  bogies  had  their  counterpart  in 
Washington's  day.  George  Mason,  fearful  like  Senator 
Sherman  of  Illinois  in  a  later  day,  "apprehended  the 
possibility  of  Congress  calling  in  the  militia  of  Georgia  to 
quell  disturbances  in  New  Hampshire." 

The  attitude  of  George  Washington  in  his  day  was  very 
similar  to  that  of  Woodrow  Wilson.  Writing  to  Knox, 
on  August  19,  1797,  he  said:  "I  am  fully  persuaded  it 
[meaning  the  Federal  Constitution]  is  the  best  that  can 
be  obtained  at  this  time.  And,  as  a  constitutional  door 


430    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

is  open  for  amendment  hereafter,  our  adoption  of  it,  under 
the  present  circumstances  of  the  union,  is  in  my  opinion 
desirable."  And  of  the  opponents  of  the  proposed  Con 
stitution  he  said,  "The  major  part  of  them  will,  it  is  to 
be  feared,  be  governed  by  sinister  and  self-important 
motives." 

The  storm  centre  of  the  whole  fight  against  the  League 
was  the  opposition  personally  conducted  by  Senator 
Lodge  and  others  of  the  Republican  party  against  the 
now  famous  Article  X.  The  basis  of  the  whole  Re 
publican  opposition  was  their  fear  that  America  would 
have  to  bear  some  responsibility  in  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
while  the  strength  of  Woodrow  Wilson's  position  was  his 
faith  that  out  of  the  war,  with  all  its  blood  and  tears,  would 
come  this  great  consummation. 

It  was  the  President's  idea  that  we  should  go  into  the 
League  and  bear  our  responsibilities;  that  we  should  enter 
it  as  gentlemen,  scorning  privilege.  He  did  not  wish  us 
to  sneak  in  and  enjoy  its  advantages  and  shirk  its  re 
sponsibilities,  but  he  wanted  America  to  enter  boldly  and 
not  as  a  hypocrite. 

With  reference  to  the  argument  made  by  Senator 
Lodge  against  our  going  into  the  League,  saying  that  it 
would  be  a  surrender  of  American  sovereignty  and  a  loss 
of  her  freedom,  the  President  often  asked  the  question  on 
his  Western  trip:  How  can  a  nation  preserve  its  freedom 
except  through  concerted  action?  We  surrender  part 
of  our  freedom  in  order  to  save  the  rest  of  it.  Dis 
cussing  this  matter  one  day,  he  said:  "One  cannot  have 
an  omelet  without  breaking  eggs.  By  joining  the  League 
of  Nations,  a  nation  loses,  not  its  individual  freedom,  but 
its  selfish  isolation.  The  only  freedom  it  loses  is  the 
freedom  to  do  wrong.  Robinson  Crusoe  was  free  to  shoot 


THE    TREATY    FIGHT  431 

in  any  direction  on  his  island  until  Friday  came.  Then 
there  was  one  direction  in  which  he  could  not  shoot.  His 
freedom  ended  where  Friday's  rights  began." 

There  would  have  been  no  Federal  Union  to-day  if  the 
individual  states  that  went  to  make  up  the  Federal  Union 
were  not  willing  to  surrender  the  powers  they  exercised, 
to  surrender  their  freedom  as  it  were. 

Opponents  of  the  League  tried  to  convey  the  impression 
that  under  Article  X  we  should  be  obliged  to  send  our 
boys  across  the  sea  and  that  in  that  event  America's  voice 
would  not  be  the  determining  voice. 

Lloyd  George  answered  this  argument  in  a  crushing 
way,  when  he  said: 

We  cannot,  unless  we  abandon  the  whole  basis  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  disinterest  ourselves  in  an  attack  upon  the  existence  of  a 
nation  which  is  a  member  of  that  league  and  whose  life  is  in  jeopardy. 
That  covenant,  as  I  understand  it,  does  not  contemplate,  necessarily, 
military  action  in  support  of  the  imperilled  nation.  It  contemplates 
economic  pressure;  it  contemplates  support  for  the  struggling  people; 
and  when  it  is  said  that  if  you  give  any  support  at  all  to  Poland  it 
involves  a  great  war,  with  conscription  and  with  all  the  mechanism  of 
war  with  which  we  have  been  so  familiar  in  the  last  few  years,  that  is 
inconsistent  with  the  whole  theory  of  the  covenant  into  which  we  have 
entered.  We  contemplated  other  methods  of  bringing  pressure  to 
bear  upon  the  recalcitrant  nation  that  is  guilty  of  acts  of  aggression 
against  other  nations  and  endangering  their  independence. 

The  Republicans  who  attacked  the  President  on 
Article  X  had  evidently  forgotten  what  Theodore  Roose 
velt  said  about  the  one  effective  move  for  obtaining  peace, 
when  he  urged:  "The  nations  should  agree  on  certain 
rights  that  should  not  be  questioned,  such  as  territorial 
integrity,  their  rights  to  deal  with  their  domestic  affairs, 
and  with  such  matters  as  whom  they  should  admit  to 


432    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

citizenship."  They  had,  also,  evidently  forgotten  that 
Mr.  Taft  said:  "The  arguments  against  Article  X  which 
have  been  most  pressed  are  those  directed  to  showing  that 
under  its  obligations  the  United  States  can  be  forced  into 
many  wars  and  to  burdensome  expeditionary  forces  to 
protect  countries  in  which  it  has  no  legitimate  interest. 
This  objection  will  not  bear  examination." 

Mr.  Taft  answered  the  question  of  one  of  the  Republican 
critics  if  Article  X  would  not  involve  us  in  war,  in  the 
following  statement: 

How  much  will  it  involve  us  in  war?  Little,  if  any.  In  the  first 
place,  the  universal  boycott,  first  to  be  applied,  will  impose  upon  most 
nations  such  a  withering  isolation  and  starvation  that  in  most  cases 
it  will  be  effective.  In  the  second  place,  we'll  not  be  drawn  into  any 
war  in  which  it  will  not  be  reasonable  and  convenient  for  us  to  render 
efficient  aid,  because  the  plan  of  the  Council  must  be  approved  by 
our  representatives,  as  already  explained.  In  the  third  place,  the 
threat  of  the  universal  boycott  and  the  union  of  overwhelming  forces 
of  the  members  of  the  League,  if  need  be,  will  hold  every  nation  from 
violating  Article  X,  and  Articles  XII,  XIII,  and  XV,  unless  there  is 
a  world  conspiracy,  as  in  this  war,  in  which  case  the  earliest  we  get 
into  the  war,  the  better. 

Evidently  Mr.  Taft  did  not  look  upon  Article  X  as  the 
bugaboo  that  Mr.  Lodge  pretended  it  was,  for  he  said: 

Article  X  covers  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  extends  it  to  the  world. 
The  League  is  not  a  super-sovereign,  but  a  partnership  intended  to 
secure  to  us  and  all  nations  only  the  sovereignty  we  can  properly 
have,  i.  e.,  sovereignty  regulated  by  the  international  law  and  moral 
ity  consistent  with  the  same  sovereignty  of  other  nations.  The 
United  States  is  not  under  this  constitution  to  be  forced  into  actual 
war  against  its  will.  This  League  is  to  be  regarded  in  conflict  with 
the  advice  of  Washington  only  from  a  narrow  and  reactionary  view 
point. 


THE    TREATY    FIGHT  433 

Mr.  Herbert  Hoover,  now  a  member  of  Mr.  Harding's 
Cabinet,  in  a  speech  delivered  on  October  3,  1919,  answer 
ing  the  argument  that  America  would  be  compelled  to  send 
her  boys  to  the  other  side,  said: 

We  hear  the  cry  that  the  League  obligates  that  our  sons  be  sent  to 
fight  in  foreign  lands.  Yet  the  very  intent  and  structure  of  the  League 
is  to  prevent  wars.  There  is  no  obligation  for  the  United  States  to  en 
gage  in  military  operations  or  to  allow  any  interference  with  our  in 
ternal  affairs  without  the  full  consent  of  our  representatives  in  the 
League. 

And  further  discussing  the  revision  of  the  Treaty,  Mr. 
Hoover  said: 

I  am  confident  that  if  we  attempt  now  to  revise  the  Treaty  we  shall 
tread  on  a  road  through  European  chaos.  Even  if  we  managed  to 
keep  our  soldiers  out  of  it  we  will  not  escape  fearful  economic  losses. 
If  the  League  is  to  break  down  we  must  at  once  prepare  to  fight. 
Few  people  seem  to  realize  the  desperation  to  which  Europe  has  been 
reduced. 


CHAPTER  XLII 

THE   WESTERN    TRIP 

TENTATIVE  plans  for  a  Western  trip  began  to  be 
formed  in  the  White  House  because  of  the  urgent 
insistence  from  Democratic  friends  on  the  Hill  that 
nothing  could  win  the  fight  for  the  League  of  Nations 
except  a  direct  appeal  to  the  country  by  the  President  in 
person. 

Admiral  Grayson,  the  President's  physician  and  con 
sistent  friend,  who  knew  his  condition  and  the  various 
physical  crises  through  which  he  had  passed  here  and  on 
the  other  side,  from  some  of  which  he  had  not  yet  re 
covered,  stood  firm  in  his  resolve  that  the  President  should 
not  go  West,  even  intimating  to  me  that  the  President's 
life  might  pay  the  forfeit  if  his  advice  were  disregarded. 
Indeed,  it  needed  not  the  trained  eye  of  a  physician  to  see 
that  the  man  whom  the  senators  were  now  advising  to 
make  a  "swing  around  the  circle"  was  on  the  verge  of  a 
nervous  breakdown.  More  than  once  since  his  return 
from  the  Peace  Conference  I  had  urged  him  to  take  a 
needed  rest;  to  get  away  from  the  turmoil  of  Washington 
and  recuperate;  but  he  spurned  this  advice  and  resolved 
to  go  through  to  the  end. 

No  argument  of  ours  could  draw  him  away  from  his 
duties,  which  now  involved  not  only  the  fight  for  the 
ratification  of  the  Treaty,  but  the  threatened  railway 
strike,  with  its  attendant  evils  to  the  country,  and  added 
administrative  burdens  growing  out  of  the  partisanship 

434 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  435 

fight  which  was  being  waged  in  Congress  for  the  ostensible 
purpose  of  reducing  the  high  cost  of  living. 

One  day,  after  Democratic  senators  had  been  urging 
the  Western  trip,  I  took  leave  to  say  to  the  President  that, 
in  his  condition,  disastrous  consequences  might  result  if 
he  should  follow  their  advice.  But  he  dismissed  my 
solicitude,  saying  in  a  weary  way:  "I  know  that  I  am  at 
the  end  of  my  tether,  but  my  friends  on  the  Hill  say  that 
the  trip  is  necessary  to  save  the  Treaty,  and  I  am  willing  to 
make  whatever  personal  sacrifice  is  required,  for  if  the 
Treaty  should  be  defeated,  God  only  knows  what  would 
happen  to  the  world  as  a  result  of  it.  In  the  presence 
of  the  great  tragedy  which  now  faces  the  world,  no  decent 
man  can  count  his  own  personal  fortunes  in  the  reckoning. 
Even  though,  in  my  condition,  it  might  mean  the  giving 
up  of  my  life,  I  will  gladly  make  the  sacrifice  to  save  the 
Treaty." 

He  spoke  like  a  soldier  who  was  ready  to  make  the 
supreme  sacrifice  to  save  the  cause  that  lay  closest  to  his 
heart. 

As  I  looked  at  the  President  while  he  was  talking,  in  my 
imagination  I  made  a  comparison  between  the  man, 
Woodrow  Wilson,  who  now  stood  before  me  and  the  man 
I  had  met  many  years  before  in  New  Jersey.  In  those 
days  he  was  a  vigorous,  agile,  slender  man,  active  and 
alert,  his  hair  but  slightly  streaked  with  gray.  Now,  as  he 
stood  before  me  discussing  the  necessity  for  the  Western 
trip,  he  was  an  old  man,  grown  grayer  and  grayer,  but 
grimmer  and  grimmer  in  his  determination,  like  an  old 
warrior,  to  fight  to  the  end. 

There  was  another  whose  heroism  was  no  less  than  his, 
Mrs.  Wilson.  She  has  since  referred  to  the  Western  trip 
as  "one  long  nightmare, "  though  in  the  smiling  face  which 


436     WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

she  turned  upon  the  crowds  from  Columbus  to  San  Diego 
and  back  to  Pueblo  none  could  have  detected  a  trace  of  the 
anxiety  that  was  haunting  her.  She  met  the  shouting 
throngs  with  the  same  reposeful  dignity  and  radiant, 
friendly  smile  with  which  she  had  captivated  the  people  of 
England,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium. 

At  home  and  abroad  she  has  always  had  a  peculiar 
power  to  attract  the  populace,  though  she  herself  has 
never  craved  the  spotlight.  Like  her  husband,  she  finds 
home  more  congenial,  and,  like  him,  she  prefers  not  to  be 
written  about. 

In  her  husband's  career  she  has  played  a  notable  role, 
the  more  noble  because  self-effacing.  She  has  consis 
tently  disavowed  intention  to  participate  actively  in 
public  affairs,  and  yet  in  many  a  crisis  she,  out  of  her 
strong  intelligence  and  sagacity,  has  been  able  to  offer 
timely,  wise  suggestion.  No  public  man  ever  had  a  more 
devoted  helpmeet,  and  no  wife  a  husband  more  dependent 
upon  her  sympathetic  understanding  of  his  problems. 
The  devotion  between  these  two  has  not  been  strength 
ened,  for  that  would  be  impossible,  but  deepened  by  the 
President's  long  illness.  Mrs.  Wilson's  strong  physical 
constitution,  combined  with  strength  of  character  and 
purpose,  has  sustained  her  under  a  strain  which  must 
have  wrecked  most  women.  When  the  strong  man  broke, 
she  nursed  him  as  tenderly  as  a  mother  nurses  a  child. 

Mrs.  Wilson  must  have  left  the  White  House  for  that 
ill-omened  journey  with  a  sinking  heart,  for  she  knew, 
none  better,  that  her  husband  was  suffering  from  accumu 
lated  fatigue,  and  that  he  should  be  starting  on  a  long 
vacation  instead  of  a  fighting  tour  that  would  tax  the 
strength  of  an  athlete  in  the  pink  of  condition.  For  seven 
practically  vacationless  years  he  had  borne  burdens  too 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  437 

great  for  any  constitution;  he  had  conducted  his  country 
through  the  greatest  of  all  wars;  he  had  contended,  at 
times  single-handed,  in  Paris  with  the  world's  most 
adroit  politicians;  he  had  there  been  prostrated  with 
influenza,  that  treacherous  disease  which  usually  maims 
for  a  time  those  whom  it  does  not  kill,  and  he  had  not 
given  himself  a  chance  to  recuperate;  he  had  returned  to 
America  to  engage  in  the  most  desperate  conflict  of  his 
career  with  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  party;  and  now, 
when  it  was  clear  even  to  his  men  friends,  and  much 
clearer  to  the  intuition  of  a  devoted  wife,  that  nature  was 
crying  out  for  rest,  he  was  setting  out  on  one  of  the  most 
arduous  programmes  of  public  speaking  known  even  in 
our  country,  which  is  familiar  with  these  strenuous  under 
takings.  Mrs.  Wilson's  anxieties  must  have  increased 
with  each  successive  day  of  the  journey,  but  not  even  to 
we  of  the  immediate  party  did  she  betray  her  fears.  Her 
resolution  was  as  great  as  his. 

When  the  great  illness  came  she  had  to  stand  between 
him  and  the  peril  of  exhaustion  from  official  cares,  yet  she 
could  not,  like  the  more  fortunately  obscure,  withdraw  her 
husband  from  business  altogether  and  take  him  away  to 
some  quiet  place  for  restoration.  As  head  of  the  nation  he 
must  be  kept  in  touch  with  affairs,  and  during  the  early 
months  of  his  illness  she  was  the  chief  agent  in  keeping 
him  informed  of  public  business.  Her  high  intelligence 
and  her  extraordinary  memory  enabled  her  to  report  to 
him  daily,  in  lucid  detail,  weighty  matters  of  state  brought 
to  her  by  officials  for  transmission  to  him.  At  the  proper 
time,  when  he  was  least  in  pain  and  least  exhausted,  she 
would  present  a  clear,  oral  resume  of  each  case  and  lay 
the  documents  before  him  in  orderly  arrangement. 

As  woman  and  wife,  the  first  thought  of  her  mind  and 


438    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  first  care  of  her  heart  must  be  for  his  health.  Once 
at  an  acute  period  of  his  illness  certain  officials  insisted 
that  they  must  see  him  because  they  carried  information 
which  it  was  "absolutely  necessary  that  the  President  of 
the  United  States  should  have,"  and  she  quietly  replied: 
"I  am  not  interested  in  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
I  am  interested  in  my  husband  and  his  health." 

With  loving  courage  she  met  her  difficult  dilemma  of 
shielding  him  as  much  as  possible  and  at  the  same  time 
keeping  him  acquainted  with  things  he  must  know.  When 
it  became  possible  for  him  to  see  people  she,  in  counsel 
with  Admiral  Grayson,  would  arrange  for  conferences  and 
carefully  watch  her  husband  to  see  that  they  who  talked 
with  him  did  not  trespass  too  long  upon  his  limited  ejnergy. 

When  it  became  evident  that  the  tide  of  public  opinion 
was  setting  against  the  League,  the  President  finally  de 
cided  upon  the  Western  trip  as  the  only  means  of  bringing 
home  to  the  people  the  unparalleled  world  situation. 

At  the  Executive  offices  we  at  once  set  in  motion 
preparations  for  the  Western  trip.  One  itinerary  after 
another  was  prepared,  but  upon  examining  it  the  Presi 
dent  would  find  that  it  was  not  extensive  enough  and 
would  suspect  that  it  was  made  by  those  of  us — like 
Grayson  and  myself — who  were  solicitious  for  his  health, 
and  he  would  cast  them  aside.  All  the  itineraries  pro 
vided  for  a  week  of  rest  in  the  Grand  Canyon  of  the 
Colorado,  but  when  a  brief  vacation  was  intimated  to  him, 
he  was  obdurate  in  his  refusal  to  include  even  a  day  of 
relaxation,  saying  to  me,  that  "the  people  would  never 
forgive  me  if  I  took  a  rest  on  a  trip  such  as  the  one  I  con 
template  taking.  This  is  a  business  trip,  pure  and  simple, 
and  the  itinerary  must  not  include  rest  of  any  kind." 
He  insisted  that  there  be  no  suggestion  of  a  pleasure  trip 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  439 

attaching  to  a  journey  which  he  regarded  as  a  mission. 

As  I  now  look  back  upon  this  journey  and  its  disastrous 
effects  upon  the  President's  health,  I  believe  that  if  he  had 
only  consented  to  include  a  rest  period  in  our  arrange 
ments,  he  might  not  have  broken  down  at  Pueblo. 

Never  have  I  seen  the  President  look  so  weary  as  on  the 
night  we  left  Washington  for  our  swing  into  the  West. 
When  we  were  about  to  board  our  special  train,  the 
President  turned  to  me  and  said:  "I  am  in  a  nice  fix. 
I  am  scheduled  between  now  and  the  28th  of  September  to 
make  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a  hundred  speeches  to 
various  bodies,  stretching  all  the  way  from  Ohio  to  the 
coast,  and  yet  the  pressure  of  other  affairs  upon  me  at 
the  White  House  has  been  so  great  that  I  have  not  had  a 
single  minute  to  prepare  my  speeches.  I  do  not  know  how 
I  shall  get  the  time,  for  during  the  past  few  weeks  I  have 
been  suffering  from  daily  headaches ;  but  perhaps  to-night's 
rest  will  make  me  fit  for  the  work  of  to-morrow." 

No  weariness  or  brain-fag,  however,  was  apparent  in 
the  speech  at  Columbus,  Ohio.  To  those  of  us  who  sat 
on  the  platform,  including  the  newspaper  group  who 
accompanied  the  President,  this  speech  with  its  beautiful 
phrasing  and  its  effective  delivery  seemed  to  have  been 
carefully  prepared. 

Day  after  day,  for  nearly  a  month,  there  were  speeches 
of  a  similar  kind,  growing  more  intense  in  their  emotion 
with  each  day.  Shortly  after  we  left  Tacoma,  Washing 
ton,  the  fatigue  of  the  trip  began  to  write  itself  in  the 
President's  face.  He  suffered  from  violent  headaches 
each  day,  but  his  speeches  never  betrayed  his  illness. 

In  those  troublous  days  and  until  the  very  end  of  our 
Western  trip  the  President  would  not  permit  the  slight 
est  variation  from  our  daily  programme.  Nor  did  he  ever 


440    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

permit  the  constant  headaches,  which  would  have  put 
an  ordinary  man  out  of  sorts,  to  work  unkindly  upon  the 
members  of  his  immediate  party,  which  included  Mrs. 
Wilson,  Doctor  Grayson,  and  myself.  He  would  appear 
regularly  at  each  meal,  partaking  of  it  only  slightly, 
always  gracious,  always  good-natured  and  smiling,  re 
sponding  to  every  call  from  the  outside  for  speeches — calls 
that  came  from  early  morning  until  late  at  night — from 
the  plain  people  grouped  about  every  station  and  watering 
place  through  which  we  passed.  Even  under  the  most 
adverse  physical  conditions  he  was  always  kind,  gentle, 
and  considerate  to  those  about  him. 

I  have  often  wished,  as  the  criticisms  of  the  Pullman 
smoking  car,  the  cloak  room,  and  the  counting  house  were 
carried  to  me,  picturing  the  President's  coldness,  his 
aloofness  and  exclusiveness,  that  the  critics  could  for  a 
moment  have  seen  the  heart  and  great  good-nature  of  the 
man  giving  expression  to  themselves  on  this  critical 
journey.  If  they  could  have  peeped  through  the  curtain 
of  our  dining  room,  at  one  of  the  evening  meals,  for 
instance,  they  would  have  been  ashamed  of  their  mis 
representations  of  this  kind,  patient,  considerate,  human- 
hearted  man. 

When  he  was  "half  fit,"  an  expression  he  often  used, 
he  was  the  best  fellow  in  the  little  group  on  our  train — 
good-natured,  smiling,  full  of  anecdotes  and  repartee, 
and  always  thinking  of  the  comforts  and  pleasure  of  the 
men  gathered  about  him.  The  illness  of  a  newspaper 
man,  or  of  one  of  the  messengers  or  conductors,  or  at 
taches  of  the  train  was  a  call  to  service  to  him,  and  one 
could  find  the  President  in  one  of  the  little  compartments 
of  the  train,  seated  at  the  bed  of  a  newspaper  man  or 
some  attache  who  had  been  taken  ill  on  the  trip.  There 


THE    WESTERN   TRIP  441 

is  in  the  President  a  sincere  human  sympathy,  which  is 
better  than  the  cheap  good-fellowship  which  many  public 
men  carefully  cultivate. 

It  was  on  the  Western  trip,  about  September  12th, 
while  the  President,  with  every  ounce  of  his  energy,  was 
attempting  to  put  across  the  League  of  Nations,  that 
Mr.  William  C.  Bullitt  was  disclosing  to  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  at  a  public  hearing  the  facts  of  a 
conference  between  Secretary  Lansing  and  himself,  in 
which  Mr.  Bullitt  declared  that  Mr.  Lansing  had  severely 
criticized  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  press  representatives  aboard  the  train  called  Mr. 
Bullitt's  testimony  to  the  President's  attention.  He  made 
no  comment,  but  it  was  plain  from  his  attitude  that 
he  was  incensed  and  distressed  beyond  measure.  Here 
he  was  in  the  heart  of  the  West,  advancing  the  cause 
so  dear  to  his  heart,  steadily  making  gains  against  what 
appeared  to  be  insurmountable  odds,  and  now  his  inti 
mate  associate,  Mr.  Lansing,  was  engaged  in  sniping  and 
attacking  him  from  behind. 

On  September  16th,  Mr.  Lansing  telegraphed  the  follow 
ing  message  to  the  President : 

On  May  17th,  Bullitt  resigned  by  letter  giving  his  reasons  with 
which  you  are  familiar.  I  replied  by  letter  on  the  18th  without  any 
comment  on  his  reasons.  Bullitt  on  the  19th  asked  to  see  me  to  say 
good-bye  and  I  saw  him.  He  elaborated  on  the  reasons  for  his  resig 
nation  and  said  that  he  could  not  conscientiously  give  countenance 
to  a  treaty  which  was  based  on  injustice.  I  told  him  that  I  would 
say  nothing  against  his  resigning  since  he  put  it  on  conscientious 
grounds,  and  that  I  recognized  that  certain  features  of  the  Treaty 
were  bad,  as  I  presumed  most  everyone  did,  but  that  was  probably 
unavoidable  in  view  of  conflicting  claims  and  that  nothing  ought  to 
be  done  to  prevent  the  speedy  restoration  of  peace  by  signing  the 
Treaty.  Bullitt  then  discussed  the  numerous  European  commissions 


442    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

provided  for  by  the  Treaty  on  which  the  United  States  was  to  be 
represented.  I  told  him  that  I  was  disturbed  by  this  fact  because 
I  was  afraid  the  Senate  and  possibly  the  people,  if  they  understood 
this,  would  refuse  ratification,  and  that  anything  which  was  an 
obstacle  to  ratification  was  unfortunate  because  we  ought  to  have 
peace  as  soon  as  possible. 

When  the  President  received  this  explanation  from  Mr. 
Lansing,  he  sent  for  me  to  visit  with  him  in  his  compart 
ment.  At  the  time  I  arrived  he  was  seated  in  his  little 
study,  engaged  in  preparing  his  speech  for  the  night's 
meeting.  Turning  to  me,  with  a  deep  show  of  feeling, 
he  said:  "Read  that,  and  tell  me  what  you  think  of  a 
man  who  was  my  associate  on  the  other  side  and  who 
confidentially  expressed  himself  to  an  outsider  in  such  a 
fashion?  Were  I  in  Washington  I  would  at  once  demand 
his  resignation!  That  kind  of  disloyalty  must  not  be 
permitted  to  go  unchallenged  for  a  single  minute.  The 
testimony  of  Bullitt  is  a  confirmation  of  the  suspicions 
I  have  had  with  reference  to  this  individual.  I  found  the 
same  attitude  of  mind  on  the  part  of  Lansing  on  the  other 
side.  I  could  find  his  trail  everywhere  I  went,  but  they 
were  only  suspicions  and  it  would  not  be  fair  for  me  to 
act  upon  them.  But  here  in  his  own  statement  is  a  verifi 
cation  at  last  of  everything  I  have  suspected.  Think 
of  it !  This  from  a  man  whom  I  raised  from  the  level  of  a 
subordinate  to  the  great  office  of  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  United  States.  My  God !  I  did  not  think  it  was 
possible  for  Lansing  to  act  in  this  way.  When  we  were 
in  Paris  I  found  that  Lansing  and  others  were  constantly 
giving  out  statements  that  did  not  agree  with  my  view 
point.  When  I  had  arranged  a  settlement,  there  would 
appear  from  some  source  I  could  not  locate  unofficial 
statements  telling  the  correspondents  not  to  take  things 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  443 

too  seriously;  that  a  compromise  would  be  made,  and  this 
news,  or  rather  news  of  this  kind,  was  harmful  to  the 
settlement  I  had  already  obtained  and  quite  naturally 
gave  the  Conference  the  impression  that  Lansing  and 
his  kind  were  speaking  for  me,  and  then  the  French  would 
say  that  I  was  bluffing." 

I  am  convinced  that  only  the  President's  illness  a  few 
days  later  prevented  an  immediate  demand  on  his  part 
for  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Lansing. 

That  there  was  no  real  devotion  on  the  part  of  Mr. 
Lansing  for  the  President  is  shown  by  the  following  in 
cident. 

A  few  days  after  the  President  returned  from  the  West 
and  lay  seriously  ill  at  the  White  House,  with  physicians 
and  nurses  gathered  about  his  bed,  Mr.  Lansing  sought 
a  private  audience  with  me  in  the  Cabinet  Room.  He 
informed  me  that  he  had  called  diplomatically  to  suggest 
that  in  view  of  the  incapacity  of  the  President  we  should 
arrange  to  call  in  the  Vice-President  to  act  in  his  stead 
as  soon  as  possible,  reading  to  me  from  a  book  which  he 
had  brought  from  the  State  Department,  which  I  after 
ward  learned  was  "Jefferson's  Manual,"  the  following 
clause  of  the  United  States  Constitution: 

In  case  of  the  removal  of  the  President  from  office,  or  his  death, 
resignation,  or  inability  to  discharge  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  said 
office,  the  same  shall  devolve  upon  the  Vice-President. 

Upon  reading  this,  I  coldly  turned  to  Mr.  Lansing  and 
said:  "Mr.  Lansing,  the  Constitution  is  not  a  dead  letter 
with  the  White  House.  I  have  read  the  Constitution 
and  do  not  find  myself  in  need  of  any  tutoring  at  your 
hands  of  the  provision  you  have  just  read."  When  I 
asked  Mr.  Lansing  the  question  as  to  who  should  certify 


444    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

to  the  disability  of  the  President,  he  intimated  that  that 
would  be  a  job  for  either  Doctor  Gray  son  or  myself.  I 
immediately  grasped  the  full  significance  of  what  he  in 
timated  and  said:  "You  may  rest  assured  that  while 
Woodrow  Wilson  is  lying  in  the  White  House  on  the  broad 
of  his  back  I  will  not  be  a  party  to  ousting  him.  He 
has  been  too  kind,  too  loyal,  and  too  wonderful  to  me  to 
receive  such  treatment  at  my  hands."  Just  as  I  uttered 
this  statement  Doctor  Grayson  appeared  in  the  Cabinet 
Room  and  I  turned  to  him  and  said:  "And  I  am  sure  that 
Doctor  Grayson  will  never  certify  to  his  disability.  Will 
you,  Grayson?"  Doctor  Grayson  left  no  doubt  in  Mr. 
Lansing's  mind  that  he  would  not  do  as  Mr.  Lansing  sug 
gested.  I  then  notified  Mr.  Lansing  that  if  anybody 
outside  of  the  White  House  circle  attempted  to  certify 
to  the  President's  disability,  that  Grayson  and  I  would 
stand  together  and  repudiate  it.  I  added  that  if  the 
President  were  in  a  condition  to  know  of  this  episode 
he  would,  in  my  opinion,  take  decisive  measures.  That 
ended  the  interview. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  no  further  attempt  was 
made  by  Mr.  Lansing  to  institute  ouster  proceedings 
against  his  chief. 

I  jiever  attempted  to  ascertain  what  finally  influenced 
the  action  of  the  President  peremptorily  to  demand  the 
resignation  of  Mr.  Lansing.  My  own  judgment  is  that 
the  demand  came  as  the  culmination  of  repeated  acts 
of  what  the  President  considered  disloyalty  on  Mr. 
Lansing's  part  while  in  Paris,  and  that  the  situation  was 
aggravated  by  Mr.  Lansing's  notes  to  Mexico  during 
the  President's  illness. 

When  I  received  from  the  President's  stenographer 
the  letter  to  Mr,  Lansing,  intimating  that  his  resignation 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  445 

would  not  be  a  disagreeable  thing  to  the  President,  I 
conferred  with  the  President  at  once  and  argued  with 
him  that  in  the  present  state  of  public  opinion  it  was  the 
wrong  time  to  do  the  right  thing.  At  the  time  the  Presi 
dent  was  seated  in  his  invalid  chair  on  the  White  House 
portico.  Although  physically  weak,  he  was  mentally 
active  and  alert.  Quickly  he  took  hold  of  my  phrase 
and  said,  with  a  show  of  the  old  fire  that  I  had 
seen  on  so  many  occasions:  "Tumulty,  it  is  never  the 
wrong  time  to  spike  disloyalty.  When  Lansing  sought 
to  oust  me,  I  was  upon  my  back.  I  am  on  my  feet  now 
and  I  will  not  have  disloyalty  about  me." 

When  the  announcement  of  Lansing's  resignation  was 
made,  the  flood-gates  of  fury  broke  about  the  President; 
but  he  was  serene  throughout  it  all.  When  I  called  at 
the  White  House  on  the  following  Sunday,  I  found  him 
calmly  seated  in  his  bathroom  with  his  coloured  valet 
engaged  in  the  not  arduous  task  of  cutting  his  hair. 
Looking  at  me  with  a  smile  in  his  eye,  he  said:  "Well, 
Tumulty,  have  I  any  friends  left?"  "Very  few,  Gover 
nor,"  I  said.  Whereupon  he  replied:  "Of  course,  it 
will  be  another  two  days'  wonder.  But  in  a  few  days 
what  the  country  considers  an  indiscretion  on  my  part  in 
getting  rid  of  Lansing  will  be  forgotten,  but  when  the 
sober,  second  thought  of  the  country  begins  to  assert 
itself,  what  will  stand  out  will  be  the  disloyalty  of  Lansing 
to  me.  Just  think  of  it!  Raised  and  exalted  to  the 
office  of  Secretary  of  State,  made  a  member  of  the  Peace 
Commission,  participating  in  all  the  conferences  and 
affixing  his  signature  to  a  solemn  treaty,  and  then  hurry 
ing  to  America  and  appearing  before  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  of  the  Senate  to  repudiate  the  very  thing  to 
which  he  had  given  his  assent." 


446    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

During  the  illness  of  the  President  his  political  enemies 
sought  to  convey  the  impression  that  he  was  incapaci 
tated  for  the  duties  of  his  office.  As  one  who  came  in 
daily  contact  with  him  I  knew  how  baseless  were  these 
insinuations.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  not  a  whole 
week  during  his  entire  illness  that  he  was  not  in  touch 
with  every  matter  upon  which  he  was  called  to  act  and 
upon  which  he  was  asked  to  render  judgment.  The 
White  House  files  contain  numerous  memoranda  showing 
his  interest  in  all  matters  to  which  department  heads 
felt  it  incumbent  to  call  his  attention  during  his  illness. 
One  of  the  most  critical  things  upon  which  he  passed 
was  the  question  of  the  miners'  strike,  which  resulted  in 
the  beginning  from  an  injunction  suit  by  the  Attorney 
General,  Mr.  Palmer,  to  restrain  the  miners  from  carrying 
out  their  purpose  to  strike.  This  was  one  of  the  most 
critical  situations  that  arose  during  his  illness  and  with 
which  he  daily  kept  in  touch. 

Uncomplainingly  the  President  applied  himself  to  the 
difficult  tasks  of  the  Western  trip.  While  the  first  meet 
ing  at  Columbus  was  a  disappointment  as  to  attendance, 
as  we  approached  the  West  the  crowds  grew  in  numbers 
and  the  enthusiasm  became  boundless.  The  idea  of  the 
League  spread  and  spread  as  we  neared  the  coast.  Con 
trary  to  the  impression  in  the  East,  the  President's  trip 
West  was  a  veritable  triumph  for  him  and  was  so  success 
ful  that  we  had  planned,  upon  the  completion  of  the 
Western  trip,  to  invade  the  enemy's  country,  Senator 
Lodge's  own  territory,  the  New  England  States,  and  partic 
ularly  Massachusetts.  This  was  our  plan,  fully  developed 
and  arranged,  when  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of 
September  26, 1919,  Doctor  Gray  son  knocked  at  the  door 
of  my  sleeping  compartment  and  told  me  to  dress  quickly, 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  447 

that  the  President  was  seriously  ill.  As  we  walked 
toward  the  President's  car,  the  Doctor  told  me  in  a  few 
words  of  the  President's  trouble  and  said  that  he  greatly 
feared  it  might  end  fatally  if  we  should  attempt  to  con 
tinue  the  trip  and  that  it  was  his  duty  to  inform  the 
President  that  by  all  means  the  trip  must  be  cancelled; 
but  that  he  did  not  feel  free  to  suggest  it  to  the  President 
without  having  my  cooperation  and  support.  When 
we  arrived  at  the  President's  drawing  room  I  found  him 
fully  dressed  and  seated  in  his  chair.  With  great  diffi 
culty  he  was  able  to  articulate.  His  face  was  pale  and 
wan.  One  side  of  it  had  fallen,  and  his  condition  was 
indeed  pitiful  to  behold.  Quickly  I  reached  the  same 
conclusion  as  that  of  Doctor  Grayson,  as  to  the  necessity 
for  the  immediate  cancellation  of  the  trip,  for  to  continue 
it,  in  my  opinion,  meant  death  to  the  President.  Looking 
at  me,  with  great  tears  running  down  his  face,  he  said: 
"My  dear  boy,  this  has  never  happened  to  me  before. 
I  felt  it  coming  on  yesterday.  I  do  not  know  what  to  do." 
He  then  pleaded  with  us  not  to  cut  short  the  trip.  Turn 
ing  to  both  of  us,  he  said:  "Don't  you  see  that  if  you 
cancel  this  trip,  Senator  Lodge  and  his  friends  will  say 
that  I  am  a  quitter  and  that  the  Western  trip  was  a  failure, 
and  the  Treaty  will  be  lost. "  Reaching  over  to  him,  1 
took  both  of  his  hands  and  said:  "What  difference,  my 
dear  Governor,  does  it  make  what  they  say?  Nobody 
in  the  world  believes  you  are  a  quitter,  but  it  is  your 
life  that  we  must  now  consider.  We  must  cancel  the  trip, 
and  I  am  sure  that  when  the  people  learn  of  your  condi 
tion  there  will  be  no  misunderstanding."  He  then  tried 
to  move  over  nearer  to  me  to  continue  his  argument 
against  the  cancellation  of  the  trip;  but  he  found  he  was 
unable  to  do  so.  His  left  arm  and  leg  refused  to  function. 


448    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

I  then  realized  that  the  President's  whole  left  side  was 
paralyzed.  Looking  at  me  he  said:  "I  want  to  show 
them  that  I  can  still  fight  and  that  I  am  not  afraid. 
Just  postpone  the  trip  for  twenty-four  hours  and  I  will 
be  all  right." 

But  Doctor  Grayson  and  I  resolved  not  to  take  any 
risk,  and  an  immediate  statement  was  made  to  the  in 
quiring  newspaper  men  that  the  Western  trip  was  off. 

Never  was  the  President  more  gentle  or  tender  than  on 
that  morning.  Suffering  the  greatest  pain,  paralyzed 
on  his  left  side,  he  was  still  fighting  desperately  for  the 
thing  that  was  so  close  to  his  heart — a  vindication  of  the 
things  for  which  he  had  so  gallantly  fought  on  the  other 
side.  Grim  old  warrior  that  he  was,  he  was  ready  to 
fight  to  the  death  for  the  League  of  Nations. 

In  the  dispatches  carried  to  the  country,  prepared  by 
the  fine  newspaper  men  who  accompanied  us  on  the 
trip,  it  was  stated  that  evidences  of  a  breakdown  on  the 
part  of  the  President  were  plainly  visible  in  the  speech 
he  delivered  at  Pueblo. 

I  had  talked  to  him  only  a  few  minutes  before  the 
delivery  of  that  speech,  and  the  only  apparent  evidence 
that  he  was  approaching  a  breakdown  was  in  his  remark 
to  me  that  he  had  a  splitting  headache,  and  that  he  would 
have  to  cut  his  speech  short.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
last  speech  he  made,  at  Pueblo,  on  September  25,  1919, 
was  one  of  the  longest  speeches  delivered  on  the  Western 
trip  and,  if  I  may  say  so,  was  one  of  the  best  and  most 
passionate  appeals  he  made  for  the  League  of  Nations. 

Many  things  in  connection  with  the  Pueblo  meeting 
impressed  themselves  upon  me.  In  the  peroration  of 
the  speech  he  drew  a  picture  of  his  visit  on  Decoration 
Day,  1919,  to  what  he  called  a  beautiful  hillside  near 


THE    WESTERN    TRIP  449 

Paris,  where  was  located  the  cemetery  of  Suresnes,  a 
cemetery  given  over  to  the  burial  of  the  American  dead. 
As  he  spoke  of  the  purposes  for  which  those  departed 
American  soldiers  had  given  their  lives,  a  great  wave 
of  emotion,  such  as  I  have  never  witnessed  at  a  public 
meeting,  swept  through  the  whole  amphitheatre.  As 
he  continued  his  speech,  I  looked  at  Mrs.  Wilson  and 
saw  tears  in  her  eyes.  I  then  turned  to  see  the  effect 
upon  some  of  the  "hard-boiled"  newspaper  men,  to 
whom  great  speeches  were  ordinary  things,  and  they 
were  alike  deeply  moved.  Down  in  the  amphitheatre 
I  saw  men  sneak  their  handkerchiefs  out  of  their  pockets 
and  wipe  the  tears  from  their  eyes.  The  President  was 
like  a  great  organist  playing  upon  the  heart  emotions 
of  the  thousands  of  people  who  were  held  spell-bound 
by  what  he  said. 

It  is  possible,  I  pray  God  it  may  not  be  so,  that  the 
speech  at  Pueblo  was  the  last  public  speech  that  Woodrow 
Wilson  will  ever  make,  and  I,  therefore,  take  the  liberty 
of  introducing  into  this  story  the  concluding  words  of  it: 

What  of  our  pledges  to  the  men  that  lie  dead  in  France?  We 
said  that  they  went  over  there  not  to  prove  the  prowess  of  America 
or  her  readiness  for  another  war  but  to  see  to  it  that  there  never 
was  such  a  war  again.  It  always  seems  to  make  it  difficult  for  me 
to  say  anything,  my  fellow  ctiizens,  when  I  think  of  my  clients  in 
this  case.  My  clients  are  the  children;  my  clients  are  the  next 
generation.  They  do  not  know  what  promises  and  bonds  I  undertook 
when  I  ordered  the  armies  of  the  United  States  to  the  soil  of  France, 
but  I  know,  and  I  intend  to  redeem  my  pledges  to  the  children;  they 
shall  not  be  sent  upon  a  similar  errand. 

Again,  and  again,  my  fellow  citizens,  mothers  who  lost  their 
sons  in  France  have  come  to  me  and,  taking  my  hand,  have  shed  tears 
upon  it  not  only,  but  they  have  added:  "God  bless  you,  Mr.  Presi 
dent!"  Why,  my  fellow  citizens,  should  they  pray  God  to  bless  me? 


450    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

I  advised  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  to  create  the  situation  that 
led  to  the  death  of  their  sons.  I  ordered  their  sons  overseas.  I 
consented  to  their  sons  being  put  in  the  most  difficult  parts  of  the 
battle  line,  where  death  was  certain,  as  in  the  impenetrable  diffi 
culties  of  the  forest  of  Argonne.  Why  should  they  weep  upon  my 
hand  and  call  down  the  blessings  of  God  upon  me?  Because  they  be 
lieve  that  their  boys  died  for  something  that  vastly  transcends  any 
of  the  immediate  and  palpable  objects  of  the  war.  They  believe, 
and  they  rightly  believe,  that  their  sons  saved  the  liberty  of  the 
world.  They  believe  that  wrapped  up  with  the  liberty  of  the  world 
is  the  continuous  protection  of  that  liberty  by  the  concerted  powers 
of  all  the  civilized  world.  They  believe  that  this  sacrifice  was 
made  in  order  that  other  sons  should  not  be  called  upon  for  a  similar 
gift — the  gift  of  life,  the  gift  of  all  that  died — and  if  we  did  not  see 
this  thing  through,  if  we  fulfilled  the  dearest  present  wish  of  Germany 
and  now  dissociated  ourselves  from  those  alongside  whom  we  fought 
in  the  war,  would  not  something  of  the  halo  go  away  from  the  gun 
over  the  mantelpiece,  or  the  sword?  Would  not  the  old  uniform 
lose  something  if  its  significance?  These  men  were  crusaders.  They 
were  going  forth  to  prove  the  might  of  justice  and  right,  and  all  the 
world  accepted  them  as  crusaders,  and  their  transcendent  achieve 
ment  has  made  all  the  world  believe  in  America  as  it  believes  in  no 
other  nation  organized  in  the  modern  world.  There  seems  to  me  to 
stand  between  us  and  the  rejection  or  qualification  of  this  treaty  the 
serried  ranks  of  those  boys  in  khaki,  not  only  those  boys  who  came 
home,  but  those  dear  ghosts  that  still  deploy  upon  the  fields  of  France. 
My  friends,  on  last  Decoration  Day  I  went  to  a  beautiful  hillside 
near  Paris,  where  was  located  the  cemetery  of  Suresnes,  a  cemetery 
given  over  to  the  burial  of  the  American  dead.  Behind  me  on  the 
slopes  was  rank  upon  rank  of  living  American  soldiers,  and  lying 
before  me  on  the  levels  of  the  plain  was  rank  upon  rank  of  departed 
American  soldiers.  Right  by  the  side  of  the  stand  where  I  spoke 
there  was  a  little  group  of  French  women  who  had  adopted  those 
graves,  had  made  themselves  mothers  of  those  dear  ghosts  by  putting 
flowers  every  day  upon  those  graves,  taking  them  as  their  own  sons, 
their  own  beloved,  because  they  had  died  in  the  same  cause — France 
was  free  and  the  world  was  free  because  America  had  come !  I  wish 
some  men  in  public  life  who  are  now  opposing  the  settlement  for  which 


THE   WESTERN   TRIP  451 

these  men  died  could  visit  such  a  spot  as  that.  I  wish  that  the  thought 
that  comes  out  of  those  graves  could  penetrate  their  consciousness. 
I  wish  that  they  could  feel  the  moral  obligation  that  rests  upon  us 
not  to  go  back  on  those  boys,  but  to  see  the  thing  through,  to  see 
it  through  to  the  end  and  make  good  their  redemption  of  the  world. 
For  nothing  less  depends  upon  this  decision,  nothing  less  than  the 
liberation  and  salvation  of  the  world. 

Now  that  the  mists  of  this  great  question  have  cleared  away, 
I  believe  that  men  will  see  the  trust,  eye  to  eye  and  face  to  face. 
There  is  one  thing  that  the  American  people  always  rise  to  and  ex 
tend  their  hand  to,  and  that  is  the  truth  of  justice  and  of  liberty 
and  of  peace.  We  have  accepted  that  truth  and  we  are  going  to  be 
led  by  it,  and  it  is  going  to  lead  us,  and  through  us  the  world,  out 
into  pastures  of  quietness  and  peace  such  as  the  world  never  dreamed 
of  before. 


o 


CHAPTER  XLIH 

RESERVATIONS 

N  JUNE  25,  1919, 1  received  from  President  Wilson 
the  following  cabled  message: 


My  clear  conviction  is  that  the  adoption  of  the  treaty  by  the 
Senate  with  reservations  will  put  the  United  States  as  clearly  out  of 
the  concert  of  nations  as  a  rejection.  We  ought  either  to  go  in  or 
stay  out.  To  stay  out  would  be  fatal  to  the  influence  and  even  to  the 
commercial  prospects  of  the  United  States,  and  to  go  in  would  give 
her  a  leading  place  in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  Reservations  would 
either  mean  nothing  or  postpone  the  conclusion  of  peace,  so  far  as 
America  is  concerned,  until  every  other  principal  nation  concerned 
in  the  treaty  had  found  out  by  negotiation  what  the  reservations 
practically  meant  and  whether  they  could  associate  themselves  with 
the  United  States  on  the  terms  of  the  reservations  or  not. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 

The  President  consistently  held  to  the  principle  involved 
in  this  statement.  To  his  mind  the  reservations  offered 
by  Senator  Lodge  constituted  a  virtual  nullification  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  of  a  treaty  which  was  a  contract, 
and  which  should  be  amended  through  free  discussion 
among  all  the  contracting  parties.  He  did  not  argue  or 
assume  that  the  Covenant  was  a  perfected  document,  but 
he  believed  that,  like  our  American  Constitution,  it  should 
be  adopted  and  subsequently  submitted  to  necessary 
amendment  through  the  constitutional  processes  of  debate. 
He  was  unalterably  opposed  to  having  the  United  States 
put  in  the  position  of  seeking  exemptions  and  special 

453 


RESERVATIONS  453 

privileges  under  an  agreement  which  he  believed  was  in 
the  interest  of  the  entire  world,  including  our  own  country. 
Furthermore,  he  believed  that  the  advocacy  for  reser 
vations  in  the  Senate  proceeded  from  partisan  motives 
and  that  in  so  far  as  there  was  a  strong  popular  opinion 
in  the  country  in  favour  of  reservations  it  proceeded  from 
the  same  sources  from  which  had  come  the  pro-German 
propaganda.  Before  the  war  pro-German  agitation  had 
sought  to  keep  us  out  of  the  conflict,  and  after  the  war  it 
sought  to  separate  us  in  interest  and  purpose  from  other 
governments  with  which  we  were  associated. 

By  his  opposition  to  reservations  the  President  was 
seeking  to  prevent  Germany  from  taking  through  diplo 
macy  what  she  had  been  unable  to  get  by  her  armies. 

The  President  was  so  confident  of  the  essential  rightness 
of  the  League  and  the  Covenant  and  of  the  inherent  right- 
mindedness  of  the  American  people,  that  he  could  not 
believe  that  the  people  would  sanction  either  rejection  or 
emasculation  of  the  Treaty  if  they  could  be  made  to  see  the 
issue  in  all  the  sincerity  of  its  motives  and  purposes,  if 
partisan  attack  could  be  met  with  plain  truth-speaking. 
It  was  to  present  the  case  of  the  people  in  what  he  con 
sidered  its  true  light  that  he  undertook  the  Western  tour, 
and  it  was  while  thus  engaged  that  his  health  broke. 
Had  he  kept  well  and  been  able  to  lead  in  person  the 
struggle  for  ratification,  he  might  have  won,  as  he  had 
previously  by  his  determination  and  conviction  broken 
down  stubborn  opposition  to  the  Federal  Reserve  system. 

So  strong  was  his  faith  in  his  cause  and  the  people  that 
even  after  he  fell  ill  he  could  not  believe  that  ratification 
would  fail.  What  his  enemies  called  stubbornness  was  his 
firm  faith  in  the  righteousness  of  the  treaty  and  in  the 
reasonableness  of  the  proposition  that  the  time  to  make 


454    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

amendments  was  not  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty 
and  by  one  nation,  but  after  all  the  nations  had  agreed 
and  had  met  together  for  sober,  unpartisan  consideration 
of  alterations  in  the  interest  of  all  the  contracting  parties 
and  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  world. 

Even  when  he  lay  seriously  ill,  he  insisted  upon  being 
taken  in  his  invalid  chair  along  the  White  House  portico  to 
the  window  of  my  outer  office  each  day  during  the  contro 
versy  in  the  Senate  over  the  Treaty.  There  day  after  day 
in  the  coldest  possible  weather  I  conferred  with  him  and 
discussed  every  phase  of  the  fight  on  the  Hill.  He  would 
sit  in  his  chair,  wrapped  in  blankets,  and  though  hardly 
able,  because  of  his  physical  condition,  to  discuss  these 
matters  with  me,  he  evidenced  in  every  way  a  tremendous 
interest  in  everything  that  was  happening  in  the  Capitol 
that  had  to  do  with  the  Treaty.  Although  I  was  warned 
by  Doctor  Grayson  and  Mrs.  Wilson  not  to  alarm  him 
unduly  by  bringing  pessimistic  reports,  I  sought,  in  the 
most  delicate  and  tactful  way  I  could,  to  bring  the  at 
mosphere  of  the  Hill  to  him.  Whenever  there  was  an 
indication  of  the  slightest  rise  in  the  tide  for  the  League  of 
Nations  a  smile  would  pass  over  the  President's  face,  and 
weak  and  broken  though  he  was,  he  evidenced  his  great 
pleasure  at  the  news.  Time  and  time  again  during  the 
critical  days  of  the  Treaty  fight  the  President  would  ap 
pear  outside  my  office,  seated  in  the  old  wheel  chair,  and 
make  inquiry  regarding  the  progress  of  the  Treaty  fight 
on  Capitol  Hill. 

One  of  the  peculiar  things  about  the  illness  from  which 
the  President  suffered  was  the  deep  emotion  which  would 
stir  him  when  word  was  brought  to  him  that  this  senator 
or  that  senator  on  the  Hill  had  said  some  kind  thing  about 
him  or  had  gone  to  his  defense  when  some  political  enemy 


RESERVATIONS  455 

was  engaged  in  bitterly  assailing  his  attitude  in  the  Treaty 
fight.  Never  would  there  come  from  him  any  censure  or 
bitter  criticism  of  those  who  were  opposing  him  in  the 
fight.  For  Senator  Borah,  the  leader  of  the  opposition, 
he  had  high  respect,  and  felt  that  he  was  actuated  only  by 
sincere  motives. 

I  recall  how  deeply  depressed  he  was  when  word  was 
carried  to  him  that  the  defeat  of  the  Treaty  was  inevitable. 
On  this  day  he  was  looking  more  weary  than  at  any  time 
during  his  illness.  After  I  had  read  to  him  a  memoran 
dum  that  I  had  prepared,  containing  a  report  on  the 
situation  in  the  Senate,  I  drew  away  from  his  wheel  chair 
and  said  to  him:  "Governor,  you  are  looking  very  well 
to-day."  He  shook  his  head  in  a  pathetic  way  and  said: 
"I  am  very  well  for  a  man  who  awaits  disaster, "  and  bow 
ing  his  head  he  gave  way  to  the  deep  emotion  he  felt. 

A  few  days  later  I  called  to  notify  him  of  the  defeat 
of  the  Treaty.  His  only  comment  was,  "They  have 
shamed  us  in  the  eyes  of  the  world."  Endeavouring  to 
keep  my  good-nature  steady  in  the  midst  of  a  trying  situ 
ation,  I  smiled  and  said:  "But,  Governor,  only  the 
Senate  has  defeated  you.  The  People  will  vindicate  your 
course.  You  may  rely  upon  that."  "Ah,  but  our  enemies 
have  poisoned  the  wells  of  public  opinion,"  he  said. 
"They  have  made  the  people  believe  that  the  League  of 
Nations  is  a  great  Juggernaut,  the  object  of  which  is  to 
bring  war  and  not  peace  to  the  world.  If  I  only  could 
have  remained  well  long  enough  to  have  convinced  the 
people  that  the  League  of  Nations  was  their  real  hope, 
their  last  chance,  perhaps,  to  save  civilization!" 

I  said,  by  way  of  trying  to  strengthen  and  encourage 
him  at  this,  one  of  the  critical  moments  of  his  life — a  mo 
ment  that  I  knew  was  one  of  despair  for  him — "Governor, 


456    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

I  want  to  read  a  chapter  from  the  third  volume  of  your 
'History  of  the  American  People,'  if  it  will  not  tire  you." 
He  graciously  gave  his  assent  and  I  took  from  under  my 
arm  the  volume  containing  an  account  of  the  famous  John 
Jay  treaty,  in  the  defense  of  which  Alexander  Hamilton 
was  stoned  while  he  stood  defending  it  on  the  steps  of  the 
New  York  City  Hall.  There  was,  indeed,  a  remarkable 
similarity  between  the  fight  over  the  John  Jay  treaty  and 
the  Versailles  Treaty.  I  read  an  entire  chapter  of  Wood- 
row  Wilson's  "History  of  the  American  People,"  including 
the  passage: 

Slowly  the  storm  blew  off.  The  country  had  obviously  gained 
more  than  it  had  conceded,  and  tardily  saw  the  debt  it  owed  Mr.  Jay 
and  to  the  administration,  whose  firmness  and  prudence  had  made  his 
mission  possible.  But  in  the  meantime  things  had  been  said  which 
could  not  be  forgotten.  Washington  had  been  assailed  with  un 
bridled  license,  as  an  enemy  and  a  traitor  to  the  country;  had  even 
been  charged  with  embezzling  public  moneys  during  the  Revolution; 
was  madly  threatened  with  impeachment,  and  even  with  assassi 
nation;  and  had  cried  amidst  the  bitterness  of  it  all  that  "he  would 
rather  be  in  his  grave  than  in  the  presidency." 

The  country  knew  its  real  mind  about  him  once  again  when  the  end 
of  his  term  came  and  it  was  about  to  lose  him.  He  refused  to  stand 
for  another  election.  His  farewell  address,  with  its  unmistakable 
tone  of  majesty  and  its  solemn  force  of  affection  and  admonition, 
seemed  an  epitome  of  the  man's  character  and  achievements,  and 
every  man's  heart  smote  him  to  think  that  Washington  was  actually 
gone  from  the  nation's  counsels. 

When  I  concluded  reading  this  chapter,  the  Presi 
dent's  comment  was,  "It  is  mighty  generous  of  you  to 
compare  my  disappointment  over  the  Treaty  with  that 
of  Washington's.  You  have  placed  me  in  mighty  good 
company." 


CHAPTER  XLIV 

WILSON — THE   HUMAN   BEING 

THERE  is  no  one  who  wishes  to  feel  the  camara 
derie   of  life,    "the   familiar  touch,"   more   than 
Woodrow  Wilson;  but  it  seems  that  it  cannot  be 
so,  and  the  knowledge  that  it  could  not  saddened  him 
from  the  outset  of  his  public  career. 

I  remember  a  meeting  between  us  at  the  Governor's 
Cottage  at  Sea  Girt,  New  Jersey,  a  few  hours  after  the 
news  of  his  nomination  for  the  Presidency  had  reached 
us  from  Baltimore  in  1912.  In  this  little  talk  he  en 
deavoured  in  an  intimate  way  to  analyze  himself  for  my 
benefit.  "You  know,  Tumulty,"  he  said,  "there  are  two 
natures  combined  in  me  that  every  day  fight  for  supre 
macy  and  control.  On  the  one  side,  there  is  the  Irish  in 
me,  quick,  generous,  impulsive,  passionate,  anxious  al 
ways  to  help  and  to  sympathize  with  those  in  distress." 
As  he  continued  his  description  of  himself,  his  voice  took 
on  an  Irish  brogue,  "And  like  the  Irishman  at  the  Donny- 
brook  Fair,  always  willin'  to  raise  me  shillalah  and  to 
hit  any  head  which  stands  firninst  me.  Then,  on  the 
other  side,"  he  said,  "there  is  the  Scotch — canny,  tena 
cious,  cold,  and  perhaps  a  little  exclusive.  I  tell  you,  my 
dear  friend,  that  when  these  two  fellows  get  to  quarrelling 
among  themselves,  it  is  hard  to  act  as  umpire  between 
them." 

For  every  day  of  my  eleven  years'  association  with 
Woodrow  Wilson  I  have  seen  some  part  of  these  two 


458    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

i 

natures  giving  expression  to  itself.  I  have  witnessed 
the  full  play  of  the  Irish  passion  for  justice  and  sympathy 
for  the  under-dog,  the  man  whom  he  was  pleased  to  call 
the  "average  man,"  whose  name  never  emerges  to  the 
public  view.  I  have  seen  the  full  tide  of  Irish  passion 
and  human  sympathies  in  him  flow  at  some  story  of  in 
justice  which  I  had  called  to  his  attention;  that  Irish 
sympathy  in  him  expressed  itself  not  dramatically,  but 
in  some  simple,  modest  way;  an  impulse  to  lift  some 
one,  to  help  an  unfortunate  person  in  distress.  That 
sympathy  might  be  expressed  in  the  presence  of  some 
father,  seeking  pardon  at  the  hands  of  the  President  in 
behalf  of  a  wayward  son,  or  some  mother  pleading  for  the 
release  of  a  loved  one,  or  it  would  show  itself  in  full 
sway,  as  it  often  did,  when  I  called  his  attention  to  some 
peculiar  case  that  had  evoked  my  sympathy  and  pity. 
And  again  I  saw  the  Scotch  in  him — strict,  upstanding, 
intractable,  and  unrelenting.  I  saw  the  Scotch  rise  in 
him  when  an  attempt  would  be  made  by  personal  friends 
to  influence  his  action  where  it  was  evident  to  him  there 
was  at  the  base  of  it  some  hint  of  personal  privilege,  of 
favouritism  on  grounds  of  friendship.  I  saw  the  full 
sweep  of  that  Scotch  tenacity  during  the  war,  in  the  very 
midst  of  that  bloody  thing,  at  a  time  when  bitter  ridicule 
and  jeers  were  his  portion.  Throughout  it  he  was  calm, 
imperturbable,  undisturbed  by  the  frenzied  passions,  of 
the  moment. 

I  saw  him  express  the  Irish  sense  of  gratitude  in  a  strik 
ing  way  in  the  White  House,  in  my  presence,  as  the 
result  of  a  conference,  in  which  the  participants  were 
the  President  and  Senators  Stone  and  Reed,  both  of 
Missouri. 
The  incident  arose  out  of  Senator  Reed's  failure  to 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  459 

get  the  President  to  agree  to  appoint  an  intimate  friend 
of  Reed's  postmaster  of  St.  Louis.  Charges,  many  of  them 
unfounded,  had  been  made  to  the  Postmaster  General's 
office  against  the  Reed  candidate  and,  although  Reed 
had  made  many  appeals  to  Postmaster  General  Burleson 
to  send  the  appointment  of  his  friend  to  the  President 
for  his  approval,  Burleson  refused  to  do  so,  and  Reed 
thereupon  brought  his  case  to  the  President.  I  remember 
how  generous  and  courteous  the  President  was  in  his 
treatment  of  Reed  and  Stone  on  this  occasion.  Senator 
Stone,  in  his  usual  kindly  way,  walked  over  to  the 
President  and  putting  his  hand  on  his  shoulder,  said: 
"Now,  Mr.  President,  I  want  you  to  do  this  favour 
for  my  friend,  Jim  Reed.  Jim  is  a  damned  good  fellow." 
The  President  laughingly  replied,  "Why,  Senator,  you 
just  know  that  there  is  nothing  personal  in  my  attitude 
in  this  matter.  I  have  no  desire  to  injure  or  humiliate 
Senator  Reed,  but  the  Postmaster  General  has  refused 
to  recommend  the  appointment  of  the  Senator's  friend 
for  the  St.  Louis  postmastership."  The  President  then 
turned  to  Senator  Reed  and  said,  "Senator,  I  will  tell  you 
what  I  will  do  for  you.  I  will  allow  you  to  name  any 
other  man,  outside  of  the  one  whose  name  you  have 
already  suggested,  and  I  will  appoint  him  at  once  without 
making  any  inquiry  or  investigation  whatever  as  to  his 
qualifications.  This  I  will  do  in  order  to  convince  you 
that  I  have  no  personal  feeling  whatever  toward  you  in 
this  matter."  But  Senator  Reed  continued  to  argue  for 
the  appointment  of  his  friend.  The  President  was 
adamant.  Senator  Stone  and  Senator  Reed  then  turned 
away  from  the  President  and  made  their  way  to  my 
office  which  was  adjoining  that  of  the  President.  It 
was  plain  that  the  two  Senators  were  deeply  disappointed 


460    WOODROW   WILSON   AS   I    KNOW   HIM 

and  highly  displeased  with  the  President.  As  the  Presi 
dent  opened  the  door  for  the  Senators  to  make  their 
entrance  into  my  room  Senator  Reed  turned  to  the 
President  again  and  in  the  most  emphatic  way,  said, 
"Mr.  President,  Senator  Stone  told  me  before  I  came  to 
see  you  that  you  were  not  a  cold  man  and  that  you  were 
a  good  fellow.  It  was  upon  that  hypothesis  that  I  took 
the  liberty  of  appealing  to  you  personally  in  behalf  of  my 
friend."  Senator  Reed  then  continued,  and  in  the  most 
eloquent  short  speech  I  have  ever  heard,  said,  "They 
tell  me  that  before  you  became  governor  of  New  Jersey 
you  had  a  fight  at  Princeton  with  the  Trustees  of  that 
University.  You  better  than  any  one  else  in  this  country 
know  what  it  is  to  have  a  pack  of  enemies  at  your  heels. 
This  is  what  is  happening  in  my  friend's  case.  My 
enemies  in  Missouri  have  conspired  to  destroy  this  man 
because  he  has  been  my  friend  and  has  fought  my  battles 
for  me.  This  man  whom  I  have  asked  you  to  appoint 
has  been  my  campaign  manager.  He  has  visited  my  home ; 
we  have  been  life-long  friends,  and  I  will  stake  my  life 
upon  his  reputation  and  upon  his  standing.  But  because 
he  has  been  my  friend  he  is  now  to  be  punished  and 
now  by  your  action  you  will  complete  the  conspiracy 
that  is  afoot  to  defeat  and  destroy  him." 

The  President  then  said,  "But,  Senator,  I  have  tried 
to  convince  you  that  there  is  nothing  personal  in  my 
attitude  and  that  I  will  appoint  any  other  man  you  may 
name."  Whereupon  Senator  Reed  said,  "If  God  Al 
mighty  himself  asked  me  to  surrender  in  this  fight  for  my 
friend,  I  would  not  do  it.  I  think  I  know  you  well  enough 
to  know  that  in  the  fight  you  had  for  your  ideals  and 
your  friends  at  Princeton,  you  would  not  have  surrendered 
to  anybody.  I  am  fighting  now  for  the  reputation  and 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  461 

the  character  of  my  friend,  and  you  ought  not  to  ask  me 
to  surrender  him  to  his  executioners." 

The  President  was  standing  with  his  arms  folded  while 
the  Senator  was  addressing  him  and  was  evidently  deeply 
touched  by  Reed's  appeal.  As  Reed  concluded  his  elo 
quent  speech  in  behalf  of  his  friend  quickly  the  President 
reached  out  his  hand  to  Reed  and  said,  "Senator,  don't 
surrender  your  friend;  stick  by  him  to  the  end  and  I 
will  appoint  him."  Whereupon  he  turned  from  the  Sena 
tors,  walked  over  to  the  telephone  which  stood  on  my 
desk,  called  up  the  Postmaster  General  and  directed  him 
to  send  over  to  the  White  House  at  once  the  appointment 
of  Senator  Reed's  friend  for  the  postmastership  at  St. 
Louis.  The  Postmaster  General  protested  but  was  over 
ruled  by  the  President.  As  the  two  Senators  left  my 
room,  Senator  Stone  said  to  Senator  Reed,  "By  God, 
Jim,  I  told  you  so.  There  is  a  great  man  and  a  true  friend. 
I  told  you  he  was  a  regular  fellow."  v 

It  has  been  said  by  the  enemies  of  Woodrow  Wilson 
that  he  was  ungrateful,  that  he  never  appreciated  the 
efforts  of  his  friends  in  his  behalf,  and  that  when  it  came 
to  the  question  of  appointments  he  was  unmindful  of  his 
obligations  to  them. 

The  following  letter  is  so  characteristic  of  the  man  that 
I  beg  leave  to  introduce  it : 

The  White  House, 
Washington  D.  C. 

April  14,  1916. 
MY  DEAR  DAVIES: 

Thank  you  for  having  let  me  read  this  letter  again. 
There  is  one  thing  that  distresses  me.    The  implication  of  Mr. 
Alward's  letter  is  (or  would  seem  to  one  who  did  not  know  the  cir 
cumstances  to  be)  that  I  had  not  shown  my  gratitude  for  all  the 
generous  things  he  did  in  promoting  my  candidacy.     Surely  he  does 


462    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

not  feel  that.  Is  it  not  true  that  I  appointed  him  to  the  office  he 
now  holds?  that  I  did  so  with  the  greatest  pleasure  as  gratifying 
his  own  personal  wish,  and  that  the  office  itself  has  afforded  him 
an  opportunity  of  showing  his  real  quality  and  mettle  to  the  people 
of  his  state  in  the  performance  of  duties  for  which  he  is  eminently 
qualified?  And  have  I  not  tried,  my  dear  Davies,  in  every  possible 
way  to  show  my  warm  and  sincere  appreciation  and  my  loyal  friend 
ship  both  to  you  and  to  him?  It  distresses  me  to  find  any  other 
implication  even  latent  between  the  lines,  and  the  inference  left  to  be 
drawn  is  that  if  I  should  not  appoint  him  to  the  Federal  Bench, 
it  would  be  virtually  an  act  of  ingratitude  on  my  part.  I  am  sure 
he  cannot  soberly  mean  that,  for  it  is  so  far  from  just. 

It  seems  to  me  my  clear  duty  to  do  in  this  case  as  in  all  others,  the 
thing  which  commends  itself  to  my  judgment  after  the  most  careful 
consideration  as  the  wisest  and  best  thing,  both  for  the  interests  of 
the  Bench  and  the  interests  of  the  party. 

Always,  with  real  affection, 

Faithfully  yours, 

WOODKOW  WILSON. 
Hon.  Joseph  E.  Davies, 
Federal  Trade  Commission. 

On  one  of  the  most  critical  days  of  the  war,  when 
Lloyd  George  was  crying  out  in  stentorian  tones  from 
across  the  sea  that  the  war  was  now  a  race  between 
Von  Hindenburg  and  Wilson,  a  fine  old  Southern  gentle 
man  appeared  at  my  office  at  the  White  House,  dressed 
in  an  old  frock  coat  and  wearing  a  frayed  but  tolerably 
respectable  high  hat.  He  was  the  essence  of  refinement 
and  culture  and  seemed  to  bring  with  him  to  the  White 
House  a  breath  of  the  old  Southland  from  which  he  had 
come.  In  the  most  courteous  way  he  addressed  me, 
saying,  "Mr.  Secretary,  I  am  an  old  friend  of  the  Presi 
dent's  father,  Doctor  Wilson,  and  I  want  to  see  Woodrow. 
I  have  not  seen  the  boy  since  the  old  days  in  Georgia,  and 
I  have  come  all  the  way  up  here  to  shake  him  by  the  hand." 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  463 

So  many  requests  of  a  similar  nature  came  to  my  desk 
during  the  critical  days  of  the  war  and  at  a  time  when 
the  President  was  heavily  burdened  with  weighty  respon 
sibilities  that  I  was  reluctant  to  grant  the  old  man's 
request  and  was  about  to  turn  him  away  with  the  usual 
excuse  as  to  the  crowded  condition  of  the  President's 
calendar,  etc.,  when  the  old  man  said,  "I  know  Woodrow 
will  see  me  for  his  father  and  I  were  old  friends."  He 
then  told  me  a  story  that  the  President  had  often  repeated 
to  me  about  his  father.  It  seems  that  the  old  gentleman 
who  was  addressing  me  was  on  a  hot  summer's  day  many 
years  ago  sitting  in  front  of  a  store  in  the  business  street 
of  Augusta,  Georgia,  where  the  President's  father  was 
pastor  of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  when  he  sighted  the 
parson,  in  an  old  alpaca  coat,  seated  in  his  buggy  driving 
a  well-groomed  gray  mare,  and  called  out  to  him,  "Doctor, 
your  horse  looks  better  groomed  than  yourself."  "Yes," 
replied  Doctor  Wilson  dryly  as  he  drove  on,  "I  take 
care  of  my  horse;  my  congregation  takes  care  of  me." 

I  knew  that  if  I  repeated  this  story  to  the  President 
it  would  be  the  open  sesame  for  the  old  man.  I  excused 
myself  and  quickly  made  my  way  to  the  Cabinet  Room 
where  the  President  was  holding  a  conference  with  the 
Cabinet  members.  After  making  my  excuses  to  the 
Cabinet  for  my  interruption,  I  whispered  into  the  Presi 
dent's  ear  that  there  was  an  old  man  in  my  office  who 
knew  his  father  very  well  in  the  old  days  in  Georgia 
and  that  he  wanted  an  opportunity  to  shake  hands  with 
him.  I  then  said  to  the  President,  "He  told  me  the  old 
horse  story,  the  one  that  you  have  often  told  me.  I  am 
sure  that  he  is  an  old  friend  of  your  father's."  This 
struck  the  President's  most  tender  spot,  for  many  times 
during  the  years  of  our  association  the  President  had  re- 


464    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

galed  me  with  delightful  stories  of  his  father  and  of  the 
tender,  solicitous  way  in  which  his  father  had  cared  for 
him.  One  of  the  passions  of  President  Wilson's  life 
was  his  love  for  and  recollection  of  that  old  father,  him 
self  a  man  of  remarkable  force  of  character  and  intellect. 
Turning  to  the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  the  President 
said,  "Gentlemen,  will  you  please  excuse  me  for  a  few 
minutes?"  When  I  told  the  fine  old  chap  that  the  Presi 
dent  would  see  him  at  once  he  almost  collapsed.  Then, 
fixing  himself  up,  rearranging  his  old  frock  coat,  taking 
his  high  hat  in  hand,  striking  a  statesmanlike  posture, 
he  walked  into  the  President's  office.  No  words  passed 
between  the  two  men  for  a  few  seconds.  The  old  man 
looked  silently  at  the  President,  with  pride  and  admira 
tion  plainly  visible  in  his  eyes,  and  then  walked  slowly 
toward  the  President  and  took  both  his  hands.  Releasing 
them,  he  put  one  of  his  arms  around  the  President's 
shoulder  and  looking  straight  into  the  President's  eyes, 
he  said,  "Woodrow,  my  boy,  your  old  father  was  a  great 
friend  of  mine  and  he  was  mighty  proud  of  you.  He 
often  told  me  that  some  day  you  would  be  a  great  man 
and  that  you  might  even  become  President."  While 
the  old  man  was  addressing  him  the  President  stood  like 
a  big  bashful  schoolboy,  and  I  could  see  that  the  old 
man  touched  the  mystic  chord  of  memories  that  were 
very  sweet  and  dear  to  the  President.  Removing  his 
arm  from  about  the  President's  shoulder,  the  old.  man 
said,  "Well,  well,  Woodrow,  what  shall  I  say  to  you?" 
Then,  answering  his  own  question,  he  said,  "I  shall  say 
to  you  what  your  dear  old  father  would  have  said  were  he 
here:  'Be  a  good  boy,  my  son,  and  may  God  bless  you 
and  take  care  of  you ! ' ' 

The  President  said  nothing,  but  I  could  see  that  his 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  465 

lips  were  quivering.  For  a  moment  he  stood  still,  in  his 
eyes  the  expression  of  one  who  remembers  things  of  long 
ago  and  sacred.  Then  he  seemed,  as  with  an  effort,  to 
summon  himself,  and  his  thoughts  back  to  the  present, 
and  I  saw  him  walk  slowly  toward  the  door  of  the  Cabinet 
Room,  place  one  hand  on  the  knob,  with  the  other  brush 
his  handkerchief  across  his  eyes.  I  saw  him  throw  back 
his  shoulders  and  grow  erect  again  as  he  opened  the  door, 
and  I  heard  him  say  in  quiet,  steady  tones,  "I  hope  you 
will  pardon  the  interruption,  gentlemen." 

The  popular  cry  of  the  unthinking  against  Woodrow 
Wilson  in  the  early  days  of  his  administration  was  that 
he  was  a  pacifist  and  unwilling  to  fight.  The  gentlemen 
who  uttered  these  unkind  criticisms  were  evidently  un 
mindful  of  the  moral  courage  he  manifested  in  the  various 
fights  in  which  he  had  participated  in  his  career,  both 
at  Princeton  University,  where  he  served  as  president, 
and  as  governor  of  New  Jersey,  in  challenging  the  "old 
guard"  of  both  parties  to  mortal  combat  for  the  measures 
of  reform  which  he  finally  brought  to  enactment.  They 
also  forgot  the  moral  courage  which  he  displayed  in  fight 
ing  the  tariff  barons  and  in  procuring  the  enactment  of 
the  Underwood  tariff,  and  of  the  fine  courage  he  mani 
fested  in  decentralizing  the  financial  control  of  the  coun 
try  and  bringing  about  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  which 
now  has  the  whole-hearted  approval  of  the  business  world 
in  America  and  elsewhere,  but  which  was  resisted  in  the 
making  by  powerful  interests. 

I  do  not  wish  to  make  an  invidious  comparison  between 
Woodrow  Wilson  and  his  predecessors  in  the  White  House, 
but  if  one  will  examine  the  political  history  of  this  country, 
he  will  find  that  very  few  Presidents  had  ever  succeeded, 
because  of  the  powerful  interests  they  were  compelled 


466    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

to  attack,  in  finally  putting  upon  the  statute  books  any 
legislation  that  could  control  the  moneyed  interests  of 
the  country.  The  reform  of  the  tariff  and  the  currency 
had  been  the  rocks  upon  which  many  administrations 
had  met  disaster. 

Nearly  every  adviser  about  Woodrow  Wilson,  even 
those  who  had  had  experience  in  the  capital  of  the  nation, 
warned  him  that  he  might,  after  a  long  fight,  succeed 
in  reforming  the  tariff,  but  that  his  efforts  would  fail 
if  he  attempted  to  pass  a  bill  that  would  establish  cur 
rency  reform.  But  the  President  allowed  nothing  to 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  system  without  which  the  financing  of  the  great 
est  war  in  the  history  of  the  world  would  have  been 
impossible.  It  was  his  courage  and  his  persistency  that 
provided  the  first  uniform  and  harmonious  system  of 
banking  which  the  United  States  has  ever  had. 

If  Woodrow  Wilson  had  accomplished  nothing  more 
than  the  passage  of  this  Federal  Reserve  Act,  he  would 
have  been  entitled  to  the  gratitude  of  the  nation.  This 
Act  supplied  the  country  with  an  elastic  currency  con 
trolled  by  the  American  people.  Panics — the  recurring 
phenomena  of  disaster  which  the  Republican  party  could 
neither  control  nor  explain — are  now  but  a  memory. 
Under  the  Republican  system  there  was  an  average  of 
one  bank  failure  every  twenty -one  days  for  a  period  of 
nearly  forty  years.  After  the  passage  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  system  there  were,  in  1915,  four  bank  failures; 
in  1916  and  1917,  three  bank  failures;  in  1918,  one  bank 
failure;  and  in  1919,  no  bank  failures  at  all. 

Woodrow  Wilson  is  not  a  showy  fighter,  but  he  is  a 
tenacious  and  a  courageous  one. 

A  little  story  came  to  me  at  the  White  House,  illustrat- 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  467 

ing  alike  the  calmness  and  the  fighting  quality  of  Woodrow 
Wilson.  The  incident  happened  while  he  was  a  student 
at  the  University  of  Virginia.  It  appears  that  some  of 
the  University  boys  went  to  a  circus  and  had  got  into 
a  fight  with  the  circus  men  and  been  sadly  worsted. 
They  called  a  meeting  at  "wash  hall,"  as  they  termed  it. 
Many  of  the  boys  made  ringing  speeches,  denouncing  the 
brutality  and  unfairness  of  the  circus  people  and  there 
was  much  excitement.  It  was  then  moved  that  all  the 
boys  present  should  proceed  to  the  circus  and  give  proper 
battle,  to  vindicate  the  honour  of  the  college.  Just  before 
the  motion  was  put  a  slim,  black-haired,  solemn  youth 
arose  from  his  seat  in  the  rear  of  the  hall,  and  walking  up 
the  aisle,  requested  a  hearing.  He  stated  that  perhaps 
he  was  being  forward,  because  he  was  a  "first -year" 
man,  in  asking  to  be  heard;  that  he  felt  that  the  action 
of  the  circus  men  deserved  the  severest  condemnation; 
that  it  was  a  natural  impulse  to  want  to  punish  cowardly 
acts  and  to  "clean  up"  the  show;  but  that  it  was  lawless 
ness  they  were  about  to  engage  in;  that  it  would  bring 
disgrace  on  the  college,  as  well  as  on  the  state  and  the 
Southland;  more  than  this,  many  of  the  showmen  would 
be  armed  with  clubs,  knives,  and  pistols,  and  if  the  boys 
did  go,  some  of  them  might  not  come  back  alive  and  others 
might  be  maimed  or  crippled  for  life.  He  then  paused, 
but  resuming,  said,  "However,  if  my  views  do  not  meet 
with  your  approval;  if  you  decide  to  go  as  a  body,  or  if  a 
single  man  wants  to  go  to  fight,  I  shall  ask  to  go  with 
him." 

Was  not  his  attitude  in  this  incident  characteristic  of 
his  dealing  with  Germany?  He  was  patient  with  Germany 
and  stood  unmoved  under  the  bitterest  criticism  and 
ridicule;  but  when  he  found  that  patience  was  no  longer  a 


468    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

virtue,  he  went  into  the  war  in  the  most  ruthless  way  and 
punished  Germany  for  her  attempt  to  control  the  high 
seas. 

I  recall  my  own  antagonism  to  him  in  New  Jersey  when 
I  was  engaged,  as  now  certain  of  his  enemies  are  engaged, 
in  attacking  him,  and  I  recall  how  my  opposition  abated 
and  altogether  disappeared  by  the  recital  by  one  of  his 
friends  to  me  one  day  of  the  controversy  among  the 
Princeton  Trustees  that  arose  over  the  now-famous 
Proctor  gift.  I  was  discussing  the  Princeton  professor 
with  this  old  friend  one  day  and  I  said  to  him  that  I 
suspected  that  Wall  Street  interests  were  back  of  his 
candidacy  for  the  governorship.  My  friend  said,  "Tu 
multy,  you  are  wrong.  There  is  no  unwholesome  interest 
or  influence  back  of  Wilson.  I  tell  you  he  is  a  fine  fellow 
and  it  he  is  elected  governor,  he  will  be  a  free  man."  He 
then  cited  the  instance  of  the  Princeton  fight  over  the 
Proctor  gift.  It  will  be  recalled  that  Mr.  Proctor  be 
queathed  to  Princeton  University  a  large  sum  of  money, 
but  attached  certain  conditions  to  the  gift  that  had  to  do 
with  the  policy  or  internal  control  of  the  University.  The 
gift  was  made  at  a  time  when  Princeton  was  in  sore  need 
of  funds.  President  Wilson,  in  a  prolonged  fight,  bitterly 
waged  by  some  who  had  been  his  close  personal  friends, 
persuaded  the  Board  of  Trustees  to  vote,  by  a  narrow 
margin,  for  rejection  of  the  gift  on  the  grounds  that  a 
great  educational  institution  could  not  afford  to  have  its 
internal  policies  dictated  by  purchase  on  the  part  of  a  rich 
man.  By  his  position  he  alienated  from  his  leadership 
many  of  the  wealthy,  influential  Princeton  alumni,  es 
pecially  in  the  larger  Eastern  cities,  but  he  stood  like  a 
rock  on  the  principle  that  the  educational  policy  of  a 
college  must  be  made  by  those  authorized  to  make  it 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  469 

and  not  changed  at  the  bidding  of  wealthy  benefactors. 
This  was  a  convincing  answer  to  my  attack  upon  the 
Princeton  professor. 

This  same  moral  courage  was  given  free  play  on  many 
an  occasion  during  our  intimacy.  It  was  made  manifest 
in  the  famous  Panama  Tolls  fight,  at  a  time  when  he  was 
warned  that  a  fight  made  to  rectify  mistakes  in  the  matter 
of  Panama  tolls  would  destroy  his  political  future. 

He  was  always  a  fair  fighter  and  a  gentleman  through 
out  every  contest  he  engaged  in.  Many  unkind  and  un 
true  things  were  said  about  Woodrow  Wilson  from  the 
time  he  entered  politics,  but  there  is  one  charge  that  has 
never  been  made  against  him  and  that  is  the  charge  of 
untruthfulness  or  "hitting  below  the  belt."  No  one  in 
the  country  during  his  eight  years  at  the  White  House 
ever  charged  him  with  making  an  untrue  statement.  No 
politician  or  statesman  ever  said  that  Wilson  had  broken 
a  promise,  though  many  have  complained  that  he  would 
not  make  promises. 

In  the  matter  of  promises  I  never  met  a  man  who  was  so 
reluctant  to  give  a  promise,  especially  in  the  matter  of 
bestowing  office  upon  willing  candidates.  I  have  known 
him  on  many  occasions  to  make  up  his  mind  for  months  in 
advance  to  appoint  a  certain  man  and  yet  he  would  not 
say  so  to  his  most  intimate  friends  who  urged  it.  Speak 
ing  to  me  one  day  about  the  matter  of  promises,  he  said, 
"The  thing  to  do  is  to  keep  your  mind  open  until  you  are 
bound  to  act.  Then  you  have  freedom  of  action  to  change 
your  mind  without  being  charged  with  bad  faith." 

One  reason  for  the  charge  made  against  him  of  coldness 
and  "political  ingratitude"  was  that  he  steadfastly  re 
fused  to  barter  public  offices  for  political  support.  He  is 
by  instinct,  as  well  as  by  conviction,  utterly  opposed 


470    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

to  the  "spoils  system."  He  considers  government  the 
people's  business  to  be  conducted  as  such  and  not  as  a 
matter  of  personal  exchange  of  political  favours.  Nor 
can  those  who  failed  to  get  from  him  what  they  fancied 
their  political  services  earned,  complain  truthfully  that 
they  were  deceived  by  him  into  supposing  that  he  shared 
their  own  opinion  of  their  deserts.  Frequently  they  had 
explicit  warning  to  the  contrary.  There  was  the  case  of 
Jim  Smith  and  the  New  Jersey  machine,  for  instance. 
When  those  gentlemen  paid  the  president  of  Princeton 
University  an  unsolicited  call  to  suggest  that  he  be  candi 
date  for  the  Democratic  nomination  for  the  governorship 
of  New  Jersey,^Mr.  Wilson,  after  thanking  them  for  the 
compliment,  with  disconcerting  directness  asked,  "Gentle 
men,  why  do  you  want  me  as  the  candidate?"  They 
replied,  because  they  believed  he  could  be  elected  and  they 
wanted  a  Democratic  governor.  He  asked  why  they 
believed  he  could  be  elected,  he  who  had  never  held  any 
public  office.  They  answered  that  the  people  of  New 
Jersey  would  have  confidence  in  him.  "Precisely,"  said 
Mr.  Wilson;  "they  will  have  confidence  in  me  because  they 
will  believe  that  I  am  free  of  the  political  entanglements 
which  have  brought  distress  to  New  Jersey,  because  they 
are  tired  of  political  bargain  and  sale,  because  they  want 
their  government  delivered  back  into  their  hands.  They 
want  a  government  pledged  to  nobody  but  themselves. 
Now,  don't  you  see,  gentlemen,  that  if  I  should  consider 
your  flattering  suggestion,  I  must  be  what  the  people 
think  I  am.  I  must  be  free  to  consider  nothing  but  their 
interests.  There  must  be  no  strings  tied  to  your  proposal. 
I  cannot  consider  it  an  obligation  of  returned  personal 
favours  to  any  individual.  We  must  clearly  understand 
that  we  are  acting  in  the  interest  of  the  people  of  New 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  471 

Jersey  and  in  the  interest  of  nobody  else."  If  the  self- 
constituted  committee  thought  this  merely  handsome  talk 
without  specific  meaning,  they  had  only  themselves  to 
thank  for  their  subsequent  predicament.  They  found  he 
meant  exactly  what  he  said. 

There  has  never  been  a  public  man  in  America  with  a 
profounder  faith  in  popular  government,  or  a  stronger 
conviction  that  the  bane  of  free  government  is  secret  bar 
gaining  among  those  ambitious  to  trade  public  office  for 
private  benefits.  Mr.  Wilson  could  no  more  pay  for  po 
litical  support  from  public  offices  than  he  could  pay  for 
it  from  the  public  treasury.  He  abhors  all  forms  of 
political  favoritism  including  nepotism.  He  not  only 
would  not  appoint  kinsmen  to  office;  he  would  dis 
countenance  their  appointment  by  others.  He  resisted 
the  efforts  of  well-meaning  friends  to  have  his  brother, 
Mr.  Joseph  R.  Wilson,  Jr.,  who  had  rendered  a  sub 
stantial  service  to  the  1912  campaign  by  his  effective  work 
as  a  trained  journalist,  elected  secretary  of  the  United 
States  Senate,  saying  that  his  brother  in  this  position 
would  inevitably  be  misunderstood,  would  be  thought  a 
spy  on  the  Senate  to  report  matters  to  the  President. 
His  son-in-law,  Mr.  Francis  B.  Sayre,  is  by  profession  a 
student  of  international  law,  a  professor  of  the  subject  in 
Harvard  University,  and  as  such  was  employed  by 
Colonel  House  on  the  research  committee  preparatory  to 
the  Paris  Conference.  Mr.  Sayre  assumed  he  was  to  go 
to  Paris,  but  the  President  set  his  personal  veto  on  this, 
saying  that  it  would  not  do  for  the  President's  son-in- 
law  to  be  on  a  list  of  those  who  were  going  abroad  at  the 
public  expense.  When  Mr.  Sayre  asked  if  he  could  not 
go  and  pay  his  own  expenses,  the  President  replied,  "No, 
because  it  would  not  be  believed  that  you  had  really  paid 


472    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

your  own  expenses."  Mr.  Sayre,  respecting  the  President's 
views,  did  not  press  the  claim. 

If  it  has  appeared  that  the  President  has  sometimes 
"leaned  backward"  in  these  matters,  it  is  because  of  his 
strong  conviction  that  politicians  have  leaned  too  far 
forward  in  using  public  office  for  private  rewards,  a  bad 
system  toward  which  the  President's  attitude  may  be 
stated  in  Hamlet's  impatient  injunction  to  the  players, 
"Oh,  reform  it  altogether!" 

My  experiences  with  him,  where  one  could  witness  the 
full  play  of  the  Scotch  and  Irish  strains  in  him,  came 
particularly  in  the  matter  of  the  numerous  pardon-  cases 
and  the  applications  for  Executive  Orders,  placing  this 
man  or  that  woman  under  the  classified  civil  service.  The 
latter  were  only  issued  in  rare  instances  and  always  over 
the  protest  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission.  In  many  of 
these  applications  there  was  a  great  heartache  or  family 
tragedy  back  of  them  and  to  every  one  of  them  he  gave  the 
most  sympathetic  consideration. 

I  remember  his  remark  to  me  one  day  when  I  was  urging 
him  to  sign  an  Executive  Order  in  behalf  of  a  poor  woman, 
the  widow  of  an  old  soldier.  After  I  had  argued  with  him 
for  a  time  he  turned  to  me  and  said,  "Every  unfortunate 
person  in  distress  seems  to  come  to  me  for  relief,  but  I 
must  not  let  my  sympathies  get  the  best  of  me,  it  would 
not  be  right  to  do  these  things  upon  any  basis  of  sym 
pathy."  Although  I  stood  rebuked,  the  order  was  signed. 
It  was  a  thing  urged  against  him  in  the  last  campaign,  that 
he  held  the  record  for  the  number  of  Executive  Orders 
issued  by  him.  His  Scotch  nature  would  also  assert  itself 
on  many  occasions.  While  I  was  living  with  the  President 
at  the  White  House  one  summer,  on  a  night  after  dinner 
we  engaged  in  the  discussion  of  an  article  which  appeared 


WILSON  — THE    HUMAN    BEING  473 

that  month  in  one  of  the  popular  magazines  of  the  country. 
In  this  article  Woodrow  Wilson  was  portrayed  as  a  great 
intellectual  machine.  Turning  to  me,  he  said, "Tumulty, 
have  you  read  that  article?  What  do  you  think  of  it?" 
I  said  that  I  thought  in  many  respects  it  was  admirable. 
"I  don't  agree  with  you  at  all,"  he  said.  "It  is  no  compli 
ment  to  me  to  have  it  said  that  I  am  only  a  highly  de 
veloped  intellectual  machine.  Good  God,  there  is  more 
in  me  than  that!"  He  then  said,  rather  sadly,  "Well,  I 
want  people  to  love  me,  but  I  suppose  they  never  will." 
He  then  asked  me  this  question,  "Do  you  think  I  am  cold 
and  unfeeling?"  I  replied,  "No,  my  dear  Governor,  I 
think  you  are  one  of  the  warmest  hearted  men  I  ever  met." 
And  when  I  say  this  of  Woodrow  Wilson  I  mean  it.  I 
hope  I  have  all  of  the  generous  tendencies  of  my  race  and 
that  I  know  a  great  heart  when  I  see  its  actions.  I  could 
not  have  been  associated  with  him  all  these  years,  witness 
ing  the  great  heart  in  action,  without  having  full  faith  in 
what  I  now  say.  No  man  of  all  my  acquaintance,  with 
whom  I  have  discussed  life  in  all  of  its  phases  and  tragedies, 
at  least  those  tragedies  that  stalked  in  and  out  of  the  White 
House,  was  more  responsive,  more  sympathetic,  and  more 
inclined  to  pity  and  help  than  Woodrow  Wilson.  His  eyes 
would  fill  with  tears  at  the  tale  of  some  unfortunate  man 
or  woman  in  distress.  It  was  not  a  cheap  kind  of  sym 
pathy.  It  was  quiet,  sincere,  but  always  from  the  heart. 
The  President  continued  talking  to  me — and  now  he  spoke 
as  the  canny  Scot — "I  am  cold  in  a  certain  sense.  Were 
I  a  judge  and  my  own  son  should  be  convicted  of  murder, 
and  I  was  the  only  judge  privileged  to  pass  judgment  upon 
the  case,  I  would  do  my  duty  even  to  the  point  of  sentenc 
ing  him  to  death.  It  would  be  a  hard  thing  to  do  but  it 
would  be  my  solemn  duty  as  a  judge  to  do  it,  but  I  would 


474    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

do  it,  because  the  state  cannot  be  maintained  and  its 
sovereignty  vindicated  or  its  integrity  preserved  unless 
the  law  is  strictly  enforced  and  without  favour.  It  is  the 
business  of  the  judge  to  uphold  it  and  he  must  do  it  to  the 
point  of  every  sacrifice.  If  he  fails,  justice  fails,  the  state 
falls.  That  looks  cold-blooded,  doesn't  it?  But  I  would 
do  it."  Then  his  voice  lowered  and  he  said,  "Then,  after 
sentencing  my  own  son  to  death,  I  would  go  out  and  die  of 
a  broken  heart,  for  it  would  surely  kill  me." 

That  is  one  key  to  the  character  of  the  man  that  was 
revealed  before  my  own  eyes  in  the  years  of  our  intimacy. 

It  showed  itself  on  many  other  occasions.  It  was  his 
idea  of  the  duty  of  the  trustee,  the  judge,  the  guardian. 

I  remember  a  visit  that  two  very  warm  friends  from  the 
Pacific  Coast  made  to  him,  both  of  whom  had  worked 
night  and  day  for  his  cause  in  the  great  state  of  the 
Golden  West. 

Their  son  had  been  convicted  and  was  incarcerated  in 
the  Federal  Prison.  They  had  every  personal  reason  for 
feeling  that  a  mere  appeal  on  their  part  on  behalf  of  this 
son  would  be  a  winning  one,  for  their  friendship  with  the 
President  was  one  of  long  standing  and  most  affectionate 
in  character.  I  can  see  him  now,  standing  in  the  centre 
of  the  room,  with  the  two  old  people  grouped  about  him, 
shaking  his  head  and  saying,  "I  wish  I  could  do  it,  but  I 
must  not  allow  personal  consideration  to  influence  me  in 
the  least.  I  know  it  is  hard  for  you  to  believe  that  I  will 
turn  away  from  your  request,  but  the  only  basis  upon 
which  you  make  it  is  our  friendship.  I  would  be  doing  an 
injustice  to  many  a  boy  like  yours  who  has  similarly 
offended  and  for  whom  no  one  is  able  to  speak  or  approach 
me  in  the  intimate  contact  which  is  your  privilege.  Please 
do  not  think  me  cold-hearted,  but  I  cannot  do  it." 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  475 

I  remember  one  of  the  last  pardon  cases  we  handled  in 
the  White  House  was  that  of  an  old  man,  charged  with 
violating  the  banking  laws  and  sentenced  to  imprison 
ment.  I  pleaded  with  the  President  to  pardon  the  old 
man;  the  Attorney  General  had  recommended  it,  and  some 
of  the  warm-hearted  members  of  the  President's  family 
had  gone  to  him  and  sought  to  exert  their  influence  in 
behalf  of  the  old  man.  It  seemed  as  if  everything  was 
moving  smoothly  and  that  the  old  man  might  be  pardoned, 
until  the  family  influence  was  brought  to  bear.  It  was 
the  last  pardon  case  I  brought  to  his  attention  before  the 
fall  of  the  curtain  on  March  fourth.  I  went  to  him,  and 
said,  "My  dear  Governor,  I  hope  you  will  close  your 
official  career  here  by  doing  an  act  of  mercy."  He  smiled 
at  me  and  I  thought  I  could  see  the  prison  gates  open  for 
the  old  man,  but  when  I  mentioned  the  name  in  the  case, 
the  President  stiffened  up,  stopped  smiling,  and  looking  at 
me  in  the  coldest  way,  said,  "I  will  not  pardon  this  man. 
Certain  members  of  my  family  to  whom  I  am  deeply  de 
voted,  as  you  know,  have  sought  to  influence  my  judgment 
in  this  matter.  They  have  no  right  to  do  it.  I  should  be 
unworthy  of  my  trust  as  President  were  I  to  permit  family 
interference  of  any  kind  to  affect  my  public  actions,  be 
cause  very  few  people  in  the  country  can  exert  that  kind  of 
influence  and  it  must  not  be  tolerated."  The  case  was 
closed;  the  pardon  refused. 

He  often  spoke  to  me  in  the  frankest  way  of  his  personal 
appearance;  how  he  looked  and  appeared  and  of  the  "old 
Scotch  face, "  as  he  called  it,  which  gave  him  the  appear 
ance  of  what  Caesar  called  a  "lean  and  hungry  look." 
Speaking  at  the  annual  banquet  of  the  Motion  Picture 
Board  of  Trade,  he  discussed  his  personal  appearance  in 
this  way: 


476    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

"I  have  sometimes  been  very  much  chagrined  in  seeing 
myself  in  a  motion  picture.  I  have  wondered  if  I  really 
was  that  kind  of  a  'guy.'  The  extraordinary  rapidity  with 
which  I  walked,  for  example,  the  instantaneous  and 
apparently  automatic  nature  of  my  motion,  the  way  in 
which  I  produced  uncommon  grimaces,  and  altogether  the 
extraordinary  exhibition  I  made  of  myself  sends  me  to  bed 
very  unhappy.  And  I  often  think  to  myself  that,  although 
all  the  world  is  a  stage  and  men  and  women  but  actors 
upon  it,  after  all,  the  external  appearance  of  things  are  very 
superficial  indeed." 

He  knew  that  his  facial  expression  gave  one  the  im 
pression  that  he  was  a  cold  and  canny  Scot.  In  repose 
one  would  get  that  impression,  but  when  that  old  Scotch 
face  took  on  a  winning  smile  it  was  most  gracious  and 
appealing.  One  of  his  favourite  limericks  was : 

For  beauty  I  am  not  a  star, 

There  are  others  more  handsome  by  far. 

But  my  face  I  don't  mind  it, 

For  I  am  behind  it, 

It's  the  people  in  front  that  I  jar. 

Behind  the  cold  exterior  and  beneath  the  "gleam  of  the 
waters"  there  was  a  warm,  generous  heart.  I  have  often 
thought  of  the  character  discussed  by  Israel  Zangwill  in 
his  book  "The  Mantle  of  Elijah."  These  lines,  in  my 
opinion,  draw  a  perfect  picture  of  Woodrow  Wilson  as  I 
knew  him: 

Speaking  of  Allegra's  father  Zangwill  said : 

"With  him  freedom  was  no  nebulous  figure,  aureoled 

with  shining  rhetoric,  blowing  her  own  trumpet,  but  Free 

Trade,  Free  Speech,  Free  Education.     He  did  not  rail 

against  the  Church  as  the  enemy,  but  he  did  not  count  on 


WILSON  — THE    HUMAN    BEING  477 

it  as  a  friend.  His  Millennium  was  earthly,  human;  his 
philosophy  sunny,  untroubled  by  Dantesque  depths  or 
shadows;  his  campaign  unmartial,  constitutional,  a  frank 
focussing  of  the  new  forces  emergent  from  the  slow  dis 
solution  of  Feudalism  and  the  rapid  growth  of  a  modern 
world.  Towards  such  a  man  the  House  of  Commons  had 
an  uneasy  hostility.  He  did  not  play  the  game.  Whig 
and  Tory,  yellow  and  blue,  the  immemorial  shuffling  of 
Cabinet  cards,  the  tricks  and  honours — he  seemed  to  live 
outside  them  all.  He  was  no  clubman  in  'The  best  club 
in  England.'  He  did  not  debate  for  argument's  sake  or  to 
upset  Ministers.  He  was  not  bounded  by  the  walls  of 
the  Chamber  nor  ruler  from  the  Speaker's  chair;  the  House 
was  resentfully  conscious  it  had  no  final  word  over  his 
reputation  or  his  influence.  He  stood  for  something 
outside  it,  something  outside  himself,  something  large, 
vague,  turbulent,  untried,  unplumbed,  unknown — the 
People." 

A  little  incident  illustrating  the  warmth  of  the  heart  of 
Woodrow  Wilson  and  the  sympathetic  way  he  manifested 
his  feeling  came  to  me  in  a  letter  received  at  the  White 
House  in  1920  from  a  Red  Cross  nurse,  who  was  stationed 
at  the  Red  Cross  Base  Hospital  at  Neuilly,  France.  An 
excerpt  from  it  follows: 

I  might  interest  you  to  recite  an  incident  within  my  own  personal 
knowledge  that  proves  the  depths  of  his  sympathy — his  sincerity.  I 
was  one  of  the  unit  of  Red  Cross  Workers  who  went  to  France  to  help 
our  soldiers  blinded  in  battle.  I  was  at  the  time  of  this  incident  sta 
tioned  at  the  Red  Cross  Base  Hospital  No.  1  at  Neuilly.  After  a 
a  visit  of  the  President  and  Mrs.  Wilson  to  the  hospital,  one  of  my 
charges,  a  totally  blind  private  to  whom  Mr.  Wilson  had  spoken, 
said  to  me:  "Miss  Farrell,  I  guess  the  President  must  be  very  tired." 
I  said,  "  Why  do  you  think  that,  Walter?  "  "  Well,  because,"  replied 
the  soldier,  "he  laughed  and  joked  with  all  the  other  fellows  but  was 


478    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

so  quiet  when  he  talked  with  me  and  just  said,  'Honourable  wound, 
my  boy,'  so  low  I  could  hardly  hear  him.  But  say,"  continued  Walter, 
"look  at  my  hand  please  and  see  if  it  is  all  there,  will  you?  The 
President  sure  has  some  hand  and  he  used  it  when  he  shook  hands, 
I'll  say." 

The  fact  was,  Walter  was  the  first  blind  soldier  the  President 
had  met  in  France  and  knowing  from  experience  the  appeal  the  blind 
make  to  our  emotions,  I  knew  the  President  was  so  touched  that  he 
was  overcome  and  couldn't  joke  further — he  was  scarcely  able  to 
manage  the  one  remark  and  could  not  trust  himself  to  venture  another. 
'Twas  with  tears  in  his  eyes  and  a  choking  voice  that  he  managed  the 
one.  Both  he  and  Mrs.  Wilson  wept  in  that  blind  ward. 

As  a  political  fighter,  he  was  gallant  and  square.  No 
one  ever  heard  him  call  an  opponent  a  name  or  knew  him 
unworthily  to  take  advantage  of  an  opponent. 

Illustrative  of  the  magnanimous  attitude  of  the  Presi 
dent  toward  his  political  enemies  was  the  striking  incident 
that  occurred  a  few  weeks  before  the  close  of  the  last 
Presidential  campaign,  1920.  Early  one  afternoon  two 
Democratic  friends  called  upon  me  at  the  Executive 
offices  and  informed  me  that  they  could  procure  certain 
documents  that  would  go  a  long  way  toward  discrediting 
the  Republican  campaign  and  that  they  could  be  procured 
for  a  money  consideration.  They  explained  the  character 
of  the  documents  to  me  and  left  it  to  me  to  say  what  I 
considered  a  fair  price  for  them.  They  explained  the 
serious  nature  of  these  documents,  and  it  was  certainly  a 
delicate  situation  for  me  to  handle  and  embarrassed  me 
greatly.  I  was  reluctant  to  offend  these  gentlemen,  and 
yet  I  was  certain  from  what  they  said  that  the  documents, 
as  they  explained  them  to  me,  even  though  they  might 
discredit  the  Republican  campaign,  were  not  of  a  charac 
ter  that  any  party  of  decent  men  ought  to  have  anything 
to  do  with.  When  the  gentlemen  told  me  the  name  of  the 


WILSON  — THE    HUMAN    BEING  479 

person  who  claimed  to  have  these  damaging  papers  in 
his  possession,  I  at  once  recalled  that  we  had  in  the  files 
of  the  White  House  certain  letters  that  could  be  used  to 
discredit  this  very  man  who  claimed  to  possess  these 
incriminating  documents.  I  thought  it  wise,  therefore, 
to  listen  politely  to  these  gentlemen  until  I  could  get  a 
chance  to  confer  with  the  President.  I  did  this  at  once. 

At  this  time  the  President  was  lying  ill  in  his  sick  room 
at  the  White  House.  The  nurse  raised  him  up  in  the  bed 
and  I  explained  the  whole  situation  to  him,  saying  to  him 
that  it  was  my  opinion  that  the  Democratic  party  ought 
not  to  have  anything  to  do  with  such  a  matter  and  that 
I  thought  we  should  at  once  apprise  the  Republican 
managers  of  the  plan  that  was  afoot  to  discredit  by  these 
unfair  means  the  Republican  candidate  and  campaign. 
When  I  told  the  President  of  the  character  of  these  docu 
ments  that  had  been  offered  to  me  he  was  filled  with  indig 
nation  and  said,  "If  we  can't  win  this  fight  by  fair  means, 
we  will  not  attempt  to  win  it  by  unfair  means.  You  have 
my  authority  to  use  whatever  files  we  have  against  this 
party  who  would  seek  unfairly  to  attack  the  Republican 
nominee  and  you  must  at  once  notify  the  Republican 
managers  of  the  plan  proposed  and  explain  the  whole 
situation  to  them.  Say  to  the  Attorney  General  that  he 
must  place  at  the  disposal  of  Mr.  Harding  and  his  friends 
every  officer  he  has,  if  necessary,  to  disclose  and  overcome 
this  plot.  I  am  sure  that  Governor  Cox  will  agree  with 
me  that  this  is  the  right  and  decent  thing  to  do." 

Acting  upon  the  President's  suggestion,  I  at  once  called 
upon  a  certain  Republican  senator  from  the  West,  now  a 
member  of  President  Harding's  Cabinet,  and  told  him 
of  the  proposed  plot  that  was  afoot  to  discredit  the  Re 
publican  campaign.  I  told  him  I  was  acting  upon  the 


480    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

express  authority  of  the  President.  He  expressed  his  high 
appreciation  of  the  information  I  had  brought  him  and 
informed  me  that  he  would  place  the  matter  in  our  hands 
with  the  utmost  confidence  in  us  to  handle  it  honourably. 

It  ought  to  be  said  here  that  upon  investigation,  person 
ally  made  by  myself,  I  found  that  there  was  nothing  in  this 
whole  matter  that  in  the  slightest  degree  reflected  upon 
the  honour  or  the  integrity  or  high  standing  of  President 
Harding. 

One  of  the  things  for  which  President  Wilson  was  unduly 
censured  shortly  after  he  took  office  was  the  recognition 
he  gave  to  his  political  enemies  in  the  Democratic  party. 
The  old-line  politicians  who  had  supported  him  in  1912 
could  not  understand  why  the  loaves  and  fishes  were  dealt 
out  to  these  unworthy  ones.  Protests  were  made  to  the 
President  by  some  of  his  close  personal  friends,  but  he 
took  the  position  that  as  the  leader  of  the  party  he  was  not 
going  to  cause  resentment  and  antagonisms  by  seeming  to 
classify  Democrats;  that  as  leader  of  his  party  he  had  to 
recognize  all  factions,  and  there  quickly  followed  appoint 
ments  of  Clark  men,  Underwood  men,  Harmon  men,  all 
over  the  country.  A  case  in  point  illustrates  the  bigness 
of  the  President  in  these  matters — that  of  George  Fred 
Williams  as  Minister  to  Greece.  In  the  campaign  of 
1912  Mr.  Williams  had  travelled  up  and  down  the  state 
of  Massachusetts  making  the  bitterest  sort  of  attacks  upon 
Woodrow  Wilson.  I  remember  how  I  protested  against 
this  appointment.  The  President's  only  reply  was  that 
George  Fred  Williams  was  an  eccentric  fellow,  but  that  he 
believed  he  was  thoroughly  honest.  "I  have  no  fault  to 
find,  Tumulty,  with  the  men  who  disagree  with  me  and  I 
ought  not  to  penalize  them  when  they  give  expression  to 
what  they  believe  are  honest  opinions." 


WILSON— THE   HUMAN    BEING  481 

I  have  never  seen  him  manifest  any  bitterness  or 
resentment  toward  even  his  bitterest,  most  implacable 
enemies.  Even  toward  William  Randolph  Hearst,  whose 
papers  throughout  the  country  have  been  his  most  un 
relenting  foes,  he  never  gave  expression  to  any  ill  feeling 
or  chagrin  at  the  unfair  attacks  that  were  made  upon  him. 
I  remember  a  little  incident  that  shows  the  trend  of  his 
feelings  in  this  regard,  that  occurred  when  we  were  dis 
cussing  the  critical  Mexican  situation.  At  this  time  the 
Hearst  papers  were  engaged  in  a  sensational  propaganda 
in  behalf  of  intervention  in  Mexico.  The  President  said 
to  me,  "I  heard  of  a  delightful  remark  that  that  fine  old 
lady,  Mrs.  Phoebe  Hearst,  made  with  reference  to  what 
she  called  her  "big  boy  Willie.'  You  know,"  he  con 
tinued,  "Mrs.  Hearst  does  not  favour  intervention  in 
Mexico  and  it  was  reported  to  me  that  she  chided  her  son 
for  his  flaming  headlines  urging  intervention,  and  told  him 
that  unless  he  behaved  better  she  would  have  to  take  him 
over  her  knee  and  spank  him." 

The  President  has  one  great  failing,  inherent  in  the  very 
character  of  the  man  himself,  and  this  is  his  inborn, 
innate  modesty — his  unwillingness  to  dramatize  the  part 
he  played  in  the  great  events  of  the  war,  so  that  the  plain 
people  of  the  country  could  see  him  and  better  understand 
him.  There  is  no  man  living  to-day  who  has  a  greater 
power  of  personal  appeal  or  who  is  a  greater  master  in  the 
art  of  presenting  ideals,  facts,  and  arguments  than  Wood- 
row  Wilson.  As  his  secretary  for  nearly  eleven  years,  I  was 
often  vexed  because  he  did  not,  to  use  a  newspaper  phrase, 
"play  up"  better,  but  he  was  always  averse  to  doing  any 
thing  that  seemed  artificially  contrived  to  win  applause. 
Under  my  own  eyes,  seated  in  the  White  House  offices,  I 
have  witnessed  many  a  great  story  walk  in  and  out  but 


482    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

the  President  always  admonished  us  that  such  things  must 
not  be  pictured  or  capitalized  in  any  way  for  political  pur 
poses;  and  thus  every  attempt  we  made  to  dramatize  him, 
as  Colonel  Roosevelt's  friends  had  played  him  up,  was 
immediately  placed  under  the  Presidential  embargo. 

His  unwillingness  to  allow  us  in  the  White  House  to 
"play  him  up"  as  the  leading  actor  in  this  or  that  move 
ment  was  illustrated  in  the  following  way:  On  July  1, 1919, 
a  cable  reached  the  White  House  from  His  Holiness,  Pope 
Benedict,  expressing  the  appreciation  of  His  Holiness  for 
the  magnificent  way  in  which  the  President  had  presented 
to  the  Peace  Conference  the  demands  of  the  Catholic 
Church  regarding  Catholic  missions,  and  conveying  to  the 
President  his  thanks  for  the  manner  in  which  the  President 
had  supported  those  demands.  The  cable  came  at  a  time 
when  certain  leaders  of  my  own  church,  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  were  criticizing  and  opposing  the  Presi 
dent  for  what  they  thought  was  his  anti-Catholic  attitude. 
I  tried  to  induce  the  President  to  allow  me  to  give  publicity 
to  the  Pope's  cable,  but  he  was  firm  in  his  refusal.  The 
cable  from  the  Pope  and  the  President's  reply  are  as 
follows: 

Rome,  The  Vatican. 

To  His  EXCELLENCY,  l  July>  1919- 

Doctor  Woodrow  Wilson, 

President  of  the  United  States. 
EXCELLENCY": 

Monsignor  Carretti,  upon  his  return  from  Paris,  hastened  to  in 
form  us  with  what  spirit  of  moderation  Your  Excellency  examined 
the  demands  regarding  the  Catholic  Missions  which  we  presented  to 
the  Peace  Conference,  and  with  what  zeal  Your  Excellency  subse 
quently  supported  these  demands.  We  desire  to  express  to  you  our 
sincere  gratitude  and  at  the  same  time  we  urge  Your  Excellency  to  be 
good  enough  to  employ  your  great  influence,  also,  in  order  to  prevent 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  483 

the  action,  which  according  to  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Germany 
it  is  desired  to  bring  against  the  Kaiser  and  the  highly  placed  German 
commanders.  This  action  could  only  render  more  bitter  national 
hatred  and  postpone  for  a  long  time  that  pacification  of  souls  for 
which  all  nations  long.  Furthermore,  this  trial,  if  the  rules  of  justice 
are  to  be  observed,  would  meet  insurmountable  difficulties  as  may 
be  seen  from  the  attached  article  from  the  Osservatore  Romano,  which 
deals  exclusively  with  the  trial  of  the  Kaiser,  the  newspaper  reserving 
right  to  treat  in  another  article  the  question  of  the  trial  of  the  generals. 
It  pleases  us  to  take  advantage  of  this  new  occasion  to  renew 
to  Your  Excellency  the  wishes  which  we  entertain  for  your  prosperity 
and  that  of  your  family,  as  well  as  for  the  happiness  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Confederation  of  the  United  States. 

(signed)  BENEDICTUS  PP.  XV. 

The  White  House, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

15  August,  1919. 
YOUR  HOLINESS: 

I  have  had  the  pleasure  of  receiving  at  the  hands  of  Monsignor 
Cossio  the  recent  letter  you  were  kind  enough  to  write  me,  which  I 
now  beg  to  acknowledge  with  sincere  appreciation.  Let  me  assure 
you  that  it  was  with  the  greatest  pleasure  that  I  lent  my  influence 
to  safeguarding  the  missionary  interests  to  which  you  so  graciously 
refer,  and  I  am  happy  to  say  that  my  colleagues  in  the  Conference 
were  all  of  the  same  mind  in  this  wish  to  throw  absolute  safeguards 
around  such  missions  and  to  keep  them  within  the  influences  under 
which  they  had  hitherto  been  conducted. 

I  have  read  with  the  gravest  interest  your  suggestion  about  the 
treatment  which  should  be  accorded  the  ex-Kaiser  of  Germany  and 
the  military  officers  of  high  rank  who  were  associated  with  him  in 
the  war,  and  beg  to  say  that  I  realize  the  force  of  the  considerations 
which  you  urge.  I  am  obliged  to  you  for  setting  them  so  clearly,  and 
shall  hope  to  keep  them  in  mind  in  the  difficult  months  to  come. 
With  much  respect  and  sincere  good  wishes  for  your  welfare, 

Respectfully  and  sincerely  yours, 

(signed)  WOODROW  WILSON. 
His  Holiness, 
Pope  Benedict  XV. 


t 


484 


WILSON— THE    HUMAN    BEING  485 

There  was  something  too  fine  in  his  nature  for  the  dra 
matics  and  the  posturings  of  the  political  game,  as  it  is 
usually  played.  He  is  a  very  shy  man,  too  sincere  to 
pose,  too  modest  to  make  advances.  He  craves  the  love 
of  his  fellow-men  with  all  his  heart  and  soul.  People  see 
only  his  dignity,  his  reserve,  but  they  cannot  see  his  big 
heart  yearning  for  the  love  of  his  fellow-men.  Out  of  that 
loving  heart  of  his  has  come  the  passion  which  controlled 
his  whole  public  career — the  passion  for  justice,  for  fair 
dealing,  and  democracy. 

Never  during  the  critical  days  of  the  war,  when  requests 
of  all  kinds  poured  in  upon  him  for  interviews  of  various 
sorts,  did  he  lose  his  good-nature.  Nor  did  he  show  that 
he  was  disturbed  when  various  requests  came  from  this  or 
that  man  who  claimed  to  have  discovered  some  scientific 
means  of  ending  the  war. 

The  following  letter  to  his  old  friend,  Mr.  Thomas  D. 
Jones  of  Chicago,  is  characteristic  of  his  feeling  toward 
those  who  claimed  to  have  made  such  a  scientific  dis 
covery  : 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

25  July  1917. 
MY  DEAR  FRIEND  : 

It  was  generous  of  you  to  see  Mr.  Kenney  and  test  his  ideas.  I 
hope  you  derived  some  amusement  from  it  at  least. 

I  am  afraid  I  have  grown  soft-hearted  and  credulous  in  these  latter 
days,  credulous  in  respect  to  the  scientific  possibility  of  almost  any 
marvel  and  soft-hearted  because  of  the  many  evidences  of  simple- 
hearted  purpose  this  war  has  revealed  to  me. 
With  warmest  regard, 

Cordially  and  faithfully  yours, 
(signed)  WOODROW  WILSON. 

Nor  did  the  little  things  of  life  escape  him,  as  is  shown 
by  the  following  letter  to  Attorney  General  Gregory; 


486    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

1  October,  1918. 
MY  DEAR  GREGORY: 

The  enclosed  letter  from  his  wife  was  handed  to  me  this  morning 
by  a  rather  pitiful  old  German  whom  I  see  occasionally  looking  after 
the  flowers  around  the  club  house  at  the  Virginia  Golf  Course.  I 
must  say  it  appeals  to  me,  and  I  am  sending  it  to  you  to  ask  if  there 
is  any  legitimate  way  in  which  the  poor  old  fellow  could  be  released 
from  his  present  restrictions. 

In  haste, 

Faithfully  yours, 

(signed)  WOODROW  WILSON. 

I  recall  a  day  when  he  sat  at  his  typewriter  in  the  White 
House,  preparing  the  speech  he  was  to  deliver  at  Hodgens- 
ville,  Kentucky,  in  connection  with  the  formal  acceptance 
of  the  Lincoln  Memorial,  built  over  the  log  cabin  birth 
place  of  Lincoln.  When  he  completed  this  speech,  which 
I  consider  one  of  his  most  notable  public  addresses — 
perhaps  in  literary  form,  his  best — he  turned  to  me  and 
asked  me  if  I  had  any  comment  to  make  upon  it.  I  read 
it  very  carefully.  I  then  said  to  him,  "Governor,  there 
are  certain  lines  in  it  that  might  be  called  a  self -revelation 
of  Woodrow  Wilson."  The  lines  that  I  had  in  mind  were: 

I  have  read  many  biographies  of  Lincoln;  I  have  sought  out  with 
the  greatest  interest  the  many  intimate  stories  that  are  told  of  him, 
the  narratives  of  near-by  friends,  the  sketches  at  close  quarters,  in 
which  those  who  had  the  privilege  of  being  associated  with  him  have 
tried  to  depict  for  us  the  very  man  himself  "in  his  habit  as  he  lived"; 
but  I  have  nowhere  found  a  real  intimate  of  Lincoln.  I  nowhere 
get  the  impression  in  my  narrative  or  reminiscence  that  the  writer 
had  in  fact  penetrated  to  the  heart  of  his  mystery,  or  that  any  man 
could  penetrate  to  the  heart  of  it.  That  brooding  spirit  had  no 
real  familiars.  I  get  the  impression  that  it  never  spoke  out  in  com 
plete  self-revelation,  and  that  it  could  not  reveal  itself  complete  to 
any  one.  It  was  a  very  lonely  spirit  that  looked  out  from  underneath 


WHITE.  HOUSE. 

WASHINGTON. 


1  October,  1918. 

My  dear  Gregory: 

The  enclosed  letter  from  his  wife  was  handed  to 
me  this  morning  by  a  rather  pitiful  old  German  whom 
I  see  occasionally  looking  after  the  flowers  around 
the  club  house  at  the  Virginia  Golf  Course.   I  must 
say  it  appeals  to  me,  and  I  am  sending  it  to  you  to 
ask.  if  there  is  any  legitimate  way  in  which  the  poor 
old"  fellow  could  bereleased  from  his  present  restric 
tions. 

In  haste, 

Faithfully  youre, 

WOODROW  WILSON^. 


Hon«  Thomas  W.  Gregory, 
The  AttorrceyGwneral . 

An  evidence  of  the  tender-heartedness  which  Mr.  Tumulty  claims  fop  the  President 


487 


488    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

those  shaggy  brows,  and  comprehended  men  without  fully  communing 
with  them,  as  if,  in  spite  of  all  its  genial  efforts  at  comradeship,  it 
dwelt  apart,  saw  its  visions  of  duty  where  no  man  looked  on.  There 
is  a  very  holy  and  very  terrible  isolation  for  the  conscience  of  every 
man  who  seeks  to  read  the  destiny  in  the  affairs  for  others  as  well  as 
for  himself,  for  a  nation  as  well  as  for  individuals.  That  privacy 
no  man  can  intrude  upon.  That  lonely  search  of  the  spirit  for  the 
right  perhaps  no  man  can  assist. 

To  Woodrow  Wilson  the  business  of  government  was  a 
solemn  thing,  to  which  he  gave  every  ounce  of  his  energy 
and  his  great  intellectual  power.  No  President  in  the 
whole  history  of  America  ever  carried  weightier  responsi 
bilities  than  he.  Night  and  day,  with  uncomplaining 
patience,  he  was  at  his  post  of  duty,  attending  strictly  to 
the  pressing  needs  of  the  nation,  punctiliously  meeting 
every  engagement,  great  or  small.  Indeed,  no  man  that 
I  ever  met  was  more  careless  about  himself  or  thought  less 
of  vacations  for  the  purpose  of  rest  and  recuperation. 

There  are  three  interesting  maps  which  show  the  mile 
age  covered  by  Presidents  Roosevelt,  Taft,  and  Wilson. 
These  maps  show  the  states  traversed  by  each  of  the 
Presidents.  Great  black  smudges  show  the  trail  covered 
by  President  Roosevelt,  which  included  every  state  in 
the  Union,  and  equally  large  black  marks  show  the  terri 
tory  covered  by  President  Taft,  but  only  a  thin  line  shows 
the  peregrinations  and  wanderings  of  President  Wilson. 
The  dynamic,  forceful  personality  of  Mr.  Roosevelt, 
which  radiated  energy,  charm,  and  good-nature,  and  the 
big,  vigorous,  lovable  personality  of  Mr.  Taft,  put  the 
staid,  simple,  modest,  retiring  personality  of  the  New 
Jersey  President,  Mr.  Wilson,  at  a  tremendous  disadvan 
tage.  Into  the  atmosphere  created  by  these  winning 
personalities  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Taft  the  person- 


WILSON  — THE    HUMAN    BEING  489 

ality  of  Mr.  Wilson  did  not  easily  fit,  and  he  realized  it, 
when  he  said  to  me  one  day,  "Tumulty,  you  must  realize 
that  I  am  not  built  for  the  dramatic  things  of  politics. 
I  do  not  want  to  be  displayed  before  the  public,  and  if 
I  tried  it,  I  should  do  it  badly." 

Without  attempting  to  belittle  the  great  achievements 
of  former  Presidents  of  the  United  States,  particularly 
Roosevelt,  it  is  only  fair  to  say  that,  comparing  the  situa 
tions  which  confronted  them  with  those  that  met  Presi 
dent  Wilson  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  incumbency, 
their  jobs  were  small.  As  a  genial  Irishman  once  said 
to  me,  "Hell  broke  loose  when  Wilson  took  hold."  Every 
unusual  thing,  every  extraordinary  thing,  seemed  to 
break  and  break  against  us.  From  the  happening  of 
the  Dayton  flood,  which  occurred  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Wilson  Administration,  down  to  the  moment  when 
he  laid  down  the  reins  of  office,  it  seemed  as  if  the  world 
in  which  we  lived  was  at  the  point  of  revolution.  Unusual, 
unprecedented,  and  remarkable  things  began  to  happen, 
things  that  required  all  the  patience,  indomitable  courage, 
and  tenacity  of  the  President  to  hold  them  steady.  The 
Mexican  situation,  left  on  our  door-step,  was  one  of  the 
great  burdens  that  he  carried  during  his  administration. 
Then  came  the  fight  for  the  revision  of  the  tariff,  the  estab 
lishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  all  items  that  con 
stituted  the  great  programme  of  domestic  reform  which 
emanated  from  the  brain  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  and  then 
in  the  midst  of  it  all  came  the  European  war,  the  neces 
sity  for  neutrality,  the  criticism  which  was  heaped  upon 
the  President  for  every  unusual  happening  which  his 
critics  seemed  to  think  called  for  intervention  of  the 
United  States  in  this  great  cataclysm.  It  was  not  a  time 
for  the  camaraderie  and  good-fellowship  that  had  char- 


490    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

acterized  the  good  old  days  in  which  Mr.  Roosevelt 
served  as  President. 

And  yet  no  man  was  less  exclusive  in  dealing  with  the 
members  of  the  Senate  and  House.  In  preparing  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  in  collaboration  with  Senator  Glass, 
he  was  constantly  in  touch  with  the  members  of  the 
Senate  Banking  and  Currency  Committee,  in  an  endeav 
our  to  make  clear  the  road  for  the  passage  of  this  import 
ant  piece  of  constructive  legislation.  Constant  demands 
were  made  upon  his  time  and  he  gave  of  his  energy  and 
of  the  small  reserve  of  strength  that  he  had  uncomplain 
ingly  and  without  a  protest.  No  rest,  no  recreation,  no 
vacation  intervened.  Every  measure  that  he  sought  to 
press  to  enactment  was  the  challenge  to  a  great  fight, 
as,  for  instance,  the  tariff,  the  currency,  the  rural  credits, 
and  the  Panama  tolls  acts. 

I  have  often  been  asked  whether  anger  or  passion  ever 
showed  itself  in  the  President,  and  I  am  reminded  of  a 
little  incident  that  happened  at  the  White  House  during 
one  of  those  conferences  with  the  newspaper  men,  which, 
before  the  days  of  the  war,  and  for  a  long  time  afterward, 
took  place  in  the  Executive  offices.  At  the  time  of  this 
particular  conference,  the  President's  first  wife  lay  seri 
ously  ill  at  the  White  House,  and  stories  were  carried  in 
the  various  newspapers  exaggerating  the  nature  of  her  ill 
ness,  some  of  them  going  so  far  as  to  say  she  was  suffering 
from  this  or  from  that  disease.  At  the  very  time  these 
stories  were  appearing  in  the  newspapers  there  were 
also  articles  that  his  daughter,  Margaret,  was  engaged  to 
marry  this  man  or  that  man.  The  President  came  to 
the  newspaper  men's  conference  this  morning  fighting  mad. 
It  was  plain  that  something  serious  was  afoot.  Taking 
hold  of  the  back  of  the  chair,  as  if  to  strengthen  himself 


WILSON  — THE    HUMAN    BEING  491 

for  what  he  had  to  say,  -he  looked  squarely  at  the  news 
paper  men  and  said,  "I  hope  that  you  gentlemen  will 
pardon  me  for  a  personal  word  this  morning.  I  have 
read  the  stories  that  have  appeared  in  certain  newspapers 
of  the  country,  containing  outrageous  statements  about 
the  illness  of  my  wife  and  the  marriage  of  my  daughter. 
I  realize  that  as  President  of  the  United  States  you  have 
a  perfect  right  to  say  anything  you  damn  please  about 
me,  for  I  am  a  man  and  I  can  defend  myself.  I  know 
that  while  I  am  President  it  will  be  my  portion  to  receive 
all  kinds  of  unfair  criticism,  and  I  would  be  a  poor  sport 
if  I  could  not  stand  up  under  it;  but  there  are  some  things, 
gentlemen,  that  I  will  not  tolerate.  You  must  let  my 
family  alone,  for  they  are  not  public  property.  I  acquit 
every  man  in  this  room  of  responsibility  for  these  stories. 
I  know  that  you  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  them; 
but  you  have  feelings  and  I  have  feelings,  even  though  I 
am  President.  My  daughter  has  no  brother  to  defend 
her,  but  she  has  me,  and  I  want  to  say  to  you  that  if 
these  stories  ever  appear  again  I  will  leave  the  White 
House  and  thrash  the  man  who  dares  to  utter  them." 

A  little  letter  came  to  my  notice  in  which  the  President 
replies  to  an  old  friend  in  Massachusetts  who  had  asked 
him  to  attempt  to  interpret  himself: 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND: 

You  have  placed  an  impossible  task  upon  me — that  of  interpreting 
myself  to  you.  All  I  can  say  in  answer  to  your  inquiry  is  that  I 
have  a  sincere  desire  to  serve,  to  be  of  some  little  assistance  in  improv 
ing  the  condition  of  the  average  man,  to  lift  him  up,  and  to  make 
his  life  more  tolerable,  agreeable,  and  comfortable.  In  doing  this  I 
try  hard  to  purge  my  heart  of  selfish  motives.  It  will  only  be  known 
when  I  am  dead  whether  or  not  I  have  succeeded. 

Sincerely  your  friend, 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


CHAPTER  XLV 

THE   SAN   FRANCISCO   CONVENTION 

DURING  the  winter  of  1919-1920  President  Wilson 
was  the  target  of  vicious  assaults.  Mrs.  Wilson 
and  Admiral  Grayson  with  difficulty  curbed 
his  eagerness  to  take  a  leading  hand  in  the  fight  over  the 
Peace  Treaty  in  the  Senate,  and  to  organize  the  Demo 
cratic  party  on  a  fighting  basis.  It  was  not  until  after  the 
Chicago  Convention  had  nominated  Mr.  Harding  and 
enunciated  a  platform  repudiating  the  solemn  obligations 
of  the  United  States  to  the  rest  of  the  world  that  the 
President  broke  his  silence  of  many  months.  Because 
he  had  something  he  wanted  to  say  to  the  country  he 
asked  me  to  send  for  Louis  Seibold,  a  trusted  friend  and 
an  experienced  reporter,  then  connected  with  the  New 
York  World.  When  Mr.  Seibold  arrived  in  Washington 
on  the  Tuesday  following  Mr.  Harding's  nomination, 
the  President  talked  unreservedly  and  at  length  with 
him,  discussed  the  Republican  Convention,  character 
ized  its  platform  as  "the  apotheosis  of  reaction,"  and 
declared  that  "it  should  have  quoted  Bismarck  and  Bern- 
hardi  rather  than  Washington  and  Lincoln."  During 
the  two  days  of  Mr.  Seibold's  visit  to  the  White  House 
he  had  abundant  opportunity  to  observe  the  President's 
condition  of  health  which  had  been  cruelly  misrepresented 
by  hostile  newspapers.  Mr.  Seibold  found  him  much 
more  vigorous  physically  than  the  public  had  been  given 
to  understand  and  mentally  as  alert  and  aggressive  as 

492 


THE    SAN    FRANCISCO    CONVENTION      493 

he  had  been  before  his  illness.  Mr.  Seibold's  article, 
which  by  the  way  was  regarded  as  a  journalistic  classic 
and  for  which  Columbia  University  awarded  the  author 
the  Pulitzer  prize  for  the  best  example  of  newspaper  re 
porting  of  the  year,  exposed  the  absurd  rumours  about  the 
President's  condition  and  furnished  complete  evidence 
of  his  determination  to  fight  for  the  principles  to  estab 
lish  which  he  had  struggled  so  valiantly  and  sacrificed  so 
much. 

As  the  days  of  the  San  Francisco  Convention  ap 
proached  those  of  us  who  were  intimately  associated 
with  the  President  at  the  White  House  were  warned 
by  him  that  in  the  Convention  fight  soon  to  take  place 
we  must  play  no  favourites;  that  the  Convention  must 
be,  so  far  as  the  White  House  was  concerned,  a  free 
field  and  no  favour,  and  that  our  attitude  of  "hands  off" 
and  strict  neutrality  must  be  maintained.  Some  weeks 
before  the  Convention  met  the  President  conferred  with 
me  regarding  the  nominations,  and  admonished  me  that 
the  White  House  must  keep  hands  off,  saying  that  it  had 
always  been  charged  in  the  past  that  every  administra 
tion  sought  to  use  its  influence  in  the  organization  of  the 
party  to  throw  the  nomination  this  way  or  that.  Speak 
ing  to  me  of  the  matter,  he  said,  "We  must  make  it 
clear  to  everyone  who  consults  us  that  our  attitude  is 
to  be  impartial  in  fact  as  well  as  in  spirit.  Other  Presi 
dents  have  sought  to  influence  the  naming  of  their  suc 
cessors.  Their  efforts  have  frequently  brought  about 
scandals  and  factional  disputes  that  have  split  the  party. 
This  must  not  happen  with  us.  We  must  not  by  any  act 
seek  to  give  the  impression  that  we  favour  this  or  that 


man." 


This  attitude  was  in  no  way  an  evidence  of  the  Presi- 


494    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

dent's  indifference  to  the  nominee  of  the  Convention, 
or  to  what  might  happen  at  San  Francisco.  He  was 
passionately  anxious  that  his  party's  standard  bearer 
should  win  at  the  election  if  for  no  other  reason  than  to 
see  his  own  policies  continued  and  the  League  of  Nations 
vindicated. 

There  was  another  and  personal  reason  why  he  insisted 
that  no  White  House  interference  should  be  brought 
into  play  for  any  particular  nominee.  His  son-in-law, 
Mr.  William  G.  McAdoo,  was  highly  thought  of  in  con 
nection  with  the  nomination,  and  therefore  the  President 
felt  that  he  must  be  more  than  ordinarily  strict  in  insisting 
that  we  keep  hands  off,  for  anything  that  savoured  of 
nepotism  was  distasteful  to  him  and,  therefore,  he  "leaned 
backward"  in  his  efforts  to  maintain  a  neutral  position 
in  the  Presidential  contest  and  to  take  no  part  directly 
or  indirectly  that  might  seem  to  give  aid  and  comfort 
to  the  friends  of  his  son-in-law.  While  Mr.  McAdoo's 
political  enemies  were  busily  engaged  in  opposing  him 
on  the  ground  of  his  relationship  to  the  President,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  President  was  making  every  effort 
to  disassociate  himself  and  his  administration  from  the 
talk  that  was  spreading  in  favour  of  McAdoo's  candidacy. 
While  every  effort  was  being  made  by  Mr.  McAdoo's 
enemies  to  give  the  impression  that  the  Federal  machine 
was  being  used  to  advance  his  candidacy,  the  President 
was  engaged  wholly  in  ignoring  Mr.  McAdoo's  candi 
dacy. 

Every  family  visit  which  Mr.  McAdoo  and  his  wife,  the 
President's  daughter,  paid  the  White  House,  was  dis 
torted  in  the  newspaper  reports  carried  to  the  country 
into  long  and  serious  conferences  between  the  President 
and  his  son-in-law  with  reference  to  Mr.  McAdoo's 


THE    SAN    FRANCISCO    CONVENTION      495 

candidacy.  I  know  from  my  own  knowledge  that  the 
matter  of  the  nomination  was  never  discussed  between 
the  President  and  Mr.  McAdoo.  And  Mr.  McAdoo's 
real  friends  knew  this  and  were  greatly  irritated  at  what 
they  thought  was  the  gross  indifference  on  the  part  of 
the  President  to  the  political  fortunes  of  his  own  son- 
in-law.  So  meticulously  careful  was  the  President  that 
no  one  should  be  of  the  opinion  that  he  was  attempting 
to  influence  things  in  Mr.  McAdoo's  behalf,  that  there  was 
never  a  discussion  even  between  the  President  and  myself 
regarding  Mr.  McAdoo's  candidacy,  although  we  had  can 
vassed  the  availability  of  other  Democratic  candidates, 
as  well  as  the  availability  of  the  Republican  candidates. 

I  had  often  been  asked  what  the  President's  attitude 
would  be  toward  Mr.  McAdoo's  candidacy  were  he  free 
to  take  part  in  the  campaign.  My  only  answer  to  these 
inquiries  was  that  the  President  had  a  deep  affection 
and  an  admiration  for  Mr.  McAdoo  as  a  great  executive 
that  grew  stronger  with  each  day's  contact  with  him. 
He  felt  that  Mr.  McAdoo's  sympathies,  like  his  own, 
were  on  the  side  of  the  average  man;  and  that  Mr.  McAdoo 
was  a  man  with  a  high  sense  of  public  service. 

And  while  the  President  kept  silent  with  reference  to 
Mr.  McAdoo,  the  basis  of  his  attitude  was  his  conviction 
that  to  use  his  influence  to  advance  the  cause  of  his  son- 
in-law  was,  in  his  opinion,  an  improper  use  of  a  public 
trust. 

That  he  was  strictly  impartial  in  the  matter  of  Presi 
dential  candidates  was  shown  when  Mr.  Palmer,  the 
Attorney  General,  requested  me  to  convey  a  message 
to  the  President  with  reference  to  his  [Palmer's]  candidacy 
for  the  nomination,  saying  that  he  would  be  a  candidate 
and  would  so  announce  it  publicly  if  the  President  had  no 


496     WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

objection;  or  that  he  would  resign  from  the  Cabinet  if 
the  announcement  would  embarrass  the  President  in  any 
way,  and  that  he  would  support  any  man  the  President 
saw  fit  to  approve  for  this  great  office. 

I  conveyed  this  message  to  the  President  and  he  re 
quested  me  to  notify  Mr.  Palmer  that  he  was  free  to  do 
as  he  pleased,  that  he  had  no  personal  choice  and  that  the 
Convention  must  be  left  entirely  free  to  act  as  it  thought 
proper  and  right  and  that  he  would  gladly  support  the 
nominee  of  the  Convention. 

Mr.  Homer  S.  Cummings,  the  permanent  chairman 
of  the  Convention,  Senator  Glass  of  Virginia,  and  Mr. 
Colby,  Secretary  of  State,  called  upon  the  President  at 
the  White  House  previous  to  taking  the  train  for  San 
Francisco  to  inquire  if  the  President  had  any  message 
for  the  Convention  or  suggestion  in  the  matter  of  candi 
dates  or  platforms.  He  informed  them  that  he  had  no 
message  to  convey  or  suggestions  to  offer. 

Thus,  to  the  end,  he  maintained  this  attitude  of  neutral 
ity.  He  never  varied  from  this  position  from  the  opening 
of  the  Convention  to  its  conclusion.  There  was  no  direct 
wire  between  the  White  House  and  the  San  Francisco 
Convention,  although  there  were  frequent  long-distance 
telephone  calls  from  Colby,  Cummings,  and  others  to 
me;  never  once  did  the  President  talk  to  any  one  at  the 
Convention.  At  each  critical  stage  of  the  Convention 
messages  would  come  from  someone,  urging  the  Presi 
dent  to  say  something,  or  send  some  message  that  would 
break  the  deadlock,  but  no  reply  was  forthcoming.  He 
remained  silent. 

There  came  a  time  when  it  looked  as  if  things  at  the 
Convention  had  reached  an  impasse  and  that  only  the 
strong  hand  of  the  President  could  break  the  deadlock. 


I  *  I  * « » 

-  a  i  I  *  s 


i! 

I 


497 


498    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

I  was  informed  by  long-distance  telephone  that  the 
slightest  intimation  from  the  President  would  be  all  that 
was  necessary  to  break  the  deadlock  and  that  the  Con 
vention  would  nominate  any  one  he  designated. 

I  conveyed  this  information  to  the  President.  He 
shook  his  head.  This  told  me  that  he  would  not  act 
upon  my  suggestion  and  would  in  no  way  interfere  with 
the  Convention.  To  the  end  he  steered  clear  of  playing 
the  part  of  dictator  in  the  matter  of  the  nomination. 
That  he  took  advantage  of  every  occasion  to  show  that 
he  was  playing  an  impartial  hand  is  shown  by  the  docu 
ments  which  follow.  The  Associated  Press  had  carried 
a  story  to  the  effect  that  Senator  Glass  had  notified 
certain  delegates  that  Governor  Cox  was  persona  non 
grata  to  the  President.  When  Governor  Cox's  friends 
got  me  on  the  long-distance  telephone  and  asked  me  if 
there  was  any  foundation  for  such  a  story  and  after  Gover 
nor  Cox  himself  had  talked  with  me  over  the  'phone  from 
Columbus,  I  addressed  the  following  note  to  the  President : 

4  July,  1920. 
DEAR  GOVERNOR: 

Simply  for  your  information : 

Governor  Cox  just  telephoned  me  from  Columbus.  He  felt  greatly 
aggrieved  at  the  statement  which  it  is  claimed  Glass  gave  out  last 
night,  and  which  he  says  prevented  his  nomination.  He  says  that 
Glass  made  the  statement  that  the  President  had  said  that  "  Governor 
Cox  would  not  be  acceptable  to  the  Administration." 

He  says  he  has  been  a  loyal  supporter  of  the  Administration 
and  has  asked  no  favours  of  it.  He  also  says  that  Mr.  Bryan  has 
been  attacking  him  in  the  most  relentless  way  and  that  Mr.  Bryan's 
antagonism  toward  him  became  particularly  aggravated  since  the 
Jackson  Day  dinner,  when  the  Governor  went  out  of  his  way  to  dis 
agree  with  Mr.  Bryan  in  the  matter  of  the  Lodge  reservations. 

He  thinks,  whether  he  himself  is  nominated  or  not,  this  action 


THE    SAN    FRANCISCO    CONVENTION      499 

of  Glass's  has  hurt  the  Democratic  chances  in  Ohio.  He  says  he  does 
not  ask  for  any  statement  from  the  Administration,  but  he  would 
leave  it  to  the  President's  sense  of  justice  whether  or  not  he  has  been 
treated  in  fairness. 

Sincerely, 
TUMULTY. 

The  President  read  my  note  and  immediately  author 
ized  me  to  issue  the  following  statement: 

The  White  House,  Washington, 
4  July,  1920. 

When  a  report  was  brought  to  Secretary  Tumulty's  attention  of 
rumours  being  circulated  in  San  Francisco  that  the  President  .had  ex 
pressed  an  opinion  with  reference  to  a  particular  candidate,  he  made 
the  following  statement : 

"This  is  news  to  me.  I  had  discussed  all  phases  of  this  convention 
with  the  President  and  had  been  in  intimate  touch  with  him  during 
its  continuance,  and  I  am  positive  that  he  has  not  expressed  an  opin 
ion  to  any  one  with  reference  to  a  particular  candidate  for  the  Presi 
dency.  It  has  always  been  his  policy  to  refrain  from  taking  any  stand 
that  might  be  construed  as  dictation." 

The  proceedings  of  the  Convention  finally  resulted  in 
the  nomination  of  Governor  Cox.  The  President  ex 
pressed  his  great  pleasure  at  the  nomination  for  Governor 
Cox  had  long  been  a  devoted  friend  and  admirer  of  his, 
and  he  was  certain  that  he  would  not  desert  him  on  the 
issue  so  close  to  his  heart — the  League  of  Nations. 

When  Governor  Cox  visited  the  White  House  and  con 
ferred  with  the  President,  the  Governor  assured  the  Presi 
dent  that  he  intended  to  stand  by  him.  The  President 
showed  deep  emotion  and  expressed  his  appreciation  to 
Governor  Cox.  Governor  Cox  afterward  told  me  that 
no  experience  of  his  life  had  ever  touched  him  so  deeply 
as  that  through  which  he  had  just  passed  at  the  White 


500    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

House.  He  spoke  of  the  modesty  of  the  President,  his 
simplicity  and  the  great  spiritual  purpose  that  lay  back 
of  his  advocacy  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Turning  to 
me,  he  said,  "No  man  could  talk  to  President  Wilson 
about  the  League  of  Nations  and  not  become  a  crusader 
in  its  behalf."  Governor  Cox  may  have  entered  the 
White  House  that  day  as  a  politician.  He  left  it  as  a 
crusader,  ready  to  fight  for  the  cause. 

As  the  campaign  progressed  we  attempted  to  induce 
the  President  to  issue  weekly  statements  from  the  White 
House,  but  after  long  consideration  he  concluded  that 
in  view  of  the  Republican  strategy  of  trying  to  make 
him  personally,  instead  of  Governor  Cox  and  the  League 
of  Nations,  the  issue,  it  would  be  better  tactics  for  him  to 
remain  silent.  He  broke  his  silence  only  once,  a  week  be 
fore  the  election,  in  a  message  to  the  people  insisting  upon 
the  League  of  Nations  as  the  paramount  issue  of  the 
campaign. 

It  was  really  touching  when  one  conferred  with  him  to 
find  him  so  hopeful  of  the  result.  Time  and  time  again 
he  would  turn  to  me  and  say,  "I  do  not  care  what  Repub 
lican  propaganda  may  seek  to  do.  I  am  sure  that  the 
hearts  of  the  people  are  right  on  this  great  issue  and  that 
we  can  confidently  look  forward  to  triumph." 

I  did  not  share  his  enthusiasm,  and  yet  I  did  not  feel 
like  sending  reports  to  him  that  were  in  the  least  touched 
with  pessimism  because  of  the  effect  they  might  have 
upon  his  feelings. 

Then  came  the  news  of  Governor  Cox's  defeat  and  with 
it  the  news  of  the  defeat  of  the  solemn  referendum  on 
the  League  of  Nations. 

The  loneliest  place  in  the  country  on  election  night  is 
the  White  House  Office,  especially  when  the  tide  of  opinion 


THE    SAN    FRANCISCO    CONVENTION     501 

throughout  the  country  is  running  strongly  against  you. 
I  have  noticed  the  difference  in  the  atmosphere  of  the 
place  and  in  the  crowds  that  come  to  congratulate  and  to 
rejoice  when  you  are  winning  and  the  few  loyal  ones  that 
remain  with  you  throughout  the  night  of  defeat.  It  takes 
a  stout  heart  to  withstand  the  atmosphere  of  the  White 
House  on  election  night. 

The  first  reports  from  the  country  were  overwhelming, 
and  there  was  no  spot  in  the  country  where  we  could  look 
for  hope  and  consolation.  In  the  early  hours  of  the  even 
ing  I  sent  whatever  few  optimistic  reports  I  could  get 
to  the  President,  so  that  at  least  he  would  not  feel  the 
full  weight  of  the  blow  on  election  night.  His  intimate 
friends  had  told  me  that  they  feared  the  effect  of  defeat 
upon  his  health;  but  these  fears  were  groundless  and 
never  disturbed  me  in  the  least,  for  I  had  been  with  him 
in  many  a  fight  and  I  was  sure  that  while  he  would  feel 
the  defeat  deeply  and  that  it  would  go  to  his  heart,  its 
effect  would  only  be  temporary. 

My  feeling  in  this  regard  was  justified  for  in  my  talk 
with  him  the  day  after  the  election  no  bitterness  was 
evident.  He  said,  "They  have  disgraced  us  in  the  eyes 
of  the  world.  The  people  of  America  have  repudiated 
a  fruitful  leadership  for  a  barren  independence.  Of 
course,  I  am  disappointed  by  the  results  of  the  election 
for  I  felt  sure  that  a  great  programme  that  sought  to 
bring  peace  to  the  world  would  arouse  American  idealism, 
and  that  the  Nation's  support  would  be  given  to  it. 
It  is  a  difficult  thing,  however,  to  lead  a  nation  so  vari 
ously  constituted  as  ours  quickly  to  accept  a  programme 
such  as  the  League  of  Nations.  The  enemies  of  this  enter 
prise  cleverly  aroused  every  racial  passion  and  prejudice, 
and  by  poisonous  propaganda  made  it  appear  that  the 


502    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

League  of  Nations  was  a  great  Juggernaut  which  was 
intended  to  crush  and  destroy  instead  of  saving  and 
bringing  peace  to  the  world.  The  people  will  have  to 
learn  now  by  bitter  experience  just  what  they  have  lost. 
There  will,  of  course,  be  a  depression  in  business  for  the 
isolation  which  America  covets  will  mean  a  loss  of  prestige 
which  always  in  the  end  means  a  loss  of  business.  The 
people  will  soon  witness  the  tragedy  of  disappointment 
and  then  they  will  turn  upon  those  who  made  that  dis 
appointment  possible." 

When  I  intimated  to  him  that  the  Cox  defeat  might 
in  the  long  run  prove  a  blessing,  he  rebuked  me  at  once 
by  saying:  "I  am  not  thinking  of  the  partisan  side  of  this 
thing.  It  is  the  country  and  its  future  that  I  am  thinking 
about.  We  had  a  chance  to  gain  the  leadership  of  the 
world.  We  have  lost  it,  and  soon  we  will  be  witnessing 
the  tragedy  of  it  all." 

After  this  statement  to  me  with  reference  to  the  result 
of  the  election,  he  read  to  me  a  letter  from  his  old  friend, 
John  Sharp  Williams,  United  States  senator  from  Mis 
sissippi,  a  letter  which  did  much  to  bolster  and  hearten 
him  on  this,  one  of  the  most  trying  days  of  his  life  in  the 
White  House.  The  letter  follows: 

DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

God  didn't  create  the  world  in  one  act.  I  never  expected  that 
we  would  win  in  the  United  States  the  first  battle  in  the  campaign 
for  a  league  of  nations  to  keep  the  peace  of  the  world.  Our  people 
were  too  "set"  by  our  past  history  and  by  the  apparent  voice  of  the 
Fathers  in  an  opposite  course,  a  course  of  isolation.  This  course  was 
hitherto  the  best  for  accomplishing  the  very  purpose  we  must  now 
accomplish  by  a  seemingly  contrary  course.  We  must  now  begin 
the  war  in  earnest.  We  will  win  it.  Never  fear,  the  stars  in  their 
courses  are  fighting  with  us.  The  League  is  on  its  feet,  learning  to 
walk,  Senate  coteries  willy-nilly. 


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504    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

As  for  the  vials  of  envy  and  hatred  which  have  been  emptied  on 
your  head  by  all  the  un-American  things,  aided  by  demagogues  who 
wanted  their  votes  and  got  them,  abetted  by  yellow  journals,  etc., 
these  lines  of  Byron  can  console  you: 

"There  were  two  cats  in  Kilkenny 
They  fit  and  fit  until  of  cats  there  weren't  any." 

This  is  almost  a  prophecy  of  what  will  happen  now  between  Borah, 
Johnson  &  Co.  and  Root,  Taft  &  Co.,  with  poor  Lodge  mewing 
"peace"  when  there  is  no  peace — except  a  larger  peace  outside  their 
horizon.  They  have  been  kept  united  by  hatred  of  you,  by  certain 
foreign  encouragements,  and  by  fear  of  the  Democratic  party.  With 
the  necessity  to  act,  to  do  something,  the  smouldering  fire  of  differ 
ences  will  break  forth  into  flame.  Conserve  your  health.  Cultivate 
a  cynical  patience.  Give  them  all  the  rope  you  can.  Now  and  then 
when  they  make  too  big  fools  of  themselves,  throw  in  a  keynote  veto 
— not  often — never  when  you  can  give  them  the  benefit  of  the  doubt 
and  with  it  responsibility.  They  have  neither  the  coherence  nor  the 
brains  to  handle  the  situation.  Events  will  work  their  further  con 
fusion,  events  in  Europe.  God  still  reigns.  The  people  can  learn, 
though  not  quickly. 

With  regards, 

(signed)  JOHN  SHARP  WILLIAMS. 

One  would  think  that  after  the  election  the  President 
would  show  a  slackening  of  interest  in  the  affairs  of  the 
nation;  that  having  been  repudiated  by  a  solemn  referen 
dum,  he  would  grow  indifferent  and  listless  to  the  adminis 
trative  affairs  that  came  to  his  desk.  On  the  contrary, 
so  far  as  his  interest  in  affairs  was  concerned,  one  coming 
in  contact  with  him  from  day  to  day  after  the  election 
until  the  very  night  of  March  3rd  would  get  the  impression 
that  nothing  unusual  had  happened  and  that  his  term 
of  office  was  to  run  on  indefinitely. 

One  of  the  things  to  which  he  paid  particular  attention 
at  this  time  was  the  matter  of  the  pardon  of  Eugene 


THE    SAN   FRANCISCO   CONVENTION     505 

V.  Debs.  The  day  that  the  recommendation  for  pardon 
arrived  at  the  White  House,  he  looked  it  over  and  ex 
amined  it  carefully,  and  said:  "I  will  never  consent  to 
the  pardon  of  this  man.  I  know  that  in  certain  quarters 
of  the  country  there  is  a  popular  demand  for  the  pardon 
of  Debs,  but  it  shall  never  be  accomplished  with  my 
consent.  Were  I  to  consent  to  it,  I  should  never  be  able 
to  look  into  the  faces  of  the  mothers  of  this  country 
who  sent  their  boys  to  the  other  side.  While  the  flower 
of  American  youth  was  pouring  out  its  blood  to  vindicate 
the  cause  of  civilization,  this  man,  Debs,  stood  behind 
the  lines,  sniping,  attacking,  and  denouncing  them. 
Before  the  war  he  had  a  perfect  right  to  exercise  his 
freedom  of  speech  and  to  express  his  own  opinion,  but 
once  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  declared  war, 
silence  on  his  part  would  have  been  the  proper  course  to 
pursue.  I  know  there  will  be  a  great  deal  of  denunciation 
of  me  for  refusing  this  pardon.  They  will  say  I  am  cold 
blooded  and  indifferent,  but  it  will  make  no  impression 
on  me.  This  man  was  a  traitor  to  his  country  and  he 
will  never  be  pardoned  during  my  administration." 


CHAPTER  XLVI 

THE   LAST   DAY 

I  WAS  greatly  concerned  lest  the  President  should  be 
unable  by  reason  of  his  physical  condition  to  stand 
the  strain  of  Inauguration  Day.  Indeed,  members  of 
his  Cabinet  and  intimate  friends  like  Grayson  and  myself 
had  tried  to  persuade  him  not  to  take  part,  but  he  could 
not  by  any  argument  be  drawn  away  from  what  he  believed 
to  be  his  duty — to  join  in  the  inauguration  of  his  successor, 
President-elect  Harding.  The  thought  that  the  people  of 
the  country  might  misconstrue  his  attitude  if  he  should 
remain  away  and  his  firm  resolve  to  show  every  courtesy 
to  his  successor  in  office  were  the  only  considerations  that 
led  him  to  play  his  part  to  the  end. 

When  I  arrived  at  the  White  House  early  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  4th  of  March,  the  day  of  the  inauguration,  I 
found  him  in  his  study,  smiling  and  gracious  as  ever.  He 
acted  like  a  boy  who  was  soon  to  be  out  of  school  and 
free  of  the  burdens  that  had  for  eight  years  weighed  him 
down  to  the  breaking  point.  He  expressed  to  me  the  feel 
ing  of  relief  that  he  was  experiencing  now  that  his  term  of 
office  was  really  at  an  end.  I  recalled  to  him  the  little 
talk  we  had  had  on  the  same  day,  four  years  before,  upon 
the  conclusion  of  the  ceremonies  incident  to  his  own 
inauguration  in  1917.  At  the  time  we  were  seated  in  the 
Executive  office.  Turning  away  from  his  desk  and  gazing 
out  of  the  window  which  overlooked  the  beautiful  White 
House  lawn  and  gardens,  he  said:  "Well,  how  I  wish  this 

506 


THE    LAST    DAY  507 

were  March  4,  1921.  What  a  relief  it  will  be  to  do  what  I 
please  and  to  say  what  I  please;  but  more  than  that,  to 
write  my  own  impressions  of  the  things  that  have  been 
going  on  under  my  own  eyes.  I  .have  felt  constantly  a 
personal  detachment  from  the  Presidency.  The  one  thing 
I  resent  when  I  am  not  performing  the  duties  of  the  office 
is  being  reminded  that  I  am  President  of  the  United  States. 
I  feel  toward  this  office  as  a  man  feels  toward  a  great 
function  which  in  his  working  hours  he  is  obliged  to  per 
form  but  which,  out  of  working  hours,  he  is  glad  to  get 
away  from  and  resume  the  quiet  course  of  his  own  thought. 
I  tell  you,  my  friend,  it  will  be  great  to  be  free  again." 

On  this  morning,  March  4,  1921,  he  acted  like  a  man 
who  was  happy  now  that  his  dearest  wish  was  to  be 
realized.  As  I  looked  at  Woodrow  Wilson,  seated  in  his 
study  that  morning,  in  his  cutaway  coat,  awaiting  word 
of  the  arrival  of  President-elect  Harding  at  the  White 
House,  to  me  he  was  every  inch  the  President,  quiet, 
dignified;  ready  to  meet  the  duties  of  the  trying  day  upon 
which  he  was  now  to  enter,  in  his  countenance  a  calm 
nobility.  It  was  hard  for  me  to  realize  as  I  beheld  him, 
seated  behind  his  desk  in  his  study,  that  here  was  the  head 
of  the  greatest  nation  in  the  world  who  in  a  few  hours  was 
to  step  back  into  the  uneventful  life  of  a  private  citizen. 

A  few  minutes  and  he  was  notified  that  the  President 
elect  was  in  the  Blue  Room  awaiting  his  arrival.  Alone, 
unaided,  grasping  his  old  blackthorn  stick,  the  faithful 
companion  of  many  months,  his  "third  leg,"  as  he  play 
fully  called  it,  slowly  he  made  his  way  to  the  elevator  and 
in  a  few  seconds  he  was  standing  in  the  Blue  Room  meeting 
the  President-elect  and  greeting  him  in  the  most  gracious 
way.  No  evidence  of  the  trial  of  pain  he  was  undergoing 
in  striving  to  play  a  modest  part  in  the  ceremonies  was 


508    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

apparent  either  in  his  bearing  or  attitude,  as  he  greeted  the 
President-elect  and  the  members  of  the  Congressional 
Inaugural  Committee.  He  was  an  ill  man  but  a  sports 
man,  determined  to  see  the  thing  through  to  the  end. 
President-elect  Harding  met  him  in  the  most  kindly 
fashion,  showing  him  the  keenest  consideration  and 
courtesy. 

And  now  the  final  trip  to  the  Capitol  from  the  White 
House.  The  ride  to  the  Capitol  was  uneventful.  From 
the  physical  appearance  of  the  two  men  seated  beside 
each  other  in  the  automobile,  it  was  plain  to  the  casual 
observer  who  was  the  out-going  and  who  the  in-coming 
President.  In  the  right  sat  President  Wilson,  gray, 
haggard,  broken.  He  interpreted  the  cheering  from  the 
crowds  that  lined  the  Avenue  as  belonging  to  the  Presi 
dent-elect  and  looked  straight  ahead.  It  was  Mr.  Hard- 
ing's  day,  not  his.  On  the  left,  Warren  Gamaliel  Harding, 
the  rising  star  of  the  Republic,  healthy,  vigorous,  great- 
chested,  showing  every  evidence  in  his  tanned  face  of  that 
fine,  sturdy  health  so  necessary  a  possession  in  order  to 
grapple  with  the  problems  of  his  country.  One,  the  man 
on  the  right,  a  battle-scarred  veteran,  a  casualty  of  the 
war,  now  weary  and  anxious  to  lay  down  the  reins  of 
office;  the  other,  agile,  vigorous,  hopeful,  and  full  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  tasks  that  confronted  him.  Upon  the 
face  of  the  one  were  written  in  indelible  lines  the  scars 
and  tragedies  of  war;  on  that  of  the  other,  the  lines  of 
confidence,  hope,  and  readiness  for  the  fray. 

The  Presidential  party  arrived  at  the  Capitol.  Wood- 
row  Wilson  took  possession  of  the  President's  room. 
Modestly  the  President-elect  took  a  seat  in  the  rear  of  the 
room  while  President  Wilson  conferred  with  senators  and 
representatives  who  came  to  talk  with  him  about  bills  in 


THE    LAST    DAY  509 

which  they  were  interested,  bills  upon  which  he  must  act 
before  the  old  clock  standing  in  a  corner  of  the  room 
should  strike  the  hour  of  twelve,  noon,  marking  the  end  of 
the  official  relationship  of  Woodrow  Wilson  with  the  affairs 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  It  was  about 
eleven-thirty.  Senators  and  congressmen  of  both  parties 
poured  into  the  office  to  say  good-bye  to  the  man  seated  at 
the  table,  and  then  made  their  way  over  to  congratulate 
the  President-elect. 

It  was  a  few  minutes  before  twelve  o'clock.  The  weary 
man  at  the  table  was  still  the  President,  still  the  ruler  of  a 
great  people,  the  possessor  for  a  little  while  longer,  just  a 
little  while  longer,  of  more  power  than  any  king  in  Chris 
tendom. 

Presently  there  appeared  at  the  door  a  gray-haired  man 
of  imperious  manner.  Addressing  the  President  in  a 
sharp,  dry  tone  of  voice,  he  said:  "Mr.  President,  we  have 
come  as  a  committee  of  the  Senate  to  notify  you  that  the 
Senate  and  House  are  about  to  adjourn  and  await  your 
pleasure."  The  spokesman  for  the  committee  was  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  the  distinguished  senator  from  Massa 
chusetts,  the  implacable  political  foe  of  the  man  he  was 
addressing. 

It  was  an  interesting  study  to  watch  the  face  and 
manner  of  Woodrow  Wilson  as  he  met  the  gaze  of  Senator 
Lodge  who  by  his  attacks  had  destroyed  the  great  thing 
of  which  the  President  had  dreamed,  the  thing  for  which 
he  had  fought  and  for  which  he  was  ready  to  lay  down  his 
life.  It  appeared  for  a  second  as  if  Woodrow  Wilson  was 
about  to  give  full  sway  to  the  passionate  resentment  he 
felt  toward  the  man  who,  he  believed,  had  unfairly  treated 
him  throughout  the  famous  Treaty  fight.  But  quickly  the 
shadow  of  resentment  passed.  A  ghost  of  a  smile  flitted 


510    WOODROW    WILSON    AS    I    KNOW    HIM 

across  his  firm  mouth,  and  steadying  himself  in  his  chair, 
he  said  in  a  low  voice:  "Senator  Lodge,  I  have  no  further 
communication  to  make.  I  thank  you.  Good  morning." 

Senator  Lodge  and  the  committee  withdrew  from  the 
room.  I  looked  at  the  clock  in  the  corner.  A  few 
minutes  more  and  all  the  power  which  the  weary  man  at 
the  table  possessed  would  fall  from  his  shoulders.  All 
left  the  room  except  the  President,  Mrs.  Wilson,  Admiral 
Grayson,  and  myself. 

The  old  clock  in  the  corner  of  the  room  began  to  toll  the 
hour  of  twelve.  Mechanically  I  counted,  under  my 
breath,  the  strokes:  "One,  two,  three,"  on  through 
"twelve,"  and  the  silent  room  echoed  with  the  low 
vibration  of  the  last  stroke. 

Woodrow  Wilson  was  no  longer  President.  By  the 
votes  of  the  American  people  he  had  been  returned  to  the 
ranks  of  his  fellow  countrymen.  A  great  warrior  had 
passed  from  the  field,  a  leading  actor  had  made  his  exit. 
The  dearest  wish  of  his  political  enemies  had  at  last  been 
realized.  The  prayers  of  his  devoted  friends  that  he 
would  live  to  see  the  eight  years  of  his  administration 
through,  had  been  answered.  His  own  bearing  and 
attitude  did  not  indicate  that  anything  unusual  had 
happened. 

Quickly  Woodrow  Wilson,  now  the  private  citizen, 
turned  to  make  his  way  to  the  elevator,  leaning  on  his 
cane,  the  ferrule  striking  sharply  on  the  stone  pavement  as 
he  walked;  but  his  spirit  was  indomitable.  A  few  minutes 
before  all  interest  had  been  centred  upon  him.  Now  but 
a  few  loyal  friends  remained  behind.  Interest  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  scene  being  enacted  a  few  feet  away  in  the 
Senate  Chamber,  the  induction  into  office  of  Vice-President 
Coolidge.  By  the  time  we  reached  the  elevator,  the  brief 


THE    LAST    DAY  511 

ceremony  in  the  Senate  Chamber  had  ended,  and  the 
multitude  outside  were  cheering  Mr.  Harding  as  he 
appeared  at  the  east  front  of  the  Capitol  to  deliver  his 
inaugural  address.  We  heard  the  United  States  Marine 
Band  playing  "Hail  to  the  Chief."  For  a  few  seconds 
I  looked  toward  the  reviewing  stand.  The  new  President, 
Warren  G.  Harding,  was  taking  his  place  on  the  stand 
amid  the  din  and  roar  of  applause.  He  was  the  focus  of 
all  eyes,  the  pivot  around  which  all  interest  turned.  Not 
one  of  the  thousand  turned  to  look  at  the  lonely  figure 
laboriously  climbing  into  the  automobile.  The  words  of 
Ibsen  flashed  into  my  mind : 

The  strongest  man  in  the  world  is  he  who  stands  most  alone. 


THE  END 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX  "A" 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

10  December,  1918. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris,  France. 

Stories  that  you  have  agreed  to  sinking  of  German  ships  have  caused 
great  deal  of  unfavourable  comment  here. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

16  December,  1918. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
%  American  Embassy,  Paris,  France. 

Most  popular  note  in  this  country  in  your  speech  are  the  words  Quote 
We  must  rebuke  acts  of  terror  and  spoliation  and  make  men  everywhere 
aware  that  they  cannot  be  ventured  upon  without  certainty  of  just  punish 
ment  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

21  December,  1918. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

If  it  is  America's  intention  to  back  up  the  Allies  in  sinking  German  ships, 
the  idea  is  so  vague  in  this  country  that  there  ought  to  be  a  great  deal  of 
elucidation  if  the  President  intends  to  take  this  stand.  Hope  the  President 
will  be  more  definite  than  he  has  been  in  speeches  in  reference  to  League  of 
Nations  and  freedom  of  the  seas.  His  enemies  here  and  abroad  hope  that 
he  will  particularize  so  that  they  can  attack  him.  People  of  the  world  are 
with  him  on  general  principles.  They  care  little  for  details. 

TUMULTY. 
515 


516  APPENDIX 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

22  December,  1918. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
American  Embassy,  Paris. 

Springfield  Republican  editorially  gives  expression  to  fear  that  President 
may  be  made  captive  by  Allied  Imperialism  and  says  Quote  The  conditions 
and  atmosphere  which  now  envelop  him  may  be  calculated  to  fill  his  mind 
with  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  previous  views  and  to  expose  him  to  the 
peril  of  vacillation,  compromise,  and  virtual  surrender  of  vital  principles 
End  Quote.  Country  deeply  pleased  by  impression  Mrs.  Wilson  has  made 
abroad. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

24  December,  1918 

THE  PRESIDENT  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Care  of  American  Embassy,  Paris,  France. 

Stories  appearing  here  stating  in  effect  that  you  intend  to  appeal  to  people 
of  Europe  bound  to  do  great  deal  of  harm.  My  affectionate  Christmas 

Greetings  to  Mrs.  Wilson  and  you. 

TUMULTY. 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

31  December,  1918. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris,  France. 

Clemenceau's  speech,  wherein  he  advocated  a  world  settlement  based 
upon  the  old  balance  of  power  ideas,  demonstrates  necessity  for  and  wisdom 
of  your  trip,  and  has  set  stage  for  final  issue  between  balance  of  power  and 
League  of  Nations.  If  America  fails  now,  socialism  rules  the  world  and  if 
international  fair-play  under  democracy  cannot  curb  nationalistic  ambitions, 
there  is  nothing  left  but  socialism  upon  which  Russia  and  Germany  have 
already  embarked.  You  can  do  nothing  more  serviceable  than  without 
seeming  to  disagree  with  Clemenceau,  drive  home  in  your  speeches  differences 
between  two  ideals,  one,  the  balance  of  power  means  continuance  of  war; 
other,  concert  of  nations  means  universal  peace.  One  has  meant  great 
standing  armies  with  larger  armaments  and  burdensome  taxation,  conse 
quent  unrest  and  bolshevism.  If  the  statesmanship  at  Versailles  cannot 
settle  these  things  in  the  spirit  of  justice,  bolshevism  will  settle  them  in  a 
spirit  of  injustice.  The  world  is  ready  for  the  issue.  Clemenceau  has  given 
you  great  chance;  this  country  and  whole  world  will  sustain  you.  Country 
ready  to  back  you  up  when  you  ask  for  its  support.  Everything  fine  here. 

TUMULTY. 


APPENDIX  517 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

6  January,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Hope  you  will  consider  the  suggestion  for  your  return  trip.  Your  personal 
contact  with  peoples  of  Europe  has  done  much  to  help  your  programme. 
Our  people  will  be  with  your  programme,  but  it  (the  programme)  must  be 
personally  conducted.  If  you  return  here  without  reception  or  ovation, 
public  opinion  on  other  side  liable  to  misunderstand.  The  time  of  your  re 
turn  (in  my  opinion)  is  the  hour  for  you  to  strike  in  favour  of  League  of 
Nations.  Lodge  and  leading  Republicans  constantly  attacking,  excepting 
Taft,  who  is  daily  warning  them  of  political  dangers  of  their  opposition  to 
your  programme.  Could  you  not  consider  stopping  upon  your  return  at 
Port  of  Boston  instead  of  New  York.  The  announcement  of  your  stopping 
at  Boston  would  make  ovation  inevitable  throughout  New  England  and  would 
centre  attack  on  Lodge.  You  have  not  been  to  New  England  hi  six  years. 
It  would  be  a  gracious  act  and  would  help  much.  It  would  strengthen  League 
of  Nations  movement  in  House  and  Senate  and  encourage  our  friends  hi 
Senate  and  House  and  throughout  country.  Our  people  just  as  emotional 
as  people  of  Europe.  If  you  return  without  reception,  Lodge  and  others 
will  construe  it  as  weakness.  If  the  people  of  our  country  could  have  seen 
you  as  people  of  Europe,  our  situation  would  be  much  improved,  especially 
result  of  last  November  would  have  been  different.  My  suggestion  would 
be  speech  at  Faneuil  Hall,  Boston;  speech  in  Providence,  New  Haven,  New 
York  and  reception  upon  return  to  Washington,  to  be  participated  in  by 
returning  soldiers. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

6  January,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

The  attitude  of  the  whole  country  toward  trip  has  changed.  Feeling 
universal  that  you  have  carried  yourself  magnificently  through  critical 
situations,  with  prestige  and  influence  greatly  enhanced  here  and  abroad. 
The  criticisms  of  the  cloak-room  statesmen  have  lost  their  force.  I  realize 
difficulties  still  to  be  met,  but  have  no  doubt  of  result.  Trip  admitted  here 
by  everybody  to  be  wonderful  success.  Last  week  with  perils  of  visit  to 
Vatican  most  critical.  The  whole  psychology  favours  the  success  of  your 
trip.  The  peoples  of  Europe  and  the  United  States  with  you  for  League  of 
Nations  and  against  settlements  based  upon  balance  of  power.  Opinion 
here  is  that  cards  are  stacked  against  you.  My  own  opinion  your  influence 
so  great  in  Europe  that  European  leaders  cannot  stand  in  your  way.  Now 


518  APPENDIX 

is  the  critical  moment  and  there  must  be  no  wasting  away  of  your  influence 
in  unnecessary  delay  of  conference.  Hearts  of  the  peoples  of  the  world  for 
League  of  Nations  and  they  are  indifferent  to  its  actual  terms.  They  are 
against  militarism  and  for  any  reasonable  plan  to  effectuate  peace. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

13  January  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT, 

Paris. 

In  past  two  weeks  the  trend  of  newspaper  dispatches  from  Paris  has 
indicated  a  misunderstanding  of  your  general  attitude  towards  problems 
pending  at  peace  conference.  One  newspaper  cablegram  says  today  that 
France,  Italy  and  Great  Britain  have  agreed  to  subordinate  your  league 
of  nations  programme  to  the  need  for  counteracting  bolshevism  and  collect 
ing  damages  from  Germany.  Another  a  few  days  ago  reported  that  Clemen* 
ceau  had  made  headway  with  his  insistence  upon  maintenance  of  balance 
of  power.  Still  another  outlined  victory  of  Great  Britain  in  her  opposition 
to  freedom  of  seas,  stating  that  you  had  abandoned  your  position  in  response 
to  arguments  of  France,  supporting  Great  Britain.  Similar  stories  would 
give  impression  that  you  were  yielding,  although  we  are  aware  that  some  of 
the  suggestions  for  compromise  are  probably  your  own.  Situation  could 
easily  be  remedied  if  you  would  occasionally  call  in  the  three  press  associa 
tion  correspondents  who  crossed  on  George  Washington  with  you,  merely 
giving  them  an  understanding  of  the  developments  as  they  occur  and  asking 
them  not  to  use  information  as  coming  from  you,  but  merely  for  then-  own 
guidance.  It  would  show  wisdom  of  various  compromises  as  well  as  circum 
stances  of  such  compromises.  Proposal  of  Lloyd  George  that  the  Russian 
Bolshevik  be  invited  to  send  peace  delegates  to  Paris  produced  very  unfavour 
able  impression  everywhere.  It  is  denounced  here  as  amazing. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

16  January  1919. 
REAR  ADMIRAL  GARY  T.  GRAYSON, 

Care  of  President  Wilson,  Paris. 

American  newspapers  filled  with  stories  this  morning  of  critical  character 
about  rule  of  secrecy  adopted  for  Peace  Conference,  claiming  that  the  first 
of  the  fourteen  points  has  been  violated.  In  my  opinion,  if  President  has 
consented  to  this,  it  will  be  fatal.  The  matter  is  so  important  to  the  people 
of  the  world  that  he  could  have  afforded  to  go  any  length  even  to  leaving  the 
conference  than  to  submit  to  this  ruling.  His  attitude  in  this  matter  will 


APPENDIX  519 

lose  a  great  deal  of  the  confidence  and  support  of  the  people  of  the  world 
which  he  has  had  up  to  this  time. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

January  16,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

Your  cable  about  misunderstandings  concerning  my  attitude  toward 
problems  created  by  the  newspaper  cablegrams  concerns  a  matter  which 
I  admit  I  do  not  know  how  to  handle.  Every  one  of  the  things  you  mention 
is  a  fable.  I  have  not  only  yielded  nothing  but  have  been  asked  to  yield 
nothing.  These  manoeuvres  which  the  cablegram  speaks  of  are  purely 
imaginary.  I  cannot  check  them  from  this  end  because  the  men  who  sent 
them  insist  on  having  something  to  talk  about  whether  they  know  what  the 
facts  are  or  not.  I  will  do  my  best  with  the  three  press  associations. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

January  17,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

Distressed  to  hear  of  your  illness.  Beg  that  you  will  make  it  your  chief 
duty  to  take  care  of  yourself  and  get  well.  All  unite  in  most  affectionate 
messages.  Everything  going  well  here.  Very  few  of  the  troubles  spoken 
of  by  the  newspapers  are  visible  to  me  on  the  spot. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

January  21,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

The  issue  of  publicity  is  being  obscured  by  the  newspaper  men  and  we 
have  won  for  the  press  all  that  is  possible  or  wise  to  win,  namely,  complete 
publicity  for  real  conferences.  Publicity  for  the  conversations  I  am  holding 
with  the  small  group  of  the  great  powers  will  invariably  break  up  the  whole 
thing,  whereas  the  prospects  for  agreement  are  now,  I  should  say,  very  good 
indeed.  Delighted  that  you  are  up  and  beg  that  you  will  not  expose  your 
self  or  exert  yourself  too  soon.  Affectionate  messages  from  us  all. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


520  APPENDIX 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

29  January,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

Notice  in  morning  papers  discussion  with  reference  to  disposition  of 
German  colonies.  Call  your  attention  to  speech  of  British  Premier  delivered 
in  January  as  follows :  Quote  with  regard  to  German  colonies,  I  have  repeatedly 
declared  that  they  are  held  at  the  disposal  of  a  conference  whose  decision 
must  have  primary  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  native  inhabitants.  The 
general  principle  of  national  self-determination  therefore  is  applicable  in 
their  cases  as  hi  those  of  the  occupied  European  territories  End  quote.  I  be 
lieve  that  Balfour  made  a  similar  statement. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Pan*. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

March  15,  1919. 
President's  Residence,  Paris 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

The  Plenary  Council  has  positively  decided  that  the  League  of  Nations 
is  to  be  part  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  There  is  absolutely  no  truth  in  report 
to  the  contrary. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

16  March  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 

Paris. 

Believe  your  most  critical  time  in  setting  forward  America's  position 
at  conference  has  come.  Opposition  to  League  growing  more  intense  from 
day  to  day.  Its  bitterness  and  pettiness  producing  reaction.  New  polls 
throughout  country  indicate  strong  drift  toward  league.  League  of  Nations 
and  just  peace  inseparable.  Neither  half  can  stand  alone.  Know  you  will 
not  be  drawn  away  from  announced  programme  to  incorporate  League  cove 
nant  in  treaty.  You  can  afford  to  go  any  length  in  insisting  upon  this.  There 
is  no  doubt  of  your  success  here  and  abroad.  The  real  friends  of  a  construc 
tive  peace  have  not  begun  to  fight.  Everything  fine  here. 

TUMULTY. 


APPENDIX  521 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

25  March,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

There  is  great  danger  to  you  in  the  present  situation.  I  can  see  signs 
that  our  enemies  here  and  abroad  would  try  to  make  it  appear  that  you  are 
responsible  for  delay  in  peace  settlement  and  that  delay  has  increased  mo 
mentum  of  bolshevism  and  anarchy  in  Hungary  and  Balkans.  Can  respon 
sibility  for  delay  be  fixed  by  you  in  some  way? 

TUMULTY. 


Cable  From  the  Associated  Press  at  Paris. 

Paris,  March  27,  1919. 
President  Wilson  to-day  issued  the  following  statement: 

Quote  in  view  of  the  very  surprising  impression  which  seems  to  exist  in  some 
quarters,  that  it  is  the  discussions  of  the  commission  on  the  league  of  nations 
that  are  delaying  the  final  formulation  of  peace,  I  am  very  glad  to  take  the 
opportunity  of  reporting  that  the  conclusions  of  this  commission  were  the 
first  to  be  laid  before  the  plenary  conference. 

They  were  reported  on  February  14,  and  the  world  has  had  a  full  month 
hi  which  to  discuss  every  feature  of  the  draft  covenant  then  submitted. 

During  the  last  few  days  the  commission  has  been  engaged  in  an  effort 
to  take  advantage  of  the  criticisms  which  the  publication  of  the  covenant 
has  fortunately  drawn  out.  A  committee  of  the  commission  has  also  had 
the  advantage  of  a  conference  with  representatives  of  the  neutral  states, 
who  are  evidencing  a  very  deep  interest  and  a  practically  unanimous  desire 
to  align  themselves  with  the  league. 

The  revised  covenant  is  now  practically  finished.  It  is  in  the  hands  of  a 
committee  for  the  final  process  of  drafting,  and  will  almost  immediately  be 
presented  a  second  tune  to  the  public. 

The  conferences  of  the  commission  have  invariably  been  held  at  times 
when  they  could  not  interfere  with  the  consultation  of  those  who  have  under 
taken  to  formulate  the  general  conclusions  of  the  conference  with  regard  to 
the  many  other  complicated  problems  of  peace,  so  that  the  members  of  the 
commissions  congratulate  themselves  on  the  fact  that  no  part  of  their  con 
ferences  has  ever  interposed  any  form  of  delay  End  quote.  ' 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

25  March,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

St.  Louis  Republic  of  Saturday  reporting  speech  of  Senator  Iteed  refer 
ring  to  provision  naming  members  of  League  says :  Quote  he  told  of  what  be 


522  APPENDIX 

called  a  secret  protocol  and  intimated  that  Germany  is  included  in  this 
secret  protocol  End  quote.  Advise  whether  or  not  there  is  any  secret  protocol 
such  as  Senator  claims  or  of  any  character,  attached  to  League  Covenant. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

March  27,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

Statement  that  there  is  any  sort  of  secret  protocol  connected  with  or 
suggested  in  connection  with  the  League  of  Nations  is  absolutely  false. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

March  28,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WTILSON, 
Paris. 

Stories  here  this  morning  that  amendment  for  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
racial  discrimination  to  be  excluded  from  covenant  causing  a  great  deal  of 
uneasiness. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

March  30,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 

Paris. 

In  an  editorial  entitled  Treat  or  Fight,  Springfield  Republican  says :  Quote  It  is 
plain  that  the  Allies  dare  not  commit  themselves  to  an  avowed  war  on  the 
Soviets  and  that  it  is  not  possible  for  the  Allies  with  the  world  in  its  present 
temper  to  take  the  position  that  the  existence  of  the  soviet  form  of  govern 
ment  in  any  country  constitutes  a  casus  belli;  that  the  world  would  recoil 
from  the  proposal  to  begin  a  new  series  of  war  with  so  dubious  an  object;  that 
Russia  should  be  left  to  manage  her  own  affairs  End  Quote.  Editorial  disagrees 
with  policy  of  French  Government  towards  Russia  and  Soviets.  Calls  atten 
tion  to  disastrous  results  of  foreign  intervention  during  French  Revolution. 
Editorial  further  says:  Quote  Impossible  to  fight  revolution  in  one  place  and  be 
at  peace  elsewhere.  If  Allies  mean  to  fight  Hungary  because  it  has  set  up  a 
soviet  form  of  government  and  allied  itself  to  Russia  they  will  have  to  fight 


APPENDIX  523 

Russia.  If  they  fight  Russia  they  will  have  to  fight  the  Ukraine.  Such  a 
war  would  mean  the  end  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  is  plain  that  the  Allies 
dare  not  commit  themselves  to  an  avowed  war  on  the  Soviets  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

March  30,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 

Paris. 

Dispatches  from  Simonds  and  others  prove  stories  of  weeks  ago  were  most 
optimistic  now  touched  with  deep  pessimism.  Simonds  in  article  on  Sat 
urday  says :  Quote  No  common  objective  in  council;  no  dominating  influence; 
drifting,  etc.  End  Quote.  I  fear  your  real  position  in  council  not  understood 
here  and  that  lack  of  publicity  strengthening  many  false  impressions.  The  re 
sponsibility  attaching  to  those  associated  with  you,  including  France  and 
England,  when  they  accepted  Fourteen  Points  evidently  lost  sight  of  by  them. 
Do  not  know  what  your  real  situation  is,  but  it  appears  to  me  that  Germany 
is  not  prepared  to  accept  the  kind  of  peace  which  is  about  to  be  offered, 
or  if  she  does  accept,  with  its  burdensome  conditions,  it  means  the  spread  of 
bolshevism  throughout  Germany  and  central  Europe.  It  seems  to  me  that 
you  ought  in  some  way  to  reassert  your  leadership  publicly.  I  know  the 
danger,  but  you  cannot  escape  responsibility  unless  you  do  so.  Now  is  the 
moment  hi  my  opinion  to  strike  for  a  settlement  permanent  and  lasting. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

2  April,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 
The  proposed  recognition  of  Lenine  has  caused  consternation  here. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — 'Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  4,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

Am  still  confident  that  President  will  win.  Encountering  difficulties; 
situation  serious.  President  is  the  hope  of  the  world  more  than  ever,  and 
with  his  courage,  wisdom,  and  force  he  will  lead  the  way.  Have  you  any 
suggestions  as  to  publicity  or  otherwise? 

GRAYSON. 


524  APPENDIX 

Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  4,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

The  President  took  very  severe  cold  last  night;  confined  to  bed.     Do  not 
worry;  will  keep  you  advised. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  5,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

We  are  naturally  disappointed  at  progress  being  made  but  not  discour 
aged.  Hopeful  everything  will  turn  out  all  right.  Will  advise  you  if  any 
thing  definite  develops.  The  President  is  better  this  morning  but  confined 
to  bed.  No  cause  for  worry. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  5,  1919. 
GRAYSON,  %  President  Wilson, 

Paris. 

In  my  opinion  the  President  must  in  some  dramatic  way  clear  the  air 
of  doubts  and  misunderstandings  and  despair  which  now  pervade  the  whole 
world  situation.  He  must  take  hold  of  the  situation  with  both  hands  and 
shake  it  out  of  its  present  indecision,  or  political  sabotage  and  scheming  will 
triumph.  Only  a  bold  stroke  by  the  President  will  save  Europe  and  perhaps 
the  world.  That  stroke  must  be  made  regardless  of  the  cries  and  admonitions 
of  his  friendly  advisers.  He  has  tried  to  settle  the  issue  in  secret;  only 
publicity  of  a  dramatic  kind  now  can  save  the  situation.  This  occasion  calls 
for  that  audacity  which  has  helped  him  win  hi  every  fight. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  6,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

The  President  says  the  situation  here  is  extremely  complex  and  intricate, 
but  seems  to  be  improving  and  he  expects  to  have  it  in  hand  this  week,  but 


APPENDIX  525 

if  necessary  will  act  according  to  your  suggestions.    The  President  is  confined 
to  bed  but  steadily  improving.     Thanks  for  your  telegram. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  8,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

President  attended  conference  in  his  study  this  afternoon.  Situation 
shows  some  improvement.  President  has  ordered  George  Washington  to 
proceed  here  immediately. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

April  9,  1919. 
GRAYSON, 
Care  President  Wilson,  Paris. 

The  ordering  of  the  George  Washington  to  return  to  France  looked  upon 
here  as  an  act  of  impatience  and  petulance  on  the  President's  part  and 
not  accepted  here  in  good  grace  by  either  friends  or  foes.  It  is  considered 
as  an  evidence  that  the  President  intends  to  leave  the  Conference  if  his 
views  are  not  accepted.  I  think  this  method  of  withdrawal  most  unwise 
and  fraught  with  the  most  dangerous  possibilities  here  and  abroad,  because 
it  puts  upon  the  President  the  responsibility  of  withdrawing  when  the  Presi 
dent  should  by  his  own  act  place  the  responsibility  for  a  break  of  the  Confer 
ence  where  it  properly  belongs.  The  President  should  not  put  himself 
in  the  position  of  being  the  first  to  withdraw  if  his  14  points  are  not  accepted. 
Rather  he  should  put  himself  hi  the  position  of  being  the  one  who  remained 
at  the  Conference  until  the  very  last,  demanding  the  acceptance  of  his  14 
principles.  Nothing  should  be  said  about  his  leaving  France,  but  he  ought 
when  the  time  and  occasion  arrive  to  re-state  his  views  hi  terms  of  the  deepest 
solemnity  and  yet  without  any  ultimatum  attached  and  then  await  a  response 
from  his  associates.  In  other  words,  let  him  by  his  acts  and  words  place  his 
associates  in  the  position  of  those  who  refuse  to  continue  the  Conference  be 
cause  of  their  unwillingness  to  live  up  to  the  terms  of  the  Armistice.  Then 
the  President  can  return  to  this  country  and  justify  his  withdrawal.  He 
cannot  justify  his  withdrawal  any  other  way.  Up  to  this  time  the  world 
has  been  living  on  stories  coming  out  of  Paris  that  there  was  to  be  an  agree 
ment  on  the  League  of  Nations.  Suddenly  out  of  a  clear  sky  comes  an  order 
for  the  George  Washington  and  unofficial  statements  of  the  President's  with 
drawal.  A  withdrawal  at  this  time  would  be  a  desertion. 

TUMULTY. 


526  APPENDIX 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

9  April,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 

A  great  number  of  your  friends  here  fear  that  the  interposition  of  United 
States  in  matter  of  indemnity  and  reparation  which  is  a  paramount  question 
with  European  nations  and  only  of  indirect  interest  to  us  will  solidify  the  op 
position  of  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium  to  a  league  of  nations. 
Our  friends  believe  that  any  necessary  sacrifices  to  assure  a  league  of  nations 
should  be  made.  Your  supporters  would  be  happy  if  you  could  throw  upon 
the  other  nations  the  burden  of  exacting  indemnities  and  at  the  same  time 
win  their  support  to  a  league  of  nations. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

10  April,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

President  made  good  progress  to-day  by  hammering  ahead  with  his  own 
force.  His  health  is  improving;  out  for  a  short  drive  this  afternoon;  first 
outing  since  last  Thursday. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  10,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 

Washington. 

Have  shown  your  message  to  the  President.  From  your  side  of  the 
water  your  points  are  well  taken,  but  he  has  formed  his  ideas  through  im 
mediate  contact  with  actual  conditions  on  this  side  of  the  world.  .  .  . 
More  progress  has  been  made  in  the  last  two  days  than  has  been  made  for 
the  last  two  weeks.  Am  spending  all  the  time  I  can  in  guiding  correspond 
ents  and  showing  them  every  attention.  I  confer  with  Grasty  every  day. 
The  President  is  working  too  hard  following  his  recent  illness.  To  know 
that  things  are  going  on  and  not  properly  handled,  and  yet  be  responsible 
for  them,  causes  him  more  worry  and  anxiety  and  does  more  harm  than 
actual  participation.  This  is  a  matter  that  worries  me.  If  his  health  can 
hold  out  I  am  still  confident  he  will  win  handsomely.  Am  keeping  as  cheer 
ful  a  front  as  possible  over  here. 

GRAYSON. 


APPENDIX  527 

Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  12,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

So  far  as  it  is  possible  to  tell  amidst  complexity  of  selfish  interests  things 
seem  to  be  slowly  clearing.  President  sends  you  his  love  and  says  keep  a 
stiff  upper  lip. 

GRAYSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

April  24,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
White  House. 

Thank  you  for  your  cable  about  Industrial  Board.  On  the  whole  I  think 
they  have  got  into  a  blind  alley,  but  I  am  glad  you  are  going  to  obtain  Hines' 
opinion.  Do  not  give  yourself  any  concern  about  secret  treaties.  You  may  be 
sure  I  wiU  enter  into  none. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

30  April,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Beg  to  call  your  attention  to  following  editorial  from  Springfield  Republican. 
Quote  The  critical  period  in  the  peacemaking  has  been  reached  when  progress 
can  win  over  reaction  the  very  least  of  victories  only  by  a  resolute  stand  of  the 
most  commanding  figure  in  Paris.  France  and  England  cannot  desert  the 
President  without  branding  themselves  as  hypocrites  and  ingrates.  Worse 
things  could  happen  than  for  the  President  to  come  home  without  a  peace 
treaty,  leaving  Europe  to  wallow  in  the  mire  of  national  rivalries  and  hates 
to  which  reaction  would  sentence  it  for  all  time.  There  is  no  compelling 
reason  why  America  should  sign  a  treaty  that  would  merely  perpetuate 
ancient  feuds  and  make  new  wars  a  certainty.  Our  chief  interest  in  the 
Conference  at  Paris,  as  the  President  declared  at  Manchester,  is  the  peace 
of  the  world.  Unless  that  can  be  made  reasonably  sure,  with  Europe's  sincere 
cooperation,  the  time  is  near  when  'pack  up  and  come  home'  will  be  America's 
only  policy  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 


528  APPENDIX 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

8  May,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

In  your  cable  you  spoke  of  forwarding  message  to  Congress.  Have 
you  made  up  your  mind  as  to  what  you  will  discuss?  Would  like  to  suggest 
certain  things  I  believe  vital.  TUMULTY 


Cablegram 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

May  9,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

Happily  there  is  no  mystery  or  privacy  about  what  I  have  promised 
the  Government  here.  I  have  promised  to  propose  to  the  Senate  a  supple 
ment  in  which  we  shall  agree,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  to  come  immediately  to  the  assistance  of  France  in  case 
of  unprovoked  attack  by  Germany,  thus  merely  hastening  the  action  to  which 
we  should  be  bound  by  the  Government  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

22  May,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Great  demonstration  New  York  last  night,  addressed  by  Hughes,  to  pro 
test  killings  in  Poland,  Galicia,  Roumania  and  elsewhere.  Feeling  in  this 
matter  growing  more  intense  throughout  the  country.  Cannot  something 
be  done?  It  is  evident  that  Germany  is  doing  everything  to  separate  the 
Allies.  A  great  many  newspapers  in  this  country  are  worried  lest  you  be 
carried  away  by  the  pleadings  of  Germany  for  a  Quote  softer  peace  End  Quote. 
I  know  you  will  not  be  led  astray.  There  is  an  intense  feeling  in  the  Senate  in 
favour  of  the  publication  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty.  Can  anything  be 

done  to  straighten  this  out?  ^ 

TUMULTY. 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

23  May,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

Mr.Taft  in  signed  article  this  morning  says  '.Quote  Find  it  hard  to  believe  that 
President  Wilson  sent  sympathetic  note  to  women  who  plead  for  Huns  End 


APPENDIX  529 

Quote.  I  think  this  matter  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  cleared  up  from  this 
side.  There  is  great  deal  of  unrest  here  owing  to  talk  in  newspapers  of  re 
turn  of  German  ships  to  Great  Britain. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

May  24,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 
Washington. 

I  think  our  friends  in  the  Senate  ought  to  be  furnished  very  frankly  with 
the  following  reason,  which  seems  to  me  quite  convincing,  for  not  at  present 
publishing  the  complete  treaty:  namely,  that  if  our  discussion  of  the  treaty 
with  the  Germans  is  to  be  more  than  a  sham  and  a  form  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  at  least  some  of  the  details  of  the  treaty  as  subject  to  reconsideration 
and  that,  therefore,  it  would  be  a  tactical  blunder  to  publish  the  details  as 
first  drafted,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  is  no  likelihood  that  they 
will  be  departed  from  in  any  substantial  way. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

May  25,  1919. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 
Washington. 

No  one  need  have  any  concern  about  the  return  of  the  German  ships  in  our 
possession.  Full  understanding  has  been  reached  about  them.  As  for 
Mr.  Taf t's  criticism,  I  am  quite  willing  to  be  responsible  for  any  sympathetic 
reply  I  make  to  appeals  on  behalf  of  starving  women  and  children.  Please 
give  following  message  to  Glass:  You  may  take  it  for  granted  that  I  will 
sign  the  Urgent  Deficiency  Bill  and  go  forward  with  the  plans  you  mention 
in  your  cable. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

26  May,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Every  Republican  member  of  new  Foreign  Relations  Committee  openly 
opposed  to  treaty,  a  majority  in  favour  of  its  amendment.  Every  Demo 
cratic  member  of  Committee,  including  Thomas,  for  treaty  and  against  sepa 
ration.  There  is  a  decided  reaction  evident  against  the  League,  caused,  in 
my  opinion,  by  dissatisfaction  of  Irish,  Jews,  Poles,  Italians,  and  Germans. 


530  APPENDIX 

Republicans  taking  full  advantage  and  liable,  in  order  to  garner  disaffected 
vote,  to  make  absolute  issue  against  League.  Reaction  intensified  by  your 
absence  and  lack  of  publicity  from  your  end  and  confusion  caused  by  con 
tradictory  statements  and  explanations  of  Quote  so-called  compromises  End 
Quote.  Simonds'  article  appearing  in  certain  American  newspapers  Sunday, 
admirable,  explaining  reasons  for  Saar  Valley  and  French  pact  and  other  con 
troversial  matters. 

There  is  a  tremendous  drive  against  League,  resembling  German  propa 
ganda,  backed  by  Irish  and  Jews.  Irish  openly  opposing;  Jews  attacking 
along  collateral  lines.  Could  not  Lansing  or  perhaps  White,  because  he  is  a 
Republican,  or  yourself  inspire  publicity  or  give  interview  explaining — 
officially  or  unofficially — the  following  matters : 

First         — America's  attitude  toward  publication  of  terms  of  Treaty, 

along  lines  of  your  last  cable  to  me. 

Second  — That  the  fourteen  points  have  not  been  disregarded. 
Third  — The  underlying  reason  for  French  pact  emphasizing  the 
point  as  Simonds'  says  Quote  That  French  pact  is  merely 
an  underwriting  of  the  League  of  Nations  during  the  period 
necessary  for  that  organization  not  merely  to  get  to  work, 
but  to  become  established  and  recognized  by  all  nations 
End  quote. 

I  am  not  at  all  disturbed  by  this  reaction — it  was  inevitable.  The  con 
summation  of  your  work  in  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  will  clear  the  air  of  all 
these  distempers.  Your  arrival  in  America,  your  address  to  the  Congress 
and  some  speeches  to  the  country  will  make  those  who  oppose  the  League 
to-day  feel  ashamed  of  themselves.  The  New  York  World  had  a  very  good 
editorial  favouring  the  mandatory  of  Turkey. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 
June  16,  1919. 

TUMULTY,  White  House, 

Washington. 

If  Germans  sign  the  Treaty  we  hope  to  get  off  the  first  of  next  week,  about 
the  24th  or  25th.  It  is  my  present  judgment  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
take  any  notice  of  the  Knox  amendment.  The  whole  matter  will  have  to 
be  argued  from  top  to  bottom  when  I  get  home  and  everything  will  depend 
upon  the  reaction  of  public  opinion  at  that  time.  I  think  that  our  friends  can 
take  care  of  it  in  the  meantime  and  believe  that  one  of  the  objects  of  Knox 
and  his  associates  is  to  stir  me  up,  which  they  have  not  yet  done.  I  may 
nevertheless  take  the  opportunity  to  speak  of  the  League  of  Nations  in 
Belgium. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


APPENDIX  531 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

21  June,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

The  fight  against  the  League  in  Knox  resolution  faces  utter  collapse. 
Root  and  Hayes  here  advising  Republican  leaders.  I  learned  that  Root 
is  advising  Republicans  to  vote  for  the  League  with  reservations.  He  is 
advising  Republicans  to  concentrate  their  forces  upon  a  resolution  of  rati 
fication,  which  would  contain  specific  reservations  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
immigration,  tariff,  and  other  purely  American  questions.  I  believe  that  this 
is  the  course  the  Republicans  will  finally  adopt.  A  confidant  of  Mr.  Taft's 
yesterday  wanted  to  know  from  me  what  your  attitude  was  in  this  matter, 
saying  that  Mr.  Taf t  might  favour  this  reservation  plan.  I  told  him  I  had  no 
knowledge  on  the  subject.  It  is  a  thing  that  you  might  consider.  To  me 
it  looks  like  cowardice. 

The  American  Federation  of  Labour  adopted  a  resolution  favouring  the 
League  of  Nations  by  a  vote  of  twenty-nine  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty 
against  four  hundred  twenty.  Andrew  Furuseth  led  the  fight  against  it. 
The  resolution  supporting  the  League  contained  a  reservation  in  favour  of 
home  rule  for  Ireland. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House,  Washington, 

June  23,  1919. 
TUMULTY, 

Washington. 

My  clear  conviction  is  that  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty  by  the  Senate  with 
reservations  would  put  the  United  States  as  clearly  out  of  the  concert  of 
nations  as  a  rejection.  We  ought  either  to  go  in  or  stay  out.  To  stay  out 
would  be  fatal  to  the  influence  and  even  to  the  commercial  prospects  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  go  in  would  give  her  the  leadership  of  the  world.  Res 
ervations  would  either  mean  nothing  or  postpone  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
so  far  as  America  is  concerned,  until  every  other  principal  nation  concerned 
in  the  Treaty  had  found  out  by  negotiation  what  the  reservations  practically 
meant  and  whether  they  could  associate  themselves  with  the  United  States 
on  the  terms  of  the  reservations  or  not.  Moreover,  changes  in  the  Treaty 
seem  to  me  to  belong  to  the  powers  of  negotiation  which  belong  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  that  I  would  be  at  liberty  to  withdraw  the  Treaty  if  I  did  not  approve 
of  the  ratifications.  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  wise  for  me  to  wait  here  for 
the  appropriation  bills.  I  hope  to  sail  on  the  twenty-fifth  or  twenty-sixth 
and  suggest  that  you  consider  the  plan  of  sending  a  vessel  to  meet  me. 

WOODROW  WILSON, 


532  APPENDIX 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

June  23,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Your  cable  concerning  reservations  in  ratification  would  make  fine  state 
ment  for  the  public.  The  country  would  stand  back  of  you  in  this.  Can  I 
use  it  in  this  way  or  can  I  at  least  furnish  copies  to  Senator  Hitchcock  and 
Mr.  Taft?  If  you  allow  me  to  make  public  use  of  it  may  I  change  Quote 
leadership  of  the  world  End  Quote  to  Quote  a  notable  place  in  the  affairs  of  the 
world  End  Quote.  This  in  order  to  avoid  possibility  of  hurting  feelings  of  other 
nations.  Now  is  time  to  issue  statement  of  this  kind  as  Lodge  has  practically 
withdrawn  Knox  resolution  and  opponents  seem  to  be  concentrating  on  Quote 
reservations  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 
TUMULTY,  White  House, 

Washington.  June  25,  1919. 

I  am  quite  willing  that  you  should  make  public  use  of  my  cable  to  you 
about  reservations  by  the  Senate  in  regard  to  the  treaty,  with  this  change 
in  the  sentence  to  which  you  call  my  attention: 

Quote  And  to  go  in  would  give  her  a  leading  place  in  the  affairs  of 

the  world,  End  Quote  omitting  also  the  last  sentence  about  changes 

belonging  to  power  to  negotiate  treaties. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


June  25,  1919. 
Secretary  Tumulty  to-day  gave  out  a  message  which  he  had  received  from 

the  President,  as  follows: 

My  clear  conviction  is  that  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty  by  the  Senate  with 
reservations  would  put  the  United  States  as  clearly  out  of  the  concert  of 
nations  as  a  rejection.  We  ought  either  to  go  in  or  stay  out.  To  stay  out 
would  be  fatal  to  the  influence  and  even  to  the  commercial  prospects  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  go  in  would  give  her  a  leading  place  in  the  affairs  of 
the  world.  Reservations  would  either  mean  nothing  or  postpone  the  con 
clusion  of  peace,  so  far  as  America  is  concerned,  until  every  other  principal 
nation  concerned  in  the  treaty  had  found  out  by  negotiation  what  the  reser 
vations  practically  meant  and  whether  they  could  associate  themselves  with 
the  United  States  on  the  terms  of  the  reservations  or  not. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


APPENDIX  533 

Cablegram  from  Grasty  to  New  York  Times 

June  29,  1919. 
Aboard  the  Oklahoma. 

President's  sailing  from  Brest  most  auspicious.  Most  beautiful  weather 
and  promise  of  more  of  same.  President  and  Mrs.  Wilson  showed  no  ill 
effects  from  strenuous  activities  of  past  few  days  and  while  both  formed 
sincere  attachment  for  France,  they  are  glad  to  turn  faces  homeward.  Con 
trary  to  some  reports  current  in  America  he  is  in  excellent  health.  While 
element  of  novelty  which  entered  his  reception  on  arrival  last  December 
disappeared,  there  was  deeper  feeling  manifested  toward  him  last  night  in 
Paris  than  ever  before.  Thousands  of  Quote  Vive  Wilson  End  Quote  came 
from  French  heart  and  continuous  ovation.  Paris  showed  popular  recog 
nition  of  leadership  of  American  in  securing  peace.  One  very  old  Frenchman 
sprang  in  front  of  President's  carriage  in  Champs  filysees  and  shouted  in 
English :  Quote  Mr.  Wilson,  thank  you  for  peace  End  Quote.  That  was  the 
keynote  and  same  sentiment  was  echoed  in  thousands  of  ways.  Although 
owing  to  different  American  viewpoints,  Wilson  has  been  frequently  antago 
nistic  during  this  month,  at  end  relations  with  other  governments'  heads 
most  cordial.  Lloyd  George  came  over  to  Place  des  fitats-Unis  last  night 
and  told  President  Quote  You've  done  more  to  bring  English-speaking 
people  together  than  ever  before  done  by  any  man  End  Quote.  Clemen- 
ceau  looked  as  if  losing  his  best  friend  when  he  said  Good  Bye  hi  Invalides 
Station.  Many  representatives  of  smaller  nations  have  expressed  to  me 
within  past  few  days  hope  that  President  be  able  to  return  to  Europe  and 
continue  his  work  of  reconciliation  and  reconstruction,  which  they  said 
nobody  else  in  position  to  do  or  able  to  do  so  well. 

GRASTY. 


APPENDIX  "B" 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

16  March,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 

Paris. 

Former  President  Taft  asks  if  he  may  cable  to  you  direct,  for  your  consid 
eration  only,  some  suggestions  about  which  he  has  been  thinking  a  great 
deal  and  which  he  would  like  to  have  you  consider.  He  said  that  these 
suggestions  do  not  look  to  the  change  of  the  structure  of  the  League,  the 
plan  of  its  action  or  its  real  character,  but  simply  to  removing  objections  in 
minds  of  conscientious  Americans,  who  are  anxious  for  a  league  of  nations, 
whose  fears  have  been  roused  by  suggested  constructions  of  the  League  which 
its  language  does  not  justify  and  whose  fears  could  be  removed  without  any 
considerable  change  of  language. 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram — Paris. 

Received  at  White  House, 
March  18,  1919. 

In  reply  to  your  number  sixteen,  appreciate  Mr.  Taft's  offer  of  suggestions 
and  would  welcome  them.  The  sooner  they  are  sent  the  better.  You 
need  give  yourself  no  concern  about  my  yielding  anything  with  regard  to 
the  embodiment  of  the  proposed  convention  in  the  Treaty. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

18  March,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 
Following  from  Wm.  H.  Taft: 

Quote  If  you  bring  back  the  Treaty  with  the  League  of  Nations  in  it,  make 
more  specific  reservations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  fix  a  term  for  the  duration 
of  the  League  and  the  limit  of  armament,  require  expressly  unanimity  of  action 
in  Executive  Council  and  Body  of  Delegates,  and  add  to  Article  XV  a  pro 
vision  that  where  the  Executive  Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  finds  the 

534 


APPENDIX  535 

difference  to  grow  out  of  an  exclusively  domestic  policy,  it  shall  recommend 
no  settlement,  the  ground  will  be  completely  cut  from  under  the  opponents 
of  the  League  in  the  Senate.  Addition  to  Article  XV  will  answer  objection 
as  to  Japanese  immigration  as  well  as  tariffs  under  Article  XXI.  Reserva 
tion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  might  be  as  follows : 

Any  American  state  or  states  may  protect  the  integrity  of  American 
territory  and  the  independence  of  the  government  whose  territory  it  is, 
whether  a  member  of  the  League  or  not,  and  may,  in  the  interests  of 
American  peace,  object  to  and  prevent  the  further  transfer  of  American 
territory  or  sovereignty  to  any  European  or  non-American  power. 
Monroe  Doctrine  reservation  alone  would  probably  carry  the  treaty 
but  others  would  make  it  certain.         (signed)  WM.  H.  TAFT  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

21  March,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 

The  following  letter  from  Hon.  Wm.  H.  Taft.  Quote  I  have  thought 
perhaps  it  might  help  more  if  I  was  somewhat  more  specific  than  I  was  hi 
the  memorandum  note  I  sent  you  yesterday,  and  I  therefore  enclose  another 
memorandum  End  Quote. 

Duration  of  the  Covenant 

Add  to  the  Preamble  the  following: 

Quote  From  the  obligations  of  which  any  member  of  the  League  may 
withdraw  after  July  1,  1829,  by  two  years'  notice  in  writing,  duly  filed 
with  the  Secretary  General  of  the  League  End  Quote. 

Explanation 

I  have  no  doubt  that  the  construction  put  upon  the  agreement  would 
be  what  I  understand  the  President  has  already  said  it  should  be,  namely 
that  any  nation  may  withdraw  from  it  upon  reasonable  notice,  which 
perhaps  would  be  a  year.  I  think,  however,  it  might  strengthen  the 
Covenant  if  there  was  a  fixed  duration.  It  would  completely  remove 
the  objection  that  it  is  perpetual  in  its  operation. 

Duration  of  Armament  Limit 

Add  to  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  Vlll,  the  following: 
Quote  At  the  end  of  every  five  years,  such  limits  of  armament  for  the 
several  governments  shall  be  reexamined  by  the  Executive  Council,  and 
agreed  upon  by  them  as  in  the  first  instance  End  Quote, 


536  APPENDIX 

Explanation 

The  duration  of  the  obligation  to  limit  armament,  which  now  may  only 
be  changed  by  consent  of  the  Executive  Council,  has  come  in  for  criti 
cism.  I  should  think  this  might  thus  be  avoided,  without  in  any  way 
injuring  the  Covenant.  Perhaps  three  years  is  enough,  but  I  should 
think  five  years  would  be  better. 

Unanimous  Action  by  the  Executive  Council  or  Body  of  Delegates 

Insert  in  Article  IV,  after  the  first  paragraph,  the  following : 
Quote  Other  action  taken  or  recommendations  made  by  the  Executive 
Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  by  the  unanimous  action  of 
the  countries  represented  by  the  members  or  delegates,  unless  other 
wise  specifically  stated  End  Quote. 

Explanation 

Great  objection  is  made  to  the  power  of  the  Executive  Council  by  a 
majority  of  the  members  and  the  Body  of  Delegates  to  do  the  things 
which  they  are  authorized  to  do  in  the  Covenant.  In  view  of  the  specific 
provision  that  the  Executive  Council  and  the  Body  of  Delegates  may 
act  by  a  majority  of  its  members  as  to  their  procedure,  I  feel  confident 
that,  except  in  cases  where  otherwise  provided,  both  bodies  can  only  act 
by  unanimous  vote  of  the  countries  represented.  If  that  be  the  right 
construction,  then  there  can  be  no  objection  to  have  it  specifically  stated, 
and  it  will  remove  emphatic  objection  already  made  on  this  ground.  It 
is  a  complete  safeguard  against  involving  the  United  States  primarily 
in  small  distant  wars  to  which  the  United  States  has  no  immediate 
relation,  for  the  reason  that  the  plan  for  taking  care  of  such  a  war, 
to  be  recommended  or  advised  by  the  Executive  Council,  must  be  ap 
proved  by  a  representative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Board. 

Monroe  Doctrine 

Add  to  Article  X. 

(a)  Quote  A  state  or  states  of  America,  a  member  or  members  of  the 
League,  and  competent  to  fulfil  this  obligation  in  respect  to  American 
territory  or  independence,  may,  in  event  of  the  aggression,  actual  or 
threatened,  expressly  assume  the  obligation  and  relieve  the  European 
or  non-American  members  of  the  League  from  it  until  they  shall 
be  advised  by  such  American  state  or  states  of  the  need  for  their 
aid  End  Quote. 

(b)  Quote  Any  such  American  state  or  states  may  protect  the  integrity 
of  any  American  territory  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  government  whose 
territory  it  is,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  or  not,  and  may,  in  the 
interest  of  American  peace,  object  to  and  prevent  the  further  transfer 
of  American  territory  or  sovereignty  to  any  European  or  non-American 
power  End  Quote, 


APPENDIX  537 

Explanation 

Objection  has  been  made  that  under  Article  X,  European  govern 
ments  would  come  to  America  with  force  and  be  concerned  in  matters 
from  which  heretofore  the  United  States  has  excluded  them.  This  is 
not  true,  because  Spain  fought  Chili,  in  Seward's  time,  without  ob 
jection  from  the  United  States,  and  so  Germany  and  England  instituted 
a  blockade  against  Venezuela  in  Roosevelt's  time.  This  fear  could 
be  removed,  however,  by  the  first  of  the  above  paragraphs. 

Paragraph  (b)  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  pure  and  simple.  I  forwarded 
this  in  my  first  memorandum. 

It  will  be  observed  that  Article  X  only  covers  the  integrity  and  inde 
pendence  of  members  of  the  League.  There  may  be  some  American 
countries  which  are  not  sufficiently  responsible  to  make  it  wise  to  invite 
them  into  the  League.  This  second  paragraph  covers  them.  The 
expression  Quote  European  or  non-American  End  Quote  is  inserted  for 
the  purpose  of  indicating  that  Great  Britain,  though  it  has  American 
dominion,  is  not  to  acquire  further  territory  or  sovereignty. 

Japanese  Immigration  and  Tariffs 

Add  to  Article  XV. 

Quote  If  the  difference  between  the  parties  shall  be  found  by  the 
Executive  Council  or  the  Body  of  Delegates  to  be  a  question  which  by 
international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  and  polity 
of  one  of  the  parties,  it  shall  so  report  and  not  recommend  a  settle 
ment  of  the  dispute  End  Quote. 

Explanation 

Objection  is  made  to  Article  XV  that  under  its  terms  the  United 
States  would  be  found  by  unanimous  recommendation  for  settlement 
of  a  dispute  in  respect  to  any  issue  foreign  or  domestic;  that  it  therefore 
might  be  affected  seriously,  and  unjustly,  by  recommendations  for 
bidding  tariffs  on  importations.  In  my  judgment,  we  could  only  rely 
on  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  evidenced  by  the  Body  of  Delegates, 
not  to  interfere  with  our  domestic  legislation  and  action.  Nor  do  I 
think  that  under  the  League  as  it  is,  we  covenant  to  abide  by  a  unanimous 
recommendation.  But  if  there  is  a  specific  exception  made  in  respect 
to  matters  completely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  and  legislation 
of  a  country,  the  whole  criticism  is  removed.  The  Republican  senators 
are  trying  to  stir  up  anxiety  among  Republicans  lest  this  is  to  be  a  limita 
tion  upon  our  tariff.  The  President  has  already  specifically  met  the 
objection  as  to  limitation  upon  the  tariff  when  the  Fourteen  Points  were 
under  discussion.  Nevertheless  in  this  respect  to  the  present  language 
of  the  Covenant,  it  would  help  much  to  meet  and  remove  objections,  and 
cut  the  ground  under  senatorial  obstruction. 


538  APPENDIX 

Prospect  of  Ratification 

My  impression  is  that  if  the  one  article  already  sent,  on  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  be  inserted  in  the  Treaty,  sufficient  Republicans  who  signed  the  Round 
Robin  would  probably  retreat  from  their  position  and  vote  for  ratification 
so  that  it  would  carry.  If  the  other  suggestions  were  adopted,  I  feel  con 
fident  that  all  but  a  few  who  oppose  any  league  would  be  driven  to  accept 
them  and  to  stand  for  the  League. 

(End  letter) 

TUMULTY. 


Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

28  March,  1919. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

Paris. 

Following  just  received  from  Mr.  Taf t :  Quote  Venture  to  suggest  to  Presi 
dent  that  failure  to  reserve  Monroe  Doctrine  more  specifically  in  face  of 
opposition  in  Conference  will  give  great  weight  to  objection  that  League 
as  first  reported  endangers  Doctrine.  It  will  seriously  embarrass  advocates 
of  League,  it  will  certainly  lead  to  Senate  amendments  embodying  Doctrine 
and  other  provisions  in  form  less  likely  to  secure  subsequent  acquiescence 
of  other  nations  than  proper  reservation  now.  Deems  some  kind  of  Monroe 
Doctrine  amendment  now  to  Article  Ten  vital  to  acceptance  of  League  in 
this  country.  I  say  this  with  full  realization  that  complications  in  Confer 
ence  are  many  and  not  clearly  understood  here.  A  strong  and  successful 
stand  now  will  carry  the  League  End  Quote. 

TUMULTY. 


Letter  from  Mr.  Taft. 

New  York,  N.  Y.,  April  10,  1919. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  TUMULTY: 

We  are  very  much  troubled  over  the  report  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
amendment  to  the  Covenant  is  being  opposed  by  England  and  Japan.  Will 
you  be  good  enough  to  send  the  enclosed  to  the  President?  We  had  a  meet 
ing  to-day  of  the  Executive  Council  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  Doctor 
Lowell  and  I,  at  the  instance  of  the  League,  will  be  glad  to  have  this  matter 
presented  directly  to  the  President  by  cable. 

Sincerely  yours, 

WM.  H.  TAFT. 
HON.  JOSEPH  P.  TUMULTY, 

Secretary  to  the  President, 

The  White  House, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Enclosure. 


APPENDIX  539 

Cablegram 

The  White  House,  Washington, 

13  April,  1919. 
PKESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 

Following  is  sent  at  the  request  of  Mr.  Taf t :  Quote  Friends  of  the  Covenant 
are  seriously  alarmed  over  report  that  no  amendment  will  be  made  more 
specifically  safeguarding  Monroe  Doctrine.  At  full  meeting  of  Executive 
Committee  of  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  with  thirty  members  from  eighteen 
states  present,  unanimous  opinion  that  without  such  amendment,  Republican 
senators  will  certainly  defeat  ratification  of  Treaty  because  public  opinion 
will  sustain  them.  With  such  amendment,  Treaty  will  be  promptly  ratified. 

(signed) WILLIAM  H.  TAFT 

A.  LAWRENCE  LOWELL  End  Quote 
TUMULTY. 


March  27,  1919. 
Admission — Paris. 
For  Secretary  Lansing  from  Polk. 

Following  are  proposed  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  League 
of  Nations  which  have  been  drafted  by  Mr.  Root : 

First  Amendment:  Strike  out  Article  XIII,  and  insert  the  following: 
The  high  contracting  powers  agree  to  refer  to  the  existing  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague,  or  to  the  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice 
proposed  at  the  Second  Hague  Conference  when  established,  or  to  some 
other  arbitral  tribunal,  all  disputes  between  them  (including  those 
affecting  honour  and  vital  interests)  which  are  of  a  justiciable  character, 
and  which  the  powers  concerned  have  failed  to  settle  by  diplomatic 
methods.  The  powers  so  referring  to  arbitration  agree  to  accept  and  give 
effect  to  the  award  of  the  Tribunal. 

Disputes  of  a  justiciable  character  are  defined  as  disputes  as  to  the 
interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any  question  of  international  law,  as  to 
the  existence  of  any  fact  which  if  established  would  constitute  a  breach 
of  any  international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach. 

Any  question  which  may  arise  as  to  whether  a  dispute  is  of  a  justi 
ciable  character  is  to  be  referred  for  decision  to  the  Court  of  Arbitral 
Justice  when  constituted,  or,  until  it  is  constituted,  to  the  existing  Per 
manent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague. 

Second  Amendment.  Add  to  Article  XIV  the  following  paragraphs: 

The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  general  conference  of  the  powers 
to  meet  not  less  than  two  years  or  more  than  five  years  after  the  signing 
of  this  convention  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  condition  of  interna 
tional  law,  and  of  agreeing  upon  and  stating  in  authoritative  form  the 
principles  and  rules  thereof. 


540  APPENDIX 

Thereafter  regular  conferences  for  that  purpose  shall  be  called  and 
held  at  stated  times. 

Third  Amendment.  Immediately  before  the  signature  of  the  American 
Delegates,  insert  the  following  reservation: 

Inasmuch  as  in  becoming  a  member  of  the  League  the  United  States 
of  America  is  moved  by  no  interest  or  wish  to  intrude  upon  or  interfere 
with  the  political  policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state, 
and  by  no  existing  or  anticipated  dangers  in  the  affairs  of  the  American 
continents,  but  accedes  to  the  wish  of  the  European  states  that  it  shall 
join  its  power  to  theirs  for  the  preservation  of  general  peace,  the  represen 
tatives  of  the  United  States  of  America  sign  this  convention  with  the 
understanding  that  nothing  therein  contained  shall  be  construed  to  imply 
a  relinquishment  by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its  traditional  atti 
tude  towards  purely  American  questions,  or  to  require  the  submission 
of  its  policy  regarding  such  questions  (including  therein  the  admission 
of  immigrants)  to  the  decision  or  recommendation  of  other  powers. 
Fourth  Amendment.  Add  to  Article  X  the  following: 
After  the  expiration  of  five  years  from  the  signing  of  this  convention 
any  party  may  terminate  its  obligation  under  this  article  by  giving  one 
year's  notice  hi  writing  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  League. 
Fifth  Amendment.  Add  to  Article  IX  the  following: 
Such  commission  shall  have  full  power  of  inspection  and  verification 
personally  and  by  authorized  agents  as  to  all  armament,  equipment, 
munitions,  and  industries  referred  to  in  Article  VULL. 
Sixth  Amendment.  Add  to  Article  XXIV  the  following: 
The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  general  conference  of  members  of 
the  League  to  meet  not  less  than  five  nor  more  than  ten  years  after  the 
signing  of  this  convention  for  the  revision  thereof,  and  at  that  time,  or 
at  any  time  thereafter  upon  one  year's  notice,  any  member  may  with 
draw  from  the  League. 

POLK,  Acting. 


The  first  suggestion  made  by  Mr.  Root  is  not  only  substantially 
expressed  in  Article  XIII  of  the  Treaty,  but  almost  literally,  in  its 
very  text,  appears  in  this  section  of  the  Covenant. 

Mr.  Root's  proposition  that  "the  high  contracting  powers  agree 
to  refer  to  the  existing  permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague 
or  to  the  court  of  arbitral  justice  proposed  at  the  Second  Hague, 
when  established,  or  to  some  other  arbitral  tribunal,  all  disputes 
between  them,"  etc.  This  is  actually  done  by  Article  13,  the  refer 
ence  being  not  to  the  Hague  or  to  the  proposal  of  the  Second  Hague 
Convention,  but  to  a  court  of  arbitration  "agreed  on  by  the  parties 
to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  convention  existing  between  them." 


APPENDIX  541 

As  will  readily  be  seen,  Mr.  Root's  definition  of  "disputes  of  justi 
ciable  character  "  is  embodied  literally  in  Article  XIII  of  the  Covenant, 
Mr.  Root's  exact  language  having  been  appropriated  at  the  Peace 
Commission. 

Mr.  Root's  second  proposed  amendment  provided  for  calling  "a 
general  conference  of  the  powers  to  meet  in  not  less  than  two  years, 
or  more  than  five  years,"  after  the  signing  of  this  convention  for  the 
purpose  of  reviewing  the  condition  of  international  law  and  of  agree 
ing  upon  and  stating  in  authoritative  form  the  principles  and  rules 
thereof." 

In  Article  XIX  of  the  Covenant  it  is  provided  that  the  Assembly 
meet  from  time  to  time  to  engage  in  "the  consideration  of  interna 
tional  conditions  whose  continuance  might  endanger  the  peace  of  the 
world."  If  it  may  be  said  that  this  provision  of  Article  XIX  does 
not  make  it  mandatory  upon  the  council  to  meet  at  fixed  periods, 
for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  international  conditions,  on  the  other 
hand  it  may  be  urged  that  it  empowers  the  Assembly  to  advise  such 
a  review  at  any  time,  and  the  Council  to  make  such  review  at  any 
time  and  as  often  as  the  necessities  might  permit.  "The  consider 
ation  of  international  conditions"  certainly  comprehends  a  review 
of  international  law  and  a  rectification  of  its  imperfections,  so  that 
substantially  the  whole  of  this  suggestion  by  Mr.  Root  is  in  the  Cove 
nant. 

The  third  amendment  of  the  Covenant  suggested  by  Mr.  Root  is 
exceedingly  interesting  in  several  particulars.  Those  who  would 
invoke  the  aid  and  sympathy  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
in  the  effort  for  Irish  freedom  will  observe  that  Mr.  Root  herein  pre 
cludes  the  United  States  from  having  any  interest  in,  or  wish  to  in 
trude  upon  or  interfere  with,  the  political  policy  of  the  internal  ad 
ministration  of  any  foreign  state.  Contrast  this  with  Article  XI 
of  the  Covenant,  which  President  Wilson  in  a  speech  on  the  Pacific 
coast  said  was  peculiarly  his  own  and  in  which  it  is  declared  to  be 
the  friendly  right  of  any  member  of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  atten 
tion  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  any  circumstances  whatever 
affecting  international  relations  which  threaten  to  disturb  the  internal 
peace  or  understanding  between  nations,  and  if  this  may  be  regarded 
as  outside  the  question,  let  it  go,  and  turn  to  another  significant  phrase 
contained  in  Mr.  Root's  suggested  amendment.  It  will  be  noted  that 


542  APPENDIX 

nowhere  in  his  suggested  modifications  of  the  Covenant  does  Mr.  Root 
suggest  any  alteration  whatsoever  of  Article  X,  as  it  stands.  On 
the  contrary,  in  Mr.  Root's  third  suggested  amendment  he  proposed 
to  put  the  United  States  definitely  on  record  as  acceding  "to  the 
wish  of  the  European  states  that  this  nation  shall  join  its  powers  to 
theirs  for  the  preservation  of  general  peace/" 

The  final  proposition  contained  in  Mr.  Root's  proposed  third 
amendment  is  broadly  cared  for  in  Article  XXI  of  the  Covenant 
relating  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  by  implication  in  paragraph  8  of 
Article  XV,  which  prohibits  any  recommendation  by  the  Council  as  to 
the  settlement  of  the  matters  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction 
of  any  member  of  the  League. 

It  may,  furthermore,  be  stated  that  the  President  cheerfully  agreed 
to  a  reservation  presented  by  Mr.  Hitchcock,  of  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  even  more  specifically  withholding  all  domestic 
questions  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  League. 

Mr.  Root's  fourth  suggested  amendment  proposed  to  permit  any 
member  of  the  League  to  terminate  its  obligations,  under  Article  X, 
by  giving  one  year's  notice  of  its  desire.  While  no  such  modification 
of  Article  X  was  made,  the  much  broader  right  was  given  to  any 
nation  to  renounce  all  of  its  obligations  to  the  League  and  to  ter 
minate  its  membership  of  the  League  upon  two  years'  notice  at  any 
time  after  joining. 

The  fifth  suggested  amendment  by  Mr.  Root,  proposing  a  modifi 
cation  of  Article  IX,  by  empowering  a  commission  to  inspect  and 
verify,  either  personally  or  by  authorized  agents,  all  armaments, 
equipment,  munitions,  and  industries  relating  to  the  manufacture  of 
war  material,  does  not  appear  to  have  been  adopted,  nor  can  any  one 
rationally  insist  that  it  was  essential  to  accept  this  suggestion.  Ar 
ticle  IX  provides  for  the  appointment  of  a  permanent  commission  to 
advise  the  Council  of  the  execution  of  those  provisions  of  the  Covenant 
relating  to  armament,  equipment,  munitions,  etc.,  in  the  military  and 
naval  branches  of  industry. 

A  sane  interpretation  of  this  article  would  imply  that  the  com 
mission  has  power  to  inspect  and  verify  facts,  because  in  no  other  way 
could  it  possibly  function. 

Mr.  Root's  sixth  proposed  amendment  makes  it  mandatory  upon 
the  Executive  Council  of  the  League  to  call  a  general  conference  of 


APPENDIX  543 

members  to  meet  not  less  than  five  years  or  more  than  ten  years  after 
the  signing  of  the  Covenant  for  purposes  of  revision,  etc.  This  modi 
fication  of  the  Covenant  was  not  made,  but  the  fact  that  it  was  omitted 
by  no  manner  of  means  precludes  the  exercise  of  that  particular  func 
tion  by  the  Council.  Without  Mr.  Root's  amendment  it  is  perfectly 
competent  for  the  Council  to  convene  such  a  meeting  of  the  members 
of  the  League  at  any  time.  It  might  do  this  in  less  time  than  five 
years,  or  it  might  postpone  the  doing  of  it  for  ten  years  or  a  longer 
period. 


APPENDIX  "C" 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

24  April,  1919. 
PRESIDENT  WILSON, 
Paris. 

As  we  see  it  from  this  distance,  the  selfish  designs  of  Japan  are  as  inde 
fensible  as  are  those  of  Italy.  The  two  situations  appear  to  parallel  each 
other  in  their  bearing  upon  the  fate  of  weak  and  helpless  nations.  Would 
it  not  be  an  opportune  time  to  cast  another  die,  this  one  in  the  direction  of 
Japan,  that  the  whole  world  may  know  once  and  for  all  where  America  stands 
upon  this,  the  greatest  issue  of  the  peace  we  are  trying  to  make?  Now  is  the 
time  to  use  your  heavy  artillery  and  emphasize  the  danger  of  secret  treaties 
and  selfish  designs  of  certain  big  nations. 

TUMULTY. 


Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington, 
11:48  A.M. 

April  25,  1919. 
Paris. 
TUMULTY, 

White  House, 
Washington. 

Am  very  grateful  for  your  message  of  approval  about  the  Japanese  business. 
It  has  warmed  my  heart  mightily.  The  difficulties  here  would  have  been 
incredible  to  me  before  I  got  here.  Your  support  kept  me  in  heart. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 

WASHINGTON 

26  April,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

It  appears  to  me  from  this  end  that  the  Japanese  demands  will  soon  pro 
duce  another  crisis.  If  such  a  crisis  arises,  I  hope  you  will  in  any  statement 
you  make  emphasize  again  America's  purpose  and  her  unwillingness  to  con 
sent  to  any  imperialistic  peace.  The  whole  country  will  be  with  you  in  this 

544 


APPENDIX  545 

matter  as  never  before.    I  think  that  your  Italian  statement  was  the  begin 
ning  of  a  real  peace  and  a  real  league  of  nations. 

TUMULTY. 


Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington, 

April  29,  1919. 
Paris. 
TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington. 

Situation  still  difficult.    President  putting  up  great  fight  against  odds. 
Japanese  claims  now  under  discussion. 

GRAYSON. 


Paris.  Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington. 

April  30, 1919. 
TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington. 

Japanese  situation  hanging  by  a  thread.    They  are  in  conference  now. 
These  are  terrible  days  for  the  President  physically  and  otherwise. 

GRAYSON. 


Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington, 
Paris.  May  1,  1919. 

TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington. 

The  solution  of  the  Kiauchau  question  is  regarded  here  both  generally 
and  by  special  friends  of  China,  like  Charles  R.  Crane,  as  remarkably  favour 
able  and  fortunate  considering  its  rotten  and  complicated  past  and  the  tangle 
of  secret  treaties  in  which  she  was  enmeshed  and  from  which  she  had  to  be 
extricated.  It  is  regarded  as  a  wonderful  victory  for  the  President.  The 
Japanese  themselves  admit  that  they  have  made  far  greater  concessions  than 
they  had  even  dreamed  would  be  required  of  them.  The  Chinese  agreed 
that  they  have  great  confidence  in  their  interests  being  safeguarded  in  every 
way  and  they  appreciate  that  the  League  of  Nations  eventually  will  look 
after  them. 

GRAYSON. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

1  May,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

I  have  not  made  use  of  the  Japanese  statement  but  am  keeping  my  ear  to 
the  ground  and  waiting.    My  feeling  is  that  an  attempt  to  explain  the  com- 


546  APPENDIX 

promise  when  no  demand  is  made,  would  weaken  our  position  instead  of 
strengthening  it.  I  will  therefore  do  nothing  about  the  Japanese  matter 
unless  you  insist.  It  would  help  if  I  could  unofficially  say:  First,  the  date 
of  your  probable  return  to  this  country;  Second,  whether  tour  country  to 
discuss  the  League  of  Nations  is  possible.  The  adoption  of  the  labour 
programme  as  part  of  the  peace  programme  is  most  important,  but  not 
enough  emphasis  is  being  placed  upon  it.  Could  you  not  make  a  statement  of 
some  kind  that  we  could  use  here,  showing  the  importance  of  this  programme 
as  helping  toward  the  stabilization  of  labour  conditions  throughout  the  world? 

TUMULTY. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

2  May,  1919. 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Paris. 

Sympathetic  editorial  New  York  World  reference  Japanese  settlement.  I 
have  not  given  out  statement  as  yet.  It  does  not  look  now  as  if  any  would 
be  necessary. 

TUMULTY. 


Received  at  The  White  House,  Washington, 

2  May,  1919. 
London. 
TUMULTY, 

White  House,  Washington. 

Am  perfectly  willing  to  have  you  use  your  discretion  about  the  use  you 
make  of  what  I  sent  you  about  the  Chinese-Japanese  settlement.  Sorry  I 
cannot  predict  the  date  of  my  return  though  I  think  it  will  be  by  June  first. 
Am  expecting  to  make  a  tour  of  the  country  but  even  that  is  impossible  to 
predict  with  certainty. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
WASHINGTON 

4  May,  1919. 
GRAYSON, 

Care  President  Wilson, 

Paris. 

Papers  here  very  critical  of  Japanese  settlement.     Chinese  statement  given 
great  publicity. 

TUMULTY. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Adamson  Eight  Hour  Law,  controversy  over,  197; 

passage  of,  201. 
Ancona,  sinking  of,  255. 
Armed  neutrality  proclaimed,  255. 
Armenia,  Wilson's  attitude  toward  United  States 

mandate,  376. 
Article  X,  the  attack  on,  431. 

Baader,  John,  nominates  Wilson  for  U.  S.  Senate, 
12. 

Baker,  Ray  Stannard,  on  Wilson  at  Peace  Confer 
ence,  343;  quoted  on  Wilson's  stand  on  Shan 
tung,  385. 

Baker,  Secretary,  at  St.  Louis  Convention,  188. 

Baltimore  Convention,  and  the  nomination,  117. 

Beck,  James  M.,  tolerance  of  Wilson  toward,  364. 

Bliss,  Gen.  Tasker,  member  of  Peace  Commission, 
358. 

Blockade,  British,  brings  diplomatic  difficulties, 
228. 

Borah,  Senator,  although  opposed  to  Treaty  was 
respected  by  Wilson,  455. 

Bowman,  Isaiah,  statement  as  to  Wilson's  attitude 
toward  Germany  at  Paris,  358. 

Bridges,  Robert,  aids  in  launching  Wilson  boom  for 
Presidency,  82. 

Brooks,  Sidney,  letter  to  Wilson  asking  for  talk  on 
Irish  question,  398. 

Bryan,  William  Jennings,  Tumulty  makes  speech 
for,  7;  the  "cocked  hat"  incident,  95;  nullifies 
effect  of  situation  by  showing  affection  for 
Wilson  at  Jackson  Day  dinner,  97;  the  Bryan- 
Parker  telegram,  107;  selected  as  Secretary  of 
State,  137;  consults  Wilson  as  to  preventing  land 
ing  of  Ypirango's  munitions,  151;  attitude  on 
Federal  Reserve  Act,  175,  177;  willing  to  resign, 
178;  objections  based  on  Democratic  National 
platforms,  179;  won  over  by  arguments  of  Glass, 
McAdoo,  and  Owen,  181. 

Bullitt,  Wm.  C.,  before  Committee  on  Foreign  Re 
lations,  440. 

Burleson,  Postmaster-General,  not  consulted  in 
appeal  for  Democratic  Congress,  326. 

Cabinet,  the  selection  of  the,  137. 

Campbell,  Henry  C.,  complains  of  "pussyfooting" 

on  hyphen  issue  at  St.  Louis  Convention,  189. 
Carnegie,  Andrew,  meeting  with,  5. 
Carranza,  Venustiano,  and  the  Villa  complications, 

153. 
Carson,  Sir  Edward,  Wilson's  comment  on  threats 

of,  397. 

Chamberlain,  Senator,  in  preparedness  campaign, 
238. 

Christmas  boxes,  sending  of,  to  A.  E,  F.  a  mistake, 
272. 


Clark,  Champ,  near  to  nomination  at  Baltimore, 
118. 

Clemenceau,  claims  Rhine  Valley  and  Saar  Basin 
for  France — calls  Wilson  pro-German,  359. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  imperturbable  on  election 
nights,  223. 

Coalition  cabinet,  demand  for,  263. 

Colby,  Everett,  in  revolt  in  Republican  party  in 
New  Jersey,  25. 

Columbus,  N.  M.,  Villa's  raid  on,  156. 

Constantinople,  Wilson's  attitude  toward  United 
States  mandate,  377. 

Cook,  Waldo  L.,  letter  to,  259. 

Council  of  National  Defence,  established,  246. 

Cox,  Governor,  not  opposed  by  Wilson  for  nomina 
tion,  498. 

Crandall,  John,  at  gubernatorial  convention,  22. 

Creel,  quoted  on  non-partisan  conduct  of  the  war, 
268;  excerpt  from  on  pers9nnel  of  Peace  Com 
mission,  338;  on  Wilson's  difficulties  in  Paris  due 
to  Republican  obstructionists  in  the  Senate,  344, 
350. 

Crimmins,  John  D.,  letter  to  Wilson  on  Irish  ques 
tion,  399. 

Currency  reform;  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  170. 

Daniels,  Josephus,  confers  with  Bryan  over  "cocked 
hat"  incident,  96;  in  consultation  when  Vera 
Cruz  was  ordered  captured,  151;  Wilson's  letter 
to,  on  preparation  for  war,  263. 

Davis,  Robert  Ward,  boss  of  Hudson  Co.,  10; 
favours  Wilson's  candidacy  for  Governor,  15;  at 
nominating  convention,  17;  visited  by  Wilson  in 
regard  to  Martine-Smith  affair,  56. 

Debs,  Eugene  V.,  pardon  not  favoured  by  Wilson, 
505. 

Dodd,  Dr.  William  E.,  on  Wilson's  neutrality  com 
plications,  228. 

Dodge,  Cleveland  H.,  aids  in  launching  Wilson's 
boom  for  Presidency,  82. 

Dolphin,  the,  and  the  Tampico  incident,  150. 

Drafting  of  troops,  machinery  for,  270. 

Election  of  1916,  Republican  "victory"  upset  by 
subsequent  returns,  216. 

Fagan,  Mark  M.,  in  revolt  in  Republican  party  in 

New  Jersey,  25. 
Federal  Reserve  Act,  the,  170;  Wilson's  fight  for, 

466,  489. 

Foch,  Marshal,  favours  the  Armistice,  320. 
Foreign  policy,  explained  by  Wilson  to  foreign 

correspondents,  271. 

Fuel  Order,  Garfield,  upheld  by  Wilson,  361. 
Garrison,  Lindley,  selected  as  Secretary  of  War, 

138;  converted  to  preparedness  campaign,  238; 

549 


550 


INDEX 


receives  opposition  to  plans  for  army  and  resigns, 
242,  244;  Wilson's  letter  to,  on  preparation  for 
war,  262. 

Gerard,  Ambassador,  reports  in  detail  the  situation 
in  Germany,  248. 

German  propaganda,  202. 

Germany,  possibility  of  war  with,  as  a  reason  for 
"watchful  waiting"  in  Mexico,  159;  possibility 
of  war  with,  realized  by  Wilson,  185;  announces 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  and  specifies 
routes  for  neutrals,  254;  U.  S.  severs  diplomatic 
relations,  255;  calls  for  armistice  on  basis  of  the 
Fourteen  Points,  807;  Wilson's  attitude  toward, 
at  Paris,  858. 

Glass,  Representative  Carter,  drafts  Federal  Re 
serve  Act,  171. 

Glynn,  Governor,  neutrality  speech  at  St.  Louis 
Convention,  185. 

Gore,  Senator,  supports  McLemore  Resolution,202. 

Grayson,  Doctor,  letter  on  Wilson's  illness  at  Paris, 
350;  advises  against  Wilson  making  Western 
trip,  434;  refuses  to  certify  to  Wilson's  disability, 
444. 

Great  Britain,  difficulties  with  over  blockade,  228. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  in  conference  with  Ambassador 
Page  on  British  blockade,  230. 

Harper's  Weekly  supports  Wilson  for  Presidency,  82. 

Harvey,  Colonel,  suggests  Wilson  for  Senate,  11; 
advocates  Wilson  for  Governor,  14;  in  charge  of 
forces  at  the  Convention,  16;  supports  Wilson 
for  Presidency,  82;  the  Harvey- Watterson  corres 
pondence  and  the  misunderstanding  with  Wilson, 
85;  offered  French  Ambassadorship,  92,  but 
attacks  Wilson  in  Times  article,  92;  Tumulty 
letter  to,  on  election  of  Wilson,  183. 

Haskins,  Charles  Homer,  statement  as  to  Wilson's 
attitude  toward  advice,  357. 

Hay,  Representative,  prepares  bill  converting 
national  guard  into  new  army,  242. 

Hearst,  William  Randolph,  Wilson's  attitude 
toward,  481. 

Hennessy,  James,  supports  Wilson  in  Martine- 
Smith  contest,  70. 

Hindenburg,  declares  Wilson  note  a  demand  for 
unconditional  surrender,  319. 

Hoover,  Herbert,  argument  for  the  Treaty,  433. 

House,  Col.  E.  M.,  cable  to  Wilson  on  McCombs, 
134;  at  conferences  for  selection  of  Cabinet,  137; 
confers  with  Wilson  on  German  note  requesting 
Armistice,  311;  consulted  as  to  appeal  for  Demo 
cratic  Congress,  325;  member  of  Peace  Com 
mission,  338;  letter  from  Wilson  referring  to  Root 
amendments  to  Covenant,  353. 

Hughes,  Senator  Wm.,  in  the  fight  at  Baltimore, 

Hughes,  Governor,  nominated  at  Chicago,  and 
thought  invincible,  191;  his  abrupt  letter  resign 
ing  justiceship  of  Supreme  Court,  193;  contrasted 
with  Wilson  during  campaign,  212. 

Hurley,  Edward  N.,  on  question  of  Armistice  before 
the  Conference  Board,  312. 

Huerta,  Victoriano,  seizes  reins  in  Mexico,  144; 
abdication  and  exile,  150. 

Busting,  Senator,  on  the  hyphen  issue,  190. 

"Hyphen"  issue  at  St.  Louis  Convention,  188; 
plank  inserted  in  platform,  191. 

Ireland,  the  demands  for  action  at  Versailles,  392. 
Jackson  Day  Dinner,  incidents  at  the,  94. 


James,  Ollie  M.,  desired  as  temporary  chairman  of 
Convention,  114;  tribute  to  Wilson  at  St.  Louis 
Convention,  185;advises  ignoring  of  Hughes'  curt 
resignation,  193. 

Japan,  the  Shantung  settlement,  380. 

Joffre,  Marshal,  surprised  at  Wilson's  grasp  of  mili 
tary  situation,  298. 

Johnson,  Douglas  Wilson,  statement  as  to  Wilson's 
attitude  toward  advice,  357;  and  his  knowledge 
of  the  problems  before  him,  858. 

Joline,  Adrian,  the  "cocked  hat"  letter  to,  95. 

Jones,  Dr.  E.  Lester,  appointment  of,  as  head  of 
Geodetic  Survey  criticized  by  Hughes,  215. 

Kitchin,  Representative  Claude,  convincing  argu 
ments  on  the  currency,  169. 

Lament,  Thomas  W.,  statement  as  to  Wilson's 
attitude  throughout  Peace  Conference,  355. 

Lansing,  Robert,  reply  to  the  Pope's  peace  over 
tures,  281;  member  of  Peace  Commission,  338; 
on  Wilson's  open-mindedness,  260;  explanation 
of  Bullitt  incident,  441;  suggests  that  Vice- 
President  be  called  to  act  in  Wilson's  stead,  443; 
resignation  requested  by  Wilson,  444. 

Latin-America,  policy  regarding,  145. 

Law-Bonar,  applauds  Wilson's  promptness  in  send 
ing  reinforcements,  300. 

Lawrence,  David,  optimistic  in  face  of  election 
returns,  221. 

Lewis,  Vivian  M.,  Republican  candidate  for  gov 
ernor  against  Wilson,  26. 

Lodge,  Senator  Henry  Cabot,  at  the  conference  with 
Wilson  respecting  the  Treaty,  423;  address  before 
League  to  Enforce  Peace,  427;  objections  against 
League  of  Nations,  429;  Reservations  to  Treaty 
opposed  by  Wilson,  452;  officially  notifies  Wilson 
of  adjournment  of  Senate,  509. 

Ludendorff,  shows  effects  of  Wilson's  efforts  to  end 
the  war,  277. 

Ludendorff,  asserts  Armistice  was  complete  surren 
der,  319. 

Lusitania,  sinking  of,  231. 

Maine,  result  of  state  election  gives  encouragement, 
212. 

Malone,  Dudley  Field,  in  conference  over  "cocked 
hat"  situation,  96. 

Manchester  Guardian,  on  Wilson's  neutrality  posi 
tion,  257. 

Martin,  Wm.  P.,  in  revolt  in  Republican  party  in 
New  Jersey,  25. 

Martine,  James  E.,  candidate  for  U.  S.  Senate,  46. 

Maximilian,  Prince,  note  asking  armistice,  807. 

Mayo,  Admiral,  and  the  Tampico  incident,  150; 
captures  Vera  Cruz,  153. 

McAdoo,  Wm.  G.,  of  great  aid  at  Baltimore,  122; 
helpful  support  during  the  campaign,  135;  se 
lected  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  137;  aids  in 
passage  of  Federal  Reserve  Act,  172;  Wilson's 
attitude  toward  his  candidacy,  494. 

McCombs,  William  F.,  manager  of  Wilson  cam 
paign,  82;  declines  French  Ambassadorship,  92; 
in  conference  over  "cocked  hat"  situation,  96; 
proposed  reply  to  Bryan-Parker  telegram,  110; 
disappointed  at  Wilson's  reply  to  Bryan,  113; 
ideas  of  patronage  not  acceptable  to  Wilson,  117; 
ready  to  give  up  at  Baltimore,  120;  not  of  Cabinet 
calibre,  128;  vacillation  in  considering  French 


INDEX 


551 


Ambassadorship,  129;  differences  with  McAdoo, 

135. 

McCormick,  Vance,  in  the  fight  at  Baltimore,  123. 
McLean,  Angus  W.,  in  the  fight  at  Baltimore,  123; 

anecdote  of  Wilson's  fighting  spirit,  299. 
McLemore,  Representative,  introduces  Resolution, 

202;  Resolution  defeated,  208. 
Mexico,  the  problem,  144;  policy  toward,  145;  the 

Zimmerman  note  to,  160. 
Miller,   David  Hunter,  on  Wilson's  devotion  to 

Monroe  Doctrine  at  Paris,  351. 
Mine  barrage,  Wilson's  idea  responsible  for,  300. 
Monroe  Doctrine  upheld  at  Paris  by  Wilson,  351. 

National  Defence  Act,  passed,  245. 

National  Security  League,  programme  for  universal 
military  service,  246. 

Neutrality,  Wilson's  policy  toward,  225. 

New  Jersey  political  conditions,  23. 

Nugent,  James,  aids  in  forcing  nomination  of  Wil 
son  for  governorship,  17. 

Officers'  training  camps,  and  their  graduates,  271. 
O'Gorman,    Senator,    attempts    reconciliation    of 

H&rvey    with   Wilson,   92;   in   conference   over 

"cocked    hat"  situation,   96;  opposes    passage 

of  Federal  Reserve  Act,  173. 
O'Leary,  Jeremiah.Wilson's  reply  to  offensive  letter 

of,  214. 

Page,  Walter  Hines,  aids  in  launching  Wilson  boom 
for  Presidency,  82;  efforts  to  modify  British 
blockade,  230. 

Palmer,  A.  Mitchell,  in  the  fight  at  Baltimore,  123; 
declines  post  of  Secretary  of  War,  138. 

Panama  Tolls,  repeal  of,  162. 

Parker,  Alton  B.,  Bryan's  opposition  to,  as  tempo 
rary  chairman  of  Convention,  108. 

Peace  Commission,  personnel  of,  338. 

Peary,  Admiral,  in  preparedness  campaign,  238. 

Pence,  Thomas,  in  conference  over  "cocked  hat" 
situation,  96. 

Pershing,  General,  responsible  for  General  Wood 
not  going  to  France,  289. 

Persia,  memorandum  of  conversation  with  Wilson 
on  sinking  of,  249. 

Plattsburg  Camp,  established  by  Gen.  Leonard 
Wood,  246. 

Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  quoted  on  question  whether 
Irish  problem  can  come  before  League  of  Na 
tions,  407. 

Pope,  the,  peace  overtures  of,  rejected,  280;  letter  to 
Wilson  asking  his  influence  against  trial  of  Kaiser 
and  German  high  command  and  the  reply,  482. 

Preparedness,  the  agitation  for,  238. 

Preparations  for  war,  Wilson's,  260. 

Prinkipos  Conference,  Wilson's  remarks  on,  374. 

Proctor  gift,  rejected  by  Princeton  University,  468. 

Prohibition,  Wilson's  connection  with  18th  Amend 
ment,  409. 

Pyne,  Moses  Taylor,  not  friendly  to  Wilson,  15. 

Railway  strike,  efforts  in  averting,  197. 

Record,  George  L.,  in  revolt  in  Republican  party 
in  New  Jersey,  25;  challenges  Wilson  to  debates, 


Reed,  Senator,  opposes  passage  of  Federal  Reserve 
Act,  173;  successful  appeal  to  Wilson  for  appoint 
ment  of  a  friend,  459. 

Republicans  appointed  to  aid  in  war  work,  268. 

Reservations  to  the  Treaty,  Wilson's  attitude 
toward,  452. 

Rhine  Valley,  French  claims  for,  359. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  Wilson's  discussion  of,  125; 
urges  neutrality  after  invasion  of  Belgium,  227; 
in  preparedness  campaign,  238;  antagonistic  to 
Wilson  on  preparedness,  £46;  extracts  from  diary 
on  conduct  of  Spanish-American  War,  256; 
Wilson's  attitude  toward  war  aims,  285;  state 
ment  that  Wilson  had  no  authority  at  Paris,  340; 
on  a  league  for  peace,  428. 

Root,  Senator  Elihu,  opposes  passage  of  Federal 
Reserve  Act,  173;  considered  for  Peace  Com 
mission,  338;  asked  by  Wilson  for  suggestions 
concerning  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Covenant,  352; 
all  material  amendments  adopted,  353. 

Ross,  Milan,  connection  with  Public  Service  in* 
terests,  24. 

Rumania,  Wilson's  attitude  toward,  860. 


Saar  Basin,  French  claims  for,  359. 

San    Francisco    Convention,     Wilson's    attitude 

toward  the  candidates,  493. 
Selective  Service  Act,  enactment  and  functioning 

of,  270. 

Sewall,  Senator,  Republican  leader  of  New  Jersey, 
24. 

Seymour,  Charles,  statement  on  Wilson's  attitude 
toward  Rumania,  360. 

Shahan,  Bishop,  Wilson's  reply  to,  on  Irish  ques 
tion,  400. 

Shantung,  the  agreement  with  Japan,  380. 
Silzer,    Judge,    opposes    Wilson's    candidacy    for 
Governor,  14. 

Sims,  Admiral,  Wilson's  cable  to,  on  forcing  the 
fighting,  295. 

Smith,  Senator  James,  seconds  nomination  of 
Wilson  in  governorship  convention,  17;  connec 
tion  with  Public  Service  interests,  24;  at  final 
meeting  of  gubernatorial  campaign,  43,  45; 
contest  against  Martine,  47;  asked  by  Wilson  to 
withdraw  but  declines,  58. 

Springfield  Republican,  "third  term"  editorial,  385. 

St.  Louis  Convention,  proceedings,  184. 

Stevens,  Edwin  E.,  Wilson's  opponent  for  senator- 
ship,  12. 

Stone,  Senator  William  J.,  supports  McLamore 
Resolution,  202;  confers  with  Wilson  on  Resolu 
tion,  204;  Wilson's  letter  to,  explaining  attitude 
toward  Resolution,  206;  intercedes  with  Wilson 
for  political  appointee,  458. 

Strike,  railway,  efforts  in  averting,  197. 

Sullivan,  Roger,  assures  Wilson  of  his  support,  98; 
turns  the  tide  at  Baltimore  Convention,  98; 
the  seeming  ingratitude  of  Wilson,  99;  and  the 
unpublished  letter,  102;  death  of,  greatly  affects 
Wilson,  104;  saves  the  day  for  Wilson  at  Balti 
more,  121. 

Sun,  Baltimore,  leading  advocate  of  Wilson's  can 
didacy,  114. 

Taft,  William  H.,  considered  for  Peace  Commission, 
338;  asked  by  Wilson  for  suggestions  concern 
ing  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Covenant,  352;  all  ma 
terial  amendments  adopted,  353;  urges  Wilson  to 


552 


INDEX 


discuss  universal  peace,  426;  defends  Article  X, 
432. 

Tampico  incident,  the,  150. 

Tardieu,  Andre,  comment  on  Wilson  refusal  of 
Germany's  proposal  for  Armistice,  317;  asserts 
Wilson  favoured  harsher  terms  than  Allies 
thought  wise,  319. 

Tillman,  Senator,  conversation  with  Wilson  on 
remaining  at  peace,  250. 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  effect  of  Wilson's  submarine 
notes  on,  279. 

"Too  proud  to  fight,"  explanation  of,  236. 

Treaty,  Wilson's  fight  for  the,  422. 

Tumulty,  Joseph  P.,  introduction  to  politics,  1; 
makes  speech  in  behalf  of  Bryan,  7;  opposes  con 
sidering  Wilson  for  senatorship,  11;  first  meeting 
with  Wilson,  27;  consulted  by  Wilson  in  Martine- 
Smith  controversy,  51;  asked  by  Wilson  to  handle 
the  Martine-Smith  fight  in  Hudson  County,  60; 
becomes  Secretary  to  the  Governor,  64;  discusses 
with  Wilson  possibility  of  Presidency,  80;  letter  to 
Wilson  on  Mexican  situation,  156;  letter  to  Col 
onel  Harvey  on  Democratic  victory,  183;  letter  to 
Wilson  on  hyphen  vote,  189;  memorandum  on 
weakness  of  Republican  party,  194;  letter  to 
Raymond  T.  Baker  on  Hughes'  chances,  195; 
letter  to  Wilson,  discountenancing  McLemore 
Resolution,  204;  letter  advising  changes  in  Wil 
son's  speech  of  acceptance,  208;  letters  to  Wilson 
on  National  Defense,  240;  letter  suggesting  inter 
cession  for  peace,  251;  note  on  coalition  cabinet, 
264;  letter  to  Wilson  on  the  Pope's  peace  pro 
posals,  280;  on  German  request  for  armistice,  313, 
315;  letter  advising  appeal  for  Democratic  Con 
gress,  323;  letter  regarding  Garfield  Fuel  Order, 
362;  letter  to  Wilson  regarding  third  term,  366; 
cables  to  Wilson  of  intense  interest  here  on  Irish 
question,  401;  cables  urging  veto  of  war-time 
prohibition  bill,  414;  cables  advising  raising  em 
bargo  on  beer,  415,  418,  419. 

Tumulty,  Philip,  in  Jersey  City  politics,  1. 

Venizelos,  Wilson's  admiration  for,  369. 

Vera  Cruz,  occupied  by  U.  S.  Marines,  151. 

Villa,  Pancho,  border  raids  of,  threaten  war,  153. 

Volstead  Act,  not  favoured  by  Wilson,  409;  vetoed, 
420. 

Walsh,  Senator  Thomas  J.,  Wilson's  letter  to  on 
Irish  question,  401. 

War,  able  conduct  of  the,  265. 

Washington  Post,  editorial  on  Wilson's  Liberty 
Loan  speech  in  New  York,  306. 

Watterson,  Henry,  conference  with  Wilson  and 
Harvey  and  story  of  the  disagreement,  83;  re 
turns  to  Wilson's  support,  89. 

Westcott,  Judge,  against  Wilson's  nomination  for 
governorship,  17;  speech  at  Baltimore  Conven 
tion,  124. 

White,  Chief  Justice,  administers  oath  of  office  at 
inauguration,  142. 

White,  Henry,  member  of  Peace  Commission,  338. 

Williams,  George  Fred,  appointed  Minister  to 
Greece  after  having  worked  against  Wilson,  480. 

Williams,  John  Sharp,  heartening  letter  to  Wilson 
after  party's  defeat,  502. 

Wilson,  Wopdrow,  proposed  for  U.  S.  senatorship, 
10;  candidacy  launched  for  governorship,  14, 
favoured  by  the  machine,  15,  but  opposed  by 
the  progressives,  17;  wins  nomination,  18;  speech 
of  acceptance  at  Convention,  20;  effects  of  the 


speech,  21;  opens  gubernatorial  campaign,  27; 
first  meeting  with  Tumulty,  27;  candidacy 
arouses  interest  of  national  press,  31;  knowledge 
of  crowd  psychology,  31;  speech  on  Progress, 
32;  on  need  of  corporate  reform  in  business,  33; 
compared  to  Lincoln,  34;  answers  Record's  chal 
lenge  and  repudiates  the  Old  Guard,  40;  final 
speech  of  the  campaign,  43;  attitude  toward 
Smith-Martine  controversy,  48;  challenge  to  the 
bosses,  59;  selects  Tumulty  as  Secretary,  64; 
difficulties  with  the  Legislature,  72;  obtains  enact 
ment  of  entire  legislative  programme,  and  be 
comes  a  national  figure  and  Presidential  possi 
bility,  77;  ieopardizes  future  by  vetoing  grade 
crossing  bill,  78;  talk  with  Tumulty  on  Presiden 
tial  situation,  80;  Presidential  boom  launched, 
82;  the  Harvey-Watterson  misunderstanding 
almost  disastrous,  85,  but  favourable  reaction 
sets  in,  88;  the  "cocked  hat"  incident,  94,  is 
nullified  at  Jackson  Day  Dinner,  97;  backed  by 
the  Old  Guard,  98;  seemingly  ungrateful  to 
Roger  Sullivan,  99;  the  Bryan- Parker  telegram, 
107,  and  the  reply,  111;  insists  that  no  conditions 
be  attached  to  nomination,  118;  talk  at  dinner  to 
newspaper  men,  125;  selection  of  his  Cabinet, 
137;  the  inauguration,  139,  not  a  day  of  triumph, 
but  of  dedication,  141;  his  inaugural  address,  141; 
policy  toward  Mexico,  145;  orders  taking  of  Vera 
Cruz,  152;  attitude  toward  raids  on  Mexican 
border,  154;  his  real  feelings  toward  Mexico,  157; 
excerpt  from  Flag  Day  address  on  German  effort 
to  incite  Mexico  to  war,  160;  speech  at  Brooklyn 
Navy  Yard  at  burial  of  Vera  Cruz  heroes,  161; 
repeal  of  Panama  Tolls,  162;  not  self-willed  or 
impervious  to  argument,  169;  Currency  Reform 
— the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  170;  renominated  at 
St.  Louis  Convention,  182;  letter  to  Justice 
Hughes  accepting  resignation,  193;  efforts  in 
averting  railway  strike,  197;  letter  to  Senator 
Stone  explaining  attitude  toward  McLenuwe 
Resolution,  206;  contrasted  with  Hughes  during 
campaign,  212;  reply  to  offensive  letter  by  Jere 
miah  O'Leary,  214;  confident  of  defeat  after 
1916  election  returns,  but  not  disheartened,  218; 
policy  toward  neutrality,  225;  Helena,  Mont., 
speech  on  breakdown  of  neutrality,  235;  explana 
tion  of  "Too  proud  to  fight,"  236;  preparedness 
and  national  defense,  238;  letter  to  Secretary 
Garrison  on  plans  for  new  army,  243;  leads  pre 
paredness  parades,  247;  reply  to  Tumulty  note 
suggesting  peace  proposals,  252;  announces  sev 
erance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  and 
addresses  Congress  which  declares  war,  255; 
statement  on  preparations  for  war,  260;  letters  to 
Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy,  262;  non-partisan 
conduct  of  war,  267;  address  to  foreign  correspon 
dents  on  "our  resolutions"  and  "actions  in  the 
war,"  271;  instructs  Pershing  on  use  of  troops 
with  French  and  English,  271;  efforts  to  end  the 
war  through  the  people,  276;  answer  to  German 
request  for  armistice,  278;  attitude  toward  mili 
tary  use  of  Roosevelt  and  Wood,  285;  cable  to 
Admiral  Sims  on  forcing  the  fighting,  295;  ad 
dress  to  officers  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  on  crushing 
the  hornets  in  their  nest,  296;  exploits  idea  of 
mine  barrage,  300;  New  York  speech  on  opening 
of  Liberty  Loan  campaign,  301;  receives  German 
note  asking  for  armistice,  308;  refuses  to  accept 
the  proposal,  317;  appeals  for  Democratic  Con 
gress  to  assure  undivided  leadership,  322;  address 
to  Democratic  National  Committee  on  defeat  «f 
party,  332;  the  trip  to  Paris,  535;  prestige  weak- 
ene<f  before  sailing,  340;  health  failing  under 
strain,  343,  349;  refutation  of  statement  that  he 
was  playing  a  lone  hand,  354;  experts  freely  con 
sulted,  357;  called  pro-German  by  Clemenceau, 
359;  attitude  toward  third  term,  365;  League 


INDEX 


553 


speech  before  Democratic  National  Committee, 
367;  on  Bolshevism,  368;  on  the  Prinkipos  Con 
ference,  374;  attitude  toward  U.  S.  mandates 
over  Armenia  and  Constantinople,  376;  attitude 
on  Shantung  question,  380;  letter  giving  facts  of 
Shantung  settlement  at  Versailles,  390;  attitude 
on  Irish  question,  392;  comments  on  threats  of 
Sir  Edward  Carson,  397;  cables  to  Tumulty  on 
Irish  complications,  402;  attitude  toward  passage 
of  18th  amendment,  409;  stand  taken  on  prohibi 
tion  while  governor,  411;  letter  to  Senator  Morris 
Sheppard  opposing  war-time  prohibition,  412; 
message  to  Congress  asking  removal  of  ban  on 
wines  and  beers,  417;  cables  Tumulty  would  raise 
ban  on  liquor  when  troops  were  demobilized,  419; 
vetoes  Volstead  Act,  420;  proposes  "wet"  plank 
in  Democratic  platform,  421;  the  fight  for  the 
treaty — trying  to  convince  Republican  senators, 
422;  delivers  address  before  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  425;  makes  Western  trip,  although  a  sick 
man,  434;  comment  on  Lansing-Bullitt  incident, 
442;  asks  for  Lansing's  resignation,  444;  not  in 


capacitated  for  his  duties  during  his  illness,  445; 
breakdown  on  Western  trip,  446;  his  Pueblo 
speech,  449;  attitude  on  Treaty  reservations,  452; 
ilness  at  Washington,  454;  as  a  human  being,  457; 
letter  to  Joseph  E.  Davies  on  political  appoint 
ments,  461;  fight  for  Federal  Reserve  Act,  466; 
controversy  over  Proctor  gift  to  Princeton,  468; 
reply  to  letter  of  gratitude  from  Pope  Benedict, 
483;  his  lines  on  Lincoln  a  self-revelation,  486; 
disappointment  at  Cox's  defeat,  501;  at  Hard- 
ing's  inauguration,  506. 

Wood,  Gen.  Leonard,  in  preparedness  campaign, 
238;  establishes  Plattsburg  Camp,  246;  why  he 
was  not  sent  to  France,  289. 

World,  the  New  York,  endorses  Wilson's  candidacy, 
106. 

Ypirango,  the,  German  ship  carrying  munitions  to 
Mexico,  150. 

Zimmerman  note,  the,  to  Mexico,  160. 


THE  COUNTRY   LIFE  PRESS 
GARDEN  CITY,    N.   Y. 


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